

# Time and Difficulty

Artificial Intelligence and Sustainable Computing (AISC 2024)

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<sup>1</sup>With grateful acknowledgment to co-authors Guy Haworth and Tamal Biswas, students in my graduate seminars, and UB's Center for Computational Research (CCR)

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- **Multiple-choice tests:**  $m_i$  are possible answers to a test question,  $u_i =$  gain/loss for right/wrong answer.


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- (a) vigor . . corroborated
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(source: itunes.apple.com)

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
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
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

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## A Difficult Trap (Kramnik-Anand, 2008 WC)



Depths...

Values by Stockfish 6

Move	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Nd2	103	093	087	093	027	028	000	000	056	-007	039	028	037	020	014	017	000	006	000
Bxd7	048	034	-033	-033	-013	-042	-039	-050	-025	-010	001	000	-009	-027	-018	000	000	000	000
Qg8	114	114	-037	-037	-014	-014	-022	-068	-008	-056	-042	-004	-032	000	-014	-025	-045	-045	-050
...			...		...				...		...			...				...	
Nxd4	-056	-056	-113	-071	-071	-145	-020	-006	077	052	066	040	050	051	-181	-181	-181	-213	-213

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



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
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
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- Computer **engines** are far higher, e.g.: **Stockfish 16 = 3544**, **Torch 1.0 = 3531**, **Komodo Dragon 3.3 = 3529**.
- Expectation  $e = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(c(R_P - R_O))}$  depends only on difference to opponent's rating  $R_O$ . With  $c = (\ln 10)/400$  the curve is:



Position Value  $\longleftrightarrow$  Expectation (2000 vs. 2000)


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
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- Complication: **dependence** on rating itself.

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


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- Slope at  $y = 0.5$  *correctness rate* is the **discrimination factor**.



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- **Why double-log works and single-log fails.**
- How well does hazard—normalized over aptitude—work as a measure of difficulty?

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## Model and Metrics

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## How Accurate Are Model Projections?


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
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- Low-hazard positions either have an obvious best move or many good moves.

# Example: Niemann-Shankland, USA Ch. 2023



Depth	1	2	3	...	18	19	20	21	22	23
Rad1	+041	+035	+029	...	-067	-068	-070	-070	-071	-071
Rab1	+016	+009	+021	...	-061	-067	-070	-070	-071	-071
Ne2	-048	-091	-040	...	-070	-070	-070	-071	-071	-071
Reb1	-030	-052	-010	...	-068	-070	-070	-071	-071	-071
Ra2	-003	-029	-010	...	-068	-070	-070	-071	-071	-071
Rf1	-029	-080	-010	...	-067	-070	-070	-071	-071	-071
Red1	-006	-057	-010	...	-067	-069	-070	-071	-071	-071
Nf1	+017	-029	-062	...	-080	-069	-070	-071	-071	-071
Rac1	+018	+012	+021	...	-067	-070	-070	-071	-071	-071
Rec1	-029	-052	-010	...	-067	-070	-071	-071	-071	-071
Rg1	-030	-044	-008	...	-067	-070	-071	-071	-071	-071
Re2	+008	+022	+035	...	-067	-069	-071	-071	-071	-071
Kg1	+021	+022	+028	...	-067	-069	-071	-071	-071	-071
Kh2	+022	+022	+013	...	-066	-069	-071	-071	-071	-071
Nxc6	-044	-044	-030	...	-088	-094	-086	-095	-089	-097
b3	-076	-076	-062	...	-101	-132	-120	-104	-118	-113

Low-hazard because crisis is far off, but difficult in real chess terms.  
 Low  $E_L$ , high entropy  $H$ . (Niemann lost.)

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
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## Time-Quality Curves (whole graph)



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- Using 10–15 minutes (705 positions): **1235 +- 170.**
- Using  $\geq 15$  minutes (371 positions): **1410 +- 205.**
- **“Thinking Is Bad For You.”** (At least it’s a bad sign...)

## Predicated on Time Spent For a Move

Staying with players rated 2000 to 2200 at the World Senior Team Ch.

- Positions on which they spent at most **30 seconds** on the move: **2860 +- 75.**
- At most **10 seconds**: **3235 +- 90.**
- Starting at turn 16 rather than 9: **3220 +- 100.**
- At most **5 seconds** (sample size 605): **3230 +- 160.**

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- Much more work to do...

# Discussion and Q & A

[And Thanks]

[Possible extra slides for Q & A follow...optional, of course...]

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- 5 ...reproducibility is doubtful and arduous.

The *chess angle* is to trade 1 against wealth of 2,3,4,5: lots of players and games, real competition, clear goals and metrics (Elo ratings), and not only reproducible but conducive to abundant falsifiable predictions.

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- How can we distinguish *uncovering genuine cognitive phenomena* from *artifacts of the model*?

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- The test result knocked down your prior 5,000-to-1 odds-against by a factor of 50, but not all the way.

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- Higher stringency cuts against timely public service.

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- **Now suppose the factual positivity rate is 20%**. Can we do this in our heads?

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- *Sensitivity and soundness generally remain separate criteria.*
- This is relevant insofar as I often get a lot of 3.00–4.00 range results.

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- Does not account for the *difficulty* of games. That is the job of the full model.

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- Lack of such studies exposed by the controversy over Hans Niemann's rise from 2465 Elo to 2700.
- Show **this GLL article** including example of Ms. Velpula Sarayu.

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
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- I will now discuss some other applications that these solid foundations enable.

# Hans Niemann: Platform or Plateau?



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- Picture emerging from recent youth events...?