

# CSE 736

Online



Learning



# RECAP

## Criticism of NE

(i) If multiple NEs, which one will occur?

GAMES: (i) n players (ii) Strategy sets:  $A_1, \dots, A_n$   
(iii) Utility functions:  $\forall i, u_i: \prod_{j=1}^n A_j \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

MIXED STRATEGIES:  $\Delta(A_i)$ : set of all prob. dist. over  $A_i$

$$u_i(p_1, \dots, p_n) = \sum_{\substack{(a_1, \dots, a_n) \\ \in \prod_j A_j}} u_i(a_1, \dots, a_n) \cdot p_1(a_1) \cdot p_2(a_2) \cdot \dots \cdot p_n(a_n)$$

pure strategy  $\nearrow$

NE:  $(p_1, \dots, p_n) \in \prod_j \Delta(A_j)$  is a NE if  $\forall i$  &  $\forall p'_i \in \Delta(A_i)$

$$u_i(p'_i, p_{-i}) \leq u_i(p_i, p_{-i})$$

(ii) May not even be able to state the stable pay off.

(iii) Sort of circular definition

## 2 player 0-sum game

(i)  $n=2$  (ii)  $A_1, A_2$  (iii)  $u_2(a_1, a_2) = -u_1(a_1, a_2)$   
 $\forall (a_1, a_2) \in A_1 \times A_2$

Given  $q \in \Delta(A_2)$ , player 1 would like to

$$\arg \max_{p \in \Delta(A_1)} u_1(p, q)$$

Given  $p \in \Delta(A_1)$ , player 2 would like to

$$\arg \min_{q \in \Delta(A_2)} u_1(p, q)$$

# von Neumann's Minimax THM:

∀ 2 player 0-sum games with  $u_1: A_1 \times A_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ,  
 $\exists$  an  $v \in \mathbb{R}$  (value of the game) s.t.

$$(i) \quad v = \max_{p \in \Delta(A_1)} \min_{q \in \Delta(A_2)} u_1(p, q) = \min_q \max_p u_1(p, q)$$

(ii)  $\exists$  a mixed NE.  $\forall$  NE  $(p, q) \in \Delta(A_1) \times \Delta(A_2)$  iff

$$(1) \quad p \in \arg \max_{p'} \min_{q'} u_1(p', q')$$

$$(2) \quad q \in \arg \min_{\hat{q}} \max_{\hat{p}} u_1(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$$

(iii)  $\forall$  NE  $(p, q)$ ,  $v = u_1(p, q)$

Main Lemma: (...)  $\max_{P'} \min_{q'} u_1(p', q') = L$

$$\geq \min_{\hat{q}} \max_{\hat{p}} u_1(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$$

$= R$

Pf of (i) of THM:

$(\geq)$ : Main Lemma

$(\leq)$ : for any  $(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$   $u_1(\hat{p}, \hat{q}) \leq \max_{P'} u_1(p', \hat{q})$

$q^* \in \arg \min_{q'} \max_{P'} u_1(p', q')$

$$\min_{q'} u_1(\hat{p}, q') \leq u_1(\hat{p}, q^*) \leq \max_{P'} u_1(p', q^*) = R$$

$\uparrow$  As true  $\forall \hat{p}$ ,

$$L \leq R$$

Pf of (ii) & (iii)

$$B_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \max_{p'} \min_{q'} u_1(p', q')$$

$$B_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{q'} \max_{p'} u_1(p', q')$$

Claim:  $B_1, B_2 \neq \emptyset$

$B_1 \neq \emptyset \iff$  for every fixed  $q$ ,  $\exists$  a  $p$  that  $\max_{p'} u_1(p', q)$

$\sim B_2 \neq \emptyset$

(Formal: compactness of  $\Delta(A_1), \Delta(A_2)$ ,  
 $A_1$  &  $A_2$  are finite  
&  $u_1$  is continuous.)

pure strategy

$(p, q) \in B_1 \times B_2 \xrightarrow{\textcircled{1}} (p, q)$  is NE ✓

$\textcircled{2} v = u_1(p, q)$

$\textcircled{1}$  player 1 plays  $p' \neq p$

$u_1(p', q) \leq u_1(p, q)$  (as  $p \in B_1$ )

$\sim$  player 2  $\forall q' \neq q, u_1(p, q') \geq u_1(p, q)$

$\textcircled{2} v = \max_{p'} \min_{q'} u_1(p', q') = \min_{q'} u_1(p, q')$

$\leq u_1(p, q) \leq \max_{\hat{p}} u_1(\hat{p}, q) = \min_{\substack{q \\ q \in B_2}} \max_{\hat{p}} u_1(\hat{p}, q) = v$   
as  $p \in B_1$   
(i)

$$(p, q) \text{ NE} \Rightarrow (p, q) \in B_1 \times B_2$$

$$\& u_1(p, q) = v \Rightarrow q \in B_2$$

$$u_1(p, q) = \max_{p'} u_1(p', q) \geq \min_{q'} \max_{p'} u_1(p', q')$$

$$u_1(p, q) = \min_{\hat{q}} u_1(p, \hat{q}) \leq \max_{\hat{p}} \min_{\hat{q}} u_1(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$$

$$\Rightarrow u_1(p, q) = v$$

$$\Downarrow \\ p \in B_1$$



# Pf of Main Lemma (2 proofs)

Regret of (Max)Hedge ( $\epsilon = \sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{T}}$ )

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x_t) \right] \geq \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{x \in [n]} \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x) \right]$$

$$T = \left\lceil \frac{4 \ln n}{\delta^2} \right\rceil$$

$$- 2 \sqrt{T \ln n}$$

$T\delta$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \max_{x \in \Delta([n])} \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x) \right]$$

$$\max_{p'} \min_{q' + \delta} u_1(q', q') \geq \min_{\hat{q}} \max_{\hat{p} - \delta} u_1(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$$


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W.l.o.g.  $u_1(a_1, a_2) \in [0, 1] \quad \forall (a_1, a_2) \in A_1 \times A_2$

(pick  $b \& c$  s.t.  
 $n = \max\{|A_1|, |A_2|\} \quad u'_1 = b u_1 + c$ )

Player 1 runs Hedge( $\epsilon$ )  
 each  $q_1 \in A_1$  is an expert

$$p_1, \dots, p_T$$

$$g_t(x) = u_1(x, q_t)$$

Player 2 runs Hedge( $\epsilon$ )  
 each  $q_2 \in A_2$  is an expert

$$q_1, \dots, q_T$$

$$g_t(x) = 1 - u_1(p_t, x)$$

# Player 1

By Hedge's regret thm:

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(p_t, q_t) \geq$$

$$\max_p \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(p, q_t) - \delta$$

$$p = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T p_t$$

for any fixed  $q$

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(p_t, q) = u_1(\bar{p}, q)$$

# Player 2

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T 1 - u_1(p_t, q_t)$$

$$\geq \max_q \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T 1 - u_1(p_t, q) - \delta$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(p_t, q_t) \leq \min_q \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(p_t, q) + \delta$$

for any fixed  $p$

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(p, q_t) = u_1(p, \bar{q})$$

$$\bar{q} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T q_t$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_{\hat{q}} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(P_t, q) + \delta \geq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(P_t, \hat{q}_t) \\
 & \quad \geq \max_P \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(P, \hat{q}_t) - \delta \\
 & \quad \geq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(\hat{P}, \hat{q}_t) - \delta \\
 & \quad \quad \quad \uparrow \hat{p} \\
 & \quad \quad \quad = u_1(\hat{P}, \bar{q}) - \delta \\
 & \Rightarrow \underbrace{\min_q u_1(\bar{P}, q) + \delta}_{\max_P \min_q u_1(P, q)} \geq \underbrace{\max_P u_1(P, \bar{q}) - \delta}_{\min_q \max_P u_1(P, q)}
 \end{aligned}$$

Additional annotations in red:
   
 -  $\hat{q}$  points to the first  $\min_q$ .
   
 -  $\frac{1}{T} \sum u_1(P_t, \hat{q}) + \delta$  is written in red, with an arrow pointing to the first term of the first inequality.
   
 -  $\hat{p}$  points to the  $\hat{P}$  in the second inequality.

$$\max_P \min_Q u_1(P, Q) + \delta$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_1(P_t, Q_t)$$

$$\geq \min_Q \max_P u_1(P, Q) - \delta$$

$$T = \Theta\left(\frac{\ln n}{\delta^2}\right)$$

Yao's lemma (prove lower bounds for randomized algo).

$I \rightarrow$  set of all inputs  $\mathcal{A} = \Delta(I)$

$\mathcal{A} \rightarrow$  ————— deterministic algorithms.

$i \in I, a \in \mathcal{A} \Rightarrow t(i, a) \rightarrow$  cost of running  $a$  on  $i$ .

$\mathcal{R} = \Delta(\mathcal{A}) =$  set of all randomized algos.

$$\min_{r \in \mathcal{R}} \max_{i \in I} t(i, r) = \min_{r \in \mathcal{R}} \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} t(d, r)$$

$\uparrow$   $\forall N$

$$\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \min_{r \in \mathcal{R}} t(d, r) = \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \min_{a \in \mathcal{A}} t(d, a)$$

pick  $d^* \in \mathcal{D}$   $\Rightarrow$   $\min_{a \in \mathcal{A}} t(d^*, a)$