

Feb 11

# Gale-Stapley Algorithm

## Example

- Initially all men/women are free
- In a loop, <sup>in textbook,</sup> ~~a~~ free woman proposes to a man.
- We have  $n$  matched pairs.

$n=2; M=\{BP, BBT\}; W=\{JA, AJ\}$

$L_{JA}: BP > BBT$      $L_{BP}: AJ > JA$   
 $L_{AJ}: BBT > BP$      $L_{BBT}: JA > AJ$

F: free, E: engaged

Initial state: all  $n$  men and  $n$  women are free.

<u>AJ</u>	JA	BP	BBT
F	F	F	F

- Let  $w$  be a free woman
- Q1: which man  $m$  should  $w$  propose to?
- A1: the man  $m$  on top of  $L_w$
- Q2: what should ~~a~~  $m$  do?
- A2: Accept?   
 Reject?  $\times$  ( $m, w$ ) get engaged

AJ  $\rightarrow$  BBT proposal made  
 what should BBT do?  
 Accept?  
 Reject?  $\times$  ~~A~~  
 (BBT, AJ) get engaged

AJ	JA	BP	BBT
E	F	F	E

Obs All  $n$  men & women are either engaged or some are free.

- All  $n$  men and  $n$  women are engaged.
- Q: what would the algm. do?
- A: The algm. terminates and outputs  $n$  matched pairs.

②  $\exists$  a ~~some~~ free woman  $w$

③ ~~the~~ who should  $w$  propose to?

(A1) The best man  $m$  that  $w$  has not proposed to yet.

(Q2) what should  $m$  do?

Case 1:  $m$  is free

$\Rightarrow (m, w)$  get engaged.

Case 2:  $m$  is engaged to  $w'$ .  
[ $w \neq w'$ ]

Case 2.1:  $w' > w$  in  $L_m$ .

$\Rightarrow$  nothing changes.  
 $w$  is free.

Case 2.2:  $w > w'$  in  $L_m$ .

$(m, w)$  get engaged.  
 $w'$  is free.

AS	JA		BP	BBT
E	F		F	E

Q1: who should JA propose to?  
 $(JA \rightarrow BP)$  proposal made.

Q2: what should BP do?  
~~JA~~ (BP, JA) get engaged.

AS	JA		BP	BBT
E	E		E	E