Philosophy of Computer Science: Online Resources

Further Readings for Chapter 14:

Computer Programs as Scientific Theories

Note 1: Many of these items are online; links are given where they are known. Other items may also be online; an internet search should help you find them.

Note 2: In general, works are listed in chronological order. (This makes it easier to follow the historical development of ideas.)

§14.2: Simulations:

• On simulated hurricanes, see:

  • Dennett, D.C. (1978). Why you can't make a computer feel pain. Synthese, 38(3):415–456.
    • Reprinted in Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978): 190–229.

  • Hofstadter, D.R. (1981). Metamagical themas: A coffeehouse conversation on the Turing test to determine if a machine can think. Scientific American, pages 15–36.
    • Reprinted as "The Turing Test: A Coffeehouse Conversation", in Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (New York: Basic Books, 1981): 69–95.

  • Rapaport, W.J. (1986a). Searle's experiments with thought. Philosophy of Science, 53:271–279, esp.&ndsp;p. 274.

  • Shapiro and Rapaport 1991, §10.7, p. 252.

  • Rapaport, W.J. (2005). Implementation is semantic interpretation: Further thoughts. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 17(4):385–417, esp. §3

  • Edelman, S. (2011). Regarding reality: Some consequences of two incapacities. Frontiers in Psychology, 2(44):1–8, esp. p. 3, footnote 3.

  • Piccinini and Anderson 2020

  And consider this: "Copies retain semantic values of their originals in virtue of similarity … . When this notion of correspondence is spelled out more precisely, it turns out that it underlies a number of uses of the term `information' … ." (Miłkowski 2023, p. 489)

• On simulated digestion, see:

  • Johnson, G. (1990, July/August). New mind, no clothes. The Sciences

  • Searle, J.R. (1990). Is the brain a digital computer? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 64(3):21–37, esp. p. 35.

  • Eisenberg, A. (2002, 31 October). The virtual stomach (no, it’s not a diet aid). New York Times, page G4.

• Computer simulations and computer models are discussed in:
  • Humphreys, P. (1990). Computer simulations. PSA: Proceedings of the [1990] Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2:497–506.

  • Humphreys, P. (2002). Computational models. Philosophy of Science, 69:S1–S11.

• In the context of ethical computing,
  • Neumann, P.G. (1993). Modeling and simulation. Communications of the ACM, 36(6):124,

  contains useful, real-life examples of ways in which simulations (and theories) can fail to be precise models of reality, and it discusses "the illusion that the virtual is real" (quoting Rebecca Mercuri).

• Green, C.D. (2001). Scientific models, connectionist networks, and cognitive science. Theory and Psychology, 11:97 117.
  • Analyzes the use of connectionist (or neural-network) computer programs as models of cognition, and argues that
    "Just because two things share some properties in common does not mean that one models the other. Indeed, if it did, it would mean that everything models everything else. There must be at least a plausible claim of some similarity in the ways in which such properties are realized in the model and the thing being modeled." (§IV, final paragraph)

• For arguments that there are limitations to simulations, see:
  • Peschl, M.F. and Scheutz, M. (2001). Some thoughts on computation and simulation in cognitive science. In Proceedings of the 6th Congress of the Austrian Philosophical Society, pages 534–540.

  • Peschl, M.F. and Scheutz, M. (2001). Explicating the epistemological role of simulation in the development of theories of cognition. In Proceedings of the 7th Colloquium on Cognitive Science (ICCS-01), pages 274–280.

  • Simonite, T. (2009, 29 August). Soap bubbles to take the drag out of future cars. New Scientist

• See also:
  • Frigg, R., Hartman, S., and Imbert, C. (2009). Special issue on models and simulations. Synthese, 169(3):425–626.

§14.2.2: Simulation vs. Imitation:

• On digestion as computation, Polger & Shapiro 2023 say:
  "After all, even digestion is 'like' computing in some sense: it can be described as a function that take as input undigested-food and produces as output digested-food. Surely, however, this is a poor reason for regarding stomachs as computers." (p. 327)

  It may be a function; the question is whether it is a computable function.

• Tymoczko, T. (1979). The four-color problem and its philosophical significance. Journal of Philosophy, 76(2):57–83.
  • Discusses whether a computer program can be (part of) a proof of a mathematical theorem.

  • For a survey of critiques of Tymoczko's arguments, see:
    • Scherlis, W.L. and Scott, D.S. (1983). First steps towards inferential programming. In Mason, R., editor, Information Processing 83, pages 199–212. JFIP and Elsevier North-Holland, §3

• For a different view of programs as theories, see: Chaitin 2009, esp. pp. 8–9.

• Turner, R. (2010). Programming languages as mathematical theories. In Vallverdú, J., editor, Thinking Machines and the Philosophy of Computer Science: Concepts and Principles, pages 66–82. IGI Global
  • Argues that programming languages are mathematical theories.

§14.3.3: Simon's Argument from Prediction

Downes, S. (1990). Herbert Simon's computational models of scientific discovery. PSA: Proceedings of the [1990] Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1:97–108.

• A critique of Simon's views on the philosophy of science in general, and of programs as theories in particular.