CSE 719:  Computational Theories of Consciousness, Fall 2009

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Moor (1988) quotes (for bib info, see online bibliography)
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1.
"Whether robots really have qualia is a contingent matter which cannot
be rigorously empirically tested.  I don't believe this defeats
functionalism, but does suggest that a significant part of the argument
for functionalism must be non-evidential." (pp. 114-115.)


2.
"...the attribution of qualia [to either humans or robots] gives us
essential explanatory power....Good explanations are what determine
ontology in this case....[T]here will be lower level explanations of
robot behavior in terms of circuitry [just as] there will be lower level
explanations of human behavior in terms of neurology....[T]hese lower
level explanations will be compatible with, but in general not as
perspicuous as, higher level explanations of behavior in terms of
qualia....[I]t will always be logically possible that attributing
qualia to robots is a mistake.  But this is a general feature of
induction and not a special problem about qualia."  (p. 115)


3.
"If robots which had the appropriate behavior and functionality were
constructed, then the increase in explanatory power [provided by
hypothesizing the existence of qualia] would eliminate the meat/metal
distinction with regard to qualia.  In such a situation, there is no
wrong stuff; people and robots are both made of chemicals, and as it
turns out, chemicals are the right stuff."  (p. 116)