Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence

Entire courses have been devoted to this topic.

• At UB, Prof. Randall R. Dipert (Philosophy) has taught PHI 398: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (scroll down to "Fall 2002").

This page only lists a few items that are relevant to our course.

Websites

1. AAAI's AI Topics website on Philosophy
   • A great site, with many links.

2. Some Standard Sources of Information on AI

3. Definitions of AI:
   • Two Contrasting Definitions of AI
   • Some Definitions of "Artificial Intelligence"

4. Rapaport's freshman-level lecture notes on AI

5. Information on the Turing Test

On the Mind-Body (or Mind-Brain) Problem

1. Mind-Body Theories (cartoon)
   from: Taylor, Richard (1974), Metaphysics, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall): 19.

2. Bechtel, William (1988), Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
   • LOCKWOOD Book Collection B105.M55 B43 1988

3. Colburn, Timothy R. (2000), Philosophy and Computer Science (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe):
   • Ch. 3 ("AI and the History of Philosophy"), pp. 19-40.
   • Ch. 4 ("AI and the Rise of Contemporary Science and Philosophy"), pp. 41-50.

4. On Functionalism
   1. Block, Ned (1996), "[What Is] Functionalism[?]", Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement

   2. Fodor, Jerry A. (1981, January), "The Mind-Body Problem", Scientific American 244(1): 114-123.

   3. Thagard, Paul (1986), "Parallel Computation and the Mind-Body Problem", Cognitive Science 10: 301-318.
      • An argument for the importance of the implementing medium in functionalistic theories of mind.

   4. Hilary Putnam's invention and subsequent refutation of functionalism:
      Putnam, Hilary (1960), "Minds and Machines" [PDF], in Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind: A Symposium (New York: New York University Press): 148-179.
      • Putnam's first article on functionalism.
      • Putnam, Hilary (1988), Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
        • An argument against functionalism, by the philosopher who first proposed it.

   5. Piccinini, Gualtiero (2003), "The Mind as Neural Software: Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism", paper read at the APA Pacific Division (March 2004).

5. On Emergent Properties
   • O'Connor, Timothy; & Wong, Hong Yu (2002), "Emergent Properties", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition).

1. Shannon, Claude E. (1950), "Programming a Computer for Playing Chess", Philosophical Magazine Ser.7, Vol.41, No.314 (March).

2. Turing, Alan M. (1950), "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", Mind 59: 433-460.
   • HTML version
   • For more information on the Turing Test, see the link above titled "Information on the Turing Test".

3. Fletcher, Joseph (1972), "Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man", Hastings Center Report 2(5): 1-4.
   • HTML version
   • On "neo-cortical function" (discussed in the above article), see:
     Cardoso, Silvia Helena (1997), "Specialized Functions of the Cerebral Cortex"

4. Newell, Allen, & Simon, Herbert A. (1976), "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search", Communications of the ACM 19(3) (March): 113-126.

5. link:
   Searle, John R. (1980), "Minds, Brains, and Programs", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417 457.

6. The secondary literature, both by Searle and by others, on the CRA is immense. The best brief overview is:

   Hauser, Larry (2001), "The Chinese Room Argument", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

7. Rapaport's webpage on how to pass a Turing test and escape from the Chinese room

8. Shapiro, Stuart C. (1995), "Computationalism" [postscript], Minds and Machines 5(4) (November): 517-524.

9. Rapaport, William J. (1998), "How Minds Can Be Computational Systems", Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10: 403-419.
   Abstract: The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, viz., that Turing-Test-passing artifacts are persons; it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.

10. McDermott, Drew (2001), Mind and Mechanism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
    • Toyama, Kentaro (1996/2001), "An Interview with Drew McDermott", ACM Crossroads 3-1.

11. Smith, Brian Cantwell (2002), "The Foundations of Computing", in Scheutz, Matthias (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 23-58.
    • For a critique of this article, see:
      DeJohn, Jerry; & Dietrich, Eric (2003), "Editorial: Subvert the Dominant Paradigm! A Review of Computationalism: New Directions, edited by Matthias Scheutz", Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15(4) (October-December): 375-382, esp. §3.1, pp. 378-379.

12. Schulman, Ari N. (2009), "Why Minds Are Not Like Computers", The New Atlantis (Winter): 46-68.

13. Figdor, Carrie (2010), "Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions", Philosophy of Science 77 (July): 419–456.

(From KurzweilAI.net)