CSE 719:  Computational Theories of Consciousness, Fall 2009

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Dehaene (2001) quotes (for bib info, see online bibliography)
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1. p. 1
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"...this global availability of information through the [global
neuronal] workspace *is* what we subjectively experience as a conscious
state."


2. p. 3, para 0
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"The task of cognitive neuroscience is to identify which mental
representations and, ultimately, which brain states are associated with
such [conscious phenomenological reports].  Within a materialistic
framework, each instance of mental activity is also a physical brain
state.  The cognitive neuroscience of consciousness aims at determining
whether there is a systematic form of information processing and a
reproducible class of neuronal activation patterns that systematically
distinguish mental states that subjects label as 'conscious' from other
states."


3. p. 3, para 1
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"In order to cross-correlate subjective reports of consciousness with
neuronal or information-processing states, the first crucial step is
**to take seriously introspective phenomenological reports**."
[cites Dennett]


4. p. 4, para 3
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"...it would be inappropriate, and a form of 'category error', to attempt
to reduce consciousness to a low level of neural organization...without
specifying in functional terms the consequences of the neural organization
at the cognitive level.  While characterization of such neural bases will
clearly be indispensable to our understanding of consciousness, it
cannot suffice.  A full theory will require many more 'bridging laws' to
explain how these neural events organize into larger-scale active
circuits, how those circuits themselves support specific representations
and forms of information processing, and how these processes are
ultimately associated with conscious reports."


5. p. 13, para 1:
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"...during the performance of effortful tasks, [subjects] can
temporarily inhibit the automatic activation of some [presumably modular]
processors and enter into a strategic or 'controlled' mode of
processing....Many cognitive theories share the hypothesis that
controlled processing requires a distinct functional architecture which
goes beyond modularity and can establish flexible links amongst existing
processors.  It has been called...the global workspace
(Baars...Dehaene), or the dynamic core (...Edelman)."


6. p. 14, para 0
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"...at least 5 main categories of neural systems must participate in the
workspace:  perceptual circuits..., motor circuits..., LTM circuits,
evaluation circuits, and attentional circuits....*The global
interconnection of those 5 systems can explain [HOW?] the subjective
unitary nature of consciousness* and the feeling that conscious
information can be manipulated mentally in a largely unconstrained
fashion....[C]onnections to the motor and language systems allow any
workspace content to be described verbally or non-verbally...."


7. p. 30, para 1
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"The repertoire of possible contents of consciousness is...characterized
by an enormous combinatorial diversity: each workspace state is...of
'high complexity', in the terminology of Tononi & Edelman.  Thus, *the
flux of neuronal workspace states associated with a perceptual experience
is vastly beyond accurate verbal description or long-term memory storage.*
...[A]lthough the major organization of this repertoire is shared by all
members of the species, its details result from a developmental process
of epigenesis and *are therefore specific to each individual*. [this
allows, even requires, "inverted" qualia]  Thus, the contents of
perceptual awareness [= qualia?] are complex, dynamic, multi-faceted
neural states that cannot be memorized or transmitted to others in their
entirety.  These biological properties seem potentially capable of
substantiating philosophers' intuitions about the 'qualia' of conscious
experience..."