Security Challenges in An Increasingly Connected World

Yi-Min Wang

Director, Internet Services Research Center (ISRC)
Microsoft Research, Redmond

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Ever-Increasing Connectivity

The Internet

- Emails, instant messaging, web browsing
- Third-party auto-redirection / fetching
- Search engine

Wireless Connection

- Auto-connection in physical proximity
- Auto-proxy configuration

Social Networking

Personal connection

Vertical View of Security/Privacy Attacks

Search Proxy-based **Phishing** Spam **Attacks** Spam URL in Intercepting Spam email top search traffic as Personal results proxy Spoofing ization Steal account Websites that Steal account log-in info only serve ads log-in info

09-17-2009 on WSJ

Microsoft Takes Aim at 'Mal-Ads' ("Malvertising")

- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125323621695721795.html
- The Redmond, Wash., company filed the lawsuits Thursday in Washington state court in Seattle. The suits cite anonymous defendants using the business names Direct Ad Solutions, Soft Solutions Inc., Qiweroqw.com, ITmeter Inc. and ote2008.info, alleging that they used Microsoft's system for posting online ads to attract users to sites that attempted to install malicious software on their PCs.
- Malvertising is becoming a more common nuisance on the Web, in some cases turning up on mainstream Web sites.
 Last weekend, the New York Times said that it unintentionally ran an advertisement on its Web site by a company that at first posed as a legitimate advertiser and then switched to promoting phony antivirus software. The New York Times removed the ads from its site.

09-23-2009 on ComputerWorld

Drudge, other sites flooded with malicious ads

- http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/9138457/Drudge other sites flooded with malicious ads?taxonomyName=Web+Site+Management&taxonomyId=62
- Criminals flooded several online ad networks with malicious advertisements over the weekend, causing popular Web sites such as the Drudge Report, Horoscope.com and Lyrics.com to inadvertently attack their readers, a security company said Wednesday.
- The trouble started on Saturday, when the criminals somehow placed the malicious ads on networks managed by Google's DoubleClick, as well as two others: YieldManager and ValueClick's Fastclick network, according to Mary Landesman, a senior security researcher with ScanSafe.
- Instead of trying to trick Web surfers into buying bogus software, these ads attacked.

09-23-2009 on ComputerWorld


Scammers auto-generate Twitter accounts to spread scareware


- http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/9138361/Scammers auto generate Twitter accounts to spread scareware?taxonomyName=Security&taxonomyId=17
- Scammers are increasingly using machine-generated Twitter accounts to post messages about trendy topics, and tempt users into clicking on a link that leads to servers hosting fake Windows antivirus software, security researchers said Monday.
- Some of the tweets exploit Twitter's current "Trending Topics," the constantly-changing top 10 list of popular tweet keywords that the micro-blogging service posts on its home page. Others are repeats of real tweets.
- All the tweets include links to sites that try to dupe users into downloading and installing bogus security software, often called "scareware" because they fool users with sham infection warnings, then provide endless pop-ups until people pay \$40 to \$50 to buy the useless program.


Google {strider wrestling fundraising}

Click on #1: <u>www.striderwrestling.com/fundraising.htm</u> (at your own risk)










Horizontal View of Security/Privacy Attacks




Phishing with End-to-End Spoofing

- Status bar spoofing (mouse-over URL spoofing)
- Address bar spoofing
- Personalized information


[Demo]

Examples of Status Bar Spoofing

Element stack Element layouts




form target = foo.com anchor target = paypal.com




label's target = foo.com
anchor's target = paypal.com

Element stack Element layouts




form target = foo.com image target = paypal.com



img's target = paypal.com label's target = foo.com

All because of unexpected combinations of element behaviors


Address Bar Spoofing #1 (Exception + Atomicity Issue)




https://evil.com#xxxxx...xxxxxxx

PayPa	7 °			^
Welcome	Send Money	Request Money	1	
Phish Log-In	.4	-off		
Email Address	Evil	com		
Password			Log In	
Fail to log in?				
SSN				
Zip code				~
<	Ш		>	

Address Bar Spoofing #2 (Race Condition + Atomicity Issue)



A Scientific Problem Formulation & Solution




Reasoning Engine
(The **Maude** System: a rewriting logic engine)

Potential Personalization


- Personal information shared in social networks
 - E.g., Facebook, MySpace, etc.
- Personal needs shared in social charity websites
 - E.g., WishUponAHero.com
 - Including Paypal account addresses
- Long-term, cross-network mining and association could lead to personalized attacks

Search Spam Example: Query="coach handbag"


Spam Doorway URL = http://coach-handbag-top.blogspot.com



<u>http://coach-handbag-top.blogspot.com/</u> script execution led to redirection to topsearch10.com



Static HTML text indexed by a static crawler



Link spam from a spammed forum




Why Redirection

- To fool static crawlers
 - Serve static spam pages to crawlers
 - Display dynamic ad pages to users
- For scalable operation
 - Create transient doorway pages on reputable websites
 - Easy "upgrade" of attacks

Strider Dynamic Crawler: Changing the Battleground


- Traditional static crawler
- Static page-content index: spammers' preferred battleground




Redirection

New Battleground


- Strider dynamic crawler
- Dynamic program-behavior index:
 - Redirection traffic analysis Domain "Follow the Money" to their headquarters our preferred battleground




Today's Non-Redirection Spam




"Upgrade" of Attacks



HoneyMonkey Black-box Exploit Detection



The 2005 HoneyMonkey Pipeline




HoneyMonkey Timeline

- March 2005: MSR project started
- May 2005: eWeek article published
 - "Strider HoneyMonkey: Trawling for Windows Exploits"
 http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Strider-HoneyMonkey-Trawling-for-Windows-Exploits/
- July 2005: First zero-day exploit detected
 - August 8, 2005: "Microsoft's 'monkeys' find first zero-day exploit" http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11273
- Winter 2005: Production HoneyMonkey in operation
- Feb. 1, 2006: Paper published in NDSS 2006
 - Malicious density among commonly visited websites:
 0.071%

- August 4, 2006: Google effort publicized
 - "Google Aims to Block Malicious Sites"
 http://www.betanews.com/article/Google Aims to Block Malicious Sites/1154720175
- Feb. 13, 2007: Google effort publicized again
 - "Google Adds Malware Warnings To Search Results"
 http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2007/02/13/google-adds-malware-warnings-to-search-results
- April 10, 2007: Google paper published
 - "The Ghost in the Browser: Analysis of Web-based Malware"
 - Re-confirmed that the fraction of malicious pages was at roughly 0.1%
- May 6, 2008: Yahoo effort publicized
 - "Yahoo to filter Net with SiteAdvisor"
 http://www.techworld.com/security/news/index.cfm?newsid=12172&pagtype=all


Pretty-Bad-Proxy (PBP)

- HTTPS: end-to-end secure protocol for web traffic.
 - Adversary assumption: MITM (man-in-the-middle).



 Are today's browser implementations consistent with this assumption?


Wireless & Auto Proxy Configuration



Key Findings


- A new class of browser vulnerabilities
 - Proxy can defeat end-to-end security promised by HTTPS
 - Vulnerabilities exist in all major browsers
- Industry outreach
 - Technical work finished in summer 2007
 - Paper withheld until 2009 IEEE SSP
 - Worked with all vendors to address the issues

The Pretty-Bad-Proxy (PBP) Adversary




Attack #1: Error Response

- Proxy's error page: e.g., 502-server-not-found, other 4xx/5xx response
- Script in error page runs in https://bank.com



Attack #2: Redirection (HTTP 3xx)



Summary

- Increasing connectivity leads to more attack scenarios and more effective attacks
 - Phishing with End-to-End Spoofing
 - Search spam
 - Pretty Bad Proxy
- "Horizontal" two-step model Get Traffic, Make Money
 - Illustrates what else can be done beyond each "vertical" attack scenario

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- "A Systematic Approach to Uncover Security Flaws in GUI Logic,"
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Other References

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 - PeerPressure http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/helenw/papers/peerPressureOSDI.pdf
- Strider Security Tracer
 - http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/05/proceedings/papers/chenndss05.pdf
- SubVirt Virtual Machine Rootkit
 - http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~pmchen/papers/king06.pdf