Last Update: Friday, 25 August 2023
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Notes:
"...‘You’, your joys and your sorrows, your memories
and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free
will, are i fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly
of nerve cells and their associated molecules."
Related reading:
and also:
Related items:
"Q. When referring to a zombie, should I use the relative pronoun who
(which would refer to a person) or that (since, technically, the zombie
is no longer living)? Essentially, does a zombie cease to become a
‘person’ in the grammatical sense?
"A. Let's assume this is a serious question, in which case you, as
the writer, get to decide just how much humanity (if any) and
grammatical sense you wish to invest in said zombie. That will guide
your choice of who or that."
Clark, Andy (2000),
"A Case Where Access Implies Qualia?",
Analysis
60(1) (January): 30–38.
Chalmers, David J.; & Searle, John R. (1997),
"‘Consciousness and the Philosophers’:
An Exchange",
New York Review of Books
44(8) (May 15).
Searle, John R. (1995),
"The Mystery of Consciousness:
Part I",
New York Review of Books
42(17) (November 2).
For a critique of Koch's latest theory, see:
Searle, John R. (2005),
"Consciousness:
What We Still Don't Know",
New York Review of Books
52(1) (January 13).
Harnad, Stevan; & Searle, John R. (2005),
"What Is Consciousness?",
New York Review of Books
52(11) (June 23).
Koch, Christof; & Tonini, Giulio; reply by
John R. Searle (2013),
"Can a Photodiode Be Conscious?",
New York Review of Books 60(4), (7 March):
43–44.
Todd, Steven J. (2009),
"A Difference that Makes a Difference:
Passing through Dennett's Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse",
British Journal of the Philosophy of Science
60: 497–520.
See especially:
Weber, Bruce (2014),
"Gerald M. Edelman, Nobel Laureate and
'Neural Darwinist,' Dies at 84",
New York Times (23 May): A21.
Nagel, Thomas (1989),
The View from Nowhere
(New York: Oxford University Press).
Nagel, Thomas (2013),
"The Core of ‘Mind and Cosmos’",
New York Times "Opinionator" (18 August).
More:
—Michael Rapaport, age 5¾ (27 July 2001)
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2008),
"Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds:
Are Bees Natural Zombies?",
Journal of Philosophy
105(8) (August): 389–415.
— Gorman, James (2012),
"The Games Crows Play, and Other Winged Tales",
New York Times (12 June): D2.
Harnad, Stevan; & Searle, John R. (2005),
"What Is Consciousness?",
New York Review of Books
52(11) (June 23).
See also:
Graziano, Michael S.A.; & Kastner, Sabine (2011),
"Human Consciousness and Its Relationship to Social Neuroscience:
A Novel Hypothesis",
Cognitive Neuroscience 2(2) (1 January): 98–113;
doi: 10.1080/17588928.2011.565121
Haugeland, John (ed.), (1981),
Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology,
Artificial Intelligence
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): Ch. 11,
pp. 307–338.
See also:
Related reading:
See also:
For a critical review, see:
…simply begs the question. (After all, what is it that explains
why and how the interactions have quality?)
Anderson, John R. (2007),
How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical
Universe?
(New York: Oxford University Press).
Includes:
See also:
If we take experiencing a raw feel to be an activity of
interacting with the world, then by this very definition, there must be
something it's like for this interaction to be happening: Interactions
always have some quality or other. (Ch. 14, p. 165.)
O'Regan, J. Kevin (2012),
"How to Build a Robot that Is Conscious and Feels"