

CSE 736

Online Learning!



↑ Atci Rudra

Problem 1': n experts

Algo's task: $t \geq 1, \dots$ pick $x_t \in [n]$
 \rightarrow incur a cost $c_t(x)$ for $x \in [n]$
 $\in [0, 1]$

Goal: $\forall T$, minimize $\sum_{t=1}^T c_t(x_t)$

Hedge(ϵ):

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T c_t(x_t) \right] \leq \frac{1}{1-\epsilon} \cdot \left[\min_{x \in [n]} \sum_{t=1}^T c_t(x) \right] + \frac{1}{\epsilon} \cdot \ln n$$

($\epsilon < t$)

Problem 2: Selling a digital good

$$v_t \in [1, h]$$

For $t \geq 1 \dots$

→ A buyer bids b_t ← unique

→ Propose a price p_t

→ If $p_t > b_t$, $r_t = 0$
o/w $r_t = p_t$

Buyers are
rational

Max utility

$$u_t = \max(v_t - p_t, 0)$$

Goals: (i) Max $\sum_{t=1}^T r_t$

(ii) Fruthful algo ($b_t = v_t$)

← correct value

TODAY: $C_t(x) = 1 - g_t(x) \equiv g_t(x) \in [0, 1]$
 $\max \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x_t)$

(i) Max Hedge (ϵ) \leftarrow max version

(ii) Max Hedge (ϵ) solve problem 2.

Read Bobby's
remarks in
W2 notes

(iii) Notion of regret.

(iv) Formal definition of a game, Nash Equilibria

(v) 2 player zero-sum games, von Neumann's theorem

(Pf via Hedge algo)

Max Hedge (ε)

- (i) $w_x \leftarrow 1, x \in [n]$
- (ii) for $t = 1, 2, \dots$

(a) $p_t(x) = w_x / \sum_{y=1}^n w_y \quad \forall x \in [n]$

(b) Pick $x_t \leftarrow x$ w.p. $p_t(x)$

(c) Observe g_t

(d) $w_x \leftarrow w_x (1 + \varepsilon)^{\mathbb{1}_{g_t(x)}}$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x_t) \right]$$

$$> (1 - \varepsilon) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\max_{x \in [n]} \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x) \right]$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x)$$

$$-\frac{1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \ln n$$

Pf: "Same" as before

MaxHedge to solve Problem 2. Assume $v_t \in [h]$

→ $h = h$.

→ Expert $x \in [h]$ propose price of x

$$\rightarrow g_t(x) = \frac{1}{h} \begin{cases} x & \text{if } x \leq b_t \\ 0 & \end{cases}$$

Q (i) Revenue guarantee?
(ii) Why truthful?

Q (ii) Truthfulness

Main Obs: Price p_t determined by
Hedge does not depend on b_t .

Utility $u_t = \max(v_t - p_t, 0)$ ← independence
of b_t .

⇒ Truthful!

(as every
buyer is unique)

Q (i) Revenue

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T r_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[h \cdot \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x_t) \right]$$

$\Omega(h)$
lower bound
on the
additive
factor

$$h \cdot g_t(x_t)$$

Optimal?

$$-\frac{h}{\epsilon} \ln(h)$$

$$(1-\epsilon) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\max_{x \in [h]} h \cdot \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x) \right]$$

[Blum, Kumar, R., W., 03]

h , hedge algo

best fixed price revenue

Hedge
 $\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow \frac{1}{h} \quad v_1 = h$
 \vdots
 $h \rightarrow \frac{1}{h}$

Improving $O\left(\frac{h \ln h}{\epsilon}\right) \rightarrow O\left(\frac{h \ln \ln(h)}{\epsilon^2}\right)$

$\rightarrow O(h)$ [Blum, Hartline 04]

Currently: set of experts

$\{1, 2, \dots, h\}$

Let $0 < \alpha < 1$.

$S = \{1, (1+\alpha), (1+\alpha)^2, \dots, (1+\alpha)^{\lfloor \log_{1+\alpha} h \rfloor}\}$

$n = \left\lfloor \frac{\ln h}{\ln(1+\alpha)} \right\rfloor + 1 \leq O\left(\frac{\ln h}{\alpha}\right)$ for small δ $h(1+\delta) \sim \delta$

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Hedge}(\varepsilon) \text{ revenue}] > (1-\varepsilon) \mathbb{E}[\max_{x \in S} \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x)]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\max_{x \in S} \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x)] \geq \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \mathbb{E}[\max_{x \in [h]} \sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x)]$$

$$\forall \varepsilon > 0$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Revenue}] > (1-\varepsilon) \mathbb{E}[\text{best fixed price rev.}] - O\left(\frac{h \ln \ln h}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$$

$$-\frac{h}{\varepsilon} \cdot \ln\left(\frac{\ln h}{\alpha}\right)$$

$$O\left(\frac{h \ln \ln h}{\varepsilon^2}\right)$$


$$\alpha = \theta(\varepsilon)$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\max_{x \in S} (\dots) \right] \geq \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\max_{x \in [n]} (\dots) \right]$$

Pf: Main idea: Let x^* be the optimal price
 Let \bar{x} be the largest price in S

$$g_t(x) = \frac{1}{\lambda} \cdot \begin{cases} x & x \leq b_t \\ 0 & \text{o/w} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{x^*}{1+\alpha} \leq \bar{x} \leq x^* \leftarrow \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T g_t(\bar{x}) \right] \geq \frac{1}{1+\alpha} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T g_t(x^*) \right]$$



(Back to Bobby's notes)

$$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} < 1+2\varepsilon$$

for $\varepsilon < \frac{1}{2}$

REGRET: (Informally) Regret of an
online Algo A is $\mathbb{E}[A's\ value - OPT\ value]$
($0 < \varepsilon < \frac{1}{2}$)

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{cost}(\text{Hedge}(\varepsilon))] < (1+2\varepsilon) \mathbb{E}[\text{cost}(OPT)] + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \ln n$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{Regret}(\text{Hedge}) < (2\varepsilon) \cdot \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\text{cost}(OPT)]}_{\text{Upper bound?}} + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \cdot \ln n$$

→ Sequences up to time T .

$$\boxed{\text{Regret (Hedge)} \leq o(T)}$$

if $\epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$

~~X~~ ⇒ Cost (OPT) ≤ T. Next week: Doubling!

⇒ Regret (Hedge^T(ϵ)) ≤ $2\epsilon \cdot T + \frac{1}{\epsilon} \cdot \ln n$

$$ax + \frac{b}{x} \quad 2\sqrt{ba}$$

Min if $x = \sqrt{\frac{b}{a}}$

$ax = \frac{b}{x} \iff x = \sqrt{\frac{b}{a}}$

($\epsilon = \sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{2T}}$)

What if T is not known?

$$\leq 2 \sqrt{2T \cdot \ln(n)}$$

T large enough

average regret

$$= \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\text{Regret}}{T} \leq 2 \sqrt{\frac{2 \ln n}{T}} \rightarrow 0$$