

Lecture 6

CSE 331

Sep 9, 2024

2nd T/F poll up

2nd T/F poll

Is the following statement **true** or **false**:

In every Stable Matching problem instance where a man m and woman w have each other as their least preferred partner, the following is true. There is no stable matching for the instance where (m, w) are matched.

(Note by a stable matching problem instance, we mean both the set of men and women as well as all the $2n$ preference lists.)

True

False

Please select one option

Submit

You have **not yet** voted.

Revoting is **not allowed**. Select your vote and click submit to register your vote.

Your name will **not be visible to anyone**.

We're not mind readers



If you need it, ask for help



**NEVER apologize
for asking a question!!!**

Make sure you can run HW0 code

note @56

stop following 1 view

Actions

Make sure you can run HW 0 template on your machine

If you did not submit [HW 0 Q3](#), please make sure you have the setup on your computer so that you can run the HW 0 Q3 template code (in whichever language you prefer). If you need it, **please go to an OH on Monday or Tuesday** in case you cannot get things to setup and need help.

Note that the [autolab page](#) has instructions on how to setup the template code in IntelliJ (so only for java). The page also has a video on how to run the C++ template code from command line on a VM (in case you are using that option).

Also see [@14](#) if you are using C++.

Please note that **starting Wednesdays, the office hours will give preference to questions specifically about HW 1 and not questions on setup** (like making sure you have your IDE/compiler ready to go).

homework0 autolab office_hours

Edit good note 0

Updated 37 seconds ago by Atri Rudra

Register your project groups

Deadline: Friday, Sep 20, 11:59pm

CSE 331

Syllabus

Piazza

Schedule

Homeworks ▾

Autolab

Project ▾

Support Pages ▾

▶ channel

Sample Exams ▾

Project Overview

Group signup form

Forming groups

You form groups of size **exactly three (3)** for the project. Below are the various logistics:

- You have two choices in forming your group:
 - You can form your group on your own: i.e. you can submit the list of EXACTLY three (3) group members in your group.

</> Note

Note that if you pick the option of forming a group of size two. If

Also, if you form a group

If you miss this deadline then you will get a ZERO on the ENTIRE project

cannot submit as

- You can submit *just your name*, and you will be assigned a random group *among all students who take this second option*. However, **note that if you pick this option, you could end up in a group of size 2**. There will be at most two groups of size 2.

</> Potential risk





































































Note that if you pick the option of being assigned a random group, you take on the risk that a assigned group might not "pull their weight." We unfortunately cannot help with such aspects of group dynamics. (Of course if a group member is being abusive, please do let Atri know.) Please note that a group member who does not do much work will get penalized on the [individual component](#) of the project grade.

Submitting your group composition

Use [this Google form](#) to submit your group composition (the form will allow you to pick one of the two options above).

- You need to fill in the form for group composition by **11:59pm on Friday, September 20**.

HW 1 gets released this Tue

Mon, Sep 9	Gale Shapley algorithm        x^2	[KT, Sec 1.1] <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Pigeonhole principle <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Asymptotic notation care package
Tue, Sep 10		(HW 1 out)
Wed, Sep 11	Gale Shapley algorithm outputs a stable matching        x^2	[KT, Sec 1.1] <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Proof details of GS termination
Fri, Sep 13	Efficient algorithms       x^2	[KT, Sec 1.1] <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Worst-case runtime analysis notes <i>Reading Assignment:</i> [KT, Sec 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4]
Mon, Sep 16	Runtime Analysis of Gale-Shapley algorithm       x^2	[KT, Sec 2.3]
Tue, Sep 17		(HW 2 out, HW 1 in)
Wed, Sep 18	Graph Basics       x^2	[KT, Sec 2.3, 3.1]
Fri, Sep 20	Computing Connected Component      x^2	[KT, Sec 3.2] (Project Team Composition Due) <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Care package on trees <i>Reading Assignment:</i> BFS by examples
Mon, Sep 23	Breadth First Search       x^2	[KT, Sec 3.2]
Tue, Sep 24		(HW 3 out, HW 2 in)
Wed, Sep 25	Explore algorithm      x^2	[KT, Sec 3.3]
Fri, Sep 27	Runtime Analysis of BFS algorithm      x^2	[KT, Sec 3.3, 3.6] <i>Reading Assignment:</i> [KT, Sec 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6] <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Care package on topological ordering
Mon, Sep 30	More graph stuff       x^2	[KT, Sec 3.3, 3.6] (Quiz 1) (Group Registration on Autolab due)
Tue, Oct 1		(HW 3 in)
Wed, Oct 2	Interval Scheduling Problem      x^2	[KT, Sec 4.1] (Project out) <i>Reading Assignment:</i> [KT, Sec 4.1, 4.2]
Fri, Oct 4	Greedy Algorithm for Interval Scheduling     x^2	[KT, Sec 4.4] <i>Reading Assignment:</i> Care package on minimizing maximum lateness
Mon, Oct 7	Mid-term exam: I	
Wed, Oct 9	Mid-term exam: II	

Reading Assignment - I

note @57

stop following

1 view

Actions

Reading Assignment: Asymptotic Analysis

As one of the changes made in F19, we will assume that y'all are familiar with asymptotic analysis and not spend reviewing it in any detail during the lectures. In case you are not that comfortable with asymptotic analysis and/or want to review the material, please read through the asymptotic analysis care package:

<http://www-student.cse.buffalo.edu/~atri/cse331/support/care-package/asymptotics/index.html>

We will need this either the middle of lecture on Wednesday or in the Friday lecture.

lectures

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Updated 1 minute ago by Atri Rudra

Reading Assignment - II

note @58

stop following

1 view

Actions

Reading Assignment: Pigeonhole principle

Another reading assignment for this week (here is the other one: @57). Please go through this support page on **pigeonhole principle**--

<http://www-student.cse.buffalo.edu/~atri/cse331/support/pigeon/index.html>

It's actually a very simple result that turns out to be surprisingly powerful. We'll use this in one of this week's (most likely the Wed) lecture.

lectures

Edit

good note | 0

Updated 24 seconds ago by Atri Rudra

(Perfect) Matching



A matching $S \subseteq W \times M$ satisfies the following properties:

S is a set of pairs (w,m) where w in W and m in M




- (1) For every woman w in W , exist *at most* one m such that (w,m) in S
exactly
- (2) For every man m in M , exist *at most* one w such that (w,m) in S
exactly

Perfect matching


Preferences



Instability



Questions/Comments?



A stable matching


Even though BBT and JA are not very happy



Brad Pitt




Angelina Jolie




Billy Bob Thornton



Jennifer Aniston



Two stable matchings



Stable Matching problem

Set of men M and women W


Preferences (ranking of potential spouses)

Matching (no polyandry/gamy in $M \times W$)


Perfect Matching (everyone gets married)

Instability

Stable matching = perfect matching + no instability



Questions/Comments?



Two Questions

Does a stable marriage always exist?

If one exists, how quickly can we compute one?

Rest of today's lecture


Naïve algorithm

Gale Shapley algorithm

Questions / Comments?



Discuss: Naïve algorithm!



The naïve algorithm

Incremental algorithm to produce all $n!$ perfect matchings?

Go through all possible perfect matchings S


If S is a stable matching

then Stop



Else move to the next perfect matching

Gale-Shapley Algorithm





David Gale



Lloyd Shapley

$O(n^2)$ algorithm

Moral of the story...



Questions / Comments?



Rest of today's agenda

Gale Shapley (GS) algorithm

Run of GS algorithm on an instance

Prove correctness of the GS algorithm

Back to the board...

