Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox

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I. INTRODUCTION

This essay presents a re-examination of Alexius Meinong's article "*Über Gegenstandstheorie*" ("On the Theory of Objects") [26] and undertakes a clarification and revision of it which, I hope, is both faithful to Meinong and capable of overcoming the various objections to his theory that have appeared in the literature.[1] I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons, using the modified theory as a sharper tool for investigating their worth than that provided by unaided intuitions or less comprehensive, ad-hoc theory fragments.

As with all theories, many of my claims are not susceptible of proof but, rather, gain their plausibility and value from their ability to deal with data and to provide solutions to various problems. The two main problems which, I believe, a properly constructed Meinongian theory ought to be capable of handling are, first, a linguistic problem of long-standing philosophical concern: that of providing a foundation for a semantics of natural languages, and, second, the problem of intentionality and the analysis of the structure of psychological discourse. Even Quine, ordinarily no friend of intentional language, attests to the importance of the latter problem, considering such discourse to be "less clearly dispensable" than other modalities ([36]: 336).

For this problem, the theory must embody a characterization of the objects of thought (in the sense of that which is thought about). In order to account for the psychological phenomenon illustrated by puzzles concerning objects considered under different descriptions (e.g., the morning star and the evening star), the objects of thought must be "non-substitutable"; i.e., it must be possible for a person to believe that an entity, a, has a property, F, without believing (or being committed to the belief) that an entity, b, has F, even when a and b are said to be the same entity.

To serve as a foundation for a natural-language semantics, the theory must account for the uniformity of thought and language with respect to fact and fiction, i.e., our ability to think and talk about anything. This observation, incidentally, is common to all philosophers who countenance non-existing objects. The theory ought also to provide for a total semantic interpretation function by supplying "referents" for all "non-referring" expressions. By means of such a function, the theory can account for the truth values, taken as part of the initial data, of sentences containing "non-referring" expressions (e.g., 'The golden mountain is golden'). To do this, properties must be meaningfully (i.e., truly and falsely) predicable, in some sense, of non-existents. Finally, a means of quantifying over the "referents" of "non-referring" terms will require an underlying "free" logic in which 'exists' will be an informative predicate not embodied in the quantificational machinery of the theory. (For more detailed motivation, see Rapaport [37], Ch. I.)

II. MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS

1. *Meinong's Main Theses*. The Theory of Objects, as Meinong presents it, is firmly entrenched in the act-content-object analysis of psychological experiences. This school of thought holds that a psychological experience, such as my judging that my pen is black, is analyzable into an *act* (judging), an *object of* the act (that my pen is black), and a *content* which "directs" the act toward its object.[2] (For details, see [37], Ch. II.) Thus, Meinong's first thesis is:

(M1) *Thesis of Intentionality*: Every psychological experience is "directed" towards something called its "object" (*Gegenstand*) (Meinong [26]: 483f).[3]

Objects are partitioned by Meinong into two kinds: objects of ideas, called 'objecta' (*Objekte*), and objects of judgments and assumptions, called 'objectives' (*Objektive*). For example, when

I think of a unicorn, *a unicorn* is the objectum of my act of thinking, and when I judge that unicorns are white, *that unicorns are white* is the objective of my act of judging (cf. [26]: 487, [37]: 70ff).

The second thesis is:

(M2) Not every object has being (*Sein*) ([26]: 489).

In Meinong's deliberately "paradoxical means of expression . . . : there are (*es gibt*) objects of which it is true that there are not (*es . . . nicht gibt*) such objects" ([26]: 490). The context makes it clear, however, that Meinong meant simply that there are objects which neither exist nor subsist, where existence (*Existenz*) and subsistence (*Bestand*) are the two "degrees" of Sein recognized by Meinong, and where 'there are' ('*es gibt*') must be taken to have no existential or subsistential commitment.

There are two related theses:

(M3) It is not self-contradictory to deny, nor tautologous to affirm, Sein of an object (cf. [26]: 491).

(M4) *Thesis of Aussersein*: All objects are *ausserseiend*.

By (M3), 'being' and, of course, 'exists', are meaningful predicates of objects. '*Ausserseiend*' is not usefully translatable into English.[4] For now, note that Meinong says that "the object (*Gegenstand*) is ausserseiend by Nature, although of its two Sein-objectives, its Sein and its Nichtsein (non-being), one subsists in any case" ([26]: 494); i.e., for any object *o*, *o* is (an) "outside-being," although either '*o* has Sein' or '*o* has Nichtsein' subsists (or is true). Note that Aussersein is closely related to the quantifier 'there are (*es gibt*)' of the "paradox" (cf. Meinong [29]: 181). Note, also, that (M2)-(M4) provide the machinery for a meaningful "existence" predicate and a domain for "non-committal" or "non-existentially-loaded" quantification.

Since Meinong recognizes non-existing objects, he is committed to ascribing properties to them. Some such properties will be essential, others non-essential; and Meinong calls the (set of) essential properties of an object its "Sosein":

(M5) Every object has Sosein ([26]: 489f, 494).[5]

That the characteristics which constitute an object's Sosein may be truly predicated of the object, whether or not the object has Sein (i.e., independently of its ontological status) was formulated as the Principle of the Independence of Sosein from Sein by Meinong's student, Ernst Mally ([26]: 489). It is most conveniently formulated as:[6]

(M6) *Principle of Independence*: (M2) and (M5) are not inconsistent.

(Corollary) Objects with Nichtsein (i.e., without Sein) have Sosein.

An important thesis, implicit throughout [26], is enunciated in Meinong's later work, *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit* ([29]: 282):

(M7) *Principle of Freedom of Assumption*:
(a) Every Sosein corresponds to an object.
(b) Every object (within certain limits) can be thought of.

Thesis (M7), together with the fact that there is no qualitative difference between the Soseins of objects which have Sein and those which don't, permits an account of the uniformity of thought and language with respect to fact and fiction.

Next,

(M8) Some objects are incomplete.

An object *o* is incomplete iff there is a property *F* such that *o* is neither *F* nor not *F* ([29]: 168ff, esp. p. 178). A special case of incomplete objects is a finite object, which has a finite number of properties.[7] By taking *a* and *b* to be incomplete objects each of which lacks some property had by the other, we can meet the non-substitutability criterion discussed in Section I.

Finally,

(M9) The meaning (*Bedeutung*, though not necessarily in Frege's sense) of every noun phrase or sentence is an object ([26]: 496, 513; cf. [28]: 25).

This enables us to supply "referents" for all "non-referring" expressions and, perhaps, provide for an "objectual" reading of "substitutional" quantification (see [37] for details).

2. *Aussersein*. Meinong considers for a while a third "degree" of Sein, weaker than existence and subsistence, which he calls "Quasisein".[8] He introduces it as a way out of a version of the problem of negative existentials: if '*A* doesn't exist' is true, then since '*A* doesn't exist' is about *A*, there *is* something which it is about, and so *A* has some sort of being after all. For various reasons, Meinong rejects the notion of Quasisein[9] and replaces it with the Thesis of Aussersein. *It is in this context that that thesis is to be most clearly understood.*

In order to resolve the problem of negative existentials, he urges that "the entire contrast of Sein and Nichtsein is first the affair of the objective and not of the objectum," from which he concludes that "neither Sein nor Nichtsein can be situated essentially in the object in itself" ([26]: 493). The point of view which emerges here is that *Sein* (*or Nichtsein*) *is properly predicable only of objectives*. In order, for example, to ascribe Sein to an objectum, one must first consider the Sein of its Sein-objective: *o* has Sein iff *o has Sein* has Sein. (This raises an immediate problem when *o* is itself an objective: in general, the problem of how to decide when *o has Sein* has Sein without running afoul of an infinite regress.)

Under this interpretation, certain of Meinong's more metaphorical formulations ([26]: 494) take on new significance. For if Sein and Nichtsein are not properly predicable of objecta (or of objects "in themselves," i.e., functioning *qua* objecta; cf. ([37]: 71f), then there is some sense in saying that "the pure object stands 'beyond Sein and Nichtsein'" or that "Sein, just as Nichtsein, is equally external (*aüsserlich*) to the object." This externality to Sein is expressed by calling the object "*ausserseiend*" and is officially titled the Thesis of Aussersein.

This is an extremely interesting and provocative theory; however, it has some drawbacks. Besides the problem of the infinite regress, there remains the ever-present urge to say that, in some yet-to-be-explicated sense, objects must "be there" in order for them to be non-committally quantified over and to be objects of psychological acts (i.e., to come into pseudo-existence; cf. n. 8). Also, Aussersein's *raison d'être* was to avoid the paradox which led to Quasisein ([26]: 494); but there may be other means of accomplishing that end which make no appeal to Aussersein.

There is a second interpretation of Aussersein which I will give more substance to shortly: the realm of Aussersein is the realm of Meinongian objects, the domain for the non-committal quantifiers.

While not an issue in the principal text ([26]), there is some indication elsewhere that Meinong may have held Aussersein to be a third degree of Sein (cf. Grossmann's discussion of this in [21]: 119 and Kalsi's declaration of it in [30]: xxxvii). I would like to emphasize here that Aussersein is *not* a degree of Sein, at least in Meinong's theory in [26] and possibly even in [30]. In [30], we find this passage:

> But because there 'are' (*es . . . 'gibt'*) quite certainly these [objects which lack Sein], . . . I believed (*gemeint*) and I still believe, [that] some being-like thing (*Seinsartiges*) ought to be attributed to them under the name of 'Aussersein'. ([30]: 19.)

This is accompanied by a footnote reference to [26]: 493f, so an interpretation of it in support of viewing Aussersein as a degree of Sein must be supplemented at least by an explanation of this reference. For in [26], it is quite clear that Aussersein, far from being a degree of Sein, is a means of *avoiding* such a third degree (cf. Grossmann [20]: 67, and Chisholm [12]: 248).

The force of 'some being-like thing' must, however, be discussed. Given our present conclusion, I would like to suggest that Aussersein is "being-like" in that it serves as the domain for quantification over Meinongian objects, under the second interpretation suggested above.

The related question whether all Meinongian objects have Aussersein or only those which lack Sein may be answered in favor of the former alternative. For, in [26], Meinong makes no distinction between existing and non-existing objects when he introduces Aussersein ([26]: 494; cf. [30]: 19).

III. A MODIFIED MEINONGIAN THEORY

1. *Introduction*. There have been many objections to Meinong's theory. Besides the difficulties with the notions of Sein and Aussersein already mentioned, there is Russell's objection

concerning the existent round square, which, according to Meinong, is existent but does not exist. By making some changes in Meinong's theory, a theory can be produced which avoids such putative contradictions, clarifies the obscurities, and preserves theses (M1)-(M9), thus allowing it to claim the title of a Meinongian Theory of Objects. Moreover, because of the implications of (M1)-(M9) cited in Section II, these changes will enable the theory to serve, ultimately, as a foundation for a natural-language semantics and a theory about the nature of psychological discourse. (For details, see [37], Ch. I.)

2. *Two Types of Objects*. The first, and major, change is to replace the tripartite act-content-object (ACO) analysis with a more complete, tetradic one. According to Meinong, when one thinks of a non-existent, though the object of thought (say, a phoenix) does not exist, nevertheless there *is* an object of thought, albeit in a different sense of 'is'. Though this has unsettled many philosophers, it really doesn't seem *too* odd as long as it is recognized that 'is' plays two roles here (cf. Meinong [30]: 19, Grossmann [21]: 112). But the paradoxical flavor can be tempered somewhat by suggesting that while there is always an object of thought, there isn't always a physical (say) object corresponding to it. Let us call the former the *Meinongian* object and the latter the *actual* object.

Thus, when I think of a phoenix and when I think of President Carter, substantially the same analyses can be given of these two psychological experiences, up to a point. There is an act (thinking), a content (which "directs" the act to the object), and a Meinongian object in each case; in the latter case, there is, *in addition*, the actual, physical object, viz., President Carter. Since the actual object does not always enter the picture, so to speak, we may call this an ACO(O′) analysis, representing the actual object by "O′" and indicating with parentheses the possibility that there is not always an actual object corresponding to a Meinongian object. I now turn to several reasons that may be adduced for this move.

3. *Two Modes of Predication*. In this section, I argue from a distinction between two modes of predication to the type-distinction. Whether or not this particular argument is valid,

however, it will remain an important part of the modified theory that there are two modes of predication. While the notion that there is more than one way for a subject to possess a property is most likely traceable back to Aristotle's *Categories*, the first fully developed theory embodying two copulas is that of Castañeda ([2]). His "internal" predication corresponds roughly to what I shall call "constituency" below, and his "external" predication serves to associate pairs of "guises" (which correspond *very* roughly to Meinongian objects) with "sameness relations" such as identity or "consubstantiation." (For more historical remarks, see [37]: 103ff.)

Meinong had only *one* mode of predication, but he accomplished some of the work of two copulas by using two kinds of properties (or predicates). For Meinong, in 'The existent round square is existent' and 'The existent round square exists', there is only one kind of predication, but two kinds of existence. Since Russell took these as involving only one predicate, he missed Meinong's point.

For various reasons, among them the historical precedence of Castañeda's theory, I employ two modes of predication in the revision of Meinong's theory. There is another reason: Let us assume for the sake of argument that Mt. Everest is the tallest mountain and that I have a gold ring. Consider, now, these statements.

(1) The tallest mountain is in Asia.

(2) The tallest mountain is a mountain.

(3) My gold ring is golden.

(4) The golden mountain is golden.

(5) The golden mountain is in Asia.

According to our assumptions and initial data, (5) is false, and the rest are true.

In order to account for the truth of (1)-(3), we ordinarily postulate a mode of predication, M_1, which unites actual objects with the properties they "exemplify." We have, then,

(1A) M_1(the tallest mountain, being in Asia)

(2A) M_1(the tallest mountain, being a mountain)

(3A) M_1(my gold ring, being golden).

To account for the truth of (4), let us postulate a (not necessarily different) mode of predication, M_0, suitable (*inter alia*) to non-existents such as the golden mountain; thus,

(4B) M_0(the golden mountain, being golden).

But, if we wish to teach someone the meaning of 'golden' as it is used in (4), we may do so by explaining its use in (3), and vice versa (cf. Chisholm [11]: 9f). The point is that 'golden' is used univocally. Hence, only *one* property is involved: being golden. But, it seems to me, non-existing golden mountains cannot be made of gold in the same way that existing golden rings are.[10] Any differences in the semantic analyses of (3) and (4), then, must be due either to a difference in the modes of predication or to a difference in the nature of the entities represented by the subjects of the sentences. But the only relevant difference between the entities is that one exists and the other doesn't, which does not help solve the problem of how non-existents can *have* properties. That can be done by taking the other alternative: There are *two* modes of predication.[11] Thus,

(4A) not-[M_1(the golden mountain, being golden)].

Consider M_0 further. There is a structural (semantic) similarity between (3) (or (2)) and (4) not accounted for merely by the distinction between M_0 and M_1. This may be seen more clearly by supposing that I don't have a gold ring (or that two equally high mountains are taller than all others), for in that case (3) (and (2)) are *still* true. The structural similarity is embodied in, and we may account for the truth-values by, (4B) together with (cf. n. 10):

(2B) M_0(the tallest mountain, being a mountain)

(3B) M_0(my gold ring, being golden).

Finally, we also have

(1B) not-[M_0(the tallest mountain, being in Asia)]

(5A) not-[M_1(the golden mountain, being in Asia)]

(5B) not-[M_0(the golden mountain, being in Asia)].

Of course, what has been presented so far is only the skeleton of a theory. We must say exactly what M_0 is. For the time being, however, it will suffice to characterize M_0 as linking a property and an item which has that property as a constituent in some sense. But corresponding to an item such as the golden mountain, there is the set of its properties (its Sosein); so (4B) may be explicated as:

> being golden $\in \{P: P$ is a property of the golden mountain$\}$.

Let us call M_0, *constituency*, reading '$M_0(x, y)$' as "y is a constituent of x" and writing 'y c x' on occasion. M_1 will be called *exemplification*, with '$M_1(x,y)$' to be read "x exemplifies y" and written 'x ex y'.

We have, then, two modes of predication, i.e., two ways for properties to "attach" to things which they characterize—two ways for properties to characterize them.[12] Now, when (2)-(4) are interpreted as in (2B)-(4B), the tallest mountain, my gold ring, and the golden mountain are Meinongian objects; and when (1)-(3) are interpreted as in (1A)-(3A), the tallest mountain and my gold ring are actual objects. Hence, M_0 is the mode of predication appropriate to Meinongian objects, and M_1 is the appropriate mode for actual objects. Put otherwise, Meinongian objects are constituted by properties, whereas actual objects exemplify them.

Is the Meinongian object, *my gold ring*, identical with my actual gold ring? Meinongian objects may or may not exemplify properties, but *whatever* the Meinongian object, *my gold ring*, may exemplify, it *doesn't* exemplify the property of being gold, as we saw above. My actual gold ring, on the other hand, *does* exemplify this property. So there are two distinct types of objects: Meinongian and actual. (We shall, for convenience, refer to this reconstruction of Meinongian objects as *M-objects*.)

4. *The Uniformity of Thought*. The type-distinction can find support in yet another quarter: the thesis of the uniformity of thought and language: we can think and speak about anything—existent or non-existent, fact or fiction. As Brentano noted (cf. Grossmann [18]: 25), all objects of thought, whether they exist or not, are qualitatively alike. To see this,

let us adapt an argument due to Russell ([40]: 516): Suppose I think that the person in the next room is happy. If there is no such person, then I am thinking at most of an M-object. If there *is* such a person, then at least there is an actual object. But there is no relevant qualitative difference between these two acts of thinking. So in the latter case there is also an M-object. For otherwise we would always be able to distinguish between the experiences of thinking of an existent and thinking of a non-existent by merely deciding whether the object of our thought were actual or Meinongian. And this we cannot do.[13]

All objects of thought, then, are of the same type. But the type cannot be that of actual objects, since non-existents aren't actual. So the type must be that of M-objects. The object of thought, whether it exists or not, is an M-object, and M-objects are of a different type from actual objects.[14]

The ability of thought to be directed to both existents and non-existents can be accounted for by taking M-objects to be the *only* objects of thought. Since to each actual object, O', which exemplifies (*inter alia*) P, there corresponds an M-object, O, which is constituted (perhaps *inter alia*) by P, we can refer to or think about O' by referring to or thinking about its Meinongian counterpart O.

5. *Blueprints, Maps, and Models*. It might be of some help in clarifying the nature of the type-distinction to consider several analogies.

The first analogy is based on a model of knowledge presented in Strawson [41]: 56. Essentially, the model is a card file; each card represents an object of our knowledge and is inscribed with names of the properties each object has. If we now extend this model by imagining the card file standing amidst a certain collection of actual (e.g., physical) objects, we obtain our analogy. The cards are the analogues of M-objects, and 'F c o' is interpreted as "'F' is inscribed on card o". Furthermore, to each actual object about which we have some knowledge, there corresponds at least one card, and to some cards there corresponds at least one actual object.

A similar analogy, perhaps bringing out more clearly the relationship between exemplification and constituency, is that of the scale model. Consider a scale model of a train, exact in every detail, so to speak. Now, there are two items to consider:

the model, T, and the actual train, T'. Pointing to T, we can say "It weighs 4 tons" and "It weighs 4 pounds." But "it" "has" those properties in two different ways. It (T) exemplifies the property of weighing 4 pounds, since it is an actual object itself. But, as the M-object-analogue, it is "constituted" by, or represents, the property of weighing 4 tons. T', on the other hand, *exemplifies* the property of weighing 4 tons, as an actual object which corresponds to T.

Other features of the type-distinction can be elicited by considering an analogy with blueprints. A blueprint of a house is to an M-object as a house of which it is a blueprint is to an actual object corresponding to the M-object. Just as the house need never be built or many houses may be built from the one blueprint, so there might be no or many actual objects correlated with an M-object. The interesting feature of this analogy is that, just as we can think of impossible objects, so can there be "impossible blueprints", i.e., blueprints of items which could not possibly be constructed because they would have to exemplify contradictory properties.[15]

An important characteristic of the cardfile and blueprint M-object-analogues is that they are, in principle, incomplete and, in fact, finite; no blueprint of a house specifies which bricks to use. As a final example, a map of some country only exhibits certain of the properties of the country: not every stream or tree is mapped, or, if they are, not every grain of sand or leaf is. This raises an interesting question concerning the analogues, further clarifying the nature of M-objects: Would a map (or blueprint, or model) which was accurate *in every detail* be identical with that of which it was a map? The answer for the case of maps seems simple, in general: No; for one cannot use a country as a map *of itself*, as a guide to itself. Suppose a life-sized duplicate of Florida were constructed to serve as a map or guide. Such a "model" would not exemplify the properties exemplified by the actual Florida (except insofar as the model itself is an actual object, as noted two paragraphs back). It would not *exhibit* the actual structure of the actual object; it would, in accordance with its purposes as a map, only *represent* that structure by exhibiting one isomorphic to it. That is, the model would be "constituted" by the properties which Florida exemplifies. (This "simple" response will be reconsidered later.)

6. *The Structure of Existence*. The distinction between two types of objects enables Sein, including existence, to be explicated in a natural way by making use of the relationship between M-objects which are constituted by, say, redness and actual red objects corresponding to them. Some notation will prove convenient at this point: Let us indicate an M-object whose constituting properties are F, G, and H by

$$\langle F, G, H \rangle.$$

Then we may say that the M-object $\langle F, G, \ldots \rangle$ *has Sein* (or *exists*) iff $\exists\alpha[\alpha$ is an actual object & α ex F & α ex G & $\ldots]$. Further, if the M-object o has Sein, then we call $\{\alpha$: α is actual & $\forall F[F \text{ c } o \rightarrow \alpha \text{ ex } F]\}$ *the set of Sein-correlates of* o, and we write

$$\alpha \text{ SC } o$$

when α *is a Sein-correlate of* o.

Thus, existence is a meaningful attribute. As such, it is explicated as a contingent, two-place relation between an M-object and an actual object. 'Existence' *also* names a property, E, which some M-objects are constituted by, such as the existent round square. Thus, Meinong's reply to Russell can be maintained and given some substance: The existent round square is existent (i.e., E c $\langle E, R, S \rangle$) but does not exist (i.e., $-\exists\alpha[\alpha \text{ SC } \langle E, R, S \rangle]$).

7. *Replies to Objections*. The modified theory can respond to objections that have been raised against Meinong's original theory. For example:

In reply to Russell's objection that M-objects violated the Law of Contradiction because the round square ($\langle R, S \rangle$) was both round and not round (since it was square), Meinong said that the Law was only valid in the domain of actual or possible objects ([27]: 222). Of course, there is no contradiction here, for

(6) The round square is not round

is simply false: As in the original theory ([29]: 173), the modified version employs the distinction between a property, F, and its "opposite" property, $\bar{F}$ (cf. [37]: 162f). Now, in Meinong's terminology, objectives either have Sein or lack Sein, rather than being "true" or "false." Maintaining and adapting this *façon de parler*, the allegedly contradictory objective (6) simply has no Sein-correlate: Neither $R \notin \langle R, S \rangle$ nor $\bar{R} \in \langle R, S \rangle$ are the case (for details, see [37]: 163ff).

Karel Lambert has objected that Meinong's restriction of the Law of Contradiction is arbitrary: "he [Meinong] tells us that the non-existence of the round square is *implied* by its nature. Since implication is a logical relation, we know that Meinong does permit some logical principles to apply to the realm of the impossible" ([24]: 308). But the non-existence of $\langle R, S \rangle$ is implied by its nature *plus* one version of the Law of Contradiction (viz., (ALC1a)) *and* a "law" (7) relating S to $\bar{R}$:

(ALC1a)	$\forall F \forall x[x \text{ is actual} \rightarrow -(x \text{ ex } F \,\&\, x \text{ ex } \bar{F})]$	
(7)	$\forall x[x \text{ is actual} \rightarrow . x \text{ ex } S \rightarrow x \text{ ex } \bar{R}]$	
(i)	$\exists x[x \text{ SC } \langle R, S \rangle]$	(assumption *pro tem.*)
(ii)	$\therefore \alpha \text{ SC } \langle R, S \rangle$	((i), EI)
(iii)	$\therefore \alpha \text{ ex } S \,\&\, \alpha \text{ ex } R$	((ii), def. of SC)
(iv)	$\therefore \alpha \text{ ex } \bar{R}$	((iii), (7))
(v)	$\therefore \alpha \text{ ex } R \,\&\, \alpha \text{ ex } \bar{R}$	((iii), (iv))
(vi)	$-(\alpha \text{ ex } R \,\&\, \alpha \text{ ex } \bar{R})$	((ALC1a), UI)
(vii)	$\therefore -\exists x[x \text{ SC } \langle R, S \rangle]$	((v), (vi))

Note that we need a version of the Law of Contradiction together with a "non-logical" or structural law (a "meaning postulate," in effect), viz., (7), to get the "implied" result that $\langle R, S \rangle$ doesn't exist. However, the Law of Contradiction is not applied to an M-object, but only within the realm of actual objects. It is the fact that it applies *there* (together with (7)) that forces the round square out of existence. (For other objections and replies, see [37].)

8. *Sein-Conditions*. According to Meinong, there are two kinds of objectives: Sein-objectives (e.g., *x has Sein*) and Sosein-objectives (e.g., *x is F*). In general, there are no "truth-value gaps" among objectives: As already noted, with respect to an

ausserseiend object (*Gegenstand*), "of its two Sein-objectives, its Sein and its Nichtsein, in any case one subsists" ([26]: 494). Hence, *x is F*, which is an object (*Gegenstand*), either has Sein or lacks it.

On the present theory, then, we have the following "Sein-conditions" (or truth-conditions) for objectives:

(S*) *x has Sein* has Sein iff $\exists\alpha[\alpha \text{ SC } x]$.

(So*) *x is F* has Sein iff (i) $F \text{ c } x$ or (ii) $\exists\alpha[\alpha \text{ SC } x \ \& \ \alpha \text{ ex } F]$.

Note that (S*) avoids both the spectre of an infinite regress and Meinong's intrinsically unsatisfying way out in terms of a feature called "factuality" (cf. [28]: 70; Findlay [15]: 75f, 102; and Grossmann [18]: 29).

Since there are two modes of predication, an objective like *x is F* is ambiguous, and so (So*) is essentially disjunctive.[16] From (So*), we can infer that the golden mountain is golden (by (i)), that the tallest mountain is a mountain (by (i) *or* (ii)), that the present King of France is not bald (by (i)), and that the tallest mountain is in Asia (by (ii)).

IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

1. *Parsons' Theory*. Terence Parsons' "coherent reconstruction" of Meinong's Theory of Objects ([33]-[35]) contains some obvious similarities with our theory as put forth above (and in [37]), as is to be expected from two formal renderings of a common theory.

Parsons' theory recognizes two kinds of entities: individuals and objects ([33]: 564f); these correspond, respectively, to our actual and M-objects. He takes individuals as primitive ([33]: 564, 579f) and leaves objects unspecified—until p. 578, where he suggests that the set of individuals forms a proper subset of the set of objects. In our terms, he is holding that all actual objects are M-objects; our theory holds the reverse: all M-objects are actual.

For Parsons (as for us), it is *objects*, not individuals, which do or don't exist. He claims ([33]: 566 n. 9) that his quantifiers range over objects, so as to avoid existential "loading," yet his definition of 'exists' (same page).

$$o \textit{ exists} =_{\text{df}} (\exists i)(i^c = o),$$

either contradicts that claim or *forces* (rather than "suggests") individuals to be objects. The 'i^c' stands for an "individual correlate", i.e., a Sosein (a set of properties), and the 'i' ranges over individuals. The definition, then, comes down to this: o exists iff o is (or, corresponds to) an individual correlate, i.e., iff o is (or, corresponds to) a set of properties had by an individual. Using our terminology, this becomes: o exists (in Parsons' sense) iff $\exists\alpha[\{F: F \text{ c } o\} = \{F: \alpha \text{ ex } F\}]$; this is much more restrictive than our notion of "exists," according to which o exists iff $\exists\alpha[\{F: F \text{ c } o\} \subseteq \{F: \alpha \text{ ex } F\}]$. Indeed, on Parsons' view, the blue pen on my desk, ⟨being blue (B), being a pen (P), being on my desk (D)⟩, does not exist, since $-\exists i[i^c = \{B, P, D\}]$ due to the finitude of that set.

Moreover, if all individuals are objects, then all sets of ordered pairs of individuals are sets of ordered pairs of objects. But this conflates Parsons' nuclear-nuclear predicates (the former) with his extranuclear-extranuclear predicates (the latter), thus removing some of the motivation for his semantics of relational predicates (cf. [33]: 576f). And it does the same for his account of relations (cf. [33]: 579f).

The assimilation of individuals to objects in the direction Parsons takes also leaves open the questions of the relation of individuals to their properties and of the nature of non-existing objects. If non-existing objects are not individuals, what are they? Surely, they are not mere *sets* of properties, for then so ought to be *individuals* (i.e., *existing* objects). Moreover, Parsons lacks *any* link between his objects and "nuclear" properties not in them (recall that he identifies objects with sets of nuclear properties; cf. [33]: 564). This, I believe, is because his only *existing* objects (i.e., those even potentially linkable with non-constituting nuclear properties) are complete and consistent; thus, all predications for him appear to be of the internal or constituting variety.

Finally, Parsons' theory allows truth-value gaps (cf. [33]: 570ff). Here, he differs sharply from both our theory and Meinong's; following Meinong, our theory holds that every objective either has or lacks Sein, *tertium non datur* (see Sect. III. 8, above).

2. *Castañeda's Theory*. Hector-Neri Castañeda's theory of guises and consubstantiation ([2],[3],[5]-[9]) is not intended as a version of Meinong's theory. Nevertheless, it demands consid-

eration here since, among other reasons, it embodies theses corresponding to (M1)-(M9) above, and our modified Meinongian theory was developed partly as a reaction to it.

The theoretical analogues of M-objects in Castañeda's theory are his individual *guises*. As M-objects are related to Soseins, so guises are related to sets of relatively arbitrary properties; such sets are called *guise cores*. Where $\{F_1, \ldots, F_n\}$ is a core, $c\{F_1, \ldots, F_n\}$ is a guise. Here, c is a "generalization" of the definite-description operator, ι, to allow for an infinite number of properties; and guises are, in part, like generalizations of the Fregean senses of definite descriptions ([6]: 126). Since the schema for the ι-operator, '$\iota x[F_1 x \ \& \ \ldots \ \& \ F_n x]$', does not allow for infinite conjunctions, Castañeda introduces the operator c on *sets* of properties of *arbitrary* cardinality, thus allowing for "descriptions" that involve *all* of the (infinitely many) properties of an actual object.[17]

The main difference between guises and M-objects is in their relations to actual objects. Guises are, literally, parts of the infinitely-propertied actual objects: the latter are semi-lattices of mutually consubstantiated guises, whose maximal elements are "Leibnizian," or maximally consistent, guises (cf. [2]: 16, 26; [6]: 128; [9]: 43, 80). M-objects are not parts, in any sense, of actual objects; that is, SC is not a part-whole relation. For example, guises "of physical objects are physical entities" ([9]: 44); in contrast, M-objects Sein-correlated with physical entities are *not* physical, though they *are* actual and, thus, exemplify properties in their own right. Physical-object guises are *externally*, infinitely propertied in their own right, also, by means of the consubstantiation and other sameness relations in which they stand to other guises.

This theoretical difference can be highlighted as follows. In Castañeda's theory, "for any property F-ness, the existing F-er is the same as the F-er" ([2]: 21). For us, the *actual* F-er is *not* the F-er: the actual α such that α SC $\langle F \rangle$ is not identical to $\langle F \rangle$. But the *actual existing* F-er *is* identical to the *actual* F-er: the actual α such that α SC $\langle F \rangle$ = the actual α such that α SC $\langle E, F \rangle$, where E = being existent. However, here F must be "unique," since, for most G, $\exists\alpha\exists\beta[\alpha \text{ SC } \langle G \rangle \ \& \ \beta \text{ SC } \langle G \rangle \ \& \ \alpha \neq \beta]$.

The difference between our theories can be made more explicit.[17] For Castañeda, actual objects are patterns of guises, as may be seen most clearly in his discussion of change:

> [C]hanges in a physical object are to be understood as the separation of some guises from the remaining sub-system of guises in a physical object. ([9]: 93.)

Here, "some" includes the Leibnizian guise at the top of the semi-lattice (though not (necessarily) the "quasi-Leibnizian" guises which "point" to it; cf. [9]: 72f). So when a change occurs, one diachronic physical object disappears and is *replaced* by another.

In our theory, on the other hand, actual objects turn out to be very much like bare substrates, having merely external relations to properties. On our theory, if an actual object α changes a property, we *keep* α and locate the change in its (external) relationships to M-objects. Thus,

$$\exists\alpha[\alpha \text{ SC } x \text{ (at } t) \ \& \ -\alpha \text{ SC } x \text{ (at } t')].$$

But it is the *same* α.

Castañeda distinguishes, as noted above, between "internal" and "external" modes of predication. The former links guises with the properties in their cores, and it is sufficiently like our constituency mode of predication to be acceptable.

External predication, on the other hand, is *not* the expected direct link between a guise and non-core properties, although it is the method whereby the link is forged (cf. [2]: 13; [9]: 75). Thus, it differs from our exemplification—the mode in which properties are predicated of actual objects. Nor is it, *pace* Parsons ([33]: 569 n. 14), the predication of "extranuclear" properties.

Consider the blue pen on my desk, i.e., $c\{B,P,D\}$ or $\langle B,P,D\rangle$. If it doesn't exist, then there is no need to account for, say its being a Bic (because it isn't a Bic). But if the blue pen on my desk, i.e., $c\{B, P, D\}$ or $\langle B, P, D\rangle$, *does* exist (i.e., is self-consubstantiated or has a Sein-correlate, respectively), then either it is a Bic or it isn't. Suppose it is; then it is linked with the property of being a Bic. Castañeda's guise is so linked by being consubstantiated with $c\{B, P, D$, being-a-Bic$\}$; the M-object is so linked by having a Sein-correlate in common with $\langle$being a Bic$\rangle$.

Finally, Castañeda's external predication connects *pairs* of guises to a few "external predicables," [17] viz., what he calls the "sameness family" ([6], Sect.IV), the most important of which is consubstantiation (**C***). Formally, **C*** is characterized by the laws given in [2]: 15ff and [9]: 78f.[18] For present purposes, **C*** may be related to the SC-relation as follows:

(A*) $\mathbf{C}^*xy$ iff $\exists\alpha\exists\beta[\alpha \text{ SC} x \ \& \ \beta \text{ SC} y \ \& \ \forall\gamma[\gamma \text{ SC} x \rightarrow \gamma = \alpha] \ \& \ \forall\delta[\delta \text{ SC } y \rightarrow \delta = \beta] \ \& \ \alpha = \beta]$.

That is, two guises are consubstantiated iff (the M-object-analogue of) each has the *same*, *unique* Sein-correlate. It is a straightforward task to show that (A*) satisfies all the laws of consubstantiation. For instance, x exists iff $\mathbf{C}^*xx$, i.e., iff $\exists!\alpha[\alpha \text{ SC } x]$, which is quite a different concept of existence from ours. The important feature of (A*), however, is that while it *is* an isomorphism, it is *not* a reduction of one theory to another. Indeed, it can't be, given the differences between guises and M-objects (e.g., our α is much like a substrate; and, for Castañeda, no singleton guise exists, in general, since (the M-object-analogue of) each such guise usually has more than one Sein-correlate).

V. A RUSSELLIAN PARADOX

1. *The Paradox*. Although our modified Meinongian theory may be an adequately clear, coherent, and faithful reinterpretation of Meinong's orignial theory, it is, unfortunately, inconsistent. But the inconsistency is not located where Russell and others thought it to be in Meinong's theory. A Russell-style paradox discovered by Romane Clark arises in the modified theory as follows:

Since M-objects are among the furniture of the world, they are actual objects (cf. Bergmann [1]: 18). Indeed, not only are they constituted by properties, they also *exemplify* properties, e.g., being an M-object, being thought of by person S at time t, being constituted by redness, etc. Accordingly, we may consider the possibility of an M-object's being its own Sein-correlate; thus,

$$o \text{ SC } o \text{ iff } \forall F[F \text{ c } o \rightarrow o \text{ ex } F].$$

For example, ⟨being a Meinongian object⟩ exemplifies its only constituting property and, so, is its own Sein-correlate. Next, we may consider the properties of being a self-Sein-correlate and of being a non-self-Sein-correlate, which we may represent, respectively, as:

$$\lambda x \forall F[F \text{ c } x \rightarrow x \text{ ex } F]$$

$$\lambda x \exists F[F \text{ c } x \ \& \ -(x \text{ ex } F)];$$

for convenience, let us name these 'SSC' and '$\overline{\text{SSC}}$', respectively.

We arrive at Clark's paradox by first assuming that $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$, i.e., the M-object whose sole constituting property is that of being a non-self-Sein-correlate, exemplifies SSC. That means that $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ exemplifies all of its constituting properties, and so $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ ex $\overline{\text{SSC}}$. That, in turn, means that $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ *fails* to exemplify one of its constituting properties, and so $-(\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ ex $\overline{\text{SSC}})$, yielding a contradiction. The alternative assumption, that $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ does not exemplify SSC, entails that $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ fails to exemplify one of its constituting properties, and so $-(\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ ex $\overline{\text{SSC}})$. But then $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ must exemplify *all* of its constituting properties, and so it exemplifies $\overline{\text{SSC}}$, again a contradiction. Therefore, $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ both does and does not exemplify SSC, which violates the Law of Contradiction (ALC1a).

2. *Some Observations*. This antinomy suggests that there is in Aussersein no such M-object as $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$, i.e., that there is a limitation on what can count as an object of thought, in contradiction to the Principle of Freedom of Assumption. But this suggestion appears to be self-defeating, for to argue the paradox itself, one must think of $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$. Incidentally, $\langle\overline{\text{SSC}}\rangle$ *has* Sein, though it is not its own Sein-correlate on pain of contradiction. One of its Sein-correlates, however, is ⟨being red⟩, since this exemplifies $\overline{\text{SSC}}$; i.e., $\exists F[F$ c ⟨being red⟩ & $-($⟨being red⟩ ex $F)]$, viz., F = being red.

The first and most important lesson of this paradox is that our extension of Meinong's theory, while immune to the objections thought fatal to Meinong's original theory, has nevertheless its own flaws. It is of historical interest to note that Meinong himself grappled with a similar problem in the context of a discussion of Russell's paradox in *On Emotional Presentation* ([30], Ch. 2). There, he considered the implications for his theory of thoughts whose objects were themselves thoughts:

> The problem [raised by Mally] is to determine whether a thought (D') about a thought (D) (*Denken*) which is not about itself (*sich selbst nicht trifft*) is about itself. ([30]: 13; Kalsi's translation.)

The difficulty in determining the nature of such an object of thought led Meinong to call it a "defective" object, and he suggested that such "objects" lacked Aussersein: "In this case one is not really confronted with an object, and experiences of apprehension in this instance lack a proper object" ([30]: 20, Kalsi's translation; cf. Chisholm [12]: 247f). While he doesn't say very much more about defective objects, it does appear that he might have been willing to weaken the Principle of Freedom of Assumption, at least to the point where it would be compatible with a claim that sometimes the object of our thought isn't precisely what we think it is:

> The question remains whether the defective object is itself apprehended and not some nondefective object . . . . ([30]: 20; Kalsi's translation.)

A second lesson is that if we do not wish to abandon the entire system, but rather to repair it, then there are three weak spots to be looked after. There are three major ways to block the paradox (short of tampering with the nature of exemplification): The first is to deny that $\overline{SSC}$ is a property. This can be done in several ways:

First, one can hold that '$\overline{}$' is not a property-forming operator. But it *is* in some cases, and, in the absence of a general criterion, independent of this paradox, for determining when it is and when it isn't such an operator, this move seems weak.

Second, one might deny that there are complex properties. By doing so, we are able to deny that there is in Aussersein such an M-object as $\langle \overline{SSC} \rangle$ (for the simple reason that there is no such property as $\overline{SSC}$) without placing a limitation on the possible objects of thought. But, while it is easy to deny that where F and G are properties, there is also the complex property F & G, it is not so easy to deny the complex property $F \vee G$ (or the M-object $\langle F \vee G \rangle$) and even harder to see how $\overline{SSC}$ can be "reduced" to its "constituents" (or what M-object would correspond to such a reduction). Moreover, there are some systems of formal ontology in which there *are* complex properties (cf. Cocchiarella [14]: 166).

Third, it might be held that not every "well-formed propositional form" yields a property (cf. Grossmann [19]: 160, Cocchiarella [14]: 169). But this seems to be the case for *impredicative* properties—ones whose definitions somehow involve an "illegitimate totality"—and it is not clear that $\overline{SSC}$ is or need be thus defined. For, while the definition of $\overline{SSC}$ involves quantification over *all* properties, it might be reconstruable in terms of *bounded* quantification over all properties of an antecedently given and well-defined kind. Should this not be possible, then this way out of the paradox is perhaps the most promising. Yet it is not immediately clear how it would account for the apparent fact that we can think of $\langle\overline{SSC}\rangle$.[19]

The second major way to black the paradox is to deny that M-objects are actual, for then they would not exemplify any properties. This move would require an alternative way, such as Castañeda's consociation (**C****),to account for the relation between a thinker and the object of his thought; but it has the advantage of eliminating some of the representationalism of our theory. On the other hand, it leaves open the nature of M-objects. (If they are not actual, i.e., among the furniture of the world, what are they?) And it raises questions concerning the nature of the predication to M-objects of such properties as being finite, being thought of, or being an M-object.

Nor, indeed, does it matter whether exemplification is the appropriate (sort of) relation, nor even whether constituency is. *Whatever* the mode of predication of properties to the M-objects which are, so to say, "constituted" by them, and *whatever* the mode of predication of properties to M-objects which, so to say, "exemplify" them, the paradox can be seen to remain.

It might prove helpful at this point to see how the paradox applies to the analogues of Section III.5. A blueprint which exemplified all of its constituting properties might be a three-dimensional, life-sized, scale model (though, in this connection, recall my remarks about life-sized maps). But no blueprint can be constituted by such a property as $\overline{SSC}$, so no paradox arises. A file card can exemplify all of its inscribed properties, but no card can *exemplify* such a property as $\overline{SSC}$, so no paradox arises here, either. However, for M-objects, it seems that they *can* be constituted by *and* exemplify $\overline{SSC}$ (indeed, if *anything* can exemplify such a property, M-objects can).

The third way out, reminiscent of Meinong's move, is to modify the Principle of Freedom of Assumption.[20] Instead of saying that *any* object can be thought of (or, more precisely, that for any property, there is an M-object constituted by that property), we could say that for any *two* (distinct) properties, there is an M-object that *distingushes* between them; i.e.,

$$\forall F \forall F'[F \neq F' \rightarrow \exists o[F \mathrel{c} o \mathrel{\&} F' \not\mathrel{c} o]]$$

There is, then, no longer any guarantee that $\langle \overline{\text{SSC}} \rangle$ is an M-object; indeed, it is not, on pain of paradox. Given the property $\overline{\text{SSC}}$ and any other property, say, F', the most we can claim is that there is an M-object, m, constituted by $\overline{\text{SSC}}$ *inter alia* (and not by F'). Let $\langle \overline{\text{SSC}}, G \rangle$ be one such m. By running the argument of the last section, we can conclude that m does *not* exemplify SSC, on pain of contradiction. But there is no paradox, since we can choose G to be such that m does not exemplify G. Of course, this undercuts a fundamental, and perhaps the most reasonable, Meinongian assumption—that we can think of anything. In defense of this way out, however, we might say that what's true is: we only *think* that we can think of anything! (Cf. [30]: 20, quoted above.)

If this were the end of the matter, we might rest content. But the Russell-Clark paradox is of considerable philosophical interest. First let us see how it applies to Parsons' and Castañeda's systems.

As noted, Parsons has only one mode of predication, but he has two kinds of properties. In [35], we learn that each nuclear property, p, has an extranuclear image, $\mathcal{E}_p = \{x : p \in x\}$, and that x has $\mathcal{E}_p$ iff $x \in \mathcal{E}_p$. To set up the paradox, then, we want to consider the following properties, which we shall name 'PSSC' and 'PSSC', respectively:

$$\lambda x \forall F[F \in x \rightarrow x \in \mathcal{E}_F]$$

$$\lambda x \exists F[F \in x \mathrel{\&} x \in \mathcal{E}_F]$$

(Note that to be able to say that o is PSSC, we need to assume, with Parsons, that all individuals are objects.) Consider now the object $\{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\}$. To do this, we must assume that $\overline{\text{PSSC}}$ is a nuclear property; if it is *not* nuclear, then there appears to be an untenable limitation in Parsons' theory on what can be thought.

Assume that $\{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\}$ is not PSSC. Then there is an $F \in \{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\}$ such that $\{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_F$. So $\{\text{PSSC}\} \notin \{y\text{: PSSC} \in y\}$, which is false. Thus, $\{\text{PSSC}\}$ is PSSC. This, on the other hand, entails

$$(+) \quad \{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\} \in \mathcal{E}_{\overline{\text{PSSC}}},$$

which is true. That is, Clark's paradox does not arise in Parsons' system. However, this is due primarily to Parsons' account of what it is to have an extranuclear property, viz., to be in a certain set.

If, instead, we take a more intuitively plausible account, i.e., a less set-theoretically formal one, then the paradox is derivable: From (+), we infer that $\{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_F$, for some $F \in \{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\}$; so $\{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_{\overline{\text{PSSC}}}$, which contradicts (+), entailing that $\{\overline{\text{PSSC}}\}$ is not PSSC. This yields the desired contradiction.

Castañeda's system, it seems to me, *is* paradox-resistant.[21] First, some terminology: where α is a guise core and $x = c\alpha$, let xF and x is$_{\text{I}}$ $F =_{\text{df}} x$ is-internally F (i.e., $F \in \alpha$), and x is$_{\text{E}}$ $F =_{\text{df}} x$ is-externally F. The properties we want to consider here, call them 'CSSC' and '$\overline{\text{CSSC}}$', respectively, are:

$$\lambda x \forall F[xF \rightarrow \exists y[yF \ \& \ \mathbf{C}^*xy]]$$

$$\lambda x \exists F[xF \ \& \ -\exists y[yF \ \& \ \mathbf{C}^*xy]]$$

Now, let g be the guise $c\{\overline{\text{CSSC}}\}$. If we assume that g is$_{\text{E}}$ CSSC, then

$$\exists F[gF \ \& \ -\exists y[yF \ \& \ \mathbf{C}^*gy]].$$

Hence,

$$g\overline{\text{CSSC}} \ \& \ -\exists y[y\overline{\text{CSSC}} \ \& \ \mathbf{C}^*gy].$$

But, since g is$_{\text{E}}$ $\overline{\text{CSSC}}$ and since a guise is$_{\text{E}}$ F iff it is consubstantiated with a guise which is$_{\text{I}}$ F, we have

$$\exists y[y\overline{\text{CSSC}} \ \& \ \mathbf{C}^*gy],$$

which yields a contradiction.

If, on the other hand, we assume that g is$_{\text{E}}$ CSSC, then, since $g\overline{\text{CSSC}}$, it follows from the definition of CSSC that

$$\exists y[y\overline{\text{CSSC}} \ \& \ \mathbf{C}^*gy].$$

That is, *g* is consubstantiated with a guise which is_I $\overline{CSSC}$. Hence, *g* is_E $\overline{CSSC}$, contradicting our assumption.

There is, however, a way out of this seeming paradox, for both assumptions (*g* is_E $\overline{CSSC}$, *g* is_E CSSC) imply that *g* exists (i.e., is self-consubstantiated). Thus, the proper interpretation of these contradictions is, simply, that *g* does *not* exist, for in that case it is not the case that *g* is_E $\overline{CSSC}$ *or* CSSC (or anything else).

However, preliminary investigation indicates that the paradox affects other, *non*-Meinongian theories, such as the adverbial theory of mental phenomena and even Frege's theory of sense and reference (see [38]). Moreover, the ways out suggested above do not appear applicable in these other cases. Rather than give up such theories in a wholesale way, it behooves us to search more deeply for the source of the trouble.[22]

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[33] Terence Parsons, "A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics," *Journal of Philosophy* 71(1974): 561-80.
[34] ———, "Parsons on Smith on Meinong et Al." Unpublished comments on "The Intensionality of Meinongian Objects," by D. W. Smith, read at the American Philosophical Association Western Division meeting in New Orleans, 1 May 1976.
[35] ———, "Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties, Meinong, and Leibniz," NOÛS 12(1978): 137-151.
[36] Willard V. Quine, "Replies [to Follesdal]," in *Words and Objections*, ed. by D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969): 292-352.
[37] William J. Rapaport, *Intentionality and the Structure of Existence*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1976.
[38] ———, "Adverbial Theories and Meinongian Theories." Unpublished MS read at the Eastern Divison meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Washington DC, December 1977.
[39] Richard and Valerie Routley, "Rehabilitating Meinong's Theory of Objects," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 27(1973): 224-54.
[40] Bertrand Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions," *Mind* n.s. 13(1904): 204-19, 336-54, and 509-24.
[41] P. F. Strawson, *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar* (London: Methuen, 1974).

NOTES

[1]The study of Meinong is restricted to [26], minimally augmented, on methodological grounds discussed in Castañeda [4], Sect. I. Specifically, I take the "Darwinian" approach to the history of philosophy, according to which a "selected [short] text . . . is [considered to be] relevantly unitary" and a system is constructed "out of the views, theses, and half-systems as they appear" therein ([4]: 382f).

[2]'Object' is here used more in the sense of "that which is aimed at" than "individual thing" and is perhaps best thought of for the moment as elliptical for "object of thought" (where 'thought' is generic for "psychological act"). Cf. defs. 4-7 of the substantive 'object' and def. 1b of the obsolete adjective 'object' in [32]: 1963. Contrast Parsons' use of the term in [33]: 561f.

[3]All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. I follow Findlay [15] in the translation of certain technical terms; however, frequently used German words such as 'Sein' and its cognates will be treated as technical English vocabulary and not italicized.

[4]'*Ausser–*' means "outside" in the sense of the prefix 'extra-'. '*Seiend*' is best understood by comparing it to the adjective '*existierend*' = "existent", as in 'an existent book' or 'the book is (an) existent'.

[5]Cf. Chisholm [12]: 245 and Kalsi in Meinong [30]: xxxviii.

[6]Cf. Chisholm [12]: 245f, Grossmann [21]: 107, Landesman [25]:6, and Rapaport [37]: 132ff.

[7]It should be noted that Findlay ([15]: 156) misdefines "incomplete object" as "finite object", but it is clear from Meinong [29] that incomplete objects can have an infinite number of properties.

[8]Quasisein is not to be confused with pseudo-existence: objects of *actual* thoughts are said by Meinong to "pseudo-exist", whether they have existence, subsistence, Quasisein, or Nichtsein. See [26]: 497, [37]: 68f.

[9]Interestingly, Meinong did not seem to realize that his argument for Quasisein is invalid! See [37]: 78ff.

[10]Meinong believed that they *were*; cf. Findlay [15]: 104. So does Castañeda, since his consubstantiation is external, thus leaving the composition of individual guises intact; indeed, the univocity of predicates in fiction and non-fiction is a basic datum in [2]. (I am indebted to Castañeda for this point.) The present theory takes this datum into account via M_0; cf. e.g., (3B) and (4B), above.

[11]To interpret (4) as

(4′) $\forall x[x =$ the golden mountain $\rightarrow M_1(x,$ being golden$)]$

would make (4) true, but it would also make

(4″) The golden mountain is silver

true. Similarly, to interpret (4) by

(4‴) $\forall x[M_1(x,$ being golden$)$ & $M_1(x,$ being a mountain$) \rightarrow .\ M_1(x,$ being golden$)]$

also makes (4″) true. Yet part of our data is that (4″) is not true.

[12]It should be noted, first, that Castañeda feels that his two *copulas* are not *relations*, although they are "dyadic entities" and, second, that there *are* systems of formal ontology in which predication is not a relation (cf. Cocchiarella [14]: 170f).

[13]Cf.: "Reality . . . is a creation of the nervous system: a model of a possible world . . . . Mental images should be as real . . . as the immediately experienced real world. Both are constructions of the brain, although it is appropriate to encode them in order to distinguish image from reality." (Jerrison [22]: 99, 101.)

[14]A mathematical analogy may help to show how the uniformity of thought forces a type-distinction upon the theory. In order to answer certain questions such as

"Does $x + 1 = 0$ have a solution?", certain "ideal" items can be constructed whose sole purpose is, in this case, to be additive inverses of natural numbers. Such "ideal" items serve a structural purpose in helping to organize our knowledge (cf. [37]: 11ff, 19f). Now, language and thought refer univocally to natural numbers *and* negative integers, but only after it is seen that there is a set of items (viz., positive integers) of the same type as negative integers which are isomorphic to (and can thus serve as representatives of) the natural numbers. The important point is that, on one construction at least, the natural numbers are *not* the positive integers; in fact, they are of different types.

[15]For an interesting discussion of such "impossible objects," see Gregory [17]: 50ff.

[16]Relational objectives are a bit trickier to handle. For a more complete discussion, see [37]: 176ff.

[17]I am indebted to Castañeda for having made these observations in conversation and in remarks on earlier versions of this paper.

[18]The laws in [2] and [9] are not identical. C*.0 in [9] is meant to embody the definition of existence in [2], but it does not appear in [2] and seems indistinguishable from C*.1 as stated in [9]. C*.7 is stated in a stronger form in [9] than in [2]. C*.7A appears only in [9], C*.8 and C*.9 only in [2].

[19]On a purely speculative level, perhaps this points to a fundamental ability of the mind to think of "strongly impossible" objects (in addition to its ability to think of such "weakly impossible" objects as round squares or non-circular circles).

[20]This was proposed by William H. Wheeler, in conversation.

[21]The following derivation was pointed out to me by Clark (personal communication). His derivation and interpretation of the paradox differ from mine, however. For details, See Clark [13] and Castañeda [10]. Other derivations are presented in Rapaport [37].

[22]I am indebted to Hector-Neri Castañeda, Romane L. Clark, J. Michael Dunn, Reinhardt Grossmann, and William H. Wheeler, of Indiana University, for their many helpful discussions; to my colleagues at Fredonia for their comments on an ancestor of this paper; and to the Joint Awards Council/University Awards Committee of the Research Foundation of SUNY for a Faculty Research Fellowship.