CSE 719:  Computational Theories of Consciousness, Fall 2009

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Block (1995) quotes (for bib info, see online bibliography)
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1.  Phenomenal consciousness:
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a)
PC "is experience".  (sect 2, para 6)
PC "properties are experiential properties" (s3p2)

b)
"...what makes a state [BRAIN ST? MENTAL ST?] phenomenally conscious is
that there is something 'it is like'...to be in that state." (s2p6)

c)
"A state is [PC] if it has experiential properties.  The totality of the
experiential properties of a state are 'what it is like' to have it."
(s3p2)
	[THE 1st SENTENCE FOLLOWS FROM 1b & THE 2nd SENT.]

d)
"...we have [PC] states when we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains.
[PC] properties include the experiential properties of sensations,
feelings[,] perceptions,...thoughts, wants and emotions." (s3p2)

e)
"...differences in intentional content often make a [PC] difference.
What it is like to hear a sound as coming from the left differs from
what it is like to hear a sound as coming from the right." (s3p2)

f)
PC "is often representational." (s3p2)

g)
PC "properties [are] distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or
functional property.  (Cognitive = essentially involving thought;
intentional properties = properties in virtue of which a representation
or state is about something; functional properties = e.g. properties
definable in terms of a computer program.)...[F]unctionalism about [PC]
is false....Although [PC] content cannot be reduced to intentional
content, [PC] contents often have an intentional aspect, and also [PC]
contents often represent in a primitive non-intentional way." (s3p2)


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2.  Access consciousness:
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a)
"A perceptual state [!] is access conscious roughly speaking if its
content--what is represented by the perceptual state--is processed via
that information processing function..." (s2p11)
	[NAMELY, "integrating the outputs of the specialized
	["knowledge" (s2p6)] modules and transmitting the integrated
	contents to mechanisms of reasoning and control of action and
	reporting" (s2p6)]

b)
"A [BRAIN? MENTAL? PERCEPTUAL?] state [or its content (s4p2)] is [AC]
if [but not only if, because of clause (3) (s4p2)], in virtue of one's
having the state, a representation of its content is (1) inferentially
promiscuous...  i.e., poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, and
(2) poised for *rational* control of action and (3) poised for rational
control of speech." (s4p2)


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3.  Comparisons & contrasts:
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a)
AC & PC "interact". (s4p3)
	[ALTHOUGH BOTH EXAMPLES SHOW CHANGES IN AC CAUSING CHANGES IN PC]

b)
"...it is in virtue of its [P] content...that a state is" PC;
...it is in virtue of its representational content...that a state is" AC,
[BECAUSE "only representational content can figure in reasoning"] (s4p5)

c)
AC "is a functional notion...: what makes a state [AC] is what a
representation of its content does in a system....[PC] is not a
functional notion".  ...what makes content [AC] is not anything that
could go on *inside* a module, but rather informational relations
*among* modules." (s4p8)

d)
"...there is such a thing as a [PC] *type* or *kind* of state....the
feel of pain is a [PC] type--every pain must have that feel.  But any
particular token thought that is [AC] at a given time could fail to be
accessible at some other time...." (s4p9)

e)
"The paradigm [PC] states are sensations, whereas the paradigm [AC]
states are 'propositional attitude' states like thoughts, beliefs and
desires...." (s4p10)


4.  AC w/o PC & vice versa:
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a) zombies, blindsight patients could have AC but not PC (s6p2-3)

b) a PC animal with "brain damage [that] has destroyed centers of
reasoning and rational control of action, thus preventing [AC]" (s7p1)