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THEOREM: For every input $(M, W, 2n$ pref. lists),
the GJS algo. outputs stable matching : $\begin{cases} |M| = |W| \\ = n \end{cases}$

Corollary: Every input to a stable matching problem has a stable matching. (Ren GJS)

Pf. : follows from the theorem.

Pf. of Theorem

let S be the output of GJS algo. on an arbitrary input.

Want to argue : S is a stable matching.

Lemma 1: For every input, GJS terminates in $\leq n^2$ iteration.

Lemma 2: S is a perfect matching.

Lemma 3: S has no instability.

Lemmas 1+2+3 \Rightarrow THEOREM

Pf. (ida) of lemma 1: In each iteration, a new proposal is made from $w \rightarrow m$, $w \in W$, $m \in M$.

$$\# \text{ iterations} = \# \text{ proposals} \leq \# \text{ pairs } (m, w) = |M \times W|$$

$$\# \text{ iterations} \leq n^2 \quad = |M| \times |W| \\ \square \quad = n \times n = n^2$$

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Obs 0: S is a matching.

Obs 1: Once a man gets engaged, he keeps getting engaged to better women.

Obs 2: GB w proposes to m after m' , $m' > m$ in ω .

Lemma 4: GB at the end of an iteration, ω is free, she has NOT proposed to all men.

Pf. (Idea) of lemma 2: proof by contradiction +
use (Obs 0 + algo. def. + lemma 1 + lemma 4).

Pf. (details): Assume that S is not a perfect matching.

by (Obs 0 + algo. def.) $\Rightarrow \exists$ a free woman.

by (Obs 0 + algo. def.) $\Rightarrow \exists$ a man n that ω has not proposed to $(*)$

By lemma 1, Gis terminates \Rightarrow All free women proposed to all men
 \Rightarrow Contradict $(*)$

□