I see him. The things I know about what I see can be true of many things I do not see. So what it is I know about what I see cannot determine what it is that I see.

The fact is that I don't have to know anything about Humpty to see him, certainly nothing that would distinguish him from a variety of other possible candidates for perceptual object (e.g., Dumpty). I can even see Humpty under conditions (e.g., 200 yards at dusk) when he looks the same as any other person (not just Dumpty). What, then, is the force of the claim that it is my *cognitive* contact with Humpty that makes *him* the person I see? Either Kim must deny that I am in direct cognitive contact with Humpty under these adverse conditions, thus denying that I see him, or he must eliminate the *epistemic* implications of being in direct cognitive contact with something. Either option is disastrous for a *cognitive* theory of reference.

FRED I. DRETSKE

University of Wisconsin

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION EASTERN DIVISION

Abstracts of Colloquium Papers to be read at the Seventy-fourth Annual Meeting

I. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

ARISTOTLE ON THE EXISTENTIAL IMPORT OF SINGULAR SENTENCES

Aristotle is sometimes held to the thesis (T1) that singular affirmative sentences imply the existence of a bearer for the grammatical subject of the sentence. Thus the truth of "Socrates is sick" requires that something exist that is identical with Socrates. Attribution of T1 to Aristotle is typically justified by appeal to *Categories* 13b27-33, which looks to contain a straightforward statement of the thesis. Unfortunately, T1's status becomes problematic in light of *On Interpretation* 21a24-28, for here Aristotle seems to deny T1 explicitly. This, at least, is the consensus among his commentators. We are thus faced with a serious inconsistency in Aristotle's account of singular sentences, an inconsistency most interpreters are content merely to mention if they notice it at all. In this paper I suggest a reconciliation between the troublesome passages.

MICHAEL WEDIN

University of California at Davis

KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF, AND REFERENCE: *THEAETETUS* 206c-210d

In the last pages of the *Theaetetus,* Plato considers and criticizes the claim that knowledge is true belief with an account; he rejects three senses of 'account' (*logos*) whose addition might, but does not, turn true belief into knowledge, and no satisfactory sense of 'account' is uncovered. I argue that the aporetic conclusion does not show that Plato has abandoned a commitment to a logos-based epistemology; he suggests an appropriate sense of 'account' in the course of criticizing the second sense of 'logos', arguing that knowledge consists in an ability systematically to interrelate various propositions. This interrelation model, as well as the theories of belief and reference suggested here, press the importance of descriptive content, to the neglect of ostension and causal or historical connections in the world.

GAIL FINE

Cornell University

ARISTOTLE: REFERENCE, REAL DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES

Two important strands in Aristotle's thought seem to be at odds: (1) he is a category theorist and pays great attention to logical form, but (2) he also believes that there are natural kinds and that essential properties need not be the properties most familiar to us or the experts. The first is mystifying in a realist unless he believes the categories of our conceptual systems must also be the categories of reality, but the second may suggest a resemblance to the picture of reference presented recently by Kripke and Putnam, which is incompatible with this. I argue that Aristotle differs profoundly from Kripke and Putnam on reference in a way that allows us to reconcile (1) and (2). The difference hinges on how each takes familiar characteristics to be related to essential properties. On Aristotle's view, reference cannot be rigid.

JOAN KUNG

Marquette University

FREE WILL

COULD IT REALLY HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE?

In this paper I argue that the belief that a given thing could have been other than what it in fact is, is highly metaphysical; that is to say, it is the sort of belief for which experience is not relevant, and, hence, it is intelligible only in the context of a larger metaphysical structure. This structure is atomism. I then explore the possibility of embedding the denial of the above belief (that a given thing could have been otherwise) in a non-atomistic framework, and argue that the consequences of so doing are more in accord with our humanitarian intuitions than is the belief in free will.

NEAL GROSSMAN

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

SOCIAL FORCES, HUMAN ACTIONS

Historians and social scientists often claim to describe the influence of social forces or institutions upon the actions (work, views, assertions, etc.) of individual human agents. But is such "influence" supposed to be *causal* in nature? or can it be effective only via the *motivation* of the agents involved? It would seem that questions of this sort are important for theorists of human action in that they concern the relationship (s) between actions and the social contexts in which agents live. This essay seeks to clarify different "social-forces" claims about the actions, work, and assertions involved in the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. Particularly useful in interpreting one sort of claim is a role-rule approach to human action as elaborated by some recent social psychologists and action theorists. Briefly, this approach allows us to conceive a noncausal, nonmotivational role in human action for social forces, a role consistent with both individual human creativity and the social roots of agency.

JOHN CONNOLLY

Smith College

TIMELESSNESS AND THEOLOGICAL FATALISM

The *timelessness solution* deployed by St. Thomas Aquinas to avoid fatalism consists of the following doctrines: (1) what is past is necessary; so if God knew ahead of time that an event E would take place, E would take place of necessity; and (2) God cannot be held to have foreknowledge of events because His knowledge is timeless. I argue that (2) commits Aquinas to timeless propositions and timeless truth, whereas (1) commits him to temporal propositions and temporal truth. From the claim that God has timeless knowledge of event E by virtue of His omniscience, I argue, it follows that a temporal proposition concerning E is true ahead of time. Fatalism results by an argument that Aquinas agrees is valid, and the timelessness solution fails.

Colby College

ROBERT P. MCARTHUR

PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC

LOGICAL FORM, PERSPICUITY, AND FIRST-ORDER LANGUAGES

In this paper I consider the proposition that logical forms are perspicuous, important, and first-order. I argue that it is incorrect to maintain, as Donald Davidson has, that the importance of first-order paraphrases of natural English is semantic. By contrast, I suggest an account of perspicuity which is Russellian in spirit and according to which the importance of logical form resides in its making validity accessible to sys-

tematic treatment. I claim that this is a coherent, though very ambitious, philosophical program.

R. M. SAINSBURY

University of Essex

ON A THEORY OF LOGICAL CONSTANCY

In a recent interesting paper,[1] Christopher Peacocke has proposed an epistemological criterion for an expression of a language characterized by a theory of satisfaction being a logical constant of that language. In this paper, I describe and criticize Peacocke's criterion. It is argued that the criterion fails to provide a sufficient condition of an expression's being a logical constant; moreover, the counterinstances adduced to show this make it probable that any satisfactory rehabilitation of the criterion must rely upon an independent solution to the problem at issue.

TIMOTHY MCCARTHY

University of Michigan

REPARSING AND ESSENTIALISM

Quine has argued that proper names can be reparsed as predicates and that essentialism is unacceptable, in particular as it pertains to modal logic. With regard to this I will attempt to establish the following: (a) that there are two respects in which the reparsing thesis implies essentialism; (b) that the reparsing thesis is inconsistent with modal logic.

The claim that essentialism is unacceptable is necessary to Quine's criticism of modal logic. Hence, the import of (a) is this: if (a) is true, then either proper names cannot be reparsed as predicates or the argument against modal logic in terms of essentialism fails.

Quine maintains that the reparsing thesis is neutral with regard to the acceptability of modal logic. It follows from (b) that this is false. So his argument for why modal logic is unacceptable should be not that it requires essentialism, but rather that it implies that proper names cannot be reparsed.

STEPHEN CRODDY

West Chester State College, Pennsylvania

II. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

REFERENCE AND LINGUISTIC AUTHORITY

After citing counterexamples to both the descriptive-cluster and historical causal theories of reference, I propose a criterion for assigning reference

[1] "What Is a Logical Constant?" this JOURNAL, LXXIII, 9 (May 9, 1976): 221-240.

which avoids them. The proposal amounts to accepting Hilary Putnam's "linguistic division of labor," but rejecting a general appeal to original dubbing acts and historical paradigms for natural kinds. I argue that we can assign reference and extension according to tests of currently acknowledged experts, while still preserving reference across theory change if we wish to do so. Reference always will be relative to current speakers' intentions to use terms in certain ways, but not relative to their false beliefs about objects to which they refer.

ALAN H. GOLDMAN

University of Miami

DEVIANT TRANSLATION

Quine has argued that translation of truth-functional connectives is (with some exceptions) determinate. In this paper the question is asked whether or not circumstances might exist in which one would do well to build a "deviant logic" into a translation manual and, if so, whether translation of logic would remain determinate. It is argued that such circumstances could exist and that, at least in some cases, translation of deviant logics would not be significantly less determinate than would translation of classical propositional logic.

CHRIS SWOYER

University of Oklahoma

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

ANSELMIAN AGENCY: A MEDIEVAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE THEORY OF ACTION

Anselm of Canterbury's recently discovered *Philosophical Fragments* contain a subtle account of agency and human action. Although some action theorists have praised and even defended Anselm's approach, only one of its features has received attention. This paper elucidates the various aspects of Anselm's analysis and their unifying principle, and assesses the philosophical utility of the complete theory of human action. I call for qualification of Arthur Danto's claim that Anselm's theory might have radically affected the historical development of action theory; but I also contend that Anselm's contribution highlights several possible shortcomings of our leading action theories.

EILEEN SERENE

Stanford University

DID OCKHAM USE HIS RAZOR?

Ockham's razor is not Ockham's. Ockham was not the first to have coined "entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem"; he had no part in formulating it. Ockham was not the most avid user of principles of

parsimony; the principle Ockham used to reduce the ontology of his realist opponents was his principle of absolute divine omnipotence, a principle of possible plenitude. Ockham did hold methodological principles of parsimony, but he was not the first to coin these either. Ockham must have regarded his principles as methodological and must have been careful not to state them as a metaphysical doctrine. Ockham's views on metaphysics and theology seem to have been inconsistent with his holding a metaphysical principle of parsimony.

ROGER ARIEW

University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign

AESTHETICS

CONFERRED ARTIFACTUALITY

A variety of works from Dada, Pop, and later movements of contemporary art, particularly *objets-trouvés* or Found Art, render problematic the traditional assumption that works of art are always artifacts. Various attempts have been made to shore up this assumption: for instance, George Dickie holds that artifactuality can be "conferred" as well as worked upon an object, though he admits he is "uneasy" about this claim. Although Dickie does not supply a workable account of how artifactuality can be conferred upon pre-existing natural or ready-made objects, this paper appeals to the notion of a comparison between before and after states of a perceptual object as a test for the "work" of an artist, and finds that the bestowal of a title frequently, though not invariably, gives rise to "conferred artifactuality." Duchamp's *Fountain* meets this test; his *Bottle Dryer* does not, though both are examples of readymades in Found Art. The simplicity of this test, and the fact that it both accords with our precritical notions and provides a basis for assessing the talents of the artist, argues for retention of the artifactuality criterion as a necessary condition for art.

M. PABST BATTIN

University of Utah

DEFINING ART HISTORICALLY

In this paper, after indicating my dissatisfaction with the current "institutional" theory of art, I offer an alternative theory (also relational). The central insight of the theory is that the concept of art is *essentially* grounded in what art contingently has been. I take art to be an activity of making objects *for* regard in some way, and distinguish this activity from other object-making activities by focusing on the characteristic *historically* directed *intention* involved. I argue that (in the central case) making art (as opposed to making non-art) is intending an object for regard in any way that previous artworks have been regarded. I then explain how revolutionary art can be accommodated through a modification of the required intention. The definition developed is presented in a

single-stage and also a recursive form. At this point I contrast further my theory and the institutional one on several issues, and end by defending my theory against some objections made to the institutional theory which could also be raised to mine.

JERROLD LEVINSON

University of Maryland, College Park

III. DESCARTES AND SPINOZA

DESCARTES'S IDENTITY OF MATTER AND EXTENSION AS AN INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION

In this paper, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that Descartes had in mind an inference to the best explanation (henceforth, IBE) argument for his celebrated identity of matter and extension (or space. For the purposes of this paper, I will regard the terms 'extension' and 'space' as interchangeable). IBE arguments are *inductive,* not *deductive,* arguments. The conclusion Descartes should—and does—draw concerning matter and extension using this kind of argument, like the conclusions of all IBE arguments, is *probable,* not *certain.* Thus, Descartes's use of an IBE argument, especially in support of a doctrine that forms the cornerstone of his physics and metaphysics, is rather startling given the traditional view of Descartes as relying most heavily—if not exclusively—on *certain conclusions* and *deductive arguments.* Yet Descartes does, I will show, spend lots of time articulating points that could, and should, be construed as ammunition for such an argument. Indeed, he spends as much time on such points as he does on the deductive argument he offers at the beginning of *Principles* II, the argument to which commentators, including Keeling and Kemp Smith, have paid exclusive attention.

FLO LEIBOWITZ

Oregon State University

SPINOZA AND THE CONCEPT OF BELIEF

It has been argued, notably by E. M. Curley, that Spinoza effects a significant improvement on Descartes in his treatment of the concept of belief, in that he recognizes, unlike Descartes, that beliefs cannot be voluntary actions. I contend that to describe the situation this way is to miss a fundamental feature of Spinoza's epistemology; the real point should be that, on a more or less ordinary view of belief as an epistemological notion, Spinoza's philosophy does not include a concept of belief at all. This is argued partly by pointing out that beliefs, as regards their internal nature, might be true *or* false, whereas, according to Spinoza, whoever has a true idea recognizes *ipso facto* that he has a true

idea. The point has important implications for the concept of knowledge, which is to be taken in Spinoza not as species of belief, but as a sort of direct mental apprehension of what is.

THOMAS CARSON MARK

University of California at San Diego

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

MODELS AND LAWLIKENESS

Do analogical models ever play an essential role in scientific explanation and confirmation, or is their role (at most) heuristic? For many years scientists and philosophers have debated this question. I argue that such models may sometimes play an essential role. My argument is based on a proposal to augment Goodman's theory of projection in order to make it easier for novel predicates (extensions) to acquire entrenchment. The heart of this proposal is the claim that analogical models may, under certain conditions, be the medium whereby entrenchment is passed from well-established predicates to new and unfamiliar ones.

JAMES ROPER

Michigan State University

MODELS, METAPHORS, AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM

In this paper, I examine Ernan McMullin's fertility criterion of theory assessment and its associated view of the role of models and metaphor in physical theory. I then investigate the sense in which these strands combine with a realist view of theoretical models to form a coherent defense of scientific realism. Having done this, I put forth a putative counterexample to the realism of the developed view and suggest an alternative analysis which, I argue, captures the essential insights of McMullin's position while avoiding one of its central problems.

MICHAEL BRADIE

Bowling Green State University

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

PHYSICALISM AND THE IDENTITY THEORY

The *contingent*-identity theory commits its advocates, e.g., Smart and Armstrong, to two claims: (1) some entities have mental states, and (2) whatever exists is physical. However, J. T. Stevenson has suggested a line of argument which, were it correct, would show these two claims to be incompatible. I clarify this objection and then suggest ways in which it

might be met. I argue that none of these attempts to escape the objection succeed. Moreover, I argue that a Kripke-inspired *necessary*-identity theory is also defeated by an argument of the Stevenson type. I conclude that, given the implausibility of idealism and the grave difficulties that beset eliminative materialism, *some* form of dualism is probably true.

EVELYN PLUHAR

Grinnell College

DISAPPEARANCE AND THE IDENTITY THEORY

One standard model, or paradigm, used to justify the claim that "there might turn out to be no mental entities" is unable to support the conclusions often drawn from it. The difficulties confronting the eliminative materialist are highlighted by considering the position as developed and defended by Richard Rorty. It is argued: (1) Rorty fails to establish that incorrigibility is a unique "mark of the mental" and, consequently, has not justified the claim that empirical considerations could lead us to eliminate talk of the mental; and (2) the paradigm Rorty advances to justify the elimination of "mental entities" cannot be extended to cover both thoughts and sensations without sacrificing the required account of the "private" or "subjective" dimension of the mental. As a result, in order to defend eliminative materialism, one must either produce a wholly different and more general justification for elimination, or defend a restricted version incorporating a limited identity theory.

ROBERT RICHARDSON

University of Cincinnati

IV. ETHICS

RULE UTILITARIANISM IN PARTIAL COMPLIANCE THEORY

It would not decrease the amount of good produced by universal obedience to a set of rules, to alter the rules by adding a provision that allows any act whatsoever to be done in case the rules have been disobeyed. Therefore rule utilitarianism as commonly formulated implies that, in case wrong has been done, any act whatsoever is right. This result is far graver than one to which David Lyons calls attention.

The unwelcome consequence is avoided by the doctrine that an act is right if it conforms to a fair set of rules obedience to which by any and every portion of the population would produce at least as much good as obedience by that same portion to any alternative fair set of rules. Without the fairness requirement, this condition would be satisfied by the act-utilitarian maxim; with the requirement, it seems compatible with the spirit of rule utilitarianism.

B. C. POSTOW

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

ALAN GEWIRTH AND THE MORAL LAW

In this paper I summarize (and clean up a bit) Gewirth's most recent attempt to ground moral obligation Kantian-style [1], expose its weaknesses, and try to eliminate them. Gewirth argues cleverly that, say, even a fanatical and racist Nazi's purposive action commits him to saying that *all* agents have the right to freedom and "basic well-being." I find a mistake here, but, by drawing an analogy between being Jewish and having a disease with self-concealing symptoms, suggest how the argument might be repaired. I weaken the rest of the argument enough not to imply that we ought to let murderers murder, and strengthen it enough to imply that we are obligated to persons who share none of our circumstances and purposes. I conclude that, but for the possibly reparable error, Gewirth's argument does indeed establish an absolute obligation, but only the obligation to observe other agents' rights to life and consciousness.

JOHN HOOKER

Vanderbilt University

PHILOSOPHY OF SARTRE

SARTRE'S *TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO:* A METHODOLOGICAL READING

To be adequately understood, Sartre's *The Transcendence of the Ego* must be read as developing two distinct but related themes. The first theme concerns the worldliness of the ego as an object of consciousness. The second deals with the pre-reflective ground of the phenomenological *epoché*. Though not ignoring Sartre's rejection of Husserl's egology, this paper focuses on the significance of Sartre's assertion that the *epoché* is originally an existential anxiety that is imposed upon us, and not, as Husserl claimed, a freely willed intellectual procedure. It concludes that Sartre's critique of Husserl's methodology anticipates his discussion of bad faith in *Nausea* and *Being and Nothingness.*

DEBRA BERGOFFEN

George Mason University

PRAXIS AND VISION: ELEMENTS OF A SARTREAN EPISTEMOLOGY

Sartre's epistemological claims over the years issue from two basic premises: the phenomenological thesis that knowledge is *vision* and the Hegelian-Marxian tenet that knowledge is totalizing *praxis.* On these foundations, I maintain, he has constructed two mutually conflicting theories of evidence, truth, rationality, and knowledge. The incoherence of Sartrean epistemology comes to the fore in his treatment of the structure/history dichotomy. By analyzing his vision and praxis epistemologies as they

[1] "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,* XLVII (1973/74): 34-61.

evolve from *Transcendence of the Ego* to *The Family Idiot* and *Situations. X,* I hope to articulate in detail the fact and nature of this epistemic incoherency, consider its implications for the structuralist controversy, and weigh the possibility of a *coupure épistémologique* in Sartre's over-all thought.

THOMAS R. FLYNN

Saint Mary's Seminary and University, Baltimore

ONTOLOGY

WHAT IS MENTAL MUST BE PHYSICAL

It is argued that, if something has sensations, thoughts, or other forms of mental activity, then it must have physical properties. Indeed, it must have a surprising number of physical properties. In the course of giving the two main arguments for this conclusion, an account of unconscious mental states as merely "mental by courtesy" is presented. An alternative is proposed to the all too common functionalist accounts of the mind.

C. B. MARTIN

The University of Calgary

ADVERBIAL THEORIES AND MEINONGIAN THEORIES

A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects is the act-content-object analysis of psychological experiences. It is suggested that Meinong's theory *need* not be based on this analysis and that an *adverbial* theory might be sufficient. The adverbial alternative is defended against a recent objection due to Roderick Chisholm, and an apparently more serious objection is presented based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark.

WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

State University of New York, College at Fredonia

V. PERSONS

BEING A PERSON—DOES IT MATTER?

Persons are overwhelmingly the beings to whom moral considerations apply. It may therefore be supposed that being a person is itself a moral consideration. It has been claimed, for example, that the proper policy to adopt toward fetuses and the irreversibly comatose hinges on whether they are persons. In this paper I examine three types of construals of 'person' and argue that none provides a sense in which being a person is a morally relevant property. I conclude that no moral debate is likely to be advanced by determining whether some affected party is or is not a a person.

LOREN LOMASKY

University of Minnesota, Duluth

PERSON ESSENTIALISM AND DEGREES OF BEING

Does Karen Quinlan still exist? Some philosophers argue that she does, others that she does not. I think that the truth lies somewhere in between. In this paper, an argument is given supporting the thesis that existence is not an all-or-nothing affair.

Attention first is focused upon the claim that objects have certain properties or attributes to different extents or degrees. The argument in behalf of the "degrees-of-being" thesis is then developed. The crucial assumption upon which the argument rests is that individuals have *essential* properties conforming to the "property-by-degree" thesis. In particular, the property of being a person is a likely candidate for the role of a property that is both essential to its bearers and also possessed to varying extents or degrees.

RANDOLPH CARTER

North Carolina State University

NAMING AND ABORTING

Recent discussions of semantics and abortion have not made much contact with each other. This small paper is designed to raise a problem concerning that. It argues that, if views about natural-kind words arising out of the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putman are true, then it follows clearly that abortion is, in most cases, the deliberate destruction of a human for one's own convenience. A paper by Lawrence Becker in *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* "Human Being: The Boundaries of a Concept,"[1] is criticized. Becker gives an argument against the view that '*x* is a human being' applies truly to an embryo or a zygote. I argue that, if Kripke and Putnam are right about natural-kind words, then 'human', as a noun, must apply to those entities.

LLOYD REINHARDT

University of California at Santa Barbara

EPISTEMOLOGY

CHISHOLM ON A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE

The existence of a priori knowledge has faced two major challenges in the history of philosophy. The first, usually associated with John Stuart Mill, denies the existence of such knowledge by attempting to show that those propositions traditionally believed to be knowable only a priori are in fact known on the basis of experience. The second, usually associated

[1] IV, 4 (Summer 1975): 334-359.

with W. V. Quine and his followers, rests upon more general considerations such as the illegitimacy of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In his book, *Theory of Knowledge*,[1] Roderick M. Chisholm attempts to defend the existence of a priori knowledge against the first challenge by offering several arguments which purport to establish that "truths of reason" cannot be known a posteriori. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine these arguments and to show how they might be answered by a philosopher such as Mill.

ALBERT CASULLO

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

INFERENTIAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE INFINITE REGRESS

It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief must come to an end. But, if this is so, we should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justificatory process. Unfortunately, although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, it is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine and criticize several seemingly plausible ways of showing that regresses of inferential justification are impossible and then propose two requirements of inferential justification which, I argue, are sufficient to show the impossibility.

RICHARD FOLEY

University of Notre Dame

WARRANT, IDEAL BELIEF, AND FIRST-PERSON PROPOSITIONS

The basic notion in epistemology is that of a proposition being evidentially warranted for a person at a time. I believe that an adequate analysis of this notion will centrally involve counterfactuals. I try to show this by outlining an analysis of warrant in terms of what a person would believe as an "empirically ideal" believer. That an analysis involves counterfactuals is problematic only if familiar difficulties in interpreting counterfactuals show up in the analysis. Consideration of propositions about a person's own psychological states indicates that some of these difficulties are present in the analysis of warrant outlined here. The counterfactual conditions for being an "empirically ideal" believer involve changes in these psychological states. I consider three approaches to meeting the difficulties.

MARK PASTIN

Indiana University, Bloomington

[1] Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

PROPOSITIONS

A NEW APPROACH TO PROPOSITIONS AND FACTS

A semantic theory is presented in which both language-independent propositions and facts have an integral role. The theory is extensional and model-theoretic, facts and propositions being explicated as ordered pairs whose constituents are extensions (objects and predicate-extension sets). *Facts* are ordered pairs (x,z)—including ordered n-tuples expressed thus—for which x is a member of z, and *Propositions* are ordered pairs of ordered pairs $((x,y), (x,z))$—such that (x,z) is a Fact—which are true if and only if $(x,y) = (x,z)$. Truth can thus be defined explicitly in the theory without danger from the semantic paradoxes.

Molecular Propositions can also be defined, and, furthermore, the theory allows for distinct but logically equivalent Propositions such as 'p' and 'p is true' (with a corresponding distinction for Facts), so that some standard objections to usual extensional conceptions of these entities can be avoided. Generally the theory provides a perspicuous rendering of semantic structure.

JOHN DILWORTH

Western Michigan University

SENTENCES AND PROPOSITIONS

The recent view of proper names as simple designators or rigid designators seems to legitimatize substitution in intensional contexts of proper names that denote the same object. If we can substitute such expressions in intensional contexts, how are we to explain the seeming invalidity of arguments like the following?

(1) Jones believes that Tully is Tully.
(2) Cicero is Tully.
Therefore
(3) Jones believes that Cicero is Tully.

I argue that, if names such as 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are simple designators, then the above argument is valid. The counterintuitiveness of accepting the validity of such arguments can be explained away by pointing out a distinction between sentences and propositions. By distinguishing between the objects of belief (i.e., propositions) and the way we express our beliefs (i.e., sentences in a language), one can see that the way we describe or characterize our beliefs is intimately connected with the language we speak. Hence, one can explain away what appear to be contradictory beliefs by reference to the language used to express those beliefs. In this way we can account for the validity of certain arguments that appear counterintuitive.

GREGORY FITCH

Arizona State University

PROPOSITIONS FOR SEMANTICS AND PROPOSITIONS FOR EPISTEMOLOGY

We argue that propositions have been called upon to play two quite distinct roles in philosophy, as in the contexts, ". . . means that *p*" and ". . . believes that *p*" and that two quite different kinds of propositional entity are required. For semantics we need (atomic, nonintensional) G-propositions, whose constituents are one or more individuals and a property or relation. Current possible-worlds semantics is vitiated by reason of the fact that "Socrates is wise in *w*" is unintelligible. So we define a possible world to be a set of G-propositions and give enumerative and recursive definitions of atomic, molecular, and general propositions as sets of possible worlds. These are the propositions for epistemology.

N. L. WILSON

McMaster University

NOTES AND NEWS

Career counseling for individuals by members of the APA Subcommittee on Nonacademic Careers will be available at the Eastern Division meetings. In order to make the best use of time, and to provide more personalized counseling, appointments for counseling must be made *prior* to the Eastern Division meetings. If possible, counseling sessions between 30 and 45 minutes will be set aside for each individual. To make an appointment, send your name, address, and a brief description of your background, career goals, and things you would like to discuss. Also note any times that you will not be available. Send the above information to: Mike Davis, 165 Wesmond Dr., Alexandria, VA 22305.

Although a schedule has not yet been made up, the number of hours the Subcommittee members can devote to individual counseling will be limited. Appointments will be made on a first come, first served basis. Applications can be submitted now, and a schedule will be created by mid-December. At that time we will send you the time and place for counseling, and some material for you to read. Applications for counseling cannot be accepted after December 15, 1977.

The Bertrand Russell Society announces a call for papers to be presented at its meeting at The Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia in December 1978. Papers may be on any aspect of Russell's philosophy. They should have a reading time of about one half an hour and should be submitted in triplicate, typed and double spaced with an abstract of not more than 150 words. The name of the author, with his address and the title of the paper, should be submitted on a separate page. The deadline for the papers is May 15, 1978, and the papers should be sent to Edwin Hopkins, Chairman, Philosophers Com-