"Any process capable of reasoning intelligently about the world must
consist in part of a field of structures, of a roughly linguistic
sort, which in some fashion represent
whatever knowledge and beliefs
the process may be said to possess."
"must": this is a necessary condition of intelligence.
"consist": the process consists of these representations
the representations are "roughly linguistic": contrast connectionism
they represent "knowledge & beliefs": So, KR as:
representation of knowledge; not: representation of world.
"There is ... an internal process that ... "computes with" these
"This ... process ... react[s] only to the "form" or "shape" of these
mental representations without regard to what they mean or represent."
i.e., the process is syntactic
Version 2 (p. 33):
"Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of
structural ingredients that a) we as external observers naturally take
to represent a propositional account of the knowledge that the overall
process exhibits and b) independent of such external semantical
attribution, play a formal but causal and essential role in engendering
the behavior that manifests that knowledge."
"mechanically embodied": including us? excluding angels?
"we as external observers":
i.e., the representations aren't (necessarily) there?
or: that the structures represent propositional information is
an external (i.e., by us) semantic attribution
"propositional": i.e., linguistic
but NB: not "object-oriented" (i.e., not a taxonomic
hierarchy ontology)? (If so, then this rules out some
standard KR languages!)
the structures play a causal role; so, they must be there--but
that's a hypothesis!