Introduction to Cognitive Science
Spring 2011
Course Summary
Last Update: 2 May 2011
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7±2 Key Dates in Cognitive Science
Course Goals:
To give you an idea of:
the nature of cognitive science
its history
its methodologies
its vocabulary
some of its principal topics, results, & open issues
To give you an idea of some of the cognitive-science research at UB
What is cognitive science?
≈def the interdisciplinary study of cognition, i.e., of:
believing
(& knowing?)
consciousness
emotion
language understanding
& generation
learning
perception
planning
problem solving
reasoning
remembering
representation
(including categories, concepts, mental imagery)
sensation
thinking
etc.
computational cognitive science =
cognition is computable (weaker)
cognition is computation (stronger)
a working hypothesis:
how much of cognition is computable?
"computable" =
classical symbolic computation
connectionist computation
methodology:
"mind as machine"
express theories of cognition as computer programs
can test theory by running the program
philosophical problem:
Do computers running such programs
actually exhibit cognition?
If not, why not?
contrast with behaviorism:
algorithms show
how
to get
from stimulus/input to response/output
interdisciplinary:
share methodologies & results across disciplines
What is the mind?
philosophy ≈def
personal search for truth in any field,
by rational (i.e., logical &/or scientific) means.
Mind-body problem: What is the relation between mind and brain?
dualisms (e.g., Descartes's interactionism)
monisms
(e.g., Berkeley's idealism;
materialism/physicalism & the identity theory)
functionalism:
psychological type of a brain state/process
is a function of its causal role
in the individual's cognitive life
Problems:
qualia (including inverted & absent)
implementation (cognitive architecture)
may be important
Problem of other minds: How do I know that you have a mind?
Theory of Mind, Folk Psychology, & Modularity
Theory theory:
BDI folk psychology is a
theory
we use
to explain & predict others' and our own behavior
Simulation theory:
We explain & predict others' behavior
by
simulating
the others' mind
Fodor's theory of mental modules
Pylyshyn's theory of cognitive impenetrability
Cognitive neuroscience
anatomy (structure) & physiology (processing) of brain
McCulloch & Pitts's logical ANNs
is the brain a computer?
AI & computation
AI: "computational cognition"
Minsky: make computers do cognitive tasks
Boden: use computers to understand (human) cognition
AI as:
advanced CSE
computational psychology:
programs as theories/models
of (human) cognition
computational philosophy:
how is cognition possible?
how much of cognition is computable?
What is computation?
algorithms
Turing machines
Church-Turing thesis:
Any algorithm can be expressed as a TM
GOFAI (classical symbolic AI): logic-based
Newell & Simon's PSSH:
a physical system can exhibit cognition
iff
it is a physical
symbol
system
(= physical implementation of a TM)
production systems:
Logic Theorist
GPS
Fodor's CTM & RTM:
cognitive states/processes are
computations over cognitive representations
cognitive representations are a language of thought (LOT),
with a syntax (& maybe a semantics)
Dennett's Intentional Stance:
best to treat complex systems
as if
they were intentional (i.e., cognitive)
SNePS
Reasoning
logic =
normative
study of reasoning correctly
(i.e., truth-preserving)
cognitive science: how people
actually
reason
not always correctly!
Wason card-selection task
Tversky & Kahneman on probabilistic reasoning
Johnson-Laird's theory of Mental Models
Rips's theory of Mental Rules
Simon: bounded rationality
AI:
computational theories of non-monotonic, default, defeasible reasoning
Why
do we reason?
Mercier, Hugo; & Sperber, Dan (2011),
"Why Do Humans Reason?
Arguments for an Argumentative Theory"
,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
34(2) (April): 57–111,
doi:10.1017/S0140525X10000968.
Connectionism (ANNs):
statistics-based
Rosenblatt's Perceptron
Minsky & Papert's objections
Rumelhart & McClelland's PDP
representation as activation patterns of artificial neurons
Fodor & Pylyshyn's objections:
not productive
not systematic
not compositional
hybrid systems
unconscious inference/tacit knowledge
Another alternative:
Dynamical Systems theory: differential-equation-based
Linguistics:
Chomsky:
deep vs. surface structure
transformational grammar:
phrase-structure grammar
(rewrite rules)
& transformational rules
universal grammar (innate LAD)
competence vs. performance
Lakoff & Johnson:
conceptual systems are metaphorical
based on human body.
Guest Lecture: Jürgen Bohnemeyer
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis:
cognition is a function of the language we speak
Concepts and Categories
classical view:
categories as sets defined by necessary & sufficient conditions
Wittgenstein:
categories only have family resemblances
Rosch:
basic-level categories
prototypes vs. exemplars
Guest Lecture: David Mark
cognitive geography
categories & concepts of natural landforms
vary with speaker's language
Vision
Marr: perception requires processing:
primal image, 2.5D image, 3D image
3 levels of psychological explanation:
"computational" (functional): what (I/O)
"algorithmic" (computational): how (algorithms)
"implementation": multiple physical realizations
Gibson: direct perception of "affordances"
philosophy:
direct vs. indirect realism (Smith vs. Rapaport)
arguments from:
illusion,
time lag,
double vision,
neuroscience of vision (Udin)
Guest Lecture: Barry Smith
Guest Lecture: Susan Udin
Mental Imagery
Pylyshyn: mental images are propositional
Kosslyn: mental images are pictorial
Maybe they're neither, just neuron firings
Consciousness
How does consciousness arise from neuron firings?
2 kinds of consciousness:
psychological/access ("easy" problem)
phenomenal ("hard" problem)
identity theory: conscious states
are
brain states
Nagel: only a bat can know "what it's like to be a bat"
McGinn: understanding consciousness is beyond our cognitive abilities
Rosenthal: consciousness is meta-thought
Dennett: multiple drafts theory
Chalmers: physicalism is false
are there neural correlates of consciousness?
Global Workspace theory
Situated/embodied/embedded/extended/external cognition
importance of context/the world
Putnam: Twin Earth: cognition is not (merely) in the head
Fodor: Methodological Solipsism: yes it is!
Hutchins/Clark: there are extended cognitive systems; so, no it isn't!
[Simon: yes it is]
[B.C. Smith: no it isn't]
Interdisciplinary cognitive science projects (at UB):
Deixis & Narrative
CVA
others
Turing Test & Chinese-Room Argument
Turing Test:
Computers will be said to be able to think
to the extent that we cannot distinguish
their linguistic/cognitive ability from a human's
Chinese-Room Argument (Searle):
It's possible to pass a TT without really thinking
Pat Hayes has allegedly defined cognitive science as
"the ongoing research program
of showing Searle's CRA to be false"!
(Harnad, cited in Boden 2006:1384)
ultimately, might be a
moral
choice!
Text copyright © 2011 by
William J. Rapaport
(
rapaport@buffalo.edu
)
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