

Information Theoretic Model for Inference Resistant Knowledge Management in RBAC Based Collaborative Environment



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Overview

- Model to reveal inference vulnerabilities
- Need for the model
- Description of the model
- Results
- Benefits



Introduction

- Information – key organizational resource
 - Dissemination and Sharing
- Current Access Control Methods
 - Segregation techniques
 - Direct Access Control
- Are these sufficient?



Need for the model

- Indirect Access Mechanisms
 - Individual knowledge
 - On the role knowledge acquisition
 - Informal communication channels
- Framework for identifying and analyzing
 - Data (information)
 - Roles
 - Roles' direct access to data
 - Association among roles prone to inference



Prior work

- Database design
 - Uncover secondary paths leading to inferences
 - Functional dependencies
 - Conceptual structures
 - Semantic data modeling



Why Information Theory?

- Mathematical theory to quantify the concept of information
- Measure for the Entropy and Information
- Mutual information
 - Amount of information obtained by observing another information
- Channel
 - Interaction between employees with different roles
 - Continuous transfer over a variable length of time



Model Description

- Data Units

- $ORG = \{D_1, D_2, \dots, D_N\}$; where N is total number of data units in the organization.
- Each data unit D_i will have some information content I_i
- Each data unit may or may not be linked with other data units.
- The information revealed is additive if the data units are statistically independent.



Model Description

- Data Units (contd)
 - The mutual information of a data unit $I(i;j)$ is the difference in the uncertainty of D_i and the remaining uncertainty of D_i after observing D_j .
- Data Inputs
 - For each data unit D_i , all data units in set ORG which are not statistically independent
 - For each data unit D_i , all proper subsets of ORG which are not statistically independent




Model Description

- Roles

- Set of Roles in the organization, $R = \{ R_1, R_2, \dots, R_M \}$; where M is total number of roles in the organization
- Relationship between Data units and Roles
- Relationship between Roles
- Degree of Proximity of Roles


Roles and Data Units



- Relation between roles
 - $RLINK1 [R_1] = \{ R_2, R_3, R_4, R_5 \}$
 - $RLINK2 [R_1] = \{ R_6, R_7 \}$
- Role-Data unit direct access
 - $RSET [D_1] \sqcap \{ R_1, R_2, R_3 \}$
 - $RSET [D_2] \sqcap \{ R_1, R_4, R_5 \}$
 - $RSET [D_3] \sqcap \{ R_5, R_6, R_7 \}$
- Role-Data unit Indirect Access
 - $R_4 \longrightarrow D_3$ (path P_2)
 - $R_1 \longrightarrow D_3$ (path P_1)

Strength of inference depends upon mutual information.

Proposed ER Model






Inference Extraction

- Select a role (r) from MASTER_ROLE
- Select all the data units (d_j) linked to the above role from RSET_DSET
- Select all the roles linked to the above role from RLINK
- Select the data units (d_k) accessed by the linked roles and the mutual information of these data units ($d_k; d_j$) from data units accessed by the role (r)
- The results are stored in INFER_TABLE


Results

- Role centric views

Roles and Role associations that can be exploited for inference attacks.



Scenario 1




Scenario 2

Results

- Data centric views

List of data units most vulnerable to design with the given role structure.





Benefits

- Identifying possible inference attacks
- Assignment of individuals to the roles
- Greater assurance against insider attacks



Questions

- Thank You