Conceptual-Role Semantics

1. Sellars, Wilfrid (1955/1963), "Some Reflections on Language Games," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963): 321-358.

2. Harman, Gilbert (1974), "Meaning and Semantics," in Milton K. Munitz & Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press): 1-16.

3. Harman, Gilbert (1975), "Language, Thought, and Communication," in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science; Vol. 7: Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press): 270-298.

4. Harman, Gilbert (1982), "Conceptual Role Semantics," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23: 242-256.

5. Harman, Gilbert (1987), "(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics," in Ernest Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics (London: Academic Press): 55-81.

6. Harman, Gilbert (1988), "Wide Functionalism," in Stephen Schiffer & Ssusan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 11-18.

7. Loar, Brian (1982), "Conceptual Role and Truth-Conditions," {/it Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23: 272-283.

8. Loewer, Barry (1982), "The Role of 'Conceptual Role Semantics'," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23: 305-315.

9. Fodor, Jerry, & Lepore, Ernest (1991), "Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role," Mind and Language 6: 328-343.

10. Rapaport, William J. (2002), "Holism, Conceptual-Role Semantics, and Syntactic Semantics", Minds and Machines 12(1): 3-59. [PDF]

    Abstract: This essay continues my investigation of "syntactic semantics": the theory that, pace Searle's Chinese-Room Argument, syntax does suffice for semantics (in particular, for the semantics needed for a computational cognitive theory of natural-language understanding). Here, I argue that syntactic semantics (which is internal and first-person) is what has been called a conceptual-role semantics: The meaning of any expression is the role that it plays in the complete system of expressions. Such a "narrow", conceptual-role semantics is the appropriate sort of semantics to account (from an "internal", or first-person perspective) for how a cognitive agent understands language. Some have argued for the primacy of external, or "wide", semantics, while others have argued for a two-factor analysis. But, although two factors can be specified—one internal and first-person, the other only specifiable in an external, third-person way—only the internal, first-person one is needed for understanding how someone understands. A truth-conditional semantics can still be provided, but only from a third-person perspective.

11. Rapaport, William J. (2003), "What Did You Mean by That? Misunderstanding, Negotiation, and Syntactic Semantics", Minds and Machines 13(3): 397-427. [PDF]
    Abstract: Syntactic semantics is a holistic, conceptual-role-semantic theory of how computers can think. But Fodor & Lepore have mounted a sustained attack on holistic semantic theories. However, their major problem with holism (that, if holism is true, then no two people can understand each other) can be fixed by means of negotiating meanings. Syntactic semantics and Fodor & Lepore's objections to holism are outlined; the nature of communication, miscommunication, and negotiation is discussed; Bruner's ideas about the negotiation of meaning are explored; and some observations on a problem for knowledge representation in AI raised by Winston are presented.