

# S O P D



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The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be addressed to the Director.



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## MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), the British Army, air power in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency (COIN), military anthropology, the principles of war and combating corruption.

A veritable constellation of generals from across the globe have published important works recently. USMC General James M Mattis has concluded that the concept of EBO is not suitable for US Joint Force operations, and has ordered that it be abandoned. Across the globe, Israeli Major General Yaakov Amidror has published his view of counterinsurgency operations, demonstrating that they can indeed be 'won' by a conventional force. From another general engaged in COIN today—this time UK General Sir Richard Dannatt—comes his view for transforming the British Army 'in contact'.

Complementing General Dannatt's article, the Editors recommend James Fergusson's work which considers the difficulties facing the current UK Land Force, and how these are exacerbated by the present deployment to Afghanistan. Continuing the focus on Afghanistan, Paul Smyth makes the case for the realignment of air power's focus in that theatre, while Thomas H Johnson and M Chris Mason provide an alternative plan for Afghanistan, advocating a more 'grass-roots' approach.

These types of operation require constant adaptation, and Andrew J Bacevich highlights the ongoing debate within the US Army over how far such adaptation should go. Bacevich concludes that this debate may in fact pre-empt civilian control of the military. Regardless of the outcome of that debate, adaptation has already occurred: George R Lucas examines the moral and ethical dilemmas facing anthropologists in the new 'Human Terrain Teams'. Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel demonstrate the security applications of another academic discipline—economics—and how it can be put to use combating corruption. Finally, John Mark Mattox's article deals with the philosophical underpinnings guiding all military operations—the principles of war'.

Enjoy  
The Editors

**James M Mattis, 'USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-based Operations', *Joint Force Quarterly*, Iss. 51, 2008, pp. 105–8, <[http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/editions/i51/4.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i51/4.pdf)>.**

Many Australian officers are no doubt aware of USMC General James Mattis's abandonment of Effects-Based Operations (EBO). As commander of US Joint Forces Command, General Mattis's decision carries great weight within the US Armed Forces, and so it will have far-reaching effects. Australia has experimented with EBO itself, with the Air Force leading the way.

While the RAAF may be well served by an effects-based approach, the Australian Army and to a lesser extent the RAN are probably not. This is because EBO's mechanistic and deterministic approach to practically imponderable problems like second and third order effects makes it inflexible in use. This lack of flexibility is antithetical to operations in the land environment, where friction and the fog of war do not allow for the exact planning, rigid execution and long staff work that EBO necessitates. Mattis makes many other criticisms of EBO, pointing out that it has failed to deliver on its advertised benefits, and that it is confusing to the officers and soldiers who are asked to apply it.

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**'I agree with Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen that "while aspirations advanced by supporters of effects-based operations ... are laudable they may not be achievable, particularly in the land warfare environment."'**

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For a small force like the Australian Army, intellectual rigour is essential—the force is simply not large enough to sustain losses while senior leaders clarify their ideas 'in contact'. Accordingly, reading General Mattis's critique of EBO is critical to clarifying the Australian Army's thinking on this important feature of the theoretical landscape. Reading this article will also give officers an insight into possible areas of change concerning coalition operations with the US.

*General James M Mattis, United States Marine Corps, is the Commander, US Joint Forces Command. As a major general, Mattis commanded the First Marine Division during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, and went on to command the First Marine Expeditionary Force after promotion to lieutenant general.*

**Yaakov Amidror, 'Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience', *Strategic Perspectives*, <<http://www.jcpa.org/text/Amidror-perspectives-2.pdf>>.**

The Australian Army is today engaged in a tough counterinsurgency fight which some commentators believe cannot be won. A conventional force, their argument runs, cannot defeat a terrorist or insurgent force because it will always blend in to the population and simply wait until the conventional force departs. Earlier this month, the Australian press reported that the commander of the UK 16 Air Assault Brigade in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, has said that 'a "decisive military victory" against the Taliban was unlikely.' The Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon, agreed with him, stating that only with political and economic reforms could coalition objectives be reached. While these statements are not surprising at all to Australian officers who

understand that political goals come before military ones, the public can interpret these statements as signs of hopelessness. Needless to say, this can potentially undermine public support for the war.

A contrary point of view, however, has also received press attention in Australia. Yaakov Amidror, a major general in the Israeli Defense Forces, argues that conventional forces can defeat insurgents and terrorists. Essentially, Amidror maintains that conventional forces can suppress terrorists and insurgents with conventional battlefield operations—but only temporarily. Once the insurgent's illegal resort to force has been defeated or suppressed, political actors can develop the necessary political solution, but from an advantageous position.

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**'Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies.'**

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Throughout his article, Amidror draws on his considerable experience in the Israeli Army and derives lessons from its long history of fighting terrorists and insurgents. His work is straightforward, and is devoid of any unnecessary academic or theoretical flourishes. While the author's practical approach will be appreciated by busy Army officers, the quality of Amidror's ideas is not sullied by this simplicity, making his article excellent and essential reading.

*Major General (Res.) Yaakov Amidror is Program Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He formerly served as Commander, IDF National Defense College and Commander, IDF Staff and Command College, as well as Military Secretary of the Minister of Defense.*

**Richard Dannatt, 'The Land Environment – Moving Towards 2018', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, Iss. 4, pp. 56–61.**

Elsewhere within this issue of the *SOPD*, the Editors have recommended an article by James Fergusson in which he has written of the challenges facing the British Army. As Fergusson points out, these challenges have stemmed largely from the pressure on the Army's personnel to meet its deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here, General Sir Richard Dannatt, the Chief of the General Staff, UK Army, offers his vision for the future, building on the operational experience gained from these same deployments.

Dannatt's approach focuses on the two main themes of maintaining the British Army's relevance to the parliament and the people, and maintaining capability across the entire spectrum of operations. To this end, he proposes several new and innovative approaches to force structure, manning, training and specialisation. For the officers of the Australian Army tasked with implementing the 'Adaptive Army' command restructure, Dannatt's contribution will be of considerable interest. In announcing this initiative, the Chief of the Army Lieutenant General Gillespie stressed that the Army must strive to be a force that 'thinks that the status quo is never, ever good enough and is

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**'In a break from traditional defence planning, we would like to see planning go from today as the start point and work forward. This may seem slightly at odds with current practice, but we must be flexible enough to take account of shifting current operations.'**

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continually seeking to adapt and improve its performance – at all levels.’ Dannatt’s article will help Australian officers to see how a key ally with a similar institutional culture has approached this challenging task, and will offer them ‘food for thought’. This will be all the more important for Australian officers when they exercise the considerable degree of initiative that Lieutenant General Gillespie has sought from them to realise the ‘Adaptive Army’.

*General Sir Richard Dannatt is currently the Chief of the General Staff, UK Army. He has served as both the Commander, NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and Assistant Chief of the General Staff at the UK Ministry of Defence.*

**James Fergusson, ‘Overstretched and over there’, *Prospect Magazine*, Iss. 151, October 2008, <[http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\\_details.php?id=10369](http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10369)>.**

The current strain on the military forces of our US allies is well known to the officers of the ADF, but fewer understand the equally troubled state of the UK armed forces. James Fergusson’s article neatly encapsulates several of the significant problems facing Australia’s oldest ally.

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**‘[‘Military Covenant Commission’ report author] Forsyth, despite his RAF background, [argues]... “For the kind of wars we’re fighting now, the future is the army.”’**

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Fergusson recalls UK General Richard Dannatt’s interview with the *Daily Mail*, in which he stated that the ‘military covenant’ between the UK and its military forces was broken. Dannatt feared that British military forces would ‘break’ if their proper position of esteem in the public eye was not quickly restored. Fergusson reviews the main factors in Dannatt’s diagnosis, centring on

problems with recruitment, equipment, pay, leave and conditions. While Fergusson concludes that these problems will not ‘break’ the services in any operational sense, he does present a compelling argument for urgent attention.

For Australian officers striving to manage a force with a high operational tempo, many of the UK’s problems will sound familiar. However, other issues remain exclusive to the British Army, at least for now. Australian officers would do well, therefore, to read this article to gain a ‘heads up’ of challenges that they may soon face.

*James Fergusson is a freelance author and has written for many UK and international newspapers. Between 1998 and 2000, Fergusson served as the spokesperson for the civilian peacekeeping force in Bosnia. His latest book is A Million Bullets—The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan.*

**Paul Smyth, ‘Addressing the Growing Importance of the ‘Durand Line’: A Role for RAPTOR?’, *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 153, Iss. 4, pp. 32–8.**

The War in Afghanistan is primarily a ground war. Everyday, Taliban and al-Qaeda militants attack coalition forces with roadside bombs, small arms and indirect fire. Air power, however, has its part to play, and up until now that has been mostly as close air support (CAS). However,

Paul Smyth argues that air power can better contribute via surveillance and interdiction, especially as the focus of the campaign changes to the border area near Pakistan.

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**‘[I]n order to redress what is effectively an insurgents’ geographical advantage ISAF must look to other means, and principally to its use of air power.’**

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Smyth’s argument makes sense: the border with Pakistan is such a challenging area to operate in because of the terrain. Aircraft, properly equipped with reconnaissance equipment such as the RAF’s RAPTOR pod, could be used to loiter above the border and provide continuous reconnaissance of the 2500 km long frontier. Of course, the number of

aircraft required to achieve a continuous effort would severely strain the currently deployed coalition aircraft fleet, and so CAS missions would need to decrease commensurately. Smyth believes that an increased deployment of armour and artillery would be able to fill a ‘CAS-gap’ while also providing more prompt and discriminating fire support. The Dutch and Canadian contingents have already proven the validity of this approach.

It is imperative that the Pakistan/Afghanistan border be sealed if the coalition is to have any hope of defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan. While Smyth’s prescriptive, technologically-specific recommendations will be of limited use to Australian officers, they would do well to read Smyth’s article and see how tactical air power, generally speaking, can be best put to use in Afghanistan.

*Paul Smyth is Head of the Operational Studies Programme at RUSI. His appointment as Head of the program follows a 25-year career in the Royal Air Force including work at the Defence Advanced Research and Assessment Group, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham.*

**T H Johnson and M C Mason, ‘All Counterinsurgency Is Local’, *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 302, No. 3, October 2008, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/afghan>>.**

While much has been made of the success of the ‘surge’ in Iraq, there is no room for complacency about military casualties—as of August 2008 the number of coalition deaths in Afghanistan had overtaken the numbers for Iraq. In this article, Thomas H Johnson and M Chris Mason briefly outline the current problems with the way the campaign is being run in Afghanistan and suggest what changes are needed if the coalition is going to avoid a significant strategic failure.

Johnson and Mason compare the current coalition effort in Afghanistan to both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the Vietnam War. Like the Vietnam War, reports of tactical victories distort the reality of a lack of rural support required to defeat the insurgency. Just as with the Soviet invasion, the current situation sees the intervening powers administering and securing the urban centres while failing to take the rural areas, where the insurgency continues to grow. The authors argue that the most important level of governance in Afghanistan is the district, or tribal; a point also made in the recent LWSC publication [\*A Complex and Changing Dynamic: Afghan Responses to Intervention, 1878-2006\*](#). By



concentrating on other levels of governance the coalition is failing to connect with the villagers who need to be won over if the insurgency is to be defeated.

Much of Australia's involvement in Afghanistan has been as part of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). As this article points out the idea behind them is a good one, but the execution is flawed—if they are to work they need to be 'beefed up'. By reconfiguring PRTs into development and security teams and posting them at the district level, NATO and US forces would shore up the support of tribal elders—the missing element required to counter the insurgency in rural areas. While this reconfiguration would not require more troops, it would require a rethinking of how operations are conducted. This, however, may prove more difficult than any other aspect of the campaign so far.

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**'The U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is founding because of the endemic failure to engage and protect rural villages, and to immunize them against insurgency.'**

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*Thomas H Johnson is a Director, and M Chris Mason is the Senior Research Fellow of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the US Naval Postgraduate School.*

**Andrew J Bacevich, 'The Petraeus Doctrine', *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 302, No. 3, October 2008, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine>>.**

The nexus between operations and strategy is an often confusing and highly uncertain one. How to develop a force and how to deploy it can involve political questions such as budgetary allocations and politico-strategic goals. Conversely, how a force is funded and what it is asked to do can prevent it from developing the necessary capabilities for operations or prevent it from using operationally expedient tactics.

Andrew J Bacevich delves into this contested area, examining the US Army's current debate between proponents of a conventionally-focused force and those of a COIN-focused force. Bacevich concludes that this debate, while demonstrating the Army's flexibility and intellectual health, actually risks exceeding constitutional propriety by pre-empting the prerogatives of its political masters.

Today, the Australian Army is in the midst of a major change of its own. As the Army implements the 'Adaptive Army' initiative, officers must remain cognisant of how future changes may affect lines of accountability. In an instance where accountability may be impaired, operational efficiency then becomes an insufficient justification for adaptation.

*Andrew J Bacevich is Professor of International Relations at Boston University.*

**George R Lucas, 'The Morality of 'Military Anthropology'', *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 7, Iss. 3, pp. 165–85.**

George R Lucas explores the debate among American anthropologists regarding the ethics of military anthropology. The debate emerged when the US armed forces employed anthropologists in Iraq and Afghanistan for mapping 'Human Terrain Systems' (HTS). Military

anthropology, itself, is a much broader topic, including anthropology of the military, as well as anthropology for the military. Australia's close proximity and frequent deployments to the culturally-diverse and different Melanesian and Polynesian societies increases the likelihood of the ADF employing anthropologists. If that occurs, Australian military personnel will need to be aware of not only the military debate as to the effectiveness of anthropologists, but also the anthropological debate as to the ethics of military anthropology.

Anthropology of the military (termed MA1), is the study of military organisations as distinct cultures. While Lucas takes the time to explain that studying military cultures is ethically sound, it is not the main focus of his article.

Of greater interest, and at the crux of the debate, is anthropology *for* the military (termed MA2). MA2 is 'the 'use' of anthropology and ethnography by military forces in the field of combat to improve their knowledge of the human or cultural terrain'. Many anthropologists are opposed to MA2, concerned that it harms and deceives observed peoples and the work produced would not be available to add to the knowledge of the wider anthropological community. Lucas, himself, considers anthropologists' ethical employment in MA2 to be premised on the moral legitimacy of the warring sides and how the anthropological information will be used. However, Lucas, noting the weakness in international law and just war theory, believes that how the anthropological information is used is the all-important question determining the ethics of anthropological involvement in MA2. This argument is highly questionable, but Lucas provides a strong base for understanding and further exploring the ethical debate surrounding military anthropology.

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**'Something is seriously awry, when an official government publication, especially a military field manual, can make compelling reading.'**

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*George R Lucas currently works at the Stockdale Centre of the US Naval Academy, Annapolis.*

**Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel, 'How economics can defeat corruption', *Foreign Policy*, Iss. 168, September/October 2008, pp. 66–74.**

In this interesting article, Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel question some of the prevailing 'common wisdom' about corruption. Using case studies that explore areas commonly associated with corruption, the authors explain that by using available data and applying economic theory, it is possible to gain a greater insight into the extent of corruption and to develop countermeasures.

Military planners often overlook corruption. Defence organisations can, often unwittingly, be supporters of corrupt processes. Responsible for billions of dollars, these organisations have to be scrupulous in their contracting and auditing if they are to avoid the taint of corruption. As has been seen in recent years with allegations against BAE in the United Kingdom and the concern surrounding the way in which contracts for support services to the US in Iraq were awarded, the taint of corruption is not confined to developing nations. Besides contracting for goods and services for supporting their own troops, military organisations need to be very careful when awarding contracts for activities such as reconstruction in fragile states. Without a good

knowledge of the local environment, military forces can end up supporting bribery and corruption in the very communities they are attempting to rebuild.

Australia is unfortunately all too aware of the pervasive nature of state sanctioned corruption, and how it can have ramifications beyond trade details, as the furore over the AWB scandal attests. As the ADF works alongside other government agencies in fragile states, it pays to consider what can be done to eliminate such an invidious practice. The ADF must ensure that the contracts it issues do not continue to bolster practices that undermine nation building efforts.

*Raymond Fisman is the Lambert Family Professor of Social Enterprise at Columbia Business School. Edward Miguel is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. The two are co-authors of Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations.*

**John Mark Mattox, 'The Baby and the Bathwater: Changing Times or Changing Principles?', *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 5, September/October 2008, pp. 5–9, <[http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\\_20081031\\_art005.pdf](http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081031_art005.pdf)>.**

'The principles of war' are often referred to, but few question their wisdom or their substance—for good reason. They are based on the knowledge gathered together by some of the most able professionals-at-arms, based on their experiences in some of the greatest wars that the world has ever known. However, respecting the wisdom of these principles is no excuse for not understanding their place in the profession and its literature. Fortunately, John Mark Mattox's article is a brief and telling examination of these fundamental principles, written in the context of one of the more pressing issues facing the Australian Army of today—'transformation'.

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**'In the face of this sweeping change, it is little wonder that some might question whether anything remains the same.'**

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Mattox examines the philosophical foundations of war, quickly demonstrating that contemporary requirements only necessitate a shift in practices, not principles. War still remains a violent clash of wills, and that is how it will remain for the foreseeable future. Australian officers, now engaged in a major change of their command

structures as part of the 'Adaptive Army' initiative, will find great merit in Mattox's article. It highlights those underlying principles that do not change, even if methods must, and so provides Australian officers with an 'intellectual compass' of sorts as they begin work adapting their own army to today's conditions.

*Colonel John Mark Mattox, US Army, is the commandant of the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Albuquerque. He received his PhD from Indiana University, and he also holds Bachelors and Masters Degrees from Brigham Young University, The US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. His latest book is St Augustine and the Theory of Just War.*



*'Reflections' has been designed by the Editors of the SOPD to showcase the most influential texts from history regarding operations, strategy and politics. This month the Editors of the SOPD recommend:*

**Charles de Gaulle, *Speech at Constantine, Algeria, 3 October 1958*,  
<<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1958degaulle-algeria1.html>>.**

Winning the 'hearts and minds' of the host population is central to any successful counterinsurgency effort. However, this effort alone is insufficient to secure success. Charles de Gaulle's speech at Constantine, Algeria in 1958 is proof of this point.

Premier de Gaulle outlines all of the necessary measures for securing the support of the Algerian populace—he promised more farmland for those disaffected with French rule, better education for their children, and additional government jobs and political offices for Muslims. However, de Gaulle failed to deliver on his promises because of a combination of factors—they included faltering political and popular will, an inconsistent approach by the military towards the population, and difficulties between the political and military leadership.

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**'What must be achieved is the basic transformation of this country, so brave, so alive, but also so full of difficulties and suffering.'**

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For Australian officers, de Gaulle's speech on the future of Algeria may sound grandiose. However, his vision for Algeria is essentially the coalition's goal in Afghanistan. While Australian officers can take heart that Australia's approach to counterinsurgency operations is far more nuanced, they must be constantly aware that combat

operations, no matter what many theorists say, are still critical. As many Western forces increasingly shift focus to dealing with 'operations other than war', de Gaulle's speech serves as a strong reminder that 'winning hearts and minds' is only one—albeit large—part of the counterinsurgency effort.

*Charles de Gaulle was born 22 November 1880. He graduated from the St Cyr Military Academy in 1912, and served as an Infantry officer during the First World War. He was wounded twice before being captured by the Germans at Verdun. After the Armistice, de Gaulle was assigned to a Polish Division forming up in France, and he served with distinction against the Soviet Army in Poland. After returning home, he served as commander of the 4th Armoured Division during the German invasion of 1940. During the battle for France, his Division enjoyed some tactical success, despite the overwhelming operational victories of the Wehrmacht. Following the fall of France in 1940, de Gaulle became one of the leaders of the Free French Forces. Charles de Gaulle was elected head of state by the French Parliament after the Second World War, and again in 1958 during the Algerian crisis. Initially determined to retain control of Algeria, de Gaulle was forced to cede independence in 1963 after public support turned against the war. He retired from office in 1969, and died 9 November 1970.*


### *Study Paper Series*

The Land Warfare Studies Centre is pleased to announce the release of the latest volume in its Study Paper Series: Bob Breen and Greg McCauley's *The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor*.

Western democracies hold their junior leaders accountable every time they and their soldiers pull the trigger, as well as for their behaviour towards those they encounter. Their tactical decisions and personal conduct may have significance that reaches far beyond their individual actions.

Corporals must be capable of operating in troubled cities, among traumatised and displaced people, while possibly being harassed by a range of unarmed and armed groups. How they react has strategic consequences. The stories from the lawless and broken cities of Baidoa in 1993 and Dili in 1999 are relevant now and into the future.

It is a hazardous business sealing poorly-marked borders in the midst of conflict. In 1999, the reactions of Australian corporals under pressure along the East Timor border had to be carefully calibrated to avoid war. This work tells stories of some close calls that averted this strategic nightmare.



*The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor* is available from the LWSC at [http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/SP\\_314.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/SP_314.pdf)