CSE 719: Computational Theories of Consciousness, Fall 2009 ======================================================================== Anderson & Lebiere (2003) quotes (for bib info, see online bibliography) ======================================================================== I. The Newell "Test" ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Newell's Functional Criteria for a Human Cognitive Architecture: Proposed Operationalizations and Gradings 1. Behave as an (almost) arbitrary function of the environment -Is it computationally universal with failure? Classical Connectionism: Mixed; ACT-R: Better 2. Operate in real time -Given its timing assumptions, can it respond as fast as humans? Classical Connectionism: Worse; ACT-R: Best 3. Exhibit rational, i.e., effective adaptive behavior -Does the system yield functional behavior in the real world? Classical Connectionism: Better; ACT-R: Better 4. Use vast amounts of knowledge about the environment -How does the size of the knowledge base affect performance? Classical Connectionism: Worse; ACT-R: Mixed 5. Behave robustly in the face of error, the unexpected, and the unknown -Can it produce cognitive agents that successfully inhabit dynamic environments? Classical Connectionism: Mixed; ACT-R: Better 6. Integrate diverse knowledge -Is it capable of common examples of intellectual combination? Classical Connectionism: Worse; ACT-R: Mixed 7. Use (natural) language -Is it ready to take a test of language proficiency? Classical Connectionism: Better; ACT-R: Worse 8. Exhibit self-awareness and a sense of self -Can it produce functional accounts of phenomena that reflect consciousness ["can it produce [subliminal perception, implicit learning & memory, and metacognitive processes] in a way that explains why they are functional aspects of human cognition" (p.4)] Classical Connectionism: Worse; ACT-R: Worse 9. Learn from its environment -Can it produce the variety of human learning Classical Connectionism: Better; ACT-R: Better 10. Acquire capabilities through development -Can it account for developmental phenomena? Classical Connectionism: Better; ACT-R: Worse 11. Arise through evolution -Does the theory relate to evolutionary and comparative considerations? Classical Connectionism: Worst; ACT-R: Worst 12. Be realizable within the brain -Do the components of the theory exhaustively map onto brain processes? Classical Connectionism: Best; ACT-R: Worse" (p.2) II. From "General Description of ACT-R" ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "The flow of cognition in [ACT-R] is in response to the current goal, currently active information from declarative memory, information attended to in perceptual modules..., and the current state of motor modules....These components...hold the information that the productions can access in buffers, and these buffers serve much the same function as the subsytems of Baddeley's...working-memory theory." (p.7) III. From "Grading ACT-R" ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "...what people are potentially conscious of is contained in ACT-R's set of buffers...--the current goal, the current information retrieved from long-term memory, the current information attended in the various sensory modalities, and the state of various motor modules....The activity of consciousness is the processing of these buffer contents by production rules. There is no Cartesian Theater. [WHY NOT? WHY ISN'T/AREN'T THE BUFFER(S) THE C.T.?] ACT-R is aware of the contents of the buffers only as they are used by the production rules." (p.14) IV. From Anderson 2007 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I have...come to the conclusion that this [I.E., THE BUFFER CONTENTS] is indeed what consciousness is and that running ACT-R models are conscious....This...is basically the ACT-R realization of the global workspace theory....[CITES BAARS AND DEHAENE, AND GOES ON TO AGREE WITH DENNETT'S MULTIPLE DRAFTS & CEREBRAL CELEBRITY, THEN SAYS:] [O]ur phenomenal conscious experience is just the exercise of our ability to access and reflect on the contents of our buffers....[C]onsciousness is the solution to the fundamental problem of achieving the mind in the brain....[C]onsciousness is the manifestation of the solution to the need for global coordination among modules....It is...not clear to me how invoking the concept of consciousness adds to the understanding of the human mind, but taking a coherent reading of the term consciousness, I am willing to declare ACT-R conscious." (pp. 244-247)