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INTENTIONALITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF EXISTENCE

by

WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Philosophy,
Indiana University
August 1976
The undersigned have examined a thesis entitled Intentionality and the Structure of Existence, by William J. Rapaport, and hereby recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Professor Romane L. Clark

Professor Reinhardt Grossmann

Professor William H. Wheeler
Our minds are finite, and even in these circumstances of finitude we are surrounded by possibilities that are infinite; and the purpose of human life is to grasp as much as we can out of that infinitude.

Alfred North Whitehead ([113]: 163)
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This study is the result of an attempt, begun several summers ago, to come to grips with problems of existence and reference raised by free logic.

There are many people to whom I am indebted for their help and advice, both philosophical and personal: The members, both past and present, of my thesis committee—Professors Romane L. Clark, J. Michael Dunn, and Reinhardt Grossmann of the Department of Philosophy and Professors Edward R. Fisher and William H. Wheeler of the Department of Mathematics—who encouraged me in this project and graciously consented to read and comment on earlier drafts, often at the last minute and, in two cases, from other continents; Professor Mark J. Pastin of the Department of Philosophy, who offered advice and assistance well beyond the call of duty; and Mrs. Betty Neal, Administrative Secretary of the Department of Philosophy, for many things.

My deepest gratitude is to my advisor (in more ways than one), Professor Hector-Neri Castañeda, whose support and friendship throughout my philosophical career has been unbounded and whose counsel has always been wise and welcome.

I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Barbara, and to my parents.

W.J.R.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: DATA, PROBLEMS, AND METHODS

A. Introduction

1. The Project.

The present essay is the first stage of a long-term project whose chief goal is the construction of a theory that can provide a foundation for a semantics for natural language and an analysis of psychological discourse. The project begins with a consideration of various data and a re-examination of several problems in metaphysics, epistemology, and semantics. As a means of sharpening our philosophical tools, we next take a careful look at theories which have dealt with some of the data and problems, chiefly Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects [63]-[67]. The final stage will be, of course, the devising of our own theory. Here, we report on the results of the first two parts of the project.

In this chapter, we present the data that are our starting point, elucidate the nature of the two problems which are our goals, and show why they are important. By looking at the data and problems in their own contexts, we hope to understand better what Meinong and others were after when they put forth their theories.

2. The Problems.

There are certain problems which invite or require us to hold that there are (or there exist) entities other than "traditional" ones, for
example, such entities as Frege's "senses" [34], Grossmann's "descriptions" [41], Carnap's "concepts" [5], Castañeda's "guises" [7]-[8], [10]-[13], and [15], or Meinong's "incomplete objecta" [63]. There are other problems which invite or require us to hold that there "are" (in some sense) "non-existent" things.¹ Such problems arise upon consideration of "non-denoting" (or "non-referring") expressions. Other terms that frequently arise in connection with these problems are "intensional entity", "abstract entity", and "possible object". Some of these are interpretations or explications of others (e.g., senses as "referents" of non-denoting terms, concepts as an explication of senses).

It is our belief that these problems can be solved by a unifying theory which recognizes a kind of entity capable of doing the work of each of those mentioned.

3. Classification of Problems.

It will be argued that a single kind of item is useful for solving problems in, or for giving correct or adequate descriptions or analyses of, particular subjects, such as literature (especially works of fiction), linguistics (especially the study of natural languages), disciplines such as science which have specialized vocabularies or jargon, science insofar as it is a theory embodying a conception of the world, and, finally, philosophy itself (as in the theory of actions and events).

Secondly, they will be seen to be useful for solving puzzles raised by logic and formal languages: problems of identity, reference, referential opacity, and negative existentials. These problems are not subject-specific; they cut across subject-matter boundaries.
Finally, there are broader concerns, not dependent on particular problems or particular solutions. Indeed, consideration of these will provide some of the strongest motivations in favor of such items and of such a unifying theory.

Subject-matter arguments are second in importance and logical ones last. But this remark deserves two comments. First, not all arguments within a category are of equal importance: certain subjects will provide more motivation than certain logical problems, and certain others of the latter will be more important than some of the former. Nevertheless, and this is the second point, the ranking of the categories is a function, not of the importance of the specific problem areas, but of their viewpoint, so to speak. Arguments based on isolated (sets of) sentences out of context of an accompanying theory (such as those of the second type) will be, in general, weak arguments. Hence, arguments such as those of the first type, based on an entire theory, will be stronger; and those (the third type) of a "global", or inter-theoretic, nature will be strongest. ²

B. Data and Problems

1. Negative Existentials.

Much of the talk about non-existent objects has an air of paradox about it; e.g., non-existents are said to be the referents of non-referring expressions, and Meinong has said that "There are objects of which it is true that there are not such objects" ([63]: 490). It is well, then, to begin with sentences which deny the existence of something: "negative existentials". Negative existentials are natural-language sentences. They can be true ('The largest prime does not
exist', or 'There is no largest prime') or false ('Black swans do not exist', or 'There are no black swans').

Suppose an architect designs a house, H, which is never built. How are we to understand the following negative existential?

(1) H does not exist.

There is a puzzle lurking here (cf. Cartwright [6]: 629ff, Lambert [51]: 381, and Quine [85]: 1-3): Since (1) is true, it must be about H, and, hence, there must be something for it to be about. So, H exists after all, and (1) is false. This amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of some step of this seemingly sound inference.

If, however, we introduce items which can serve as the meanings of such non-denoting expressions, we can preserve the truth and the form of (1) by taking it to be about\textsuperscript{3} such an item.\textsuperscript{4} (Moreover, if "aboutness" is a relation between a sentence (or proposition) and such an item in one case, then it is plausible that it is so in all cases, including false negative existentials.)

Thus, we would understand (1) in a direct fashion as

(1A) There actually is no house corresponding to H,

rather than having to paraphrase it as

(1B) Every (actual) house is such that it is not H.

The former is about all houses, actual or not, asserting that besides the existing ones, there is no other which is H. That is, it asserts of H that it has not been built. The latter, (1B), is about the actual world, asserting of its built houses that none of them is H. (Cf. the
discussions in Russell [93]: 337 and Findlay [31]: 51-56.)

This is only meant to show that the move of introducing such items is possible. It must, of course, be supplemented by an account of the nature of these items, how properties might be predicated of them, how they interact with ordinary objects, and so on. Quantifiers which range over these items would also have to be introduced to account for the manner in which "there is" something which (1) is "about", and these quantifiers would have to be related to the more usual ones.

However, insofar as paraphrases such as (1B) are felt to suffice for describing the world, the value of introducing such items and developing a supporting theory is not yet demonstrated.

2. Truth.

One can provide semantical analyses of certain seemingly true sentences (and seemingly valid inferences) by means of such entities. Consider, for example,

(2) Gandalf is a wizard.

If (2) is true, then (because the negative existential 'Gandalf does not exist' is also true) we can account for its truth by introducing an item to which 'Gandalf' could refer. Roughly, (2) would be true if and only if this item "had" the property of being a wizard. To cash this out, we would need to make precise not only the nature of such items but also how they might be propertied.

But is (2) true? Some philosophers claim that such sentences are false (Chisholm [17]: 9 mentions the possibility of this move). But
to show this requires more than mere paraphrase into a false sentence such as:

(2A) One and only one thing is Gandalf (or, gandalfs) and it is a wizard.

One must defend the "change" in truth value. For it is not the case that we counted the sentence true on the basis of incorrect intuition; the situation is not parallel to, say, that of the set-theoretical paradoxes arising from incorrect intuitions about sets. There, our intuitions lead to logical contradictions. Here, our intuitions only lead us to a domain of items to which such expressions as 'Gandalf' could refer.

Perhaps saying that (2) is true arises from a confusion between it and, say, 'I believe that Gandalf is a wizard', which is true (cf. Quine's observation cited in Section 3). For, independently of thinking beings, perhaps (2) has no truth value. This leaves us with two possibilities: we can find sentences that are not open to this confusion, or we can look at larger contexts, such as works of fiction (perhaps even involving "real" people or events, as in historical novels).

3. Fiction and Myth.

Sentences about non-existents appear prominently in fiction and in myths. A currently popular approach to the semantics of sentences like (2) is to understand them as being within the scope of an implicit intensional operator (cf. Burge [2]: 310), for example,

(2B) In The Lord of the Rings it is the case that Gandalf is a wizard.
According to this approach, we would then interpret the (2)-fragment of (2B) extensionally "in" a "possible world". For one who shuns possible worlds, this analysis is not available. It has the additional disadvantage that the "world" of the relevant myth or work of fiction may be quite impossible or might have as individual "inhabitants" creatures who are impossible.

It does bring up, however, something that Quine pointed out: "excepting such contexts as 'there is no such thing as Cerberus,' a singular term is ordinarily used only when the speaker believes or cares to pretend that the object exists" (quoted in Lambert [50]: 4). More generally, non-denoting terms appear (negative existentials aside) only in intentional contexts. Thus, there is no extra motivation provided by fictional contexts beyond that of intentional contexts, and we shall deal with these later (Sect. 11).

The point is even clearer in the case of mythology; and here we border on arguments from science (see Sect. 6). In the study of mythology, we are concerned with the beliefs of a culture. Our special items would enable us to deal more simply and directly with the objects of such beliefs, in a fashion much closer to the way the culture expresses them. Their beliefs would not have to be paraphrased (beyond translation from the native tongue) after the fashion of either (2A) or (2B), thus avoiding "cultural contamination" by the beliefs (equally culture-bound) of the anthropologist.

Nevertheless, fictional and mythological contexts are somewhat parochial. Why should the extensional language of science and mathematics be changed merely to be able to say "Zeus is a powerful god
and father of Athene" without paraphrase or commitment to the (actual) existence of Zeus, gods, and Athene? Such contexts are, at any rate, special cases of a slightly more general problem, to which we now turn.

4. The Uniformity of Ordinary Language.

4.1. Fictional language. The claim that sentences such as (2) about fictional characters are elliptical for more complicated ones like (2B) fails to take other relevant data into consideration. Thus, the question

(3) Who is Pegasus?

cannot be expanded into

(3A) In the Greek myth, who is Pegasus?

for the ability to do so entails that the questioner already knows an important part of the answer, and this simply cannot be presupposed in all cases. Also, this technique simply does not seem to capture the meaning of individual statements made in a work of fiction; and it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to discuss characters who appear in more than one story or in historical novels.

The point is that the grammar of natural languages does not distinguish between sentences about fictional (or other non-existent) objects and sentences about real things. Ordinary language, being thus uniform in its talk of such entities, suggests a further use for our special items.

Let us consider the example of fiction a bit more. Fiction is a linguistic phenomenon, usually opposed to "fact". Fictional events,
either written down and preserved or spoken and perhaps preserved by
oral tradition, always "exist"; factual events are more ephemeral.
Fiction, taken broadly, is literature, be it true or false, be it about
existents (history) or non-existents:

The greatest mistake we can make in dealing with characters
in fiction is to insist on their "reality." No character
in a book is a real person. Not even if he is in a history
book and is called Ulysses S. Grant. (Scholes [101]: 17.)

What I am suggesting, to paraphrase Scholes, is that it is a mistake in
dealing with terms in sentences to insist on the "reality" of their de­
notations: no denotation (except, perhaps, in the case of demonstra­
tive reference) is a real thing, not even if the denoting term occurs
in a true sentence.

4.2. Semantic uniformity. It seems reasonable that if two un­
ambiguous sentences are alike in syntactic structure, then they ought
to be alike in semantic interpretation; and if some sentences require
special items for their semantic analysis, then all syntactically
identical ones do. Since there is no syntactic ambiguity evident in
sentences such as 'Gandalf is a man' and 'Quine is a man', or 'The
present King of France is bald' and 'The present President of France
is bald', be they taken "fictionally" or "factually", neither should
there be any semantic ambiguity. That is, if the semantic "value" (be
it a truth value, a "proposition", or whatever) of 'Quine is a man' is
a function of the semantic values of, roughly, 'Quine', 'is a', and
'man', then so ought the semantic value of 'Gandalf is a man' to be a
function of the semantic values of 'Gandalf', 'is a', and 'man'. 
Thus Findlay and Prior:

"There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and talking about what does and what does not really exist." . . . [I]t would certainly be awkward to say that thinking [or talking] of X isn't the same sort of thing when X exists and when it doesn't. . . . (Prior [83]: 129-30.)

If there were two semantical techniques, how would the decision be made as to which one to use? Is this or that bit of text fiction? Is it factual? If the latter, then a semantic interpretation function whose range consisted of ordinary entities will suffice; if the former, a range of special items seems called for.

Moreover, as Chisholm has noted,

if we wish to teach someone the meaning of "golden" as it is used in ["The thing Peter is thinking about is a golden mountain"] . . . , we may do so by explaining its use in "The Queen possesses a golden ring." ([17]: 9-10.)

Or vice versa: the Queen's golden ring may be described to a child ignorant of real gold but conversant in fairy tales as "just like the golden mountain in the story". The words are used in the same way, i.e., with the same meaning, and so the sentences are understood in the same way.

Although I feel that such considerations as these are more important than others we have examined so far, they are not quite strong enough. One reason is a generalization of the objection raised at the end of Section 3: Who cares about ordinary language? Special languages, such as those of science, are more important, and will be dealt with in Section 6.1. Further, it may be questioned whether ordinary language does have a uniform structure: perhaps it does
only in psychological contexts. (Again, cf. Quine, in Lambert [50]:

4.) Eliminate these, and (perhaps) extensional paraphrases of the remainder will suffice.

5. Semantics for Natural Language.

Let us begin again, this time from the observation that "language tempts us to employ locutions which rouse the fighting spirit of those who care about what exists and what doesn't" (Meyer and Lambert [69]: 15).

Consider a natural language such as English. Certain grammatical sentences of English are clearly true, others clearly false.\(^5\) Still others, equally grammatical, have no clear truth-value. Now, from a purely syntactical point of view, that is, with respect to grammaticality or well-formedness, English is no different from a formal or artificial language, such as one for a system of logic or such as a regimented fragment of English as in Montague [71]-[72].\(^6\) Semantically, however, there is a difference. For a formal language, we usually limit our considerations to semantic interpretations which are complete in the sense that for each name or other referring expression in the language, there corresponds an element of the universe of discourse. That is, there is a semantic interpretation function, \(g\), whose domain is the union of the syntactic categories of the formal language, that is total on that subset of its domain consisting of individual constants (perhaps including definite descriptions). For example, for each name \(n \in \text{Dom}(g)\), there corresponds an element \(g(n) \in \text{Rng}(g)\), where \(\text{Rng}(g)\) is the "domain of interpretation"; in alternative terminology, \(g(n)\) is defined for all names \(n \in \text{Dom}(g)\).\(^7\) Natural languages,
however, only have a partial interpretation function when the universe of discourse is taken to be the real, physical world. For example, there are names in English, such as 'Pegasus', for which the interpretation function is undefined—the same interpretation, that is, which assigns Gerald Ford to the name 'Ford' or to the description 'the 1976 U.S. President'.

Two alternatives suggest themselves. On the one hand, we can change the syntax of English such that the interpretation function becomes total. This could be accomplished by, for instance, eliminating by paraphrase all non-denoting expressions such as improper descriptions, thus enabling those grammatical sentences without clear truth value to gain one (however arbitrary). What I urge, instead, is that we change the semantics by enlarging the range of the interpretation function to make it total. 8

Against the objection that enlarging the universe of discourse to obtain a total function is an idle game, I offer the following considerations. The problem with English on its intended interpretation in a physical-object universe is that while its syntax allows such sentences as 'Pegasus is a flying horse' and 'Pegasus does not exist' to be well-formed, its semantics is at best unclear. Consider, by way of analogy, the syntax of a language for arithmetic whose intended interpretation is the set of natural numbers. With a sufficiently rich vocabulary and a sufficiently flexible syntax, we could ask such questions as

Are there numbers between 1 and 2?

Is there a square root of 2?
Does \( x + 1 = 0 \) have a solution?

If \( x + 1 = 0 \) has a solution, does its solution have a square root? Plainly, on the intended interpretation, the answers to these would be "No". Yet mathematics would not have progressed far had mathematics rested content with such answers. Instead, the domain of interpretation was enlarged to encompass such items as negative, rational, irrational, and complex numbers. What I am suggesting is that if we are to make any progress in our understanding of the semantics of natural languages, the domain of interpretation must be similarly enlarged: we must have a total, not a partial, interpretation function.

We shall return to considerations from natural language in Section C.5, but before turning to other topics, let us consider some further objections. There is a third method in addition to the two mentioned: we might simply ignore the syntactically well-formed but semantically uninterpreted expressions. Call these the "residue" of English. Again, a comparison with mathematics will help:

(I) In the (re-)construction of numbers as sets (\( 0 = \emptyset, \, 1 = \{0\}, \, 2 = \{0, 1\}, \) etc.), the set-theoretical union of numbers (which seems analogous to such a "residue") serves a useful purpose. If numbers are not modeled as sets, '\( m \cup n \)' is meaningless. After modeling, it is syntactically well-formed, but is it meaningful in the sense of being semantically acceptable on the intended (set-theoretical) interpretation? Indeed, it is: where \( m \) and \( n \) are (reconstructed, i.e., set-theoretical models of) numbers, \( m \cup n = \max(m, n) \). To ignore this would be impractical.
(II) There is another case, however, where ignoring the residue seems reasonable. Consider the set-theoretical reconstruction of ordered pairs according to which \(<a, b> = \{\{a\}, \{a,b\}\}. Here, the set-theoretical union of two such pairs is useless; it is an "accidental" feature of the reconstruction—a residue. But here we can make the following analogy: ordered pairs \(<a, b>\) are to non-denoting terms as the union of ordered pairs is to our special items. The union exists; perhaps the special items do, also. The question is: Are they useful? Is the present case for the special items more like (I) or more like (II)?

In (I), the analogy we want to make is between the union of numbers and non-denoting expressions, on the one hand, and the max-function and our special items, on the other. If set-theoretical union is useful, why not non-denoting expressions? And if they are, then we are led to the special items. 'What is the union of two numbers?' is meaningless unless numbers are sets. 'What is the referent of a non-denoting term?' is meaningless unless those terms are of the kind to which 'referent' is applicable. In English, they are. And the only adequate answer to the question is: the special items are their referents.

In (II), the problem is: if set-theoretical union of ordered pairs is useless, why shouldn't non-denoting expressions be? 'What is the union of two ordered pairs?' is meaningless unless ordered pairs are sets. If they are, this question is not meaningless, but useless. 'What is the referent of a non-denoting term?' is meaningless unless such terms are of the right kind. But they are, and, as
I am in the process of showing in this chapter, they are not useless. Our guiding model is (I), not (II).

Another objection is that such moves are fine for the realm of numbers, due to their importance in science, engineering, and business—but why bother expanding the domain just to handle things like Pegasus or the present King of France? Perhaps such empty names and improper descriptions are rather special. However, reference to non-existents occurs more frequently and in more important contexts than one might at first imagine. For one thing, in contemplating our actions, we must refer to merely possible items, which serve as standards for measuring the success of our actions; we shall take up this theme later, in our discussion of intentionality (Sect. 11.5). Another important case of reference to non-existents can be found in negative existential sentences, discussed above in Section 1. We now turn to a more significant domain which involves them.


At the end of Sections 3 and 4.2, I suggested that subject-matters with specialized languages were more important to consider than subject-matters for which ordinary language is sufficient. The methods of paraphrasing our talk so as to avoid the use of special items, such as those offered in Russell [95] and Quine [84], are not intended for everyday use but are offered as tools for science. The problems of non-denoting expressions need not arise in science if the program of extensional paraphrase can be fully carried out. In this section, we shall consider the special language of science and science as our conception of the world.
6.1. The language of science. I have already suggested (Sect. 3) that our special items might be useful in anthropology. But that may be a special case of the broader argument from intentional contexts, to be discussed later. Nor do I want to go one by one through the sciences, cataloguing those which can and those which need not use such items. A broader perspective is required.

Science abounds in non-existent objects; or, better, scientific language abounds in terms whose denotation is open to question. Some are terms with no reference, now banished, such as 'phlogiston' or 'aether'; some are current, such as 'force', 'quark', or 'black hole'; others are not even prima facie referring, such as 'point particle' or 'light ray' (cf. Fine [33]: 31n.2 and Sachs [100]: 307); and some are merely auxiliary, such as 'virtual image'.

The simplest semantical interpretation of these would be by means of special items in an enlarged domain. Indeed, in the case of terms such as 'phlogiston', where the theories which postulated such entities have been refuted, the very fact that they were scientific theories (and not mere "metaphysical speculation") requires that the model of the world according to them must have been populated (as we now see) by such special items.

There is a strong objection to this. For statements about such entities--sentences containing such terms--are only made, it will be suggested, within the "scope" of an implicit (or explicit) existence assumption. Thus, Russell-style extensional paraphrases will not turn out trivially false. Perhaps so. But if all such talk is merely assumption, then the interpretations of terms cannot be actual objects.
Yet statements about the non-existence of perpetual-motion machines or the aether are still about objects, special though they be, which "must have . . . certain characteristic properties" (Chisholm [21]: 250). Against this, however, it can be said that in denying the existence of such things, what we are really doing is denying the joint instantiation (or exemplification) of certain properties. If these objections are sustained, then this part of our argument is weak. We shall return to a more general case of it when we consider the broader problem of assumptions and intentional contexts.

Such special items are also needed "to connect scientific theories with our experience that supports those theories" (Castañeda [11]: 141). Such a connection must be by means of propositions like

(4) Water is H₂O.

The problem here concerns the relation between our ordinary, pre-scientific, or "manifest" image of the world, in which 'water' is a term, and the "scientific" image, wherein we speak of 'H₂O'. A sentence like (4) is best understood as expressing a certain relationship (weaker than genuine identity) between items from separate "images" or even separate theories. This is especially true if 'water' in ordinary language has a purely "functional" role. Before the discovery of the truth of (4), 'water', while indeed naming a certain
chemical compound, meant, roughly, "that liquid which is drinkable, constitutes rain, is ice when frozen, etc.". (In some possible world, this might describe liquid \( \text{CO}_2 \), and \( \text{CO}_2 \) might have been called 'water' there.) If we understand 'water' as naming an item with those functional properties (and no others, such as "is a by-product of the mixture of \( \text{HCl} \) and \( \text{NaOH} \)"), and if we understand '\( \text{H}_2\text{O} \)' as naming an item with only those chemical properties deriving from its molecular structure, then (4) can best be read as a statement of a relationship between these two items.

A stronger argument along these lines will be considered when we deal with Fregean tetrads, but we might consider some other examples here:

(5) Genes are DNA.

Here, 'genes' is a (functional) term coming from one theory within the scientific image, and 'DNA' is a (chemical) term coming from another (more refined) theory within the same image (cf. Margoliash [59]: 189). Such an inter-theoretic identity can also be interpreted as affirming a relationship between two special items.

Finally, another interesting example from the history of science concerns progress that was made within a theory from the scientific image (meteorology) by means of an identification of two items from the manifest image:
[A] storm . . . occurred in the Black Sea on November 14, 1854, during the Crimean War when it destroyed the French fleet at Balaklava. Since the day before there was also a storm in the Mediterranean, the question arose whether the two occurrences were in reality a single storm moving across southern Europe. (Hughes [44]: 335.)

6.2. Science as our conception of the world. The results of science (more particularly, current scientific theory) become our theory or conception of the world. Science attempts to give metaphysical statements: knowledge of the world. Yet it aims at knowledge and so is fundamentally an epistemological discipline. Nor can science be purely descriptive, for it should be possible to give a complete description of anything by means of a mere catalog of its constituents, an inventory of data. Science, indeed any theory, does more: it attempts to structure and explain the data. And to do this, a theory must be "wider" than the data: it must show how the actual data fit with other, future or merely possible, data. In this fashion, science moves us from a domain of actual objects to one of possible objects (even if only for the structural-organizational purpose of "rounding out" the data).

As before, there is a parallel in mathematics. From natural numbers, thoroughly familiar, we move on to rationals and negatives, reals and imaginaries. Similarly, based on our familiarity with the actual here-and-now (the present), scientific theories move (at first merely by postulating) to the actual there-and-then (past and future) and finally to the possible. More concretely, we begin with certain objects with well-established properties; we infer or conceive of objects with combinations of these properties which are then either created or
discovered (such as superheavy elements; cf. Seaborg [104]: 291); and finally we conceive of objects with other combinations of properties or even with new properties (e.g., quarks with charm), which are merely possible. Clearly, actual objects are important no matter how conceived, but if our tool for conceiving them allows the conception of other, merely possible, objects, then we ought to explore their potential for usefulness elsewhere.

The admission of "possible" objects which are useful (e.g., quarks, or possible social organizations, or inventions) leaves the door open for those which are not (e.g., possible fat men in doorways). But even this goes only half-way: "impossible" objects enter in the same fashion, e.g., via sets of properties. Our language easily accommodates talk of them; there can be fictional accounts of them; and they are encountered in science (perpetual motion machines) and mathematics (in reductio proofs; cf. Routley [90]: 334).

One need not agree that impossible objects per se are important. But if important problems require for their solution entities (e.g., possibilia) whose structure is such as to allow for impossible objects, then allow them (cf. Castañeda [7]: 8).

7. Fregean Tetrads.

The methodology to be followed in this section needs some discussion. By "text" I shall mean, roughly, a sequence of related sentences, in the same sense in which a sentence is a sequence of related words and a word is a sequence of related letters or sounds (cf. n.2). To "interpret" a text is, roughly, to determine what states of affairs
its author has tried to represent by it, i.e., to determine what message its author wished to communicate.

Now, faced with the task of interpreting a text, be it literary, philosophical, logical, linguistic, etc., a primary method of attack is first to determine the relationships of the symbols (terms, predicates, relations, etc.) among each other. This is both a syntactical and a semantical undertaking; but the semantics is a theory of meaning, not reference. It is the second part of the task, subordinate to the first, to determine, if possible, the referents (denotations) of these symbols (in the real world).

Otherwise, if the order is reversed, or if the tasks are not clearly separated, one might prejudge the meanings or relationships of some of the symbols and then carry that bias over to the interpretation of the others. For instance, by assuming that '=' always means genuine identity (self-identity), one can raise puzzles (such as those of Fregean tetrads) which would not have arisen by the converse methodology, suggested in the last paragraph. For, this methodology of strict attention to the text and its structure assumes of '=' only that it represents a 2-place relation (and perhaps one "similar", albeit in an unspecified way, to genuine identity). If it turns out that '=' represents genuine identity, that is a piece of information. But it should not be a presupposition (except as a last resort--and then its hypothetical nature should be made explicit).

Ockham's razor may be a valuable metaphysical principle. But a better methodological (and epistemological?) principle is: Make all possible distinctions.
Consider the following text:

(I) John believes that the Evening Star is a planet. \((B_J Pe)\)

(II) The Evening Star is the Morning Star. \((e = m)\)

So, (III) John believes that the Morning Star is a planet. \((B_J Pm)\)

But, (IV) John does not believe that the Morning Star is a planet. \((\neg B_J Pm)\)

Let us suppose that (I), (II), and (IV) are factually correct. But (III), which appears to follow logically from (I) and (II) by the substitutivity of identicals, flatly contradicts (IV). How can (III) and (IV) be reconciled? How, that is, are we to interpret this text?

If the inference is invalid, there is no problem, so let us consider that possibility first. Sentence (III) is obtained syntactically (in the grammatical, not the logical, sense) from (I) by substitution of 'm' for 'e'. What logical rule of inference would allow this transformation salva veritate? This is a notably difficult question to answer, and one well beyond our scope. Clearly, we want some variation of "That which we call a rose/By any other name would smell as sweet" (Shakespeare [105], II, ii, 43-44). The difficulties in formulating such a principle involve such things as quotational contexts and idiomatic expressions which prevent the preservation of truth. So let us, to avoid certain issues, limit our substitutions to occurrences of terms that are "trouble-free", without trying to specify the extent of 'trouble-free'. The minimal syntactic (logical) rule relating (III) thus to (I) and (II) is:
Let $N_1$ and $N_2$ be co-referential noun phrases; i.e., both describe, name, denote, or otherwise refer to some one thing.

Let $S_1$ be a true sentence containing trouble-free occurrences of $N_1$.

Let $S_2$ be a sentence obtained from $S_1$ by substituting zero or more trouble-free occurrences of $N_1$ by trouble-free occurrences of $N_2$.

Then $S_2$ is a true sentence.

Now our question is this: Are 'm' and 'e' co-referential in the sense of (SL)? That is, are we to interpret '=' in (II) as a relation-symbol representing (SL)-co-referentiality?

To answer this, let us ask what metaphysical (semantic) fact grounds this syntactic principle. Presumably, it is the indiscernibility of identicals (cf. Castañeda [11]: 123):

\[(\text{LL}) \quad \text{If } x \text{ is identical with } y, \text{ then whatever is true of } x \text{ is true of } y.\]

We now must consider two questions: Is '$B_jP$' (i.e., is the property of being believed by John to be a planet) something "true of" e? Is the nature of the relationship stated in (II) that of genuine identity as mentioned in the antecedent of (LL)? If the answers to both of these are "Yes", then the inference is valid, and we have yet to reconcile (III) and (IV). If the answer to either is "No", then we may proceed to investigate other interpretations.

Suppose we understand (I) as a true report about John's belief, in terms which accurately describe the content (or form) of that belief; and let us understand (II) as a true, albeit contingent, identity statement. Then (III) follows by (SL) and is true if understood thus:
(III) is a true report (by someone other than John) about John's belief, in terms that, say, the speaker and audience understand, but that might not be ones which John would agree to, stating that John believes a certain astronomical object to be a planet, whether we call that object 'e' or 'm'. That is, it does not reveal perspicuously the precise content of John's belief (as he himself might report it)—it is "propositionally opaque" in the sense of Castañeda [15]: 27. We must understand (IV) as being "propositionally transparent", giving us further information about the content of John's belief. That is why it appears to contradict (III); it really doesn't, if (III) is taken as suggested.

On this interpretation, however, the inference equivocates on \( B_j P \) and on 'm'. Though this makes sense of the text, it strays from it. For \( B_j P \) must be taken the same way throughout. It is the hypothetical speaker of (I)-(III) who equivocates on \( B_j P \) in concluding (III) from (I) and (II).

So suppose that (I) is to be understood as a report by someone other than John, in the manner of our interpretation of (III), above. This focuses the equivocation on 'm' and presents us with two possibilities. Either (a) 'm' and 'e' always refer to an actual, physical object—the astronomical body—or (b) they always refer to something else—our special items. On (a), (IV) is false, and the inference is validated by (SL) (as grounded in (LL)). On (b), (II) is false, if '=' represents genuine identity; then (SL) is inapplicable, (III) does not follow, and (IV) is true.
But (I) and (IV) were assumed true beyond reproach. Thus, the inference is a *reductio* of (II), and (b) is the only viable interpretation. The text, which we dub a "Fregean tetrad" (after similar terminology in Castañeda [7]: 4), leads to our special items.\(^{14}\)

There are other alternatives to consider, but they all revolve around our only remaining problem: the interpretation of '=' in (II). In the next section, we examine this and other problems of identity.

8. Identity.

Following Castañeda ([7]: 4 and [11]: 122-23), I take (LL) to be one of the central principles of genuine identity.\(^{15}\) It is important to realize that it is an *ontological* principle, not a *linguistic* (either syntactic or semantic) one (cf. [11]: 123). It may be put less perspicuously but more accurately as: whatever is true of something is true of it. It holds of all entities, be they actual (e.g., physical) objects or the special items encountered earlier.

With this in mind, let us reconsider the Fregean tetrad of the last section. One alternative is to hold "that incomplete sentences like ['B.\(j\)'\(P_\)'] ... do not express properties ... of the entities referred to by means of expressions occupying the blank '_'' (as discussed in Castañeda [11]: 124). If such an expression refers to an actual entity, then, due to the supremacy of (LL) and the truth of (IV), this claim is correct (otherwise, the inference would be valid and (IV) false): a belief about \(x\) is not "true of" \(x\) if \(x\) names an actual entity. For the belief is not about the actual thing \(x\), but is about that actual thing \(x\) "under some description". And this is because in order to think, we must think in terms of descriptions—-we must
categorize or classify, and we must do so on the basis of similarities: "Without the concepts of identity and sameness, a creature cannot think" ([11]: 121). If, on the other hand, the expression occupying '_' names one of our special items, we can hold that 'B_jP_' does express a property of it. But then, as we saw above, there are no problems.

There are four remaining alternatives. Assume, first, that 'm' and 'e' are co-referential and that '=' represents genuine identity. Then (LL) applies and the inference to (III) is valid. But (IV) is unassailably true. Hence, either the disparity between (III) and (IV) is merely verbal (for, if (II) is true, then whatever is genuinely identical with the Evening Star is indeed believed by John to be a planet if B_jPe is true; cf. Castañeda [7]: 5), or one of our two assumptions is false.

Suppose, then, that 'm' and 'e' are not co-referential but that '=' represents genuine identity. In this case, (II) is false and, while the inference may be valid, it is unsound, so (III) is false. This leaves us with the task of explaining the nature of and relation between m and e which led us to believe (II).

Suppose, on the other hand, that '=' does not represent genuine identity. Then (LL) is inapplicable, the inference invalid, and we are faced with essentially the same task as before.

The outcome of these considerations is that either (II) is a false statement of genuine identity or it is not a statement of genuine identity at all. If we choose to interpret the text in the
latter fashion, we shall have to provide an explication of the relation represented by '='. (This will be done by the CSC-relation of Chapter III, Section C.)

9. Quine's Argument

In [85]: 152-53, Quine offered an argument against such entities as our special items. His strategy was to show that admitting such entities into one's ontology in order to solve problems similar to those discussed in the previous sections will not do the job.

Quine has in mind the following sort of situation: Suppose that 'p' names a true sentence and that 'e' names the special item the Evening Star. We can construct the Fregean tetrad:

\begin{align*}
(A) & \quad B_j Pe \\
(B) & \quad e = \lambda x(p \& (x = e)) \\
(C) & \quad \text{Therefore } B_j P(\lambda x(p \& (x = e))) \\
(D) & \quad \text{But } \sim B_j P(\lambda x(p \& (x = e))).
\end{align*}

It seems to follow that the special item e, which ought to be genuinely identical to \( \lambda x(p \& (x = e)) \), both has and lacks the property \( B_j P \).

But, as Castañeda was the first to point out ([11], Sect. II), defenders of special items (and other "intensional" entities) must reply to such an objection by rejecting (B) in the same way they rejected (II) earlier, because it is another case of the same relation. There are two special items represented in (B), and they are not genuinely identical. This move, of course, presents such defenders with a challenge: to give a full account of such items; we take up this challenge in Chapter II.
10. Fregean Triads.

Fregean tetrads reduce to triads, after rejection of the alleged conclusion of the inference ((III) and (C) above), and provide a useful tool for our purposes. Let us consider some more instances of it.

Consider: . . . 'The blue marble in the box is identical with the blue glass in the box.' . . . [T]he marble . . . and the glass . . . are really different entities. . . . [T]he marble may be destroyed by being melted . . . while the glass comes out unscathed except for the loss of its shape. (Castañeda [11]: 133-34.)

Putting this in the form of a Fregean triad, we get the following consistent propositions:

(E) \( B_j (\text{this marble can be destroyed by melting}). \)
This marble = this piece of glass.
~\( B_j (\text{this piece of glass can be destroyed by melting}). \)

Next, recall (4), 'Water is \( H_2O \)'. Application of the triad yields

(F) \( B_j (\text{water tastes good}). \)
Water = \( H_2O \)
~\( B_j (\text{\( H_2O \) tastes good}). \)

Finally, consider this triad based on (5), 'Genes are DNA':

(G) \( B_{\text{Mendel}} (\text{genes have something to do with heredity}). \)
Genes = DNA
~\( B_{\text{Mendel}} (\text{DNA has something to do with heredity}). \)

The '=' in each of (E)-(G) is different: in (E), it represents "compositional" identity (cf. [11]: 134); in (F), "theoretical" identity (cf. [11]: 137) or, better, "inter-image" identity (cf. Sect. 6.1, above); in (G), "inter-theoretical" identity (cf. Sect. 6.1). None of these is genuine identity. The examples are interesting because a
different sameness relation is involved in each, and the consistency of each triad can be accounted for by the special items already in use.

Fregean triads are important because they are applicable over a wide range of cases and need have nothing at all to do with non-existents or non-denoting expressions. And while Fregean triads can be had with other operators, notably 'it is necessary that', it is the belief version which is most important. We shall see the reason for this in Section 11.

Before doing that, however, let us have two more examples. The following puzzle is adapted from van Fraassen and Lambert [109]: 240:

(H) (i) John prevented the accident at the corner of High St. and Pleasant St. 
Therefore (ii) The accident at the corner of High St. and Pleasant St. = the 1965 explosion of the White House. 
Therefore (iii) John prevented the 1965 explosion of the White House.

Now, on the theory defended so far, we avoid the anomolous conclusion (iii) by denying that (ii) is a case of genuine identity, so that (LL) is inapplicable. What is of interest is that we can use special items in discussion of events. Now, one sort of context which is becoming obvious as a candidate for a strong motivation for these items is psychological contexts. This seems not to be such. But events and prevention have to do with human agents, so perhaps we are not too far away.

On the other hand, consider

(J) (i) The rainfall prevented the drought. 
Therefore (ii) The drought = the explosion of the earth. 
Therefore (iii) The rainfall prevented the explosion of the earth.
Here we have the same problem, but no agency at all. We could deny the use of 'prevents' except where conscious agency is involved. But there is another way. The drought, because of the assumed truth of (J1) is a non-evert. Are all non-events (genuinely) identical? Surely not; for they can only be identified by reference to actual events. And since the non-drought, which is actual on the truth of (J1), is not genuinely identical to the non-explosion of the earth, which is also actual, it seems reasonable to conclude that their "opposites" are also not genuinely identical. So (Hii) and (Jii), while true for some other sameness relation, are false if taken as statements of genuine identity.

11. Intentionality.

11.1. Intentionality and science. It is by now a truism that, beginning with the Scientific Revolution, human beings have been shifted from a central place in the scheme of things to "being . . . a puny appendage and irrelevant spectator" (Burtt [3]: 180). This objectivism of science and the attempts to rid its language of expressive power with extensional paraphrases have ignored the fact that "the order of nature . . . is still but the object of rationally conceiving mind" ([3]: 323-24)—the object (albeit in a somewhat different sense) of psychological attitudes. If it can be shown that such attitudes cannot be ignored and can only be understood with the help of special items in an expanded universe of discourse, then we shall perhaps have taken a step towards re-establishing the central position of human beings in the scientific world-view.
We have already seen how several arguments for such special items have directly depended upon, or at least pointed towards the importance of, intentional attitudes. That non-denoting expressions occur mainly in psychological contexts was noted in Sections 2 and 3, and the importance of the belief version of Fregean triads was shown in the last section. In Section 6.2, we discussed impossible objects: Their importance lies not in any intrinsic value they might have (for they might be mere appendages to our construction or explication of possible objects); rather, their significance lies in the fact that we can think of them. The important issues do not concern impossible objects (or even mere non-existents) per se, but our beliefs about them. Finally, it is arguable that science is nothing but our conception of the world. Empirical evidence for scientific theories must take the form 'I observe that . . . ', and this is closely related to Castañeda's claim ([11]: 127) that all statements are within the scope of an implicit 'I think that . . . '. Indeed, aren't all theories really "I think that"s?  

11.2. Intentional language. Intentional language seems to be a fundamental feature of the world (or at least of our world-view). Can such language be eliminated or otherwise extensionally paraphrased? Let us begin by considering intentional attitudes directed upon non-existents. Examples are: 'John wants a unicorn', 'John is thinking of a ghost', 'John believes in ghosts', 'John wants a book' (where there is no particular book which John wants), or Chisholm's example ([21]: 252),
(6) John fears a ghost,
of which he asks whether it can be "paraphrase[d]" . . . in such a way
that the result involve[s] no such apparent reference to a non-existent
object?" ([21]: 252).

A possible paraphrase is:

(6A) John fears, and John would describe his fear with the word 'ghost'.

By 'John fears' could be meant either a neurophysiological or behavior-

ist description of John. The second conjunct is no good, of course,
if John doesn't actually use the word 'ghost'. So we might try

(6B) John fears, and John would describe his fear in terms which
could be otherwise described with the word 'ghost'.

But then we must be able to explain the meaning of 'ghost', which is
"used to refer to" objects that do "not . . . have any . . . kind of
being" (Chisholm [21]: 249). Here, there seem to be two alternatives.
We might, following Meinong and Chisholm ([21]: 251), expand

(*) 'Ghost' is used to designate ghosts

into

'Ghost' is used in the expression of intentional attitudes
directed at ghosts.

This makes essential use of intentional language, and it can be cashed
out with the help of our special items. The other alternative is to
provide an extensional interpretation of (*). These usually turn on
behavioristic treatments of language learning and language use. To
enter into this controversy would take us too far afield, and so let us return to the analysis of (6).

Perhaps "the word 'ghost' ... functions only as part of the longer expression 'fears a ghost'" (Chisholm [21]: 253). Here, there appear to be two possibilities. First, rather than fearing being an "act" whose "object" is a ghost, John may be said to fear in a "ghostly" manner (much as some philosophers claim that seeing a red object is seeing "redly"). We shall take up this option in greater detail in Chapter II, Section C.3.

Second, we might "extract"

the entity [viz., John] as proper subject, treating the remainder as an unanalyzable predicate, and forbidding the extraction of the non-entity as proper subject in addition to the entity. ... (Routley [91]: 225.)

Thus, (6) is to be taken as

(6C) John fears a ghost.

The difficulties with this are that there is then no way to relate such sentences as (6C) to (i) other sentences containing 'ghost' which are not analyzable in the same fashion, e.g., 'Ghosts do not exist' or 'Ghosts are immaterial' (cf. Chisholm [21]: 253 and Routley [91]: 225), and to (ii) "apparently general transformations which convert subject-predicate statements to relational ones" ([91]: 225). The Routleys' point here is not clear, but they appear to have in mind the inability to transform (6) understood as (6C) into something along the lines of (6CR) Ghosts are (or, a ghost is) feared by John,
as 'John reads a book' is transformable into 'A book is read by John'.

Of course, the move from (6C) to (6CR), while sanctioned by ordinary language, is not legitimate in the absence of a domain of items to which such words as 'ghost' can refer or of quantifiers which can range over such items.

Perhaps (6) is to be understood as asserting "that there is a certain relation holding between John and a certain set of . . . properties" (Chisholm [21]: 253). The properties would be, say, those which (John believes that) ghosts have. And the relation might be such that (6) becomes

(6D) John fears that those properties have been jointly instantiated.

But according to (6), John fears an object, while according to (6D), he fears that a certain state of affairs obtains, and it is at least arguable that these are not the same thing at all. So let us try

(6E) John fears a joint instantiation of those properties.

But now we have returned to a proposition involving a non-existent object, which was what we were trying to avoid. Nor, we might add, is it sufficient to understand (6) as

(6F) John fears the set of those properties,

for this is simply false, though it is difficult to say just how it is false: More precisely, suppose that the special item ghost is a set of properties, say \{A, B, C\}, and consider the following fragment of a Fregean tetrad:
(K)  
(i) John fears a ghost
(ii) \textit{ghost} = \textit{def} \{A, B, C\}
Therefore (iii) John fears \{A, B, C\}

Since (Kii) is a definitional identity, (Kiii) follows. Yet if John is a mathematician, (Kiii) is probably false. Hidden premisses in (K), it might be objected, are

(iv) \{A, B, C\} is a set
Therefore (v) John fears a set

and substitution of genus for species is not permissable. For consider

(L)  
(i) The Martian thinks that he saw a man.
(ii) All men are animals.
Therefore (iii) The Martian thinks that he saw an animal.

Substitution of genus (animal) for species (man) in the assumed-to-be-true (Li) turns it into the plausibly-false (Liii); and neither (Li) nor (Lii) can be denied. The problem is that the Martian doesn't know (Lii).

In spite of this, I'm still tempted to say that John does \textit{not} fear a set, but a \textit{thing}, a \textit{concretum}, an \textit{object}--other than a set. Suppose that John is thinking of a red ball and that (since there is no relevant difference between the acts of thinking of a red ball and thinking of a ghost) a red ball = \{redness, sphericity\}. Now \{redness, sphericity\} is a set, but John is \textit{not} thinking of a set. Suppose further that John is blind and has never been in contact with a red ball, although he has been in contact with red things and balls. Either substitution of genus for species goes, or 'red ball = \{redness, sphericity\}' goes. Suppose, then, that John believes that \{redness,
sphericity} is a set. He doesn't believe that a red ball = \{redness, sphericity\}; rather, say, he believes that a red ball has redness (whatever redness may be) and is spherical. For he believes that it is a concretum, an object.

A different type of intentional statement is

(7) The mountain I am thinking of is golden,

or

(8) The particle I am thinking of (or which my theory postulates) has weight W.

Extensional paraphrases of these in the manner of Russell [95] turn (7) into a falsehood (if I am not thinking of a real mountain) and (8) into a falsehood if my theory is false. But, at least for many idiolects, (7) is true (if I am thinking of a golden mountain); and be my theory false or not, (8) is still true (according to the theory). Further consideration of the Russellization of (7), viz.,

(7A) \(\exists x \forall y \langle y \text{ is a mountain I am thinking of} \iff x = y \text{ and } Gx\rangle\),

suggests that if we do not interpret the quantifier existentially, and instead have it range over objects of thought (special items), then we might also have to change our ordinary notion of predication. For, objects of thought, even if identified with neuron firings, can't be colored, i.e., can't reflect light.

Comparing objects of beliefs yields another sort of intentional statement:

(9) The particle that I am thinking of (or, that my theory suggests) differs in interesting respects from the particle that you are thinking of (or, that your theory suggests).
Russellization of (9) fares no better than before; our special items, on the other hand, are useful in understanding it. Or consider the case of iterated belief statements:

(10) John believes (truly) that Peter believes that p.

Insofar as it is possible to determine the truth value of (10) as a function of the truth values of its constituents, we must compare the intentional objects of John's belief with those of Peter's.

Finally, take this example from Castañeda [7]: 7:

(11) John believes that there is a man at the door, and Paul believes that he [that man] is a burglar,

where, in fact, there is no one at the door. There are two problems: What is the logical form of (11)? How do we identify "the entity which is the object of John's and Paul's beliefs" ([7]: 7)? These questions admit of simple answers if we use our special items with quantifiers ranging over them ('M' = is a man at the door, and 'B' (without subscripts) = is a burglar):

(11A) $\exists x (B_j Mx \land B_p Bx)$

or, perhaps,

(11B) $\exists x (B_j (Ex \land Mx) \land B_p Bx)$,

where 'E' = exists. But even with quantification restricted to actual objects, the first question can be answered thus:

(11C) $B_j \exists x Mx \land B_p B \downarrow x (B_j Mx)$,

or, perhaps, thus:
i.e., 'John believes that there exists a (or, one and only one) man at the door, and Paul believes that the man whom John believes is at the door (i.e., "he [that man]"), is a burglar'. Or even

\[(11E) \forall j \exists x Mx \land \exists y (\forall j B(My) \land Bx).\]

The problem is answering the second question. If 'lx(B_Mx)' is left intact, it can only refer to one of our special items. If it is Russellized itself, the second conjuncts of (11C) and (11E) become, respectively,

\[(11F) \forall y (B_My \leftrightarrow y=x \land Bx)\]
\[(11G) \exists x (Mx \land \forall w (B_Mw \leftrightarrow w=z \land z=x) \land Bx).\]

But these are false: it is simply not the case that Paul need believe that there is precisely one thing such that John believes that it is a man at the door.

11.3. Belief. The special items that would be needed for an expanded universe of discourse are also clearly useful for understanding and analyzing intentional contexts. This suggests that they are plausible candidates for being the objects of belief.

Recall the Fregean tetrad concerning the Evening Star (e) and the Morning Star (m), and also the suggestions (Sect. 8) that (a) 'B_j P' (i.e., being believed by John to be a planet) does not express a property of e if e is the actual heavenly body, but (b) it does express a property of e if e is one of our special items.
John "has a state of believing whose 'content' is a proposition, or a state of affairs, that involves . . . [e], but on . . . [suggestion (a), e] cannot be part and parcel of that proposition or state of affairs" (Castañeda [11]: 125). That is, John's belief cannot be exhibited by anything (proposition, state of affairs, or what have you) that has the actual e in it without, so to speak, a "costume" on. For if it were, the belief would be propositionally opaque. If the heavenly body has on the "costume" of e (or, to mix metaphors, presents its e "face" towards John rather than its m "face"), then the representation is propositionally transparent. So, to save this transparency, John's belief must be represented by something which doesn't have the actual heavenly body in it. "This suggests that states of believing do not connect with the [actual] entities the believings are about" ([11]: 125): rather, even on (a) (as well, of course, as on (b)), they can be taken to "connect" with our special items ("costumed" actual ones, perhaps):

[W]hatever . . . [John] does he cannot get out of his predicament: whenever he thinks of the ordinary [i.e., actual] object . . . he can do so only by having before his mind an "appearance" . . . [i.e., a special item corresponding to] that object. ([11]: 125.)

This "predicament" also explains why philosophers have so much trouble discussing the issue clearly. For we need to be able to refer to the actual object, but we too can only do so by means of special items.

11.4. Thought and language. The theme emerging from our consideration of the data thus far is that a theory of the special items in an expanded universe of discourse introduced to solve semantic
problems and, in general, to account for certain linguistic data, can also be used to account for certain psychological data and to solve puzzles of intentionality.

Even our thesis of the uniformity of ordinary language is best seen as a reflection of an intentional fact: the uniformity of (contemplative) thinking:

[Th]inking is impervious to existence. Thinking is quite as comfortable in the contemplation of the existent as in the contemplation of the nonexistent. (Castañeda [7]: 9.)

Merely by examining our thinking (which is an epistemological, not a metaphysical, task), we cannot distinguish between successful thinking (true contemplation of existing things, say) and other sorts (e.g., false contemplation of existents, contemplation of non-existents).

If, then, there is no qualitative difference between these two kinds of thinkings, why should there be a difference between the kinds of things thought about? Surely, some exist, others don't; but, equally surely, some are red, others aren't: these differences are of another sort. The question I wish to raise might be put this way: If contemplation of non-existents is not "about" actual objects, but "about" special items, why shouldn't we construe contemplation of existents as being "about" special items, too, rather than "about" actual objects? Doing so would enable us to account for the uniformity of contemplative thinking. We shall be content merely to raise the question here, and to return to it in Chapter II, Section C.

11.5. Practical thinking. Let us close this section on the data of intentional phenomena with the observation that our special items
can also play a role in our (practical) intentions:

[0]ur thinking is systematically empowered to trigger our action mechanisms so as to be at least in readiness to bring out the action that is thought of in that thinking itself. (Castañeda [11]: 142.)

Now, suppose that I intend to do A but don't intend to do B, even though (unknown to me), doing A is the same as doing B. We have learned that this is not genuine identity. But if my "action mechanisms . . . bring out the action that is thought of," then they bring out A. So, they bring out B, which isn't the action thought of. We might conclude that from the extensional point of view, it doesn't matter what we intend, only what we actually do (as in Existentialism).

But consider moral responsibility. Suppose doing A is good while doing B is bad. Here, the intention (hence, the special item doing A) is all-important. As a dividend, then, we have an argument for special items from morality. 20

C. The Inadequacy of Current Theories

In this section, we tie up some loose ends and look at the data and problems from a broader perspective.

1. Chisholm's Argument and Ockham's Razor.

A useful starting point is the following methodological argument of Chisholm ([19]: 24):

(M) (i) "If . . . there are certain true sentences which can be taken to imply that there are certain things other than attributes and concrete individual substances" (e.g., our special items)

(ii) "and if . . . we are unable to paraphrase these sentences into other sentences which can be seen not to imply that there are those things"
(iii) "... it is not unreasonable to suppose that there are in fact those things."

As I have urged in the preceding sections, something very much like (Mi) seems true, viz., that there are certain true sentences (and larger texts) which can be taken to imply the usefulness of, if not the need for, holding that there are such things as our special items. In this section, we shall consider the inability to paraphrase these sentences (and texts) into other sentences which do not make use of our special items, but only of actual (e.g., physical) objects.

Note, first, that "if we could show, with respect to these truths, that they need not be construed as pertaining to" such items, then we would "weaken" the inference to (Miii) (cf. Chisholm [21]: 248). Weaken, but not destroy--because the mere fact of paraphrasability does not entail ontological correctness. That is, the existence of (adequate) extensional paraphrases need not entail a reduction to an "extensional" ontology. Similarly, the existence of cars with no separate defrosting control, but only a suitable combination of arrangements of the heating controls and the air vents, does not entail the nonexistence of cars with separate defrosting controls.

As another example, suppose that there are a finite number of things in some universe of discourse and that they fall into three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories, A, B, and C. Suppose further that for each property P, some A has P iff some B has P, including among such properties the relations of As and Bs to Cs. Now, it is possible to have a language whose individual variables range only over As and Cs, and this language would accurately
describe the domain except that it could not distinguish between $A$s and $B$s. But from the existence of this language, we cannot draw any ontological conclusions about the number or kinds of entities in the domain. The (isomorphic) equivalence of $A$s and $B$s cannot be reduced to a genuine identity.

Returning to the real world, there may not even be an ontological "fact of the matter", but two (or more) conflicting theories. That is, if the truths of (M) can be construed as pertaining to our special items and if there are no "bad" consequences of so doing (e.g., inconsistency) and perhaps some "good" ones (e.g., adequate analyses of psychological contexts)—just as there is no harm in having a separate defrosting control (if, say, there is no extra cost) and perhaps an advantage (e.g., ease of operation, ability to heat and defrost simultaneously)—then the only reason for not thus construing them would be some principle such as Ockham's Razor.

Such principles, however, are arguably unsatisfactory for theories of what the world is really like:

[W]hat is needed is a counterpart to the Law of Parsimony [i.e., Ockham's Razor]—so to speak, a Law against Miserliness—stipulating that entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy and, more generally, that it is vain to try to do with fewer what requires more.

This law . . . has what might be loosely called ontological as well as semantical applications. It condemns gaps in ontology just as Occam's law repudiates redundancies; and it may be construed as a maxim denouncing equivocations just as Occam's law opposes synonyms. (Menger [68]: 104.)

Principles such as the Razor are, at the very least, to be applied with caution and not in every case (cf. Church [24]: 200 and Peirce
An example of a valid application of it will be offered in Section 4.

Inability to paraphrase in the manner of (Mii), moreover, is not as strong as ability to prove with respect to any one of these truths that it must be construed as pertaining to special items. It is difficult to envisage what form such a direct proof would take. One plausible technique would be to devise an independently acceptable "background" theory which would be such that even if all of these truths could be "explained away", they shouldn't be. (For instance, for certain contexts, probably the psychological ones, even if there were a good way of extensionally paraphrasing them, there might be overriding reasons for maintaining the analysis of them with our special items.) We shall consider some arguments of this latter sort in Sections 3 and 4.

2. Specific Failures of Extensionalization.

The two most famous examples of extensional techniques are Russell's theory of descriptions [95] and Quine's method for eliminating proper names (cf. [84], Sects. 37-38). In [102]: 181, Dana Scott (talking of Russell's theory) suggests implicitly three criteria of adequacy for extensional alternatives to theories with special items: simplicity, no (or few) scope problems, and a clear semantical interpretation. Russell's theory is adequate, on Scott's view, with respect to simplicity. But it should be noted, in connection with our comments in the previous section, that the context makes it clear that Scott means that the theory as a whole should be simple, not that it should make
do with as few entities as possible. In fact, the syntactical complications of Russell's theory are, at least in part, due to his Ockhamist tendencies in matters ontological. 21

Russell's theory falls short, according to Scott, on the other two criteria. I am not sure that the second criterion is either generalizable or avoidable (there will be problems of scope even in the Meinongian theory to be developed in Chapter II, Section C). Its source is the ambiguity of the surface structure of natural language, and this is simply a fact we must face.

Scott's main objection to the Russell(-Quine) techniques of contextual elimination of seeming reference to special items is that they are ad hoc:

[T]he case by case presentation of the contextual eliminations . . . makes me worry that some type of discontinuity may creep in, that is to say, in one context the virtual object [or other special item] may behave as one kind of thing whereas in another place it may be quite different. Well, that is not unreasonable: no object stands in all the same relationships to all other objects. What disturbs me rather is that the contextual method makes it too easy to allow the entities to be fickle. ([103]: 146; cf. Lorentz, cited in Sachs [100]: 298.)

The behavioral differences he mentions might be reflections of the different relationships, but the point is that they need not be. They might, rather, be reflections of the eliminative techniques. A reasonable principle, then, is that if (references to) entities are to be eliminated, they should be eliminated in a uniform way from all contexts. Insofar as this can't be done, either they ought not to be eliminated, or reasons should be given why seemingly similar (references to) entities are eliminated in different fashions. While the
Russell-Quine program might be sufficiently uniform, those contexts which have not been successfully treated by its methods can serve as a testing ground for the uniformity of an ultimate theory which contains this program as a part.

Another extensional method for definite descriptions is due to Frege ([34]: 71n.). On his theory, improper definite descriptions denote an arbitrarily chosen "null" entity (cf. the discussion in Carnap [5], Sect. 8 and Scott [102]: 181). Here, the objection is twofold. First, the arbitrariness is, simply, unnatural. (This holds even for Scott's own theory.) While we may not be sure exactly what 'the present King of France' denotes, it does great damage to our natural-language intuitions and is inadequate for natural-language semantics to have it denote, say, 0, the empty set, or the entire domain (cf. Burge [2]: 310). Second, if we are going to allow one arbitrary element (especially if, with Scott, it is one not in the domain), there seems no good reason not to allow (at least) as many as there are non-denoting expressions. And then why not go all the way and allow special items for all individual or descriptive expressions?

But even if Russell's methods, say, are acceptable for (most) references to non-existents, there are yet certain contexts which, I have tried to show, cannot be extensionalized. These are the psychological ones, discussed in Section B.11. Rather than repeat those arguments here, I shall merely quote, of all people, Quine:

What makes me take the propositional attitudes more seriously than logical modality is . . . not that they are clearer, but that they are less clearly dispensable. ([86]: 336; cf. [84]: 202.)
3. Direct Semantics.

The program of complete extensionalization has not yet been accomplished, and I urged in the last section that it may never be. Nevertheless, let us assume that a program of extensional paraphrase that is complete and "continuous" (in Scott's sense) can be developed, and let us see whether there are, even then, reasons for the usefulness of special items.

A suggestion along these lines has been made by Scott:

One often hears that modal (or some other) logic is pointless because it can be translated into some simpler language in a first-order way. Take no notice of such arguments. There is no weight to the claim that the original system must therefore be replaced by the new one. What is essential is to single out important concepts and to investigate their properties. ([103]: 143.)

This must be carefully distinguished from a similar suggestion (e.g., in Quine [84], Sects. 44-45) to the effect that precisely because of the existence of a translation, we may continue using intensional idioms, knowing that they are merely a façon de parler. Scott's point is, rather, that a direct (i.e., non-eliminative) semantical interpretation of theories couched in, e.g., intensional language is a worthwhile endeavor. There are, at least, two (related but distinguishable) reasons for this.

First, if acceptable extensional paraphrases are available, then it is reasonable to regard our special items "as . . . ideal objects introduced to enhance the regularity of our language" ([103]: 145; cf. n.21) and "to make clear the structure of the . . . domain" of actual objects ([103]: 147; cf. Findlay [31]: 55). An indirect
semantics would translate a sentence which referred to special items into extensional language and then interpret the translation in the domain of actual objects. A direct semantics would interpret the non-extensional sentence in the extended domain of special items, thus enabling us to keep our language simple (as opposed to our ontology) and to exhibit in a straightforward manner the structure of the domain of actual objects (which on this view is the intended interpretation, and which we augment for structural clarity with special items).22

The second reason for the worthwhileness of the extended domain is that it can help us "check formulas without having to first eliminate the contextually defined notions" (Scott [102]: 189). On the assumption that the extensional language is adequate, each language can be used as a check of the adequacy of the other. For no true extensional sentence should be a translation of or translatable into a false special-item one, and, conversely, no extensional paraphrase should be considered adequate if it is false while its special-item counterpart is true (although there might be special-item truth-value gaps). The extensional language and its intended interpretation might be more ontologically perspicuous, but the other might be more epistemologically so, or easier to use (to "speak").

Finally, I want to stress the usefulness of the special-item language as a criterion of adequacy for the extensional one. For it must be remembered that we start with the special-item language and devise extensional paraphrases of it, not the other way around.23
4. Global vs. Local Considerations.

Most of the data we have been considering concerned "local" problems. In addition, many of these local problems admitted of two solutions, one with and one without special items. Now let us take a broader view. Even if complete extensionalization is possible, there is still the threat of "discontinuity" or ad-hoc-ness. Hence, a "global" solution "common to all [the local problems] is definitely superior, by being systematic and not ad hoc" (Castañeda [7]: 7). The move to special items is such a solution.

The situation is this. We have a mass of local problems for whose solution special items are useful. Some (e.g., those illustrated by Fregean tetrads and those involving intentional contexts) may be sufficiently important by themselves to warrant the introduction of such items. But even if no one problem is thus important, taken together they present a strong case. An alternative way of looking at it is to say that the fact that such items can be used to solve so many problems is not so much part of the initial data as it is part of the argument for accepting the resulting metaphysical theory: each local problem which submits to such a solution is a successful test of our hypothesis.

A global theory is important for several reasons. First, even if a special-item analysis is not needed in any one area, if such an analysis can bring the separate problems into focus, offering one solution in place of many, it can serve a useful purpose. (Cf. Meinong's remarks on the unity of science, [63]: 484-85.) That is, a grab-bag of unrelated, extensional analyses does not seem prima facie better than a uniform solution involving special items. (Unless, of course, there
are good arguments against such items, of which there seems to be only Quine's; cf. Sect. B.9.) Unless we adopt the use of such items, we seem fated to building up epicycles of extensional techniques. A simpler, more uniform view can be had by giving up the local, "extensionocentric" view for a more global one based on an extended domain.

Second, a global theory has the advantage of capturing generalizations that would be missed by either local methods involving special items (e.g., the generalization that Fregean tetrads and the problem of non-existents are closely connected) or by local extensional ones (e.g., that intentional contexts involving non-denoting terms and those not involving them can be handled by one mechanism). Compare the situation in the history of mathematics: a generalization such as the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra cannot be made unless negative and imaginary numbers are given commensurate status with the natural numbers.

Finally, Ockham's Razor can now be usefully employed, for a uniform, global theory would only need one kind of special item to solve all the local problems, rather than requiring one kind per problem. Specifically, we have urged the introduction of items to serve as referents of non-denoting expressions in an expanded universe of discourse for a semantics of natural language. These items can also be used to solve the problems raised by Fregean tetrads and intentional contexts and thus help provide an analysis of psychological discourse.
5. Further Considerations on Natural Language.

Perhaps a few more observations on natural language are in order, since much of our data can be collected under the heading of problems surrounding natural-language semantics. If this is so, we have a compelling, global argument for a theory of special items.

We saw hints of this in earlier sections. The thesis of the syntactic uniformity of ordinary language (Sects. B.4,5)—its inability to distinguish between denoting and non-denoting expressions on a purely syntactic level—takes on greater importance when viewed as a piece of data to be taken into consideration by those who would construct a natural-language semantics. Problems of reference, discussed in Sections B.1 and 11.2 also become more significant when placed in this context. And the discussion of the role of possible and impossible objects in our conceptual scheme (Sect. B.6.2) is nicely complemented by the observation that natural language allows us not only to speak of such things, but to speak of them as objects (i.e., by means of noun phrases).

An argument from natural language is strong in that it is an argument from a subject-matter (cf. Sect. A.3). We are, here, not concerned with isolated sentences, but with a whole body of them—indeed, with the fundamental ability to generate them. Moreover, linguistics is a branch of science, and so our present argument takes on an added dimension by suggesting the usefulness of an extended domain of special items for scientific purposes.

The idea of the argument is not new. It has been suggested explicitly by Parsons [77]: 567, and there are hints in its direction
scattered among several philosophers. Let us see if we can give it some form.

What would it mean to give a semantics for natural language? It would be to give, *inter alia*, a domain of interpretation which would enable us to explain how we comprehend the meaning of sentences using as our initial data their *surface* structure. Although this is controversial, it seems to me that it is required for empirical adequacy: We comprehend sentences by either hearing or reading them. In both cases, it is the surface structure which is sensed first; any processing which takes place (e.g., analysis of the deep structure of the sentence) *must* begin here.

Since some sentences contain non-denoting expressions, the domain would have to have entities corresponding to them. That is, the interpretation function *must* be total (as discussed in Section B.5), otherwise we have not given an empirically adequate explanation.

Consider how it is that we understand a natural-language sentence. We "pretend" (or assume) that it is true and (mentally) construct a picture or model of the world based on it (cf. Findlay [31]: 48). Thus, we understand 'The present King of France is bald' as predicating baldness of someone, and we know how to verify that statement even though, as a matter of fact, we *can't* verify it (cf. Grandy [37]: 140). Indeed, the ontology of our ordinary experience (that is, the world as we find it) can be stated, in part, as a semantics of ordinary lanaguage (cf. Castañeda [13]: 18), and, as Castañeda has shown, "the total domain of discourse we have at the back of our minds in our daily transactions includes both existing and non-existing" items ([12]: 5).
It is then a further question whether our picture of the world is accurate, for example, whether a given term denotes an actual object. The items which will serve as meanings, on this view, will be those things which are postulated to show what the world would be like were it exactly as we talked about it.\textsuperscript{26} Such items are useful in describing adequately the structure of our thinking about the world. They are, thus, quite literally the objects of our understanding and, more generally, of psychological attitudes.

Moreover, as Routley has pointed out (in conversation), any adequate semantics for natural language must not eliminate definite descriptions but must treat them directly as referring expressions (cf. Orayen [75]: 335). We must not begin with a domain consisting only of existing, "non-special", objects (though this might be important for physical science) and then "twist" our language to conform to it (cf. Scott [103]: 168). Natural language comes first, the semantics afterwards. And this is equally true if our goal is "the development of an object-language [i.e., a formal language as a tool for the investigation of philosophical and scientific problems] with something more of the character and the expressive richness of English than is the case for the object-languages of most modern systems of logic" (Leonard [55]: 26). Special items are not only useful but necessary for this:

\textquote[Meinong [63]: 496.]{[Linguistics (Sprachwissenschaft)] is entirely obligated to deal with objects (Gegenstände) in word- and sentence-meanings (Satzbedeutungen).}
D. Summary and Prospectus

There are two main problems for which we seek a solution: the analysis of psychological discourse (cf. Sect. B.11) and a foundation for a semantics for natural language (cf. Sects. B.5, C.5). Any theory offered as a solution will have to meet certain criteria:

In order to provide an analysis of psychological discourse,

(C1) the theory must embody a characterization of the objects of thought

(in the sense of that which is thought about; cf. Sect. B.11.3).

In order to account for the psychological phenomenon captured by Fregean tetrads (cf. Sects. B.7, 10),

(C2) the objects of thought must be "non-substitutable".

That is, it must be possible for a person to believe that an entity, a, has a property, F, without believing (or being committed to the belief) that an entity, b, has F, even when a and b are said to be the same actual entity.

To serve as a foundation for a natural-language semantics,

(C3) the theory must account for the uniformity of thought and language with respect to fact and fiction,

that is, the ability to think and talk about anything (cf. Sects. B.4, C.11.4); and

(C4) the theory must provide for a total semantic interpretation function by supplying "referents" for all "non-referring" expressions.

By means of such a function,
(C5) the theory must account for the truth values, given as part of our intial data, of sentences containing "non-referring" ex­pressions (such as 'The golden mountain is golden'; cf. Sect. B.2).

To account for such truth values,

(C6) properties must be meaningfully (i.e., truly and falsely) predicable, in some sense, of non-existents (cf. Sect. B.1). In turn, to make sense of these requirements, the theory must explicate the required mode of predication and its rela­tion to the ordinary mode.

The interpretation function must also enable us to preserve and account for the validity of certain inferences whose premisses contain "non-referring" expressions (e.g.: Pegasus is a horse; all horses are animals; therefore, Pegasus is an animal; cf., also, Sect. B.1). This will require, in some cases, a "non-committal" or "non-existentially-loaded" reading of the quantifiers (cf. Sects. B.1, 11.2, and C.5), which, in turn, will enable the theory to satisfy the condition that

(C7) 'Exists' must be an informative predicate, of some sort, which is not embodied in the quantificational machinery of the theory.27

In Chapter II, we examine a theory which is adequate to (C1)­(C7): Meinong's Theory of Objects.
Notes to Chapter I

1 I owe this way of putting the distinction to Reinhardt Grossmann.

2 This parallels the recent trend in philosophy of language and philosophy of science away from the consideration of single words, to sets of them (sentences), and finally to sets of sets of them (entire texts or theories).

3 The force of this sense of 'about' may be more strongly felt in the case of 'Santa Claus does not exist'; cf. "it is . . . disturbing to be told that, when we finally tell our children that Santa Claus does not exist, we say nothing about Santa Claus. Presumably they expect to hear something about him—the truth about him, one way or the other" (Cartwright [6]: 633).

4 Cartwright, from whom this argument is drawn, goes on to argue in favor of ontological "status" for some entities (e.g., dragons), but not others (e.g., carnivorous cows). But (except perhaps on a possible-worlds approach), it seems to me that any way of making his theory more precise will either allow both dragons and carnivorous cows, or neither. Cf. [6]: 638.

5 Or: express propositions which are clearly true or false.

6 On the relation between natural and non-natural languages, cf. Montague [71]: 189, 219 and [72]: 373, and Dunn [30].

7 In yet a different vocabulary, it can be said that n "exists". Cf. Stahl [106] and Montague [70].

8 Substitution quantification is a semantic change in the style of the second alternative. Free logics are syntactical changes in the spirit of the first alternative. Intensional methods such as Frege's or Meinong's are examples of the second alternative which combine the best features of both while avoiding their pitfalls and those of Russell-style theories which fall under the first alternative.

9 Is the answer to the fourth, "No"? On the intended interpretation, the question must be understood thus: "If x+1=0 has a solution among the natural numbers, does this solution have a square root among the natural numbers?" The answer is "No".

10 But cf. Parsons' version of Meinongian objects in [77], where he treats them as sets of properties. See Ch. III, Sect. A.
Cf. the discussion in Scott [103]: 143 on the conception of real numbers by means of sets. Compare, also, the following considerations: For the CIA to use their files for security purposes is, let us say, a valid function of the CIA and a valid use of the files, but to use them for blackmail is not. Given the valid use, it may be (logically or physically, though not legally (?)) impossible to prevent the non-valid use. Similarly, to use language to talk about existents is a valid use of language (as in 'the gold bar is gold'), while it could be claimed that use of it to talk about non-existents is not (as in 'the golden mountain is golden'); but, given the valid use, how can (or why should) the not-so-valid use be blocked? Moreover, although we could decide to restrict language-use to valid cases of talk about existents, how would we be able to know what existed?

Indeed, this is a reason why possible-world theory is not sufficient for solving our problems. Impossible worlds, at least, would be needed. Cf. Routley [90].

I use 'true sentence' rather than 'theorem' because we are discussing a natural-language text. Nevertheless (SL) is to be thought of syntactically, not semantically.

Moreover, on (a) important information about the content of John's belief is not conveyed. Indeed, on (a) can such information ever be conveyed? For then 'e' refers to the astronomical object which happens to be e. John believes that e is a planet, in those terms. How can we represent this? Not by \(B_P e\); for by (SL), we can derive the false \(B_P m\). If we had a relevant notion of "paraphrase adequate for propositional transparency", we might try \(B_{\neg} p\) and \(p\) is an adequate paraphrase of \(P e\) (where \(P m\) is not an adequate paraphrase). But there are well-known problems with quotation in these contexts. Further, John may never have formulated his belief linguistically. We might use counterfactuals ("Had John formulated his belief linguistically, it would have had the form . . ."), but that's another problem by itself. Finally, "adequate paraphrase" would probably require special items for its explication, so why not use them right away?

The converse of (LL), namely, the identity of indiscernibles, is also central, but not at issue here. It is, perhaps, a typographical error that Castañeda, in [7]: 3-4, calls (LL), or the indiscernibility of identicals, "the central part and parcel of the concept of identity", while he calls its converse, which he does not discuss further, "the fundamental feature of identity".

The discussion in this section follows that of Castañeda [11], Sect. II.

The original 'the explosion of the White House in 1965' makes (Hiii) needlessly ambiguous.
Etymologically, 'theory' derives from the Greek θεωρία, meaning "A looking at, viewing, contemplation . . ." ([76]: 3284).

Further evidence for the value of special items for adequate description of intentional situations is found in pantomime. There, adequate description requires the use of non-denoting expressions, and hence adequate understanding requires our special items. To describe a mime pretending to sell balloons as "holding his arms in such-and-such a position and moving them thus-and-so" is extensionally accurate, but is simply inadequate. Moreover, it is not clear that the extensional description (generally, of any event) is either complete or "neutral". It is not neutral, because it is affected by what the describer believes is involved. And it is not complete unless the mime (or participants, if any) explains his actions, which involves his beliefs. Intentionality is pervasive.


On Russell's parsimoniousness, cf., e.g., [98], Sect. VI. It is interesting to consider the trade-off in complexity between syntax and population of the domain of (semantic) interpretation: a minimal ontology requires a complicated (deep structure) syntax, whereas a simple syntax needs an overcrowded ontology. On the relevance of this to arguments from natural language, cf. Sects. B.3, 5.

A slight complication is that the extended domain is not merely a superset of the actual-object domain. To see this, consider the analogous situation in which negative integers are ideal objects introduced to clarify the structure of natural numbers. The feeling that they are somehow less "real" than the naturals leads to their construction from naturals (as, say, equivalence classes of ordered pairs of naturals). But then, to maintain the univocity of reference to positive and negative integers, the positive ones must be reconstrued as similar equivalence classes. This new domain of "special" items has a subset isomorphic, but not identical, to the set of naturals with which we began. We shall return to this in Ch. II, Sect. C and Ch. III, Sect. A.

Another example of a "special-item" approach is Robinson's non-standard analysis. Here, the special items are infinitesimals, and the extensionalized language is the limits-approach to the calculus as developed by Cauchy, Bolzano, and Weierstrass. Cf. [88], Chs. I, X.

For contrasting discussions on the relations of semantics to surface and deep structures, cf. Chomsky [22]; Fodor et al. [33]; Katz [45], esp. pp. 116f; Lakoff [49]; Martin [60]; Montague [72]; and the references therein.
While it is the (merely empirical) impossibility of verification which leads to empirically verifiable, Russelian paraphrases, the unparaphrased statement is not impossible to verify in principle, and some such statements, on my view and on Meinong's (cf. [63]), are verifiable, albeit not empirically (e.g., 'The round square is round', 'The golden mountain is golden').

Mark Pastin has pointed out to me that this sense of 'exactly' needs clarification: The proposition 'this pen is red' does not say exactly how the world is (since it doesn't indicate the precise shade of red). But if I believe that this pen is red when it is blue, then the world would be such that this pen were red, were the world "exactly" as I believed it to be.

Discussions of such quantificational machinery abound in the literature. Some relevant sources are: Castañeda [7]: 7; Cocchiarella [25]-[26]; *Landesman [54]: 8-9, 13ff; Leonard [55]; Meyer and Lambert [69]; Montague [70]-[72], *Routley [91]: 228; Scott [103]; van Fraassen and Lambert [109]; and the references therein. Starred items discuss Meinong explicitly in this regard.
A. Introduction

In this chapter we undertake a careful examination of Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects [63]-[67]. We begin with a relatively informal exegesis of the principal themes and theses, pointing out some problems and tensions along the way. In Section C, we turn to a more formal presentation of the theory, amended so as to resolve some of the tensions and to take into account some of the data of the previous chapter.

It will prove convenient to begin by presenting, without much discussion, some of Meinong's chief theories and to compare them with the criteria set forth in Chapter I, Section D:

(M1) **Thesis of Intentionality**: Every psychological experience is "directed" towards something called its "object" (Gegenstand) (Meinong [63]: 483-84).

'Object' is here used more in the sense of "that which is aimed at" than "individual thing" and is perhaps best thought of for the moment as elliptical for "object of thought" (where 'thought' is generic for "psychological act").

(M2) Not every object has Sein.

That is, objects need not have any kind of being (Sein) ([63]: 489). In Meinong's deliberately "paradoxical means of expression . . . :
there are (es gibt) objects of which it is true that there are not (es . . . nicht gibt) such objects" ([63]: 490; all translations are my own unless otherwise noted, and frequently used German words such as 'Sein' and its cognates will be treated as technical English vocabulary and not underlined.) The context makes it clear, however, that Meinong meant simply that there are objects which neither exist nor subsist, where existence (Existenz) and subsistence (Bestand) are the two "degrees" of Sein recognized by Meinong, and where 'there are' (or 'es gibt') must be taken to have no existential or subsistential commitment.

There are two related theses:

(M3) It is not self-contradictory to deny, nor tautologous to affirm, Sein of an object.

That is, 'being' (or, if you wish, 'existence') is a meaningful predicate of objects. This is implicit throughout [63], but it is an especially evident attitude in Meinong's struggles with "Quasisein", the alleged third degree of Sein (cf. [63]: 491).

The second related thesis is offered in place of the above "paradox":

(M4) Thesis of Aussersein: All objects are ausserseiend.

'Ausserseiend' is not usefully translatable into English, and we shall have much to say on the interpretation of this thesis in later sections. Meinong tells us that "the object is ausserseiend by nature, although of its two Sein-objectives, its Sein and its Nichtsein (non-being), one subsists in any case" ([63]: 494); i.e., for any object o, o is (an) "outside-being", although either 'o has Sein' or 'o has Nichtsein'
subsists (or is true). Note that Aussersein is closely related to the quantifier 'there are (es gibt)' of the "paradox" (cf. Meinong [66]: 181).

The next main theses concern the Principle of the Independence of Sosein from Sein. The key concept involved here is the notion of the 'Sosein' (so-being) of an object. Though not explicitly defined in [63], an object's Sosein is its being thus-and-so or its "having certain properties" (Kalsi, in [67]: xxxviii), or, more simply, its properties (cf. [63]: 489). For example, (part of) the Sosein of the golden mountain is its being golden (cf. [63]: 490). The Principle of Independence (actually due to Meinong's student Ernst Mally) states that "the Sosein of an object is not, so to say, concerned with (mitbetroffen) its Nichtsein" or its Sein ([63]: 489). That is, characteristics which constitute an object's Sosein may be truly predicated of the object, whether or not the object has Sein (i.e., independently of its ontological status) (cf. Chisholm [21]: 245-46, Grossmann [40]: 107, and Landesman [54]: 6). Thus, we have

(M5) Every object has Sosein.

(M6) Principle of Independence: (M2) and (M5) are not inconsistent.

(Corollary) Objects with Nichtsein (i.e., without Sein) have Sosein.

An important thesis, implicit throughout [63], is enunciated in Meinong's later work, Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit [66].

This is the Principle of Freedom of Assumption:

With regard to each proper (eigentliche) or, so to say, general (gewohnlichen) Sosein-determination (−bestimmung),
it lies in my power, according to the Principle of Freedom of Assumption, to choose by means of [a] suitable thinking (Meinen) an object to which in fact the determination in question belongs; and to state this constitutive belonging—(Zukommen) is the duty of the (Kantian) analytic judgment. ([66]: 282.)

This can be related to the Thesis of Aussersein by observing that the domain from which the choice is made might be taken as "the boundless realm of Aussersein" (Grossmann [40]: 160). This yields:

(M7) Principle of Freedom of Assumption:
(a) Every Sosein corresponds to an object.
(b) Every object (within certain limits) can be thought of.

Next,

(M8) Some objects are incomplete.

Objects can be classified into those which are "complete" and those which are "incomplete". The latter are undetermined with respect to some properties; i.e., an object o is incomplete iff there is a property F such that o is neither F nor not F ([66]: 168ff, esp. p. 178). Chisholm says that "an incomplete object is one having a Sosein that violates the law of excluded middle" ([21]: 248), but this is ambiguous due to an ambiguity in the phrase "is . . . not F" above; we shall clarify this later. A special case of incomplete objects is the finite object: ones "which have a finite number of determinations" (Findlay [31]: 156).³

Finally,

(M9) The meaning (Bedeutung) of every noun phrase or sentence is an object ([63]: 496, 513; cf. [65]: 25).
Turning now to a comparison of these theses with the criteria of adequacy (C1)-(C7), we find the following:

The characterization of psychological acts and their objects which accompanies (M1) is adequate to (C1).

Thesis (M8) entails (C2). To see how this is possible, recall the definition of non-substitutability and the notation from the statement of (C2), and suppose that \( a \) and \( b \) are incomplete objects each of which lacks some property had by the other. Now, if we assume that some actual entity, \( e \), has all of the properties had by \( a \) and by \( b \), we can hold that \( a \) and \( b \) are said to be the same entity \( e \); yet \( a \) and \( b \) are not genuinely identical. Thus, (LL) does not apply, so a person can believe that \( a \) is \( F \) without believing that \( b \) is \( F \) (cf. Ch. I, Sects. B.7, 8).

Since there is no difference between the Soseins of objects which have Sein and those which don't, and since (M7) holds, (C3) is satisfied.

Thesis (M9) is adequate to (C4), for we can take the range of the interpretation function to be the set of objects (i.e., the domain of Aussersein).

The truth of sentences such as 'The golden mountain is golden' can be preserved and accounted for by means of (M5) and the Corollary to (M6), thus satisfying (C5); and (M6) itself is adequate to (C6).

Finally, (M2)-(M4) provide the machinery for a meaningful "existence" predicate and a domain for "non-committal" quantification, as required by (C7).
B. Informal Exegesis

1. Historical Apologia.

In examining Meinong's theory, we shall restrict our attention for the most part to his article, "Über Gegenstandstheorie" ("On the Theory of Objects") [63]. The justification for this is twofold: First, our long-range project (Ch. I, Sect. A.1) is not a historical one, so we need not examine everything Meinong said on every topic. Rather, our ultimate goal is to present a theory adequate to the tasks set forth in Chapter I and based on Meinong's theory as put forth primarily in [63]. Hence, other Meinongian principles which might conflict with those in [63] may be disregarded. Moreover, in dealing with objections to Meinong's theory, we shall only be concerned with showing that our formal reconstruction of his theory can reply to them.

Second, the task at hand is a historical one, and there are, then, good methodological grounds for thus limiting the scope of our considerations: In Castañeda [9], Sect. I, a distinction is drawn between the "distortive" "Athenian" approach to the history of philosophy and the more realistic "Darwinian" approach. The Athenian historian examines the entire corpus of a philosopher and, if not careful, can misinterpret passages out of context or impose a false unity on the corpus. The Darwinian hypothesizes that a "selected [short] text . . . is relevantly unitary" and "constructs systems out of the views, theses, and half-systems as they appear" therein ([9]: 383, 382). Our study of [63], minimally augmented, will be Darwinian in manner.
2. The Thesis of Intentionality.

2.1. Directedness. We begin by examining the claim that every psychological experience is directed to an object. According to Meinong, that one cannot judge, nor can even have an idea (vorstellen), without something to judge about, something to have an idea of (vorzustellen), belongs to the self-evident, that an entirely elementary consideration of these experiences already demonstrates. ([63]: 483.)

Meinong calls this a "peculiar 'being directed to something' ('auf etwas Gerichtetsein')" ([63]: 483) or, less metaphorically, a "reference (Bezugnahme)" ([63]: 484); and he calls that to which the judging or having an idea refers or is directed the "object (Gegenstand)" ([63]: 484).

This is acceptable as an accurate description, as long as we go on to analyze the nature of the psychological experience, its object, and their relationship beyond mere tautology: for all we know now is that the psychological experience is "directed" to . . . that to which it is directed! (Cf. Chisholm [17]: 6.) Before turning to this task, let us consider why this directedness captured Meinong's attention.

Meinong's teacher, Franz Brentano, enunciated the thesis that this directedness was unique to psychological phenomena and could therefore serve to distinguish the psychological from the physical—mind from body (cf. Findlay [31]: 4 and Chisholm [16], Ch. 11; Chisholm's interpretation is criticized in McAlister [61]).

It is not clear, however, that Brentano's thesis is correct. At the least, the notion of directedness or intentionality needs to be elucidated. As Ryle observes, "grammatically transitive verbs can be
properly used in the descriptions of physical phenomena too. The sun heats the stone" ([99]: 259). Magnetized iron filings "point" beyond themselves towards, say, the North Pole (though here we might consider that the iron doesn't point by itself, but is forced to by the environing magnetic field). Or suppose that properties only exist if instantiated and are "particular" (in the sense in which the colors of two identically mass-produced red cubes are distinct; cf. n.13): can't we then speak of the color of an apple in the way we speak of an idea of the apple (that is, isn't such a property "directed" to the thing which has it)? Finally, doesn't the Big Dipper point to the North Star?

But no matter how narrowly we understand 'psychological' or where we find differences between psychological directedness and that of the last paragraph (e.g., the Big Dipper also points to a place midway between it and the North Star), the thesis that only psychological phenomena are directed is not necessary to Meinong's theory. What is of interest (and what is potentially unique to the psychological) is that the object of a psychological act need not exist:

But the totality of that which exists, including that which has existed and will exist, is infinitesimal in comparison with the totality of the objects of knowledge (Erkenntnisgegenstände) . . . . ([63]: 486.)

To understand this, though, it is important to realize that when Meinong speaks of existence, he contrasts it not with non-existence but with subsistence. This distinction, however, is not essential (cf. Sect. 3.1), and in fact the more general thesis also holds: the object of a psychological act need not have Sein ([63], Sect. 3). This seems
obvious and more like data than part of a theory. Yet consider it more closely: If the object lacks Sein, then isn't it the case that there is nothing to which the act is directed? That is, the mind ought to be "blank" (cf. Grossman [40]: 20). Moreover, "we know what our mental acts intend [i.e., are directed to] before we know whether or not their intentions [i.e., objects] exist" ([40]: 20)!

Before being able to present a solution to this problem, we will need to look into the reasons why the object is extra-mental and how the experience is directed; and, in turn, we first need to make some preliminary observations on the different kinds of experiences and objects.

2.2. Acts and objects.

2.2.1. Pseudo-existence. The original definition of 'object' and the etymology of 'Gegenstand' suggest that Meinong is only interested in objects of some actual psychological experience or other. But any good theory must be able to predict and hence (as urged in Ch. I, Sect. B.6.2) must encompass "unactualized" items structurally similar to those which are actual; and so Meinong almost immediately begins to speak of "the object as such and in its generality" ([63]: 485). Indeed, this enables him to distinguish the theory of objects from psychology, where the latter is understood to be the study of "objects ... to which some psychological occurrence (Geschehen) is actually directed"; such objects of actual thoughts are said to "pseudo-exist" or "to exist in our idea (Vorstellung)" ([63]: 497).

While this is a useful term, we must be careful to note that (a) Meinong does not hold (nor therefore mean to imply) that objects are
mental entities, (b) this is a merely contingent classification of objects, and (c) pseudo-existence is a degree of existence only in a derivative sense: it is not a third degree of Sein standing beside existence and subsistence. (For example, a number, \( n \), might be said to "pseudo-exist" iff either someone actually uses \( n \) in a calculation or act of counting, or there exist at least \( n \) things, but this is not a second kind of existence over and above its mathematical existence.)

The relation of the object in general to the pseudo-existent object is similar to that of Russell's sensibilia to his sense-datum (cf. [98], Sect. III). But here we must be careful to take note of an ambiguity due to language: It is possible that any generalized object be the object of an actual thought (subject to certain restrictions irrelevant here), so we may say that any object is a possible object. Yet some objects, as we shall shortly see, are impossible in the sense that they have contradictory properties. Nevertheless, such impossible objects are possible in the first sense. We shall have more to say on this later. Henceforth, 'object' should be understood in the generalized sense, according to which only some objects are pseudo-existent.

2.2.2. Acts. It will be useful to review briefly Meinong's classification of psychological acts.

The simplest kind is the Vorstellung—the idea or presentation—"the experience in which something is put before the mind, whether perceptively or cogitatively, but not necessarily in a fully interpretive, predicative manner" (Findlay, in [67]: xxvi). For instance, one may have an idea of a red cube.
Next is the **assumption**, which may be thought of as consisting of a **Vorstellung** to which is "added" a moment of affirmation or rejection: one may assume that a cube is red or that it does not exist, adding to the idea of the cube the affirmation of redness or the rejection of existence (cf. Findlay [31]: 64).

Assumptions do not entail commitments, unlike a **judgment**, which may be thought of as an assumption "plus" a moment of conviction, either positive or negative. It is, roughly, a belief or disbelief—a committed assumption (cf. [31]: 63 and Grossmann [40]: 79).

Finally, a special case of the act of judging is the act of knowing, which Meinong calls a "double fact" ([63]: 485, 499). First, while all judgments are directed to objects, only the "true" ones "grasp" (ergriffen) their object (cf. [63]: 485). This is most easily understood, I believe, as saying that if a person judges truly that \( p \), then it is the case that \( p \). But true judgments are not knowings, for there is also what Meinong calls the "per accidens true judgment" ([63]: 499). What makes a true judgment an act of knowing is an internal or "psychological" ([63]: 499) quality called "evidence", by which the "factuality" of an object of judgment is apprehended (Findlay [31]: 33); this is the second part of the double fact of knowing.

2.2.3. **Objects.** Recall that "'object' (Gegenstand), in the broadest sense of the term, designates anything toward which a psychological act or attitude may be directed" (Chisholm [17]: 6). Meinong's theory as presented in [63] partitions objects into two kinds: objects of ideas and objects of judgments and assumptions.
The object of an idea is, roughly, any thing (cf. Grossmann [40]: 78), nameable by a noun phrase. Meinong calls such a "Vorstellungsgegenstand" an "Objekt", which we shall translate as "objectum" (following Findlay [31]: 167). This word is introduced in the same passage in which we learn that the object of a judgment or an assumption is called an objective:

By the knowing (Erkennen) of such connections [viz., between the Sein of two existents] one has therefore already to do with that peculiar (eigentümlichen) object-like thing, of which I hope to have shown that it is opposite (gegenübersteht) to judgments and assumptions in ways similar to the proper (eigentliche) object of ideas. I have proposed for it the name "objective" ("Objektiv") and have proved that even this objective [can] substitute anew for the functions of a proper objectum, in particular [it] can be [the] object (Gegenstand) of a renewed (neuerlichen) passing-of-a-judgment (Beurteilung) to which it is related as an objectum (ihm wie einem Objekte zugewandten) [just] as other intellectual operations. (Meinong [63]: 487.)

Thus, the objective of a judgment or assumption can be treated as the objectum of some new act directed towards it. To understand how this is possible, it is necessary to realize that an objective is "about" an objectum in a way related to the way a judgment, say, is "built upon" an idea. We shall have a bit more to say about this later. For now, it is enough to understand that if I judge that $p$, then that-$p$ is the objective of my judging, and that if I judge that $p$ is true, then that-$p$-is-true is the objective and that-$p$ serves as objectum. It is important to note here a distinction between an objectum as an individual of a certain kind and as a role played by a certain part of an objective. Indeed, truth can be ascribed only to objects which serve as objectives, not to objects serving as
objecta; so objectives are those objects which either are or are not the case (cf. Findlay [31]: 60). Finally, objectives can be expressed by that-clauses (among other devices; cf. Chisholm [20]: 214): 8

If I say: "it is true that there are (es gibt) Antipodes", the Antipodes are not that to which truth is ascribed, but the objective, "that there are Antipodes". (Meinong [63]: 487.) 9

2.3. Act, content, and object. Meinong says very little in [63] about the relation between psychological acts and their objects or, in particular, about how it is possible for such an act to be directed to an object. Although we shall be forced to turn to other writings, Meinong seems clearly to presuppose in [63] some of the arguments we shall be examining (cf. [63]: 484), and as late as the 1917 On Emotional Presentation [67] he seems not to have changed any of his views significantly.

2.3.1. The act-component. Meinong, following Twardowski (cf. Findlay [31]: 8 and Grossmann [40]: 48), analyzes the psychological experience into two parts. "The act (Akt) is that part of an experience which is independently variable vis-à-vis the object" (Meinong [67]: 55; throughout, I have slightly revised the translations from [67]). Thus, there are four possible situations: (1) There can be two acts of the same kind, say judgments, directed to different objects (in this case, different objectives); (2) there can be two acts of the same kind directed to the same object; (3) there can be two acts of different kinds, say judgment and assumption, directed to the same object; and (4) there can be two acts of different kinds directed to different objects.
2.3.2. The content-component.

2.3.2.1. Definition of 'content'. In order for a psychological experience to be directed to an object, we must postulate a component of the experience which "links" (cf. Findlay [31]: 9) the act-component to the object. Such a "director" must be a mental counterpart or representative (in some sense) of the non-mental object. In this way, too, the seemingly contradictory data (a) that the object is not a part of the experience and (b) of the long philosophical tradition (e.g., in Aristotle and Spinoza) that the object somehow becomes embedded in the mind of the thinker or is identical with the thought of it, can be reconciled. That which links and thereby directs the act to the object is called the content (Inhalt) of the psychological experience.

Meinong's approach to this is as follows (cf. [67]: 50): Consider two psychological experiences, \( E_1 \) and \( E_2 \), which apprehend two different objects, \( O_1 \) and \( O_2 \), and which are such that their act-components, \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \), are of the same kind, \( K \) (e.g., both judgments or both ideas). Since \( O_1 \neq O_2 \), it follows that \( E_1 \neq E_2 \). But \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \), while distinct (since they are parts of distinct experiences), are similar enough (they are "\( K \)-equivalent" or act-"tokens" of the same act-"type") to prevent the distinction between \( E_1 \) and \( E_2 \) from being attributed to them. That is, the hypothesis that a psychological experience is nothing but a psychological act does not explain how \( E_1 \) is directed to \( O_1 \) rather than to \( O_2 \) and \( E_2 \) to \( O_2 \) rather than \( O_1 \). Hence, each experience must contain another component, called the "content",
which accounts for this difference. In the present case, we conclude that $C_1 \neq C_2$ (cf. Grossman [40]: 93).

More precisely,

the content is that experience-part which is so coordinated with the object to be apprehended with the help of the experience, and [which object is] immediately presented by [that experience], that it varies or remains constant with this object. (Meinong [67]: 55.)

Thus, in contrast with the act, the content is a dependent variable of the object; and, in particular, there cannot be two different objects and only one content or two different contents and only one object. So, if $E_1 = E_2$, $A_1 = A_2$, and $O_1 = O_2$, then $C_1 = C_2$, and so we have $O_1 = O_2$ iff $C_1 = C_2$ (when $A_1 = A_2$). This relative (because of the dependence on $A_1$'s being equal to $A_2$) 1-1 correspondence between content and object is the link between the experience (or act) and the object, and, hence, it accounts for the directedness of psychological phenomena. 10

2.3.2.2. Uses of content. Let us first consider some consequences for linguistics. The relative 1-1 correspondence between content and object, which grounds the content's being able "to refer to one definite object and no other" (Findlay [31]: 9) together with the observation that thinking of something and talking about it are parallel situations, makes Meinongian objects good candidates for the meanings of linguistic expressions. According to Meinong, a word, _w_, means (be deutet) the object, _o_, of an idea, or more generally an act, _a_, for a person, _S_ (perhaps at a time, _t_), and expresses (aus drückt) _a_ ([65]: 25-26). Thus, a Meinongian theory can provide a foundation for a
semantics for natural languages by taking the meaning of a term to be the least ambiguous reference from the domain of objects. We shall return to this in Section C.5.9.2.

The content-component also provides a possible solution to the puzzle of the directedness of some physical events (Sect. B.2.1). For, where is there an analogue of a content in the sun's heating a stone? There is nothing about the act of heating which uniquely points to the stone. Or consider a rock hitting a pebble: Is there anything about the act of hitting which uniquely points to the pebble? At most, there is the direction of the stone's motion. Were it an animal rather than a stone, we might suggest "intention" as the content-counterpart. But stones cannot have intentions, and the stone could have fallen in the same direction and yet have hit anything in its path (not necessarily the pebble) or even nothing at all.

2.3.3. The object. The object of a psychological experience is distinct from the act-component of the experience. Meinong assumed this in [63] but did not argue for it there:

Knowledge (Erkenntnis) is, so to say, a double fact in which the known (das Erkannte) is opposite to (gegenübersteht) the knowing (dem Erkennen) as a relatively independent thing. . . . ([63]: 485.)

[I]f I assert, "Blue does not exist", in no way do I think thereby of an idea and its possible (etwaige) faculties, but just of Blue. ([63]: 491.)

That is, the act is distinct from its object; moreover, one thinks of the object, not of the act or the content. We shall consider arguments for the act-object distinction in Section C.
In a sense, it is obvious that, in general, the object of a psychological act is not the act itself. The chief question is whether the object is part of the entire psychological experience—whether, that is, the object is identical with the content. Put otherwise, the issue is over the identity of that to which a psychological experience is directed with that which directs the experience.

Twardowski offered three arguments against their identity, which Meinong adopted (cf. Grossmann [40]: 48-53). The first, in Meinong's words, is this:

That, though, [the] content and object even of [an] idea [are] not identical, seems to be shown thus: I can have an idea of that which does not exist, [or] even cannot exist. That, though, through which I have the idea of it, which presents such [a] perhaps impossible object, must in any case exist, [and] can therefore not coincide with [an] object incapable of existence. ([67]: 167; my translation.)

This argument, based as it is on the datum that we can think of things which do not exist (or, more generally, lack Sein), raises the paradox of Section B.2.1: My idea of the non-existent has an object, yet the object lacks Sein; how can this be?

It seems to me that to say in the argument that the object does not exist is not (necessarily) to say that the content lacks an object: the content has an object, but it is one which does not exist. Put otherwise, there is an object, but it does not exist. This is a confrontation of two different uses of the verb 'to be'; in particular, it is not an opposition of a "non-existence" in one sense with an "existence" in the same sense. The details will have to wait till
Section C, but we must, I think, reject the argument as equivocating on 'exists'.

The third argument is that two different contents can have the same object, for example, the 1976 U.S. President and Nixon's second Vice-President. But, as we saw in Section 2.3.2.1, it seems more reasonable to maintain here that we have two objects which are correlated in some fashion with only one actual person.

Twardowski's second argument is that the object has properties which the content does not, and in some cases cannot, have, and so they are distinct (cf. Findlay [31]: 10-11, 14, 20). For example, mountains are spatially extended, but the content of my idea of a mountain is not; the golden mountain is golden, yet the content of my idea of it is at best colorless; and the round square is round and square, while the content of my idea of it cannot be both (since it exists). This argument is impressive, and I believe that it establishes the required distinction.

3. Degrees of Being.

3.1. Existence and subsistence. As pointed out in Section A, Meinong distinguished between two sorts of Sein: existence and subsistence ([63]: 486). For example, Similarity and Difference subsist, while physical objects exist. There is evidently a distinction worthy of being drawn: one could say that Similarity "exists", but surely it doesn't exist, say, in space and time just like some other existents. Whatever Meinong's reasons may have been for distinguishing thus between two modes of being (cf. Lambert [52]: 224), the only one evident
in [63] is methodological or heuristic: to prepare the reader for the acceptance of Aussersein. But this reason (if such it be) is especially poor, since it suggests (erroneously) that Aussersein is also a degree of being.

There being little or no reason to maintain it, therefore, we leave open the possibility of the distinction, while refraining from basing anything upon it. We speak henceforth (unless otherwise noted) of an object's "having Sein" (using 'exists' and 'subsists' where English style seems to call for it).\(^12\)

3.2. **Quasisein (I).** Meinong toys for a while with the notion of a third "degree" of Sein, weaker than the other two (cf. [63]: 492). His ultimate rejection of it leads to the Thesis of Aussersein. To prepare, then, for our examination of this thesis, we investigate the argument for the third degree of Sein.

Meinong is led to this argument by a version of the paradox of negative existentials (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.1): If a Nichtsein-objective, which takes the general form \(A\) lacks Sein (equivalently, \(A\) has Nichtsein), is to be meaningful, "it is as if . . . \([A]\) must first have once been (erst einmal sein müsste), so that one could raise (aufwerfen könne) the question of its Sein or Nichtsein generally" ([63]: 491). The paradox is that if \(A\) were to be, then one couldn't raise the question of its Nichtsein (hence the subjunctive "as if"-clause). Yet, Meinong maintains that Nichtsein-objectives are meaningful when he says "that a certain \(A\) is not, more briefly the Nichtsein of \(A\), is . . . quite just as good an objective as the
Sein of A" ([63]: 491; cf. Russell's treatment of the same paradox in [92]: 449).

The problem, stated more generally and less paradoxically, is that "every . . . object is in a certain way given prior (ist . . . vorgegeben, pretended) to our decision on its Sein or Nichtsein in a way also not prejudiced against its Nichtsein" ([63]: 491; cf. 492), and that it is necessary to explain this "givenness." Meinong first explains it as a form of Sein and later by means of Aussersein.

The structure of the argument for a third degree of Sein is that, first, some principles are given from which a kind of Sein is derived, and, second, the properties of this Sein are presented. In refutation, Meinong rejects both the principles and the properties. Here, then, is the argument:

(Q1) "[T]he objective, no matter whether Sein- or Nichtsein-objective, surely stands to its objectum, even if cum grano salis, analogously vis-à-vis (ähnlich gegenüber) the whole to the part." ([63]: 491-92.)

(Q2) "But if the whole is, so also must the part be . . . ." ([63]: 492.)

(Q3) Therefore "[I]f the objective is, so also must the objectum belonging to [it] in some sense be. . . ." (By (Q1), (Q2); [63]: 492.)

(Q4) A lacks Sein (in particular, A neither exists nor subsists). (Assumption.)

(Q5) Therefore A lacks Sein has Sein. (By (Q4); [63]: 491.)

(Q6) A lacks Sein is a whole of which A is a part. (By (Q1).)

(Q7) Therefore A has Sein. (By (Q3), (Q5), (Q6).)

(Q8) Therefore the Sein asserted of A in (Q7)—call it 'Quasisein' ([63]: 492)—is different from the Sein denied of A in (Q4). (Else, (Q4) contradicts (Q7); [63]: 492.)

(Q9) Therefore every object has Quasisein. (Since 'A' can range over all objects; [63]: 492.)
Thus, one property of Quasisein is that it is truly predicatable of all objects. But this is false, for Meinong's argument is invalid: (Q9) does not follow, because 'A' in fact ranges only over objects which lack Sein. Hence, objects which either exist or subsist might conceivably lack Quasisein. Yet the "givenness" (or capacity therefor) which Quasisein is to explicate belongs to every object independently of the object's existence or subsistence. Unless, then, an argument for universal Quasisein is forthcoming (as I fear it is not), Quasisein fails in its assigned task.

The other major feature of Quasisein is that "a Nichtsein of the same kind . . . may not be opposed to it" ([63]: 492). There appear to be two reasons for this. First, since all objects are supposed to have Quasisein, none lack it; hence, none have its opposite. As we have just seen, however, Quasisein belongs at most to those objects which lack Sein and thus is not unopposed: for, "Nichtquasisein" could be taken to be merely Sein itself! The second reason is that such a Nichtsein would lead to an infinite regress of weaker and weaker degrees of Sein by a repetition of the same argument ([63]: 492). Note, incidentally, that Nichtquasisein itself has Quasisein.

But Meinong faults Quasisein precisely on this feature of its lack of opposition. In essence, his claim is that any candidate for a degree of Sein must have a "running-mate" in the form of a corresponding Nichtsein ([63]: 492). His other (and better) objection to it is its ad hoc nature: the avoidance of paradox, i.e., the explication of "givenness", is the only situation which calls for a third degree of Sein ([63]: 492).
Having rejected his conclusion, Meinong proceeds to criticize his assumptions. He first identifies (Q3) as the crucial premiss leading to Quasisein ("that queer Sein des Nichtseienden," as he puts it in [63]: 493). While he does not say much about alternative possibilities, we may make a few observations.

An interesting objection to (Q3) has been raised by Grossmann ([40]: 113): The objective A lacks Sein at most subsists. If it does, then it consists of a part which less-than-subsists, which is just as much in need of explanation as the original paradox. Moreover, Grossmann's point can be extended, for how can A exist, if it merely subsists, have a part which more-than-subsists? (Here we also have another argument against the existence/subsistence distinction.) More cautiously, perhaps, we might allow objectives with Sein to have objecta which lack Sein. But note that this does nothing towards resolving the paradox; rather, it denies the "givenness" outright and appears to be subject to Grossmann's objection (though Grossmann adopts this as a way out in the end).

Since (Q3) is the troublesome premiss, Meinong next raises doubts about the principles which led to it, specifically "the analogy with the behavior of the part to the whole" ([63]: 493). It is interesting to note that he does not consider the possibility of existing wholes whose parts have no being but, rather, rejects the assumption that objectives are wholes whose parts are objecta. (It should be noted here for the sake of completeness that Meinong has left open the possibility that the objective is indeed a whole, but merely one whose parts are not objecta.)
Meinong next observes that

Therefore, instead of deriving, on the basis of a question­able analogy, from the Sein of the objective a Sein of its objectum even in the case where that objective is a Nichtsein-objective, it is better to be advised by the facts which occupy us, that that analogy is not exactly valid for Nichtsein-objectives, viz., therefore, that the Sein of the objective is in no way generally dependent upon (ist angewiesen auf, thrown back upon) the Sein of its objectum. ([63]: 493.)

Two points need to be made. First, it now appears that the whole/part analogy may indeed have limited application in the realm of Sein-objectives. But then why employ it? Why (indeed, how) should one distinguish between these two kinds of objectives in this way?

Second, Meinong concludes this passage by saying that the Sein of the objective is not "angewiesen auf" the Sein of its objectum. This seems to be translatable in two ways: the objective's Sein is not (a) thrown back upon, or (b) dependent upon, the objectum's Sein. Now, (a) seems to be a more reasonable conclusion for him to draw, for that has been the direction of his argument: deriving the Sein of the objectum from that of the objective. But (b) is another possible translation. It means that no matter whether the objectum has Sein or not, the objective can have Sein (or not). So it allows that the objectum lacks Sein while the objective has it, which is what Meinong wants to allow.

But (b) is even stronger: it's the denial of (b') the Sein of the objective depends upon the Sein of its objectum. Did Meinong hold this? Is it true? Consider the objective the round square is round. This has Sein, and its Sein in no way depends on the
Sein of its objectum. So (b') is false, and Meinong must hold (b). Yet that should have been clear from a consideration of Sosein-objectives, as we have just seen. Hence, while true and a thesis of his Theory of Objects, (b) is not the sort of thing Meinong should have said after "viz., therefore".

I conclude that (a) is the philosophically proper translation and that Meinong now holds that the Sein of the objective is not inherited by the objectum. There is some evidence against (a): on that translation, we should say that the objective's Sein is not thrown back upon the objectum itself, rather than upon the objectum's Sein. But it should be noted that I am making a philosophical point here, not a philological one: while the problem indeed concerns the translation of 'ist angewiesen auf', I am arguing that no matter what Meinong did say, he should have said (a).

3.3. Aussersein (I).

3.3.1. Introduction. The most distinctive and at the same time most puzzling feature of Meinong's Theory of Objects is his Thesis (Satz) of the Aussersein of the pure object. It is doubly puzzling, not only because Meinong's presentation of it is obscure and metaphorical, but also because there are several plausible explications of it.

3.3.2. Non-committal quantification. Recall that to meet criterion (C7), that there be a meaningful existence predicate not embodied in the quantificational machinery of the theory, we must provide a domain for such quantification.
When Meinong wants to say that there is (or is not) a certain objectum, he frequently uses the German idiom 'es gibt' instead of a less ambiguous phrasing involving 'sein', 'existieren', or 'bestehen' (cf. e.g., [63]: 487, 490, 499). But he also uses 'es gibt' in a "wider" sense not tied down to the sense of Sein, as we have seen:

Those who like paradoxical means of expression, could therefore very well say: there are (es gibt) objects of which it is true that there are (es gibt) not such objects. . . . ([63]: 490.)

Clearly, paradox can be avoided by giving the wider reading to the first occurrence of 'es gibt' and replacing the second by something like "there do not exist or subsist". Meinong does this himself in [67]: 19: "There 'are' (es 'gibt'), as is well known, enough objects which do not exist, and also such as do not even subsist" (my translation; cf. also Grossmann [40]: 112). Equally clearly, the wider sense remains in need of clarification: for where are these non-seienden objects? What is the domain of this wide, "particular" (not "existential"!) quantifier?

A clue is provided in the passage already cited in Sect. 3.2 concerning the "givenness" of objects. Although it may be a mere linguistic coincidence that 'es gibt' and 'vorgeben' are etymologically related, a first step towards explicating the "givenness" which led to Quasisein is to see that such an explication must at the same time provide the domain for "es gibt"-quantification. Indeed, Meinong himself suggests replacing the latter notion by the former in [63]: 500.
3.3.3. Meinong's argument for Aussersein. Meinong introduces Aussersein to avoid Quasisein, so let us resume his argument where we left it at the end of Sect. 3.2. There, we suggested, Meinong had urged that an objective does not transmit its Sein to its objectum. This is followed by a more positive statement: "the entire contrast of Sein and Nichtsein is first the affair of the objective and not of the objectum," from which he concludes that (or, which he restates as) "neither Sein nor Nichtsein can be situated essentially in the object in itself" ([63]: 493).

The point of view which begins to emerge here is that Sein (or Nichtsein) is properly predicable only of objectives. That is, in order, for example, to ascribe Sein to an objectum, one must first consider the Sein of its Sein-objective: \( o \) has Sein iff \( o \) has Sein.

The immediate problem this raises when \( o \) is itself an objective (in general, the problem of how to decide when \( o \) has Sein has Sein without running afoul of an infinite regress) will be discussed in Section C.5.9.3.1.

Under this interpretation, certain of Meinong's more metaphorical formulations ([63]: 494) take on new significance. For if Sein and Nichtsein are not properly predicatable of objecta (or of objects "in themselves", i.e., functioning qua objecta), then there is some sense in saying that "the pure object stands 'beyond Sein and Nichtsein'" or that "Sein, just as Nichtsein, is equally external (äusserlich) to the object." This externality to Sein is expressed by calling the object "ausserseidend" and is officially titled the Thesis of Aussersein.
This is an extremely interesting and provocative theory, reminiscent of analyses of existence due to Frege and Russell (cf. Lambert [52]: 225-26) and of all theories of meaning which take sentences or larger texts rather than words in isolation as minimal meaningful units (cf. Ch. I, Sects. A.3, B.7). It has some drawbacks, however.

First, there is the problem, already mentioned, of the infinite regress. Second, there remains the ever-present urge to say that, in some yet-to-be-explicated sense, objects must "be there" in order for them to be non-committally quantified over and to come into pseudo-existence, i.e., to be objects of psychological acts. And, third, its raison d'être was to avoid the paradox which led to Quasisein ([63]: 494); but there may be other means of accomplishing that end which make no appeal to Aussersein, as we shall see later.

There is a second interpretation of Aussersein which we can only outline roughly here, suggested by the considerations in the previous section: the realm of Aussersein is the realm of Meinongian objects, the domain for the non-committal quantifiers. We will give more substance to this interpretation in Section C; we must, however, be careful not to confuse it with one suggested by Landesman ([54]: 4). There, he says that "the ascription of Aussersein to an object is just a technical way of asserting that the object is something that can be thought about or referred to." Thus _o is ausserseiend iff _o is a possible object-of-thought. This is surely true; yet it is equally surely not an adequate interpretation. First, by 'technical', Landesman cannot mean very much more than "verbally different". Second, as he himself points out, "the possession of Aussersein" as thus characterized does
not explain "how anything can be thought of or referred to" ([54]: 4). Indeed, Landesman's version of Aussersein is more like the datum which itself calls for explanation, namely, how it can be "that one can think of and refer to things that do not exist" ([54]: 6; cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.11.4). We shall offer an explanatory counterpart of Landesman's Aussersein in Section C.6.2.

We note finally that in [63], Meinong seems to hold to a two-valued logic, stating that with respect to an ausserseiennd object (Gegenstand), "of its two Sein-objectives, its Sein and its Nichtsein, in any case one subsists" ([63]: 494). Hence, either the pink cube has Sein or the pink cube has Nichtsein has Sein, and so we can attribute Sein even to incomplete (indeed, finite) objects (contra Findlay [31]: 166-67); and either the present King of France is bald has Sein, or it lacks Sein (contra Parsons [77]; cf. Ch. III, Sect. A.2).

3.3.4. Aussersein as a degree of Sein. While not an issue in our principal text [63], there is some indication elsewhere that Meinong may have held Aussersein to be a third degree of Sein (cf. Grossmann's discussion of this in [40]: 119 and Kalsi's declaration of it in [67]: xxxvii). I would like to emphasize here that Aussersein is not a degree of Sein, at least in Meinong's theory in [63] and possibly even in [67].

In [67], we find this passage: "But because there 'are' (es . . . 'gibt') quite certainly these [objects which lack Sein], . . . I believed (gemeint) and I still believe, [that] some being-like thing (Seinsartiges) ought to be attributed to them under the name
of 'Aussersein'" ([67]: 19). This is accompanied by a footnote reference to [63]: 493f, so an interpretation of it in support of viewing Aussersein as a degree of Sein must be supplemented at least by an explanation of this reference. For in [63], it is quite clear that Aussersein, far from being a degree of Sein, is a means of avoiding such a third degree (cf. Grossmann [39]: 67 and Chisholm [21]: 248).

The force of 'some being-like thing' must, however, be discussed. Given our present conclusion, I would like to suggest that Aussersein is "being-like" in that it serves as the domain for quantification over Meinongian objects, under the second interpretation of the last section.

The related question of whether all Meinongian objects have Aussersein or only those which lack Sein may be answered in favor of the former alternative. For, in [63], Meinong makes no distinction (as he did for Quasisein; cf. our discussion of (Q9), above, Section 3.2) between existing and non-existing objects when he introduces Aussersein ([63]: 494; cf. [67]: 19).

Finally, Meinong claims in [67] that Aussersein, like the Quasisein of [63], has "no negative or contradictory opposite" ([67]: 19). Since, of course, it is not a degree of Sein, it need not be part of a matched set. Nevertheless, our first interpretation provides a reply to his claim. On that interpretation, objects qua objecta are ausserseiend because Sein is not properly predicatable of them. Hence, that of which Sein is predicatable constitutes the opposite of Aussersein,
viz., objectives. (We shall give a reply on behalf of the second interpretation in Section C.)


In his critique of Meinong in *Mind*, Russell observed that "unless we were aware what redness is, we could not know that redness exists" ([93]: 215; cf. Findlay [31]: 50, and Grossmann [38]: 20).

This proposition to the effect that essence precedes existence (to invert a phrase of the Existentialists) was accepted by Meinong:

[T]he Sosein of an object is not, so to say, concerned with (mitbetroffen) its Nichtsein. The fact is important enough to formulate it explicitly as the Principle of the Independence of Sosein from Sein. . . . ([63]: 489.)

Of course, this is not stated generally enough. The Principle of Independence (PI), then, must be that given an object, its Sosein is one thing and its Sein-status is quite another. All objects, whether or not they exist or are even impossible, have a Sosein; this is why the golden mountain is golden and the round square is round, even though the former doesn't exist and the latter cannot ([63]: 490).

Meinong later tells us that PI means that the Sosein is (1a) the location of that which is not external to the object and (1b) that which constitutes the object's essence (Wesen), and (2) is connected to the object whether or not the object has Sein ([63]: 494). It seems, then, that we may take the Sosein of an object to be its essential (characterizing, or defining) properties and that we may identify the Sosein of $o$ with the set of $o$'s essential properties (cf. Chisholm [21]: 245).
Moreover, it follows from (2) that every object has a Sosein (whether the object has Sein or not). An interesting argument for the universality of Sosein can be constructed from an argument for universal Being in Russell [92]: 449. The original argument is:

Assume that A is nothing (i.e., A is not).
Therefore A can't be said not to be (since one can't say anything about that which is nothing).
Therefore there is an x such that x is a term and x's Being is denied and x=A.
Therefore there is an x such that x=A (i.e., A is).
Therefore 'A is not' is false or meaningless.
Therefore A is.

Whether or not this argument is valid or even acceptable to Meinong, consider the following parallel one:

Assume that A lacks Sosein.
Therefore nothing can be said about A (i.e., there is no Sosein-objective whose objectum is A).
But 'A lacks Sosein' is a Sosein-objective whose objectum is A.
Therefore 'A lacks Sosein' is false or meaningless.
Therefore A has a Sosein.

If we represent a Meinongian object by listing within angle-brackets the properties which are members of its Sosein (thus enabling us to exhibit its main features while remaining neutral, for now, on its structure), then A = <lacking Sosein>; i.e., A is the thing which only lacks Sosein. (Similarly, <blackness> = the thing which is only black, <goldenness, mountainhood> = the golden mountain, and <roundness, squareness> = the round square.)
But this raises the spectre of paradox: just as the golden mountain is golden, so does A lack Sosein; yet, as the above argument showed, A has Sosein. This suggests that we might have to distinguish the way in which A "lacks" Sosein from the way in which it "has" Sosein. We leave this task for Section C.

Does there correspond an object to every Sosein, i.e., to every set of properties? The only plausible counterexample would be if 'object' were limited to pseudo-existent objects. But as soon as we try to think of a Sosein without a corresponding object, we can immediately think of such an object. So to deny that for every Sosein there is (in Aussersein) an object, would be useless.

However, we can make a stronger statement: objects and Soseins are in a 1-1 correspondence. It is clear from our characterization of Soseins that every object has a unique Sosein: for an object can't have two essences. But does every Sosein correspond to only one object? Suppose that I think of an objectum with Sosein $s$, call it $o_1$, and that you think of an objectum with Sosein $s$, call it $o_2$. Are $o_1$ and $o_2$ genuinely identical (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.8)? To decide whether "they" are the same, we seem first to have to distinguish "them": we seem to have to consider the object which I think of and whose Sosein is $s$ and also the object which you think of and whose Sosein is $s$. But these objects are not identical with each other or with $o_1$ and $o_2$. The former is, roughly <being thought of by me, having Sosein $s$>, and the latter is <being thought of by you, having Sosein $s$>. And while these are different, the object, named '$o_1$', with Sosein $s$ is identical to the object, named '$o_2$', with Sosein $s$. So the 1-1 correspondence holds.
5. The Existent Round Square (I).

Russell's two main objections to Meinong's theory were (1) that the round square violated the Law of Contradiction in being both round and not round and (2) that "if the round square is round and square, the existent round square is existent and round and square" even though it doesn't exist ([94]: 533). We consider (1) in Section 5.8. To (2), Meinong replied as follows:

The objection rests on the validity of such propositions (Sätze) as that the existent (existierende) round square "exists" ("existiert"), in which indeed it seems to be explicitly admitted that there is (es ... gibt), besides the round square, also one to which existence belongs. But the difficulty under consideration here, cannot affect especially (kann vor allem nicht wohl ... betreffen) the round square or impossible objects, because, e.g., the same holds equally of [the] "golden mountain", to which the rank of a so to say loyal object will not easily be refused: for also the existent golden mountain "exists" and this agrees with that which experience teaches, hardly essentially (wesentlich) better than the proposition of the existence of the round square. In that one forms (bildet) the participle "existent" or the like, one arrives quite actually (wirklich) at the position of formally calling an objectum after (nachzusagen) existence quite in the same way as one otherwise calls it after a Sosein-predicate. Also, entirely according to rule, Sosein-determinations (Soseinsbestimmungen) (e.g., those to be [the] objectum of a legitimate existence-affirmation) without doubt go hand in hand with existence. To that extent, it is in fact hardly quite enough to maintain of Kant's "actual hundred Talers" [that] they have entirely no objective (gegenständlich) advantage over the "thought-of hundred Talers", viz., nothing that the latter lacks.

But this surplus (Superplus) of determinations, which attach to existence and which we, at least for the purpose of present understanding, could call for that reason existential-determinations, are never existence itself, so certainly being-there (Dasein) is no Sosein and also the Sosein is no "So", i.e., the objective is no objectum. Therefore, one can also add such existential-determinations to other determinations, speak of an "existent golden mountain" just as of a "high golden mountain", and then affirm "existent" as a predicate of the former just as certainly
as "high" of the latter. Nevertheless, the former mountain exists therefore as little as the latter: "to be existent" in that sense of the existential-determination and "to exist" in the ordinary sense of "being-there" ("Dasein") is quite certainly not at all the same. ([64]: 223.)

To this, Russell's only response was that he could "see no difference between existing and being existent" ([97]: 439).

Admittedly, Meinong's discussion has many puzzling features. To his credit, he quickly saw that the problem was not limited to impossible objects, and so he attempted to provide a more general solution. There are two features of his reply essential to our purposes:

(R1) Since 'existent' is an adjective, there are (in the realm of Aussersein) objecta among whose constituents is the property of being existent.

(R2) The property corresponding to 'existent', viz., that of being existent, is not identical to that which we affirm of objects when we say that they have Sein.

Now, under the assumption implicit in (R1) that there is a property of being existent, (R2) reduces to a version of PI: For it says that merely to say or to think that x is existent has nothing to do with whether or not x actually has Sein. So the more important of the two claims is (R1), which itself has two parts:

(R1A) For every adjective P, there is a property, P*, which it names.
(R1B) For every property P*, there is (in Aussersein) an objectum o such that o's Sosein contains P*.

We saw in Section 4 that (R1B) is acceptable. Hence, the crucial thesis is (R1A), or, at least, the special case where P = 'existent'.

Indeed, let us weaken (R1A) so that P ranges only over adjectives of some specified language L which are neither meaningless (e.g.,
'brillig') nor complex (e.g., 'red-and-round'). Is the weakened version of (R1A) acceptable? No answer can be given until we have decided upon some antecedent characterization of what it is to be a property.

No matter what our stand on (R1A), however, the difficulty remains of there being two senses of 'exist' (not, note, of there being two degrees of Sein). According to Meinong's version of the Thesis of Aussersein, existence (in the sense of Sein) is external to the object, and by his version of PI, that which is external to the object is not located in its Sosein ([63]: 494); hence, the existence which is in the Sosein of the existent round square cannot be Sein (Orayen makes a similar point in [75]: 332). We shall return to this problem in Section C.

C. Formal Reconstruction

1. Introduction.

The preceding survey of Meinong's Theory of Objects is somewhat incomplete, since there are several theses and problems which are more easily presented within the context of a more formal development of the theory.

The remainder of this chapter contains such a "formal reconstruction". It is built upon four foundations: the data of Chapter I, Meinong's theory as discussed in Section B, further considerations in the form of data to be presented here, and the promised remaining details of Meinong's theory. It is offered as a complementary, revised version of that theory as examined above.
2. The Act-Object Distinction.

One of our tasks in Section C will be to provide arguments for certain claims that Meinong omitted to argue for in [63]. One such claim is that the object is, in general, a non-mental entity. We have already looked at Meinong's adaptation of Twardowski's arguments for the content-object distinction. Here we shall consider arguments for the act-object distinction that are also adapted from Twardowski's content-object arguments.

First, since the object need not have Sein, but the act always does, they must be different. However, because we will interpret an object's having Sein as its being correlated with an "actual object", we will not be able to use this argument. Second, the object has properties which the act does not: the golden mountain is golden, but my idea of it is not; hence, the act is distinct from the object. However, until we characterize the relation of an object to its properties, we may not employ this, either. Third, distinct acts can be directed to the same object: I can both judge and assume that p; so the object cannot be the act. To this, it can be objected that since judgment and assumption differ in other ways, it is still possible for the object itself to be a part of the act.

A variation of Twardowski's first argument is given by Findlay: "To assume that the real object X is a constituent of the idea Y, although an idea qualitatively indistinguishable from Y could exist even if X had no existence whatever, is an astonishingly futile piece of thinking" ([31]: 19). But since we will be distinguishing between Meinongian objects and "actual" objects, and, at most, this argument
will enable us to distinguish the latter from the act, we cannot use it for our present purposes.

If we understand "mental entity" to mean things "in" the mind or perhaps things actually thought of, then objects are not mental entities, since they need not be pseudo-existent. This argument from generalized objects (cf. Sect. B.2.2.1) will only be acceptable after we provide a characterization of such objects. Moreover, it leaves open the possibility that pseudo-existent objects are mental entities while they pseudo-exist.

A version of Twardowski's third argument due, surprisingly, to Russell is the strongest. It is not Russell's argument per se that we are interested in, but one with the same structure. Russell says, "As regards the external perception, if two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the per­cipient" ([93]: 215). Modified, this becomes: If two people can think of the same object, as the possibility of common theories about the world requires (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.11, and Russell's observation that it is "highly inconvenient" if two people cannot think of the same object, [93]: 215), then the object of thought is not in the mind of the thinker. Therefore, the object is external and not part of the act. Later, Russell objects that while "it is plain that others may believe the same thing [that I believe]; this, however, might be regarded as implying only sameness of content" ([93]: 510). However, it is impossible for two people to have the same content, since the
content is by definition a part of the psychological experience. Hence, it must be the object which is in common.

3. The Adverbial Theory.

The object of a psychological experience is distinct from the act-component (Sect. 2) and from the content-component (Sect. B.2.3.3) of that experience, and when the act-components are kept "constant" (i.e., held to the same kind), there is a (relative) 1-1 correspondence between the contents and objects, which accounts for the "directedness" of the experience to the object (Sect. B.2.3.2.1).

There is an alternative possibility which proves interesting and valuable to consider, namely, that the object is identical to the content. We here make no commitment to the truth of this alternative; we are only concerned to see whether a Meinongian theory of objects would be impossible were the alternative true.

The Thesis of Intentionality says that, in general, every psychological experience (a) consists of an act which (b) is directed to an object external to the experience (c) by means of a content internal to the experience. The basic datum on which this is based is that every judgment or idea is a judgment or idea of something, interpreting this to mean that there is an act and an object of the act. But it seems equally plausible to interpret it to mean that there is an act which has a certain characteristic or which is "performed" or experienced in a certain way. On the latter interpretation, there would be no "pure" judgments or ideas; just as there is no "pure" color, but only red, blue, etc., so there would be only, e.g., mountainlike ideas,
ghostly ideas, etc. On the former interpretation, there is a pure act of judgment, say, in the sense that the act is distinguishable from the object.

Nevertheless, on the alternative theory now being considered, there is an experience of a certain kind or in a certain manner; and this seems sufficient as an explication of the phenomenon of "directedness". Since the "content" was defined as that part of the psychological experience which was the "director", let us call this the "act-content theory", or "AC-theory" for short. The AC-theory, then, holds that all ideas, e.g., are of something, in the sense that they all have a content.

It may help in clarifying the distinction between these two theories to take a linguistic turn. Consider

(12) John is thinking of Plato.

On the AC-theory, the structure of the "state of affairs" expressed by (12) would be something like either (12A) or (12B):

(12A) John is thinking Platonically.
(12B) John is-thinking-of-Plato.

We discussed difficulties with the (12B)-approach in Chapter I, Section B.11.2, so let us now concentrate on (12A).

The adverbial theory of perception holds that

(13) I am sensing a red sensation

is to be explicated, not as a dyadic relation of sensing holding between a subject ("I") and an object ("a red sensation"), but in a subject-predicate form as:
The AC-theory, then, may be taken as a version of an adverbial theory of thinking (cf. Grossmann [38]: 27n.34). On this theory, (12) is "construed as telling us, not about something which is related to [John] . . . as being the object of [his] . . . thought, but only about the way in which [he] . . . happen[s] to be thinking" (Chisholm [20]: 210).

Chisholm, in [20], raises an objection against interpreting (12) as (12A) similar to the one he raises against (12B) in [21]. He claims that this move renders invalid an argument-form which had been valid before the adverbial move:

Consider, first,

(14) Jones thinks of a unicorn.

Adverbially, this is paraphrased as

(14A) Jones thinks unicornically,

which is supposed to do away with the putative reference to unicorns and to have only to do with Jones, his act of thinking, and the manner of his thinking. Consider, next, this valid inference:

(14B) (i) Jones thinks of a unicorn.
     (ii) Jones thinks only of things that exist.

Therefore (iii) There are unicorns (i.e., a unicorn is a thing that exists.

Upon adverbial paraphrase, this becomes the invalid inference:
(14C)  
(i) Jones thinks unicornically.  
(ii) Jones thinks only of things that exist. 
Therefore (iii) There are unicorns.

Chisholm's point is that (14A) (= (14Ci)) must still have something to do with unicorns to preserve the validity of the paraphrased inference. Perhaps so. But (14C) is not the complete paraphrase. To obtain that, (14Bii) would have to be adverbially interpreted also, namely, as

(14CiiA)  
Jones thinks only existentially.

Now, either (14Ci) follows from (14Ci) and (14CiiA), or it doesn't. If it does, then Chisholm's objection fails. If it doesn't follow, then Chisholm's objection is upheld.

I think that it does follow. For consider this valid inference:

(15)  
(i) Jones thinks of Quine  
(ii) Jones thinks only of things that exist. 
Therefore (iii) Quine exists.

Adverbially paraphrased in toto, I suggest this becomes:

(15A)  
(i) Jones thinks Quinely.  
(ii) Jones thinks only existentially. 
Therefore (iii) Quinely thinking is existential thinking.

Now, if (15A) is valid, then (15Ai) must be the adverbial reading of (15ii); i.e., to say that Quine exists is to say that to think Quinely is to think existentially. So, to say that unicorns exist is to say that to think unicornically is to think existentially. Thus, the complete adverbial paraphrase of (14B) is not (14C), but

(14D)  
(i) Jones thinks unicornically.  
(ii) Jones thinks only existentially. 
Therefore (iii) Unicornical thinking is existential thinking.
Since this inference is valid, the adverbial theory is upheld.

On the AC-theory, then, there is no "pure" act of fearing nor any independent "objects" such as unicorns or ghosts, but only unified acts-of-a-kind or acts-in-a-kind-of-manner such as "ghostly thinking". But clearly we can abstract an act of thinking and an "object" (i.e., a content or manner) of the act, and this, even if only an instrumentalist move, allows us still to have a theory of objects. Thesis (M1), in the weaker form that "every mental act whatsoever has an intention" (Grossmann [40]: 107), can be preserved by interpreting it to mean that every act has a "way", i.e., a content. 14

Now, one difficulty is that the content is so intimately tied to the act that no two contents are identical; i.e., just as on the act-content-object theory (ACO-theory), every two distinct acts, whether they be of distinct types or merely experienced by different people or at different times by one person, have distinct contents. Hence, we must talk of "content-types" or, perhaps, of universals (or properties) whose particulars (or instances) are the individual contents (content-tokens). Now, just as the ACO-theory must distinguish between individual acts (or act-tokens) and kinds of act (or act-types) without thereby requiring a fourth component (making it an "AA'CO-theory"), so the AC-theory, which needs content-tokens and content-types, need not be thought of as a three-component "ACC'-theory".

Nevertheless, the AC-theory augmented by content-types is isomorphic, I believe, to the ACO-theory. Instead of a theory of contents, on this view, we would have a theory of "manners" or contents. Such a theory, like a theory of objects, would contain versions of theses
(M1)-(M9), and so would satisfy criteria (C1)-(C7). Since Meinong's own theory is of the ACO variety, I shall not attempt to prove this claim here, but merely give an indication of how it can provide solutions to some issues. For example, suppose I think of the golden mountain; since the golden mountain is golden, the object of my thought is golden. On the AC-theory, this would mean that I am thinking in a goldenly, mountainly manner, and, so, I am thinking goldenly. For another example, by means of the content-type, we can explain how it is possible for two people to think of the same thing: the contents of their thoughts are of the same kind; i.e., they are thinking in the same manner.

However, on the AC-theory there is, sometimes, a third "component": If I think of Gerald Ford, we can distinguish four items: myself (the thinker), the act (thinking), the content (Gerald-Ford-ly), and Ford himself (the "actual", physical object). It is considerably beyond our scope to argue for the existence of an external world. Nevertheless, Twardowski's three arguments can be brought to bear on the relation between the content and the actual object.

First, while it is true that we can think of things which don't exist, all this need mean is that sometimes no actual object corresponds to the content of our thought; thus, the content is surely distinct from the actual object. Second, actual objects certainly can be spatially extended or made of gold, while contents are not; since, therefore, actual objects have properties which the corresponding contents lack, they are distinct. And, third, contents and actual objects are not related in a 1-1 correspondence: there can be two contents
corresponding to one actual object (e.g., the 1976 U.S. President and Nixon's second Vice-President both correspond to the actual object named Gerald Ford), and there can be two actual objects corresponding to the same content (e.g., a "red" content can correspond to my red notebook and my red rug); hence, once more, content and actual object are distinct.

Representing the actual object by "0'"., we may call the present theory the "AC(0')-theory", indicating by parentheses the possibility that there is not always an actual object corresponding to a content. This is, it seems to me, the theory advocated by Twardowski and taken over by Meinong. But if we need 0' on the AC-theory, might we not need it also on the ACO-theory? There is historical precedent for an ACO(0')-theory: Although Russell (mistakenly) believed 0 to be "immanent", i.e., part of the psychological experience, he also held it "evident that, if there be an immanent object at all, there is also an object which is not immanent" ([93]: 514), viz., what I call an "actual" object.

In the next section, we try to show that the ACO-theory is really an ACO(0')-theory, i.e., that to some Meinongian objects 0, there correspond actual objects 0' such that 0 ≠ 0'.

4. Meinongian and Actual Objects.

4.1. Modes of predication.

4.1.1. Historical background. In this section, we argue from a distinction between two modes of predication to a distinction between two types of objects: "Meinongian" objects (the "0" of ACO(0')) and
"actual" objects (the "O" of ACO(O')). Whether or not this particular argument for such a "type-distinction" is valid, however, it will remain an important claim of our theory that there are two modes of predication.

The notion that there is more than one way for a subject to possess a property is most likely traceable back to Aristotle's Categories in which a distinction is drawn between accidental and essential predication (cf. Thompson [108]: 47). It is also arguable that the "four-fold way" arising from the distinction between things "said of" and things "in" a subject is a classification of four modes of predication.

In his General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and Truths, Leibniz also puts forth a theory involving two copulas (giving rise to "essential" vs. "existential" propositions, but apparently he did not develop it (cf. Parkinson [76A], Sects. 144-46; and Castañeda [14]).

More recently, Cocchiarella has offered a theory of different modes of copulation in [26], but it is unclear whether his modal operators affect the entire formula or the copula itself (cf. [26]: 38). An argument is needed to show that a formula entirely within the scope of such an operator is equivalent to one where only the copula is within the scope. It is only in the latter case that there would be different modes of copulation in the sense being discussed here.

The first fully developed theory embodying two copulas is that of Castañeda [7]. His "internal" predication corresponds roughly to what we shall call "constituency" below, and his "external" predication serves to associate pairs of "guises" (which correspond very roughly
to Meinongian objects) with "sameness relations" such as identity or "consubstantiality".

Meinong only had one mode of predication, but he accomplished some of the work of two copulas by using two kinds of properties (or predicates). We have already seen this in the passage cited in Section B.5, where he drew a distinction between being existent and existing. For Meinong, in

(16) The existent round square is existent

and

(17) The existent round square exists,

there is only one kind of predication, but two kinds of existence. Since Russell took these as involving only one predicate, he missed Meinong's point.

For various reasons, among them the historical precedence of Castañeda's theory, we shall employ two modes of predication in our revision of Meinong's theory. We turn now to the other reasons.

4.1.2. Constituency and exemplification. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Mt. Everest is the tallest mountain and that I have a gold ring. Consider now, these statements:

(18) The tallest mountain is in Asia.
(19) The tallest mountain is a mountain.
(20) My gold ring is golden.
(21) The golden mountain is golden.
(22) The golden mountain is in Asia.

According to our assumptions and initial data, (22) is false, and the
rest are true.

In order to account for the truth of (18)-(20), we postulate a mode of predication, $M_1$, which unites actual objects with the properties they "exemplify". The nature of $M_1$ is one of the perennial problems of philosophy, and we do not pretend to solve it here. What is of importance is the recognition that there is such an ontological link, whatever its structure may be. We have, then,

(18A) $M_1($the tallest mountain, being in Asia$)$
(19A) $M_1($the tallest mountain, being a mountain$)$
(20A) $M_1($my gold ring, being golden$)$.

To account for the truth of (21), let us postulate a (not necessarily different) mode of predication, $M_0$, suitable (inter alia) to non-existents such as the golden mountain; thus,

(21B) $M_0($the golden mountain, being golden$)$.

But now recall Chisholm's example from Chapter I, Section 4.2 (in [17]: 9-10): if we wish to teach someone the meaning of 'golden' as it is used in (21), we may do so by explaining its use in (20), and vice versa. The point, once more, is that 'golden' is used univocally. Hence, only one property is involved: being golden. But, it seems to me, non-existing golden mountains cannot be made of gold in the same way that existing golden rings are. Any differences in the semantic analysis of (20) and (21), then, must be due either to a difference in the modes of predication or to a difference in the nature of the entities represented by the subjects of the sentences. But the only relevant difference between the entities is that one exists and the
other doesn't, which does not help solve the problem of how non-existents can have properties. We can do that by taking the other alternative: There are two modes of predication; $M_0 \neq M_1$. Thus, 

(21A) \[ \text{not-}M_1 \text{(the golden mountain, being golden)}. \]

Let us consider $M_0$ further. There is a structural (semantic) similarity between (20) (or (19)) and (21) not accounted for merely by the distinction between $M_0$ and $M_1$. This may be seen more clearly by supposing that I don't have a gold ring (or that two equally high mountains are taller than all others), for in that case (20) (and (19)) are still true. The structural similarity is embodied in, and we may account for the truth-values by, (21B) together with:

(19B) \[ M_0 \text{(the tallest mountain, being a mountain)} \]
(20B) \[ M_0 \text{(my gold ring, being golden)}. \]

Finally, we also have

(18B) \[ \text{not-}M_0 \text{(the tallest mountain, being in Asia)} \]
(22A) \[ \text{not-}M_1 \text{(the golden mountain, being in Asia)} \]
(22B) \[ \text{not-}M_0 \text{(the golden mountain, being in Asia)}. \]

Of course, what I have presented so far is only the skeleton of a theory. We must, and shall in due course, say exactly what $M_0$ is. For the time being, it will suffice to characterize $M_0$ as linking a property and an item which has that property as a constituent in some sense. The precise sense of constituency, to repeat, will be explored later. But corresponding to an item such as the golden mountain, there is the set of its properties (its Sosein); and we shall explicate (21B) as:
being golden $\in \{P: P$ is a property of the golden mountain$\}$.

Let us call $M_0$, constituency, reading '$M_0(x, y)' as '$y$ is a constituent of $x$" and writing '$y \subseteq x$' on occasion. $M_1$ will be called exemplification, with '$M_1(x, y)' to be read "$x$ exemplifies $y$" and written '$x\text{ ex } y'$.

(We note, for the record, that while set-membership explicates constituency—as it seems also to do for Castañeda's internal predication—constituency is not to be identified with set-membership, for the object-of-my-thought's being a red pen is not to be identified with the membership of red in a certain set (nor is the contingency of the former to be identified with the necessity of the latter).)

4.1.3. Two types of objects. There are, then, two modes of predication, i.e., two ways for properties to "attach" to things which they characterize—two ways for properties to characterize them. Now, when (19)-(21) are interpreted as in (19B)-(21B), the tallest mountain, my gold ring, and the golden mountain are Meinongian objects; and when (18)-(20) are interpreted as in (18A)-(20A), the tallest mountain and my gold ring are actual objects. Hence, $M_0$ is the mode of predication appropriate to Meinongian objects, and $M_1$ is the appropriate mode for actual objects. Put otherwise, Meinongian objects are constituted by properties, whereas actual objects exemplify them.

Grossmann ([40]: 2) makes a similar distinction (albeit for other purposes). Adopting his terminology for the moment, we might say that an actual object, "according to the Aristotelian tradition, . . . is a substance", since it exemplifies properties, but might not be constituted by (or consist of) them. (We remain neutral for now on the last
point.) And a Meinongian object, "according to . . . the Berkleyan tradition, . . . is a bundle" but not a mere "collection of properties."

Is the Meinongian object, my gold ring, identical with my actual gold ring? From the present point of view, a version of Twardowski's second argument provides the answer. Meinongian objects may or may not exemplify properties (we discuss this in Section 4.5.3), but whatever the Meinongian object, my gold ring, may exemplify, it doesn't exemplify the property of being gold, as we saw in the last section. My actual gold ring, on the other hand, does exemplify this property. So there are two distinct types of objects: Meinongian and actual. In the terminology of Section 3, 0 ≠ 0'. (We shall, for convenience, refer to our reconstruction of Meinongian objects as "M-objects".)

4.2. Content, Meinongian object, and actual object. Another argument for the type-distinction, previewed at the end of Section 3, holds that since the AC-theory is really an AC(0')-theory, the ACO-theory must be an ACO(0')-theory. We now elaborate on this.

The difficulty we need to overcome is that granted that the ACO-theory is better than the AC-theory, there need be no type-distinction; for, if 0 exists, then the structure of the psychological experience could be A-C-0', and if 0 doesn't exist (i.e., lacks Sein), the structure could be A-C-0 Meinongian. Thus, we need to show that this is not the case; and to do that we will try to show that all psychological experiences have the latter structure.

By definition, the content of a psychological experience is that which directs it to its object; and we have seen that it does so
"uniquely": for each content, there is one and only one object. Now, suppose the object of thought were an actual object, say the green box on my desk; i.e., suppose the structure of the experience is A-C-0'. In general, however, an M-object is not uniquely associated with an actual object; thus, the M-object the green box can be associated with the actual green box on my desk, the actual green box on my bookcase, and many other green boxes. So we cannot assimilate the M-object to the content, by definition. But neither is the M-object the actual object (as we saw in Section 4.1.3). Hence, the structure of the experience must be A-C-0-0'.

Moreover, the content does not direct the act uniquely to the actual object, since the content is in 1-1 correspondence with the Meinongian object. So the actual object is not the object of thought; and, since there need be no actual object, but there is always an M-object, the structure of the psychological experience is A-C-0(-0').

An analogy may help to clarify the relationship between C, 0, and 0'. Findlay notes that, "In making my ideas of the Himalayas adequate . . . I have, by my own activity, constructed a reference which points in one unambiguous direction, and in that direction the Himalayas happen to lie" ([31]: 36-37). That is, the "reference constructed" is the content of the idea, the unambiguous direction in which it points is towards the M-object, and in that direction as a matter of contingent fact (accidentally, as it were) are the actual Himalayas. In any act of pointing, we must distinguish between that which is unique about the act, namely, the direction of the pointing, and those items which might be pointed to. The latter are not unique,
nor need there be any. (Cf. the Big-Dipper and falling-rock examples of Sections B.2.1, 2.3.2.2, and n.5.)

With this in mind, consider the following diagram, where A is the center of circle B, and A' is a point on the possibly discontinuous curve C:

Imagine the vector $AMA'$ moving around C so that it points to each A' on C. The direction of $AMA'$ at each instant is uniquely specifiable, and C can be "idealized" or "projected" onto B. The analogy I have in mind, then, is this: B represents a domain of M-objects, $AMA'$ represents a psychological experience whose content is represented by the direction of $AMA'$, and C represents a domain of actual objects (discontinuities in C represent "non-existents"; overlaps on C represent objects with common properties). A point M on B is, in a certain sense, the only unique thing that AM can point to, since for each A' on C, there is one and only one M on B such that $AMA'$ is a line, whereas for some M, there may be more than one A' or even none.\(^{20}\)

We note finally that the relation of content to M-object is similar to that of "referring" in an ordinary-language sense, according to which "any" subject of discourse can count as referred to, including
non-entities of diverse kinds" (Routley [91]: 233-34); and that of content to actual object is similar to the "philosophers' usage [of 'refers'] which embodies theoretical assumptions about language, according to which the reference of a subject expression is some existing item . . . in the actual world" ([91]: 234; cf. Rorty [89]). In terms of our analogy, the ordinary-language sense of referring is represented by AM, while AA' (when it exists, i.e., when A' is on C) represents the philosophers' sense. In connection with the type-distinction, note that were 0 = 0', the philosophers' sense of referring would merely be a special case of the ordinary-language sense. From the linguistic point of view, we may say that words refer "directly" (in the ordinary-language sense) to M-objects and "indirectly" (in the philosophers' sense) to actual objects.

Returning now to the relation of the content to the two types of objects, we can begin to shed some light on the nature of the M-objectum. Since there might be many actual objects corresponding to a certain content, that which the content directly and uniquely "points to" is that which all those actual objects have in common. Now, it is generally accepted that that which they have in common is one or several properties. But they also have in common this: being a subject of predication which is not itself predicable, i.e., being a particular. So, all actual blue objects have in common: (a) being blue and (b) being a particular; and the content must be adequate to both (a) and (b). Hence, the M-object must be, roughly, that which is common to all actual objects to which the content is adequate. In particular, the M-object, blue thing, which corresponds to all actual
blue objects is (a) constituted by the property of being blue and is 
(b) an objectum (i.e., an individual—cf. Sect. B.2.2.3; cf. also 
Meinong [67]: 167-68).

4.3. The uniformity of thought. The type-distinction can find 
support from yet another quarter: the theses of the uniformity of 
thought and language (cf. Ch. I, Sects. B.4-5, II.4). In Findlay's 
words, "Whatever be the correct analysis of the experience which takes 
place when we are said to be thinking about something, it is clear 
that it is in every case qualitatively the same, whether the object 
to which it is directed actually exists or not" ([31]: 19). It follows 
from this, as Brentano noted (cf. Grossmann [38]: 25), that all objects 
of thought, whether they exist or not, are qualitatively alike.

To see how this follows, it will help to turn to an argument due 
to Russell ([93]: 516; cf. Sect. 4.4 below), which we adapt as follows: 
Suppose I think that the person in the next room is happy. If there 
is no such person, then I am thinking at most of an M-object. If there 
is such a person, then at least there is an actual object. But there 
is no relevant qualitative difference between these two acts of think­
ing. So in the latter case there is also an M-object. For otherwise, 
we would always be able to distinguish between the experiences of 
thinking of an existent and thinking of a non-existent by merely de­
ciding whether the object of our thought were actual or Meinongian. 
And this we cannot do.

Existental and non-existent objects of thought, then, are of the 
same type. But the type cannot be that of actual objects, since non-
existents aren't actual. So the type must be that of M-objects. Again,
we find that the object of thought, whether it exists or not, is an M-object, and M-objects are of a different type from actual objects.

A mathematical analogy will help us to see how the uniformity of thought forces a type-distinction upon our theory. Recall from Chapter I, Sections B.5 and 6.2 that in order to answer certain questions such as "Does x+1=0 have a solution?", certain "ideal" items can be constructed whose sole purpose is, in this case, to be additive inverses of natural numbers, and that such "ideal" items serve a structural purpose in helping to organize our knowledge. Now, language and thought refer univocally to natural numbers and negative integers, but only after it is seen that there is a set of items (viz., positive integers) of the same type as negative integers which are isomorphic to (and can thus serve as representatives of) the natural numbers. The important point to notice is that, on one construction at least, the natural numbers are not the positive integers; in fact, they are of different types.

In a similar fashion, M-objects are "ideal" elements (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.6.2), and the ability of thought to be directed to both existents and non-existents can be accounted for by taking M-objects to be the only objects of thought. Since to each actual object, 0', which exemplifies (inter alia) P, there corresponds an M-object, 0, which is constituted by (inter alia) P, we can refer to or think about 0' by referring to or thinking about its Meinongian counterpart 0.

4.4. Objectives and states of affairs. The arguments of Sections 4.1 and 4.3 hold for objecta and actual individuals. In Section 4.2,
we argued more generally for a type-distinction between M-objects and actual objects no matter what kind of act would have been involved. The M-object of a judgment or assumption is called an objective (cf. Sect. B.2.2.3). Let us call the corresponding actual object a state of affairs. In this section, we discuss the type-distinction between these and argue that it entails a type-distinction on the level of objects of ideas.

Once again, we can borrow Russell's argument from [93]: 516: "correct judgments have [an actual] object. . . . [N]ow . . . suppose that true judgments have [an actual] object, while false ones have an [M-]object. . . . It will be necessary to suppose that correct judgments also have . . . [M-]objects; for, if not, it is hardly to be supposed that this difference of correct and erroneous judgments would be imperceptible, as it certainly is." The point is that if true judgments had only actual objects while false ones had only Meinongian ones, then there would be no problem of false belief; and so both sorts of judgments have M-objects, true ones having actual objects besides. (This argument is not as clear as one might wish, since it presupposes that we can distinguish between actual and M-objects.)

Meinong himself appears to have been sensitive to the distinction. Chisholm reports that he chose 'Objektiv' over 'Sachverhalt', "which would seem to be pretty much the German equivalent of 'state of affairs', on the ground that in its ordinary use it is restricted to those objectives that occur or obtain" ([20]: 216). For Meinong, however, an existing objective is a Sachverhalt, whereas on our theory, states of
affairs are actual items which correspond to, but are distinct from, objectives.

The structure of the distinction I have in mind is essentially that discussed in the following passage:

According to Frege, false as well as true judgments intend Thoughts. . . . Thus there is an object for false as well as true judgments. . . . They are quite unlike states of affairs, at least as I shall use the expression; for while Frege assumes that there is the Thought that the earth is flat, there is no such state of affairs. States of affairs which are not facts simply do not exist. Moreover, while the state of affairs that the earth is round involves the earth as a constituent, the Thought that the earth is round, according to Frege, does not contain the earth, but rather the sense expressed by "the earth". (Grossmann [38]: 27.)

Our theory has it, roughly that false and true judgments are directed to objectives; that while there is the objective that the earth is flat, there is no such state of affairs; that states of affairs which are not "facts" simply do not exist; and that while the state of affairs that the earth is round involves the actual earth as a constituent, the objective that the earth is round "contains" rather the objectum the earth.

With this distinction in mind, we may now argue for the distinction between objecta and actual individuals. Consider this adaptation of Findlay's argument cited in Section 2:

To assume that the actual object X is a part (in some sense) of the objective Y, although an objective qualitatively indistinguishable from Y could exist even if X had no existence whatever is futile.

Let Y be the Sosein-objective,

A blue cube is blue,
where $X$ is some actual blue cube. Now, $Y$ obtains whether or not $X$
exists; and if an actual blue cube is not a part of $Y$ when $X$ doesn't
exist, then neither is it if $X$ does exist. Similarly, consider once
more

(19) The tallest mountain is a mountain

and

(23) The golden mountain is a mountain.

Since an actual golden mountain is not a part of the objective repre­

tented by (23), neither is Mt. Everest a part of the objective repre­

tented by (19). Rather, the objectum the tallest mountain is a part

of the objective represented by (19); and the actual Mt. Everest is

a part of the state of affairs represented by (19). Since, then,

there is a distinction between objectives and states of affairs, so
too is there one between objecta and actual individuals.

4.5. Finite and infinite objects.

4.5.1. Properties. We have spoken several times of properties.
The perennial philosophical problem of the nature of exemplification
is one side of a coin whose other side is the problem of the nature
of properties. For our purposes, any theory as to what a property is
will suffice. It is unclear from [63] what Meinong thought they were.
Being of a Platonic turn of mind, I prefer to think of properties as
existing, primitive, and irreducible. But a theory which views proper­
ties as, roughly, sets of actual objects which exemplify them, is
acceptable. Indeed, such a theory forces the type-distinction on us
in a manner exactly parallel to that of the mathematical example of Section 4.3. For, if M-objects are constituted by such properties, then they are constituted by sets of actual objects; hence, the M-object which has all the properties which some actual object exemplifies is clearly not identical to it.

One principle we shall accept concerning properties is that there are at least a countably infinite number of them. Again, this principle is not crucial to the theory; the points we wish to make carry over to a different sort of distinction, viz., between "complete" and "incomplete" objects. But it will be convenient for our exposition to accept the principle. Moreover, I believe it is easily seen to be true: the schema 'being at least \( x \) inches tall' represents an infinite number of properties.

4.5.2. The type-distinction. Were the object of thought occasionally an actual object (and not always an M-object), then, it seems, there need be no type distinction. Now, according to Findlay ([31]: 152), Meinong held that actual objects (which for him were objects with Sein) are "complete": their "nature . . . is as much determined by the circumstances that are absent from it as by those that are present. To know an [actual] object completely, therefore, we should have to know exactly" what it exemplified and what it did not. That is, if \( \alpha \) is an actual object, then for every property, \( F \), either \( \alpha \) ex \( F \) or not-(\( \alpha \) ex \( F \)), which is essentially the Law of Excluded Middle. But the cardinality of \( \{F: \alpha \) ex \( F \) or not-(\( \alpha \) ex \( F \))\} = the cardinality of \( \{F: F \) is a property\}, which we have assumed to be infinite. Hence, the actual object is infinite.
Yet, can the object of a psychological attitude ever be the actual object in all its infinite glory and complexity? No; only finitely characterizable items are accessible to thought. Indeed, not only can we not apprehend an infinite object, we cannot even apprehend a very large albeit finite one. There is a practical limit to the size of any M-object which is potentially pseudo-existent, just as there is a practical limit to the length of a sentence if it is to be comprehensible. But why is all this the case? One possible reason is the "characteristic . . . finitude of the mental operations" (Castañeda [11]: 142). We cannot think about an infinity of things at once, but must break infinitely-propertied entities into finite, "bite-size" bits of processable information. The cognitive mental states are, thus, epistemological "filters" which only allow finitely-propertied M-objects to pass through. 21

Since finite M-objects are incomplete, then, we cannot have complete knowledge of all of the properties of infinite actual objects, but only of finite M-objects. Thus, actual and M-objects are of different types (the former complete and therefore infinite, the latter finite and hence incomplete), and the object of thought is Meinongian (cf. Findlay [31]: 155f, and Routley [91]: 133).

A possible objection to this view is that if we are told something about, say, a person whom we haven't met, and subsequently we meet the person, the things told "about the person" are really about an M-object, whereas the actual person is distinct from the M-object. But, first, one might hold that whom we see is not an actual person, but a finite (or at least incomplete) aspect of that person, e.g., that aspect which
is visible. Second, one might hold that whom we see is the actual person corresponding to the M-object talked about; then it must be realized that the latter could equally well have been correlated with some other actual person than the one we met. In such a case, we would still say that "that" was the person described. (Here, we assume that the describer accepts the person met as the actual object corresponding to the M-object described.)

4.5.3. Infinite Meinongian objects and actual objects. Meinongian objects are constituted by properties, and those, in particular, which are capable of pseudo-existence are constituted by a finite number of properties. Are there infinite M-objects? And, if so, is the set of actual objects a subset of them? While all objects of thought are Meinongian, perhaps not all M-objects are possible objects-of-thought. If so, then we need only worry about a type-distinction in the case of infinite M-objects; for the actual object corresponding to a finite object of thought, 0, which has Sein could be taken to be an infinite M-object whose Sosein contained the Sosein of 0. Moreover, we need only consider the possibility of a type-distinction between infinite M-objects with Sein and actual objects.

Our revised version of Meinong's theory holds that there is a type-distinction even at this level and that the two modes of predication serve to distinguish them. However, let us consider the matter from other points of view.

Since we have remained uncommitted on the nature of exemplification, we have left open the possibility that it is constituency. If
they are identical, then we need to explain why some complete objects exist and others don't. One possibility would be to say that existing objects have spatio-temporal coordinates among their properties (of course, this only works for physical objects). But there are, surely, two complete M-objects which are alike in all respects save for such properties and which are such that one exists while the other doesn't.

Another possibility is that those complete M-objects which are actual are constituted by instances of properties, while the others are constituted by the properties themselves. Indeed, according to Grossmann, "this . . . is Meinong's later view" ([40]: 15). It has much to recommend it. First, it lends itself to the theory mentioned in Section 4.5.1. Properties could be taken to be sets of actual objects which, in turn, are constituted by property-instances. Second, exemplification could then be defined as follows: O exemplifies F iff O is constituted by an F-instance.

But the view has much to disrecommend it as an alternative. First, it presupposes the existence and a characterization of property-instances. Second, to each actual object, construed as being constituted by property-instances, there corresponds an infinite M-object constituted by the corresponding properties; hence, a type-distinction remains. (This, of course, is commendable from our point of view.) Finally, for the same reason that there are complete M-objects which don't exist, might there not be complete M-objects constituted by instances, but which don't exist? If so, then this alternative is explanatorily inadequate.
If exemplification and constituency, however, are not identical, and there is no type-distinction as we have outlined it, then we could hold that actual objects are those complete M-objects which *both* exemplify and are constituted by properties. Let us consider this possibility briefly.

Treating the actual object corresponding to an incomplete one as we did in the first paragraph of this section, we may assume now that \( o \) is a complete (and consistent—cf. n.22) object. We also assume, as in Section 4.5.1, that properties exist (so that we may quantify over them). Consider, now,

\[(24) \text{ } o \text{ is actual iff } \exists F(o \text{ ex } F).\]

However, as we shall explain in Sections 5.3 and 5.7.2, all objects are actual in a certain sense and thus exemplify some properties. Among these might be such properties as being constituted by properties, being pseudo-existent, or being an object-of-thought. So let us try

\[(24A) \text{ } o \text{ is actual iff } \exists F(F \subseteq o & o \text{ ex } F).\]

On this definition, some objects are necessarily actual, e.g., those which are constituted by properties like the ones mentioned in connection with (24). Perhaps this is acceptable, for, after all, these are very special kinds of actual objects. But if (24A) is a serious possibility, we should also consider the somewhat stronger

\[(24B) \text{ } o \text{ is actual iff } \forall F(F \subseteq o \iff o \text{ ex } F).\]

Now, on the unassailable assumption that every object is constituted by
some properties, (24B) easily entails (24A). It can also be shown that
the entailment goes in the other direction in the presence of several
plausible assumptions, namely,

(25) $\forall F (\exists o \text{ ex } F \leftrightarrow \neg (\exists o \text{ ex } \overline{F}))$
(26) $\forall F (F \cap \neg o \leftrightarrow \overline{F} \neq o)$
(27) $\forall F \forall G (F \cap \neg o \land o \text{ ex } F \rightarrow G \cap o \rightarrow o \text{ ex } G)$.

(We also need, as shown by (25) and (26), a notion of the "complement"
of a property and a principle affirming that such a complement is itself
a property.) Now, (25) is surely acceptable; it is indeed the pre­
supposed criterion of consistency for exemplification. Similarly, (26)
is the presupposed criterion of consistency for constituency. Hence,
the choice between (24A) and (24B) devolves upon the acceptability of
(27). We leave the matter there, however, since our purpose was
merely to sketch out this alternative.

Moreover, this alternative is not essential to our main argument.
If this be the ontological assay of actual objects, well and good.
Whether or not it is, our central concern is with the incomplete ob­
jects (and, in particular, the finite ones) and their relationship
with actual objects, however the latter be characterized. (See Lewis
[57]: 204 for a similar type-distinction.)

4.6. Blueprints, maps, and models. To clarify somewhat the nature
of the type-distinction, we present in this section several analogies
to other type-distinctions.

The first analogy is based on a model of knowledge presented in
Strawson [107]: 56. Essentially, the model is a card file; each card
represents an object of our knowledge and is inscribed with names of the properties each object has. If we now extend this model by imagining the card file standing amidst a certain collection of actual (e.g., physical) objects, we obtain our analogy. The cards are the analogues of M-objects, and \( F o \) is interpreted as "'F' is inscribed on card \( o \)." Furthermore, to each actual object about which we have some knowledge, there corresponds at least one card, and to some cards there correspond at least one actual object.

A similar analogy which perhaps brings out more clearly the relationship between exemplification and constituency is that of the scale model. Consider, for example, a scale model of a train, exact in every detail, so to speak. Now, there are two items to consider: the model, \( T \), and the actual train, \( T' \). Pointing to \( T \), we can say "It weighs 4 tons" and "It weighs 4 pounds." But "it" has those properties in two different ways. It exemplifies the property of weighing 4 pounds, since it is an actual object itself. But, as the M-object-analogue, it is "constituted" by, or represents, the property of weighing 4 tons. \( T' \), on the other hand, exemplifies the property of weighing 4 tons, as an actual object which corresponds to \( T \).

Other features of the type-distinction can be elicited by considering an analogy with blueprints, as we have already done in Chapter I, Section B.1. A blueprint of a house, say, is to an M-object as a house of which it is a blueprint is to an actual object corresponding to the M-object. Just as the house need never be built or many houses may be built from the one blueprint, so there need be no or many actual objects correlated with an M-object. The
interesting feature of this analogy is that, just as we can think of impossible objects, so there can be "impossible blueprints", i.e., blueprints of items which could not possibly be constructed because they would have to exemplify contradictory properties. 23

An important characteristic of the cardfile and blueprint M-object-analogues is that they are, in principle, incomplete and, in fact, finite. No blueprint of a house, for instance, specifies which bricks to use. To take a final example, a map of some country only exhibits certain of the properties of the country: not every stream or tree is mapped, or, if they are, not every grain of sand or leaf is. This raises an interesting question concerning our analogues which further clarifies the nature of M-objects: Would a map (or blueprint, or model) which was accurate in every detail be identical with that of which it was a map? The answer for the case of maps is simple: No; for one cannot use a country as a map of itself, as a guide to itself. Suppose a life-sized duplicate of Florida were constructed to serve as a map or guide. Such a "model" would not exemplify the properties exemplified by the actual Florida (except insofar as the model itself is an actual object, as we noted two paragraphs back). It would not exhibit the actual structure of the actual object; it would, in accordance with its purposes as a map, only represent that structure by exhibiting one isomorphic to it. That is, the model would be "constituted" by the properties which Florida exemplifies.
5. Being and Truth.

5.1. Existence. We may now begin to tie up a few loose ends of our informal exegesis. First, the type-distinction enables us to explicate existence (Sein) in a natural way by making use of the relationship between M-objects which are constituted by, say, red and actual red objects corresponding to them. In particular, we have the following definition schema:

Let $o$ be the M-objectum $<F, G, \ldots>$
Then $o$ has Sein iff $\exists \alpha (\alpha$ is an actual object & $\alpha$ ex $F, G, \ldots$).

Further, if $o$ has Sein, then we call $\{\alpha : \alpha$ is actual & $\alpha$ ex $F, G, \ldots\}$ the set of Sein-correlates of $o$, and we write

$\alpha \subseteq o$

when $\alpha$ is a Sein-correlate of $o$.

5.2. Quasisein (II). Recall from Meinong's argument for Quasi-sein (Sect. B.3.2) that the seeming inconsistency between

(Q4) A lacks Sein

and

(Q7) A has Sein

was resolved, albeit unsatisfactorily, by the introduction of the third degree of Being.

A more satisfactory solution makes use of the distinction between the M-object and a Sein-correlate. The world consists of actual objects. Among these are the ones constituted by a finite number of properties and which are directly accessible to thought; these are the
M-objects. The question, "Does A exist?", if it is to be meaningful and non-tautologous, most generally concerns an M-object. Thus, the objective A lacks Sein must be interpreted to mean that A is an M-object with no Sein-correlate. That is, to ask whether A exists is to ask if an actual object of one type (Meinongian) is correlated with an actual object of another type (non-Meinongian). If A lacks Sein has Sein, nevertheless A "has Sein" in the trivial (or, perhaps, tautologous) sense that it is among the furniture of the world and, hence, an actual object (cf. Bergmann [1]: 18). This is not, therefore, a third degree of Sein, though it is "due to every object as such" ([63]: 492), as was Quasisein. Whether, then, to call Quasisein a degree of Sein may be a verbal issue. For surely, in A lacks Sein, A has some sort of status—this is the givenness which must be accounted for. And the first step of our account is that A is an M-object and thus to be counted as actual, whether or not it be in the range of the SC-relation.

5.3. Aussersein (II). The alternative just discussed to Quasisein, based on the type distinction, is independent of the Thesis of Aussersein, at least under the first interpretation of that thesis in Section B.3.3.3. Indeed, that alternative provides for the second interpretation in that section. It enables us to see that the "givenness" of an object "prior to our decision on its Sein or Nichtsein" ([63]: 491) has nothing to do with whether it has a Sein-correlate. The Thesis of Aussersein becomes, then, that M-objects are those actual objects capable of having Sein-correlates. Aussersein is a label for the double-aspect of existence appropriate to M-objects: existing always (qua actual objects) but not always having Sein-
correlates. This second interpretation makes clear the sense in which Aussersein may be taken as the realm of M-objects and hence as the domain for the non-committal quantifiers. Finally, in connection with our remarks in Section B.3.3.4, the opposite of Aussersein thus interpreted consists of the actual, non-Meinongian objects—those incapable of having Sein-correlates.

5.4. Existence presuppositions. Although Quasisein may be unnecessary, the second objection to our first interpretation of Aussersein (Sect. B.3.3.3) suggests that at least one always presupposes a Sein in order to talk about an objectum (cf. Meinong [63]: 489 and Findlay [31]: 238). And, as Meinong points out, it may be the case that "often enough, all natural interest be absent from a Sosein which doesn't have a Sein behind it as it were" ([63]: 489). Thus, Sosein-objects which lack the backing of a presupposition of Sein, such as the present King of France is bald, can be claimed to be of no interest for, say, scientific purposes. Nevertheless, such objectives are ausserseiend and we must understand how their Sein-status can be ascertained. Similarly, sentences expressing them can be formulated, so we ought to be able to devise a semantics for them. That is, our semantical techniques, save perhaps for choice of domain, must tell us how to interpret all sentences, be they interesting or not.

Meinong's reply to all this is that we can have knowledge of objects, whether or not they exist and whether or not we know whether they exist, by concentrating on their Sosein, or essential properties ([63]: 494). Such knowledge becomes a sort of calculus of properties—
properties examined in isolation from questions of their instantiation. Some objects, such as the round square, and some objectives, such as the present King of France is bald, may not be worth studying. But that is because we already know that the relevant objects don't exist. On the other hand, some objects are such that we either don't care or don't yet know whether they exist, and still we want to study them, e.g., theoretical entities such as quarks, fictional entities such as Hamlet, or certain abstract mathematical entities such as inaccessible cardinals. We may, in fact, in the course of such study answer the question in the negative, e.g., by discovering the object to be constituted by contradictory properties. For instance, scientific objects such as the planetary model of an atom have properties (in some sense, viz., constituency) but do not exist (cf. Weisskopf [112]: 315).

A Meinongian theory, it is important to see, allows us to study such objects without being committed to their actual existence, i.e., to their having any Sein-correlates. No presupposition of Sein need be made on such a theory. This is especially crucial if we want to raise the question of their existence: We could always assume that an object exists (i.e., has a Sein-correlate) and then study its (essential) properties--its Sosein. But under that assumption of existence, we can't meaningfully raise the question of the object's existence. To raise the question of existence, we must go "outside" that assumption, which generally takes the form of an operator 'there exists an object _ such that . . .'.
Within the scope of such an operator, we don't need to make the existence assumption; only M-objects and Sosein-objectives are needed. We need the existence assumption if we are talking about the "world" of the object from the viewpoint of the actual world. But we don't need it if we talk from within the realm of Aussersein. These two points of view are complementary, not contradictory. The Meinongian point of view is less restricted and less restrictive. It is the point of view of talking about the broadly possible (in the sense of "thinkable") from within the realm of the broadly possible. The other talks of the broadly possible from without, which seems to be intrinsically more restrictive.

More generally, in doing philosophy (the study of necessary truths) and, in particular, ontology (necessary truths about the world), we are working within a grand existence assumption that the world exists. We don't explicitly make this assumption; it is "there" beforehand. The world might not exist; we, however, cannot help but assume that it does.

Although we shall return to this next point in Section 5.7.3, it is best made now: From the standpoint of the actual world "outside of" the existence assumption of the last paragraph but one, we "construct" the broadly possible "in" the actual. From the Meinongian viewpoint, we "construct" the actual (or a model thereof) within the realm of Aussersein, by asking questions of Sein. This, I believe, is one source of the confusion which surrounds Aussersein. "Do M-objects exist?" is a question asked in the (non-Meinongian) actual world about the actual
world. "Does the object \(<F, G, \ldots>\) exist?" is a question asked in the realm of Aussersein about the actual world.

Let us consider the matter from another perspective. Russell noted that "redness, e.g., is very difficult to think of without the assumption of its existence, which necessarily occurs in any visualising of a red colour" ([93]: 346). But does it necessarily occur as our present theory construes existence? Surely I can think of an object without thinking that it exists. Put in more Meinongian terms, I need not entertain an assumption (Annahme) about a Sein-objective in order to entertain an assumption about a Sosein-objective.

When one assumes that \(p\), one is, roughly, "making believe" that \(p\), or "accepting for the moment" (à la Bourbaki) that \(p\). The nature of assuming seems to be such that when one assumes that \(p\), one pays no attention to the Sein-status of \(p\) (or \(p\)'s objectum). One doesn't even confer temporary (or "honorary") Sein on \(p\) (or its objectum). Rather, one is merely concerned with the Sosein of \(p\) (or its objectum) --with, perhaps, what would be true were \(p\) true.

The main point is that by means of a Meinongian theory, we need not represent

\[(21)\] The golden mountain is golden

by any such schema as:

\[(21C)\] It is assumed in myth \(m\) that the golden mountain exists (i.e., that there is, in the world of myth \(m\), an \(m\)-Sein-correlate, \(x\), of \(<G,M>\)) and it is golden (i.e., \(x\) \(m\)-exemplifies \(G\)).

Rather, we can say all we wish using only
We need make no existence assumptions and need no "worlds", mythological, possible, or otherwise.  

5.5. Sosein and the Principle of Independence (II). Our version of Meinong's theory embodies PI, for the (necessary) truth of, e.g.,

(21D) G c <G,M>

is independent of the (contingent) truth-values of

(21E) <G,M> has Sein

and

(21F) <G,M> has Nichtsein.

Nor is there any paradox associated with A = <lacking Sein> (cf. Sect. B.4). First, A is constituted by the property of lacking a Sosein, but, second, A does not exemplify that property. Indeed, A exemplifies the property of having a Sosein! Similarly, pseudo-existent objects exemplify but are not (necessarily) constituted by the property of being thought of (cf. Sect. 4.5.3 and Ch. I, Sect. B.8).

It is surprisingly difficult to formulate PI in a more precise fashion without falling into mere tautology. For example, Chisholm tells us that PI asserts that "every object . . . has the characteristics it does have whether or not it has any kind of being" ([21]: 246). Letting quantifiers range over the domain of Aussersein (cf. Sects. B.3.3.4 and C.5.3), this becomes

(PI.1) \( \forall x (x \text{ has Sosein} \rightarrow (x \text{ has Sein} \lor x \text{ has Sosein})) \land (x \text{ lacks Sein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sosein}) \),
which is mere tautology. The somewhat weaker

\[(\text{PI.2}) \forall x((x \text{ has } \text{Sein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sosein}) \& (x \text{ lacks } \text{Sein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sosein}))\]

is equivalent to

\[\forall x (x \text{ has Sosein}),\]

which, while true, does not carry the message of PI.

Consider, next, the version offered in Routley [91]: 227:

\[(\text{PI.3}) \forall x \sim (x \text{ has Sosein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sein}).\]

Now, if the '→' of (PI.3) is material implication, then this is equivalent to

\[(\text{PI.4}) \forall x (x \text{ has Sosein} \& x \text{ lacks Sein}),\]

which is clearly false. Worse, if we now consider

\[(\text{PI.5}) \forall x \Box (x \text{ has Sosein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sein})\]

(or even a version using relevant implication), then (PI.5) is equivalent to

\[(\text{PI.6}) \sim \exists x \Box (x \text{ has Sosein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sein}),\]

i.e., no M-object necessarily exists. Now, Meinong did assert this in at least one place ([67]: 95), but it is questionable whether he actually meant it. We shall presently discuss this again, but let us note that it would be somewhat dogmatic to employ a formulation of PI which automatically rules out ontological arguments.

We also note that another equivalent of (PI.5), namely,

\[(\text{PI.7}) \forall x \Diamond (x \text{ has Sosein} \& x \text{ lacks Sein}),\]
materially implies (in as weak a modal system as Kr)

$$\forall x \Diamond (x \text{ lacks } \text{Sein}),$$

which is as questionable as (PI.6).

We might, then, try

(PI.8) $$\exists x \Diamond (x \text{ has } \text{Sosein} \& x \text{ lacks } \text{Sein}).$$

But then we ought to come right out and assert

(PI.9) $$\exists x (x \text{ has } \text{Sosein} \& x \text{ lacks } \text{Sein}).$$

Before being so bold, however, we should also consider

(PI.10) $$\Diamond \exists x (x \text{ has } \text{Sosein} \& x \text{ lacks } \text{Sein}),$$

which also seems acceptable. 26

We prefer, to avoid unnecessary complications at this stage of our investigation, to use a version of PI which avoids employing modalities or entailment (or other implicational) relations. A reasonable solution, then, is this version, due to Chisholm: "though every object may correctly be said to be something or other, it is not the case that every object may correctly be said to be" ([21]: 246):

(PI*) $$\forall x (x \text{ has } \text{Sosein}) \& \neg \forall x (x \text{ has } \text{Sein}).$$

Note that (PI*) entails (PI.9), which in turn entails (PI.10). Moreover, each conjunct of (PI*) is a thesis independently acceptable:

that every object has a Sosein was discussed earlier in Section B.4,
and that some objects lack Sein is the theoretical counterpart of the datum that we can think of things which don't exist. Thus, (PI*) amounts to asserting that these theses are consistent with one another.
To repeat, our interpretation of \((\Pi^*)\) is that every \(M\)-object is constituted by properties, but not every \(M\)-object has a \(\text{Sein}\)-correlate. We must be careful, however, to keep the type-distinction firmly in mind. While we don't deny that an \(M\)-object may be constituted by properties even though it has no \(\text{Sein}\)-correlate, we do deny that an actual object can exemplify properties even if it does not exist (cf. Grossmann [40]: 161)—because it is self-contradictory to say that an actual object does not exist. (We return to this reason in Section 5.7.1.)

The failure to make this distinction may be part of the motivation behind Linsky's objection to \(\Pi\):

It seems to me that in speaking of objects we imply (in some sense) that we are talking about the real world, as opposed to . . . fiction . . . etc. . . . So the principle of the independence of \(\text{Sosein}\) from \(\text{Sein}\), though it captures a part of the logic of our talk about objects also neglects a part. The part which the principle neglects is the implication that in talking about objects we are talking about the real world. ([58]: 19.)

But that neglected part is a pragmatic consideration—one which takes into account the context of utterance. The important point (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.4) is that language (or thought) is equally well suited for both factual and fictional discourse and admirably neutral with respect to differentiating between the two. It is not anything about the syntactic structure of language (or thought) (or even its semantic structure) which distinguishes the two, but rather contexts of use; and so our theories about the structure of language on the semantic (as opposed to the pragmatic) plane ought not to take this "neglected" part into account. Indeed the "implication (in some
sense)" mentioned in the first sentence of the Linsky citation is a pragmatic implication, on a par, perhaps, with the implication of 'I don't have any' by 'I ain't got none' (cf. Sect. 5.9.2).

5.6. The existent round square (II). Before turning to new business, let us return (as promised in Section 6.5) to the problem of the existent round square.

One question left unanswered there was whether, for every adjective P, of some specified language, such that P is neither meaningless nor complex, there is a property, P*, which it names. An affirmative answer entails (with the help of other considerations of Section B.5) that there is an M-object, e.g., <being existent, being round, being square>, which is existent but does not exist, i.e., does not have Sein. For the present theory to avoid Russell's objection in a Meinongian spirit, it is crucial that we accept the affirmative answer; and I can think of no reason why 'existent' should not name a property, no matter how unsure we may be of its extension. 27

In Section B.5, we also offered a Meinong-inspired argument that the existence had by the existing round square was not Sein. An alternative argument to the same conclusion can be constructed within the present revised theory as follows:

(I) There is (in Aussersein) an existent round square, <E,R,S>. (Assumption.)
(II) <E,R,S> lacks Sein. (Assumption.)
(III) E = Sein (i.e., the existence which is in the Sosein of <E,R,S> is Sein itself). (Assumption.)
Therefore (IV) <E,R,S> has Sein (by (III)).
(V) (IV) contradicts (II).
Therefore (VI) ~(I) or ~(II) or ~(III).

(VII) (II) is clearly true.

Therefore (VIII) ~(I) or ~(III).

(IX) (I) follows from (R1) (cf. Sect. B.5) or from the Principle of Freedom of Assumption (cf. Sect. 6.2).

Therefore (X) ~(III).

Indeed, on the present theory, having Sein is not a constituting property of M-objects. It is a relation between an M-object and an actual object.

We note in passing that there is a constituting property of having-Sein; i.e., <having-Sein> is an M-object. Moreover, having-Sein c <having-Sein>, though it may not be necessary that <having-Sein> has Sein, i.e., has a Sein-correlate. Note that <being the Eiffel Tower> does exemplify the property having-Sein. Note finally that the fact that M-objects are themselves actual (cf. Sects. 5.2-5.3) can be cashed out, in part, by saying that <being <being the Eiffel Tower>> has Sein: its Sein-correlate is <being the Eiffel Tower>.

Much of the confusion can be cleared away by recalling the map-analogy of Section 4.6. The distinction between the property of being existent and Sein, especially in the case of <E,R,S>, is no more odd than having a map of a mythical country with a notice in the legend that the country exists. We could legitimately say, e.g., that the country has two rivers and exists, although it lacks a Sein-correlate, i.e., that no actual country exemplifies having two such rivers and existence.

As we shall see shortly, the existent round square is existent is an analytic Sosein-objective which is knowable apriori. This is not the case for Sein-objectives: they cannot be known apriori and aren't
analytic, because (except for certain Nichtsein-objectives) they are all contingent. So the truth of the existent round square is existent cannot be a truth about Sein: it cannot be a Sein-objective. It makes "explicit in the predicate only the postulated, but not necessarily genuine, trait of existing" (Munitz [73]: 82).  

5.7. The structure of existence.

5.7.1. The meaningfulness of existence. According to the first interpretation of Aussersein, existence is not predicable of objecta, but only of objectives. Is there, then, any sense in which we can meaningfully speak of an objectum's existence? We can, and shall, of course, say that an objectum, o, has Sein insofar as the objective o has Sein has Sein. Granted this, let us examine the nature of the existence (so understood) of objecta.

Logic ought to be metaphysically neutral. If it is to be so, it must provide us with the means to talk about anything and to meaningfully assert or deny the existence of anything. This can be done by having the terms of the formal language underlying one's logic name M-objects, i.e., objects of thought. For it is meaningful to ask of an M-object whether it exists. On the present theory, this means to ask whether something in the actual world corresponds to the object of our thought—whether the M-object has a Sein-correlate. Indeed, to say that there is always an object of thought (i.e., that every act has an object) but that sometimes the object doesn't exist (i.e., have Sein) is, to me, utterly meaningless unless we distinguish between two senses of 'exists', taking the second to mean "has a Sein-correlate". We shall return to this point shortly.
As for those actual objects capable of being, but not having, Sein-correlates, it is tautologous to affirm existence of them and self-contradictory to deny it—for they exist by definition, so to speak (cf. Russell [95]: 48 and Pears [78]). The type-distinction, then, provides us with an answer to the perennial philosophical problem of whether 'exists' is a predicate (or whether existence is a property): To say "A exists" is to say either: (1) that the property of existence is a constituent of an M-object, A, which is meaningful, or (2) that an M-object, A, has a Sein-correlate, which is also meaningful, or (3) that an actual object, A, exemplifies existence, which is tautologous, or (4) that an actual object, A, has a Sein-correlate, which is meaningless. Thus 'exists' is a meaningful predicate of M-objects (either as a one-place, constituting property or as a two-place relation), but not of actual objects.

5.7.2. The structure of the actual world. We may hope to clarify this somewhat by the following technique. The actual world could be pictured in two ways. In picture (I), the world is considered to consist of actual objects, exemplifying certain properties and arranged in certain configurations (states of affairs); included among these objects are the M-objects. In picture (II), the world is considered to be partitioned in such a manner that the M-objects are distinguishable from the actual objects:
In general, to say that M-object \( a \) has Sein is to describe picture (II) by saying that to \( a \) there corresponds an actual object \( a' \). To say that M-object \( c \) lacks Sein (or has Nichtsein) is again to describe (II) by saying that no actual object corresponds to \( c \).

To ask whether M-objects exist, in the sense of whether the ACO-theory is correct, is meaningless when the world is pictured as in (II). However, it is a meaningful question about (I). The world as pictured in (I) is such that everything exists. Here, 'everything' is a quantifier ranging over M-objects and actual objects. In picture (II), not everything exists, where 'everything' ranges only over the realm of M-objects.

Picture (II), moreover, serves as a convenient device for representing Meinong's own interpretation of M-objects as standing "beyond Sein and Nichtsein" ([63]: 494). For if the domain of actual objects is the world of Sein, then the realm of M-objects is here pictured as external to that world—literally ausserseiend. Picture (II) also enables us to absolve Meinong of charges of having an overpopulated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realm of M-Objects</th>
<th>World of Sein</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( a &lt; &gt; b' )</td>
<td>( \cdot a' )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b &lt; &gt; )</td>
<td>( \cdot b' )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( c &lt; &gt; )</td>
<td>( \cdot )</td>
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M-objects: \( a, b, c, ... \)
Actual objects: \( a', b', ... \)
ontology. For if ontology is understood as the study of the categories of being, then it is, on the present view, the study of the world of Sein in picture (II). (We explain how Aussersein fits into this scheme, below.) Landesman's observation that "a claim to the effect that a term names or refers to an entity that does not exist implies that that entity should not be incorporated into any ontology" ([54]: 8) comes down to saying that such a claim implies that that entity is not correlated with an entity in (or, is not part of) the metaphysical realm of actual objects.

On the other hand, to the charge that picture (I) is overpopulated, with redundant entities (e.g., \( a \) and \( a' \)), there are several replies. First, these entities are not redundant—they are not even identical, \( a' \) having vastly more properties than \( a \). On another account, \( a' \) and \( a \) are entirely different kinds of entities: \( a' \) might be, say, a certain person, and \( a \) merely an object of thought. Second, the charge is correct if its only aim is to "picture Meinong as an authentic 'entity multiplier'" (Orayen [75]: 331): For, psychological events do have objects; these objects exist in the sense that they themselves are actual. Recall that "every ... object is in a certain way given prior to our decision on its Sein" (Meinong [63]: 491); i.e., every object is actual, whether or not it is correlated with another actual object.

Two observations are in order. First, to say of an M-object that it exists is ambiguous in much the same way that the utterance "Paris has 5 letters" is. For just as in the latter case it is not clear whether we are using or mentioning 'Paris', so in the former, it is
not clear whether we are asking the question of the $M$-object as such (in which case the answer is "Yes") or asking it in the sense of whether it has a Sein-correlate.

Second, there is as always an analogy from mathematics. Suppose some physical problem has a mathematical model (a curious turn of phrase!) such that the problem's solution depends upon finding the roots of a cubic equation. Suppose further that of the three roots, one is real while the others are complex (i.e., "imaginary"!). Then, while all roots "exist" (in one sense), it might be that only one "exists" in the sense that it is realizable—that it can be re-interpreted physically, i.e., that it has a Sein-correlate.

Finally, pictures (I) and (II) enable us to clarify the relation of so-called non-existent objects to "facts" about them. Preliminary to our investigation of the truth of statements expressing objectives in Section 5.9.3, we shall only be able to present a rough analysis here, but certain features are already prominent.

Since

(28) The 9-million-roomed house does not exist

is true, there is a state of affairs corresponding to it; in fact, there are two (where '9MR' and 'H' name 'having 9-million rooms' and 'being a house'):

(S28A) \( \exists x (x \text{SC}<9MR,H>) \)
(S28B) \( \exists x (x \text{ is actual} \& x \text{ ex 9MR} \& x \text{ ex H}) \).

The former is a state of affairs in picture (I), and <9MR,H> is a constituent of it. The latter is a state of affairs in the world of Sein—
the right half of picture (II)—and $<9MR,H>$ is not a constituent of it.

Suppose

(29) John is thinking of the 9-million-roomed house

is true. This corresponds to only one state of affairs, whose struc-
ture is that of a relation between an actual person, viz., John, and
an M-object:

(S29) Thinking(John, $<9MR,H>$).

This state of affairs is in picture (I) and contains $<9MR,H>$ as a con-
stituent. Similar remarks hold for the pair

(30) The 9-million-roomed house is a house
(S30) $H \subset <9MR,H>$;

and, if we employ a Principal of Tolerance according to which statements
are interpreted in such a manner as to avoid inconsistency or to make
them true where possible, similar remarks hold also for the pair

(31) The 9-million-roomed house exists
(S31) $\exists x(x \text{ is actual} \land x = <9MR,H>)$.

Turning to M-objects with Sein, the 2-roomed house, $<2R,H>$, is a
constituent of the state of affairs

(S32A) $\exists x(x \subset C<2R,H>)$

in picture (I), where the objective is expressed by

(32) The 2-roomed house exists.

But it is not a constituent of another state of affairs corresponding
to (32), namely,
(S32B) $\exists x (x \text{ is actual } \& x \text{ ex 2R } \& x \text{ ex H}).$

Taken literally,

(33) The 2-roomed house has a living room

is false, since there is no state of affairs with the structure

(33A) $L c <2R,H>.$

Rather, we have in picture (I),

(S33A) $L \not c <2R,H>.$

Employing the Principle of Tolerance, we also have in picture (I)

(S33B) $\exists x (x \text{SC}<2R,H> \& x \text{SC}<L>),$ in which $<2R,H>$ is a constituent, and in picture (II)

(S33C) $\exists x (x \text{ is actual } \& x \text{ ex 2R } \& x \text{ ex H } \& x \text{ ex L}),$

which does not have $<2R,H>$ as a constituent.

In general, then, M-objects are constituents of states of affairs when we picture the world as in (I) but not when we picture it as in (II). If, indeed, one of Meinong's main theses is "that non-existent things are constituents of certain facts" (Grossmann [39]: 69), then this thesis is nonsense if "non-existent thing" refers to an actual thing which doesn't exist (there being none). But if "facts" refers to states of affairs and "non-existent objects" to M-objects which lack Sein, then it is perfectly acceptable.

Now, the point of the ACO(0')-theory is that in fact the world can be pictured as in (II), so that there is no need to try to "reflect" all objectives of the sort expressed by (28) in (S28B)-style, "extensional" language. The argument of an extensionalist (e.g., Russell) is that the "reflection" can be carried through. Our belief is that it
cannot. The fact that it is chiefly psychological contexts which cause difficulties for extensionalists and the fact that M-objects are objects of psychological acts go hand in hand. Psychological contexts have resisted extensional paraphrase because to succeed one needs M-objects and the extensionalists have denied or ignored them. With M-objects, of course, there is no need to extensionalize, and there's good reason not to (as we saw in Chapter I).

5.7.3. Epistemological ontology. One feature of our double picture of the world is that since M-objects are actual (i.e., since every psychological event does have an object), they appear in both partitions of picture (II). Indeed, the right half of picture (II) is simply picture (I). This is puzzling if we try to think of M-objects as items with which to build (a model of) the universe. A closer analysis reveals that this "double presence" is inevitable and actually indicative of the double function of M-objects, since we are trying to use them to build a model of the world within the world.

But a better account is that we are not so much using them in an ontological fashion to build the world as we are using them in an epistemological fashion to describe the already-built world. We describe the world in terms of certain items already in it, via the Sein-correlation mechanism.

The M-object the round square, \(<R,S>\), is actual but has no Sein-correlate. How do we say that it is actual? One way, in picture (I), is after the fashion of (S31): \(\exists \alpha (\alpha \text{ is actual } \& \alpha = <R,S>)\). Another, also in picture (I), is by considering the M-object whose sole
constituting property is that of being the round square. This object, which we may represent by \(<R,S>\), has \(<R,S>\) as Sein-correlate. That is, \(\exists \alpha (\alpha \text{ being-constituted-by-the-properties-of-being-round-and-being-square})\), since \(<R,S>\) exemplifies this property (i.e., \(<R,S>\) is constituted by the properties of being round and square, since \(R,S \in <R,S>\)). But this argument can be generalized, and so all M-objects are actual. To repeat, this is not to say that all M-objects exist (= have Sein = have a Sein-correlate).

We must distinguish between the items we hold to be actual—the items encompassed in a metaphysical ontology—from those which enable us to have beliefs about the actual world. The latter are items needed for an epistemological ontology. That is, we must distinguish between what there is and what there must be in order for us to know what there is.  

This, then, is the source of the two senses in which M-objects "exist". All M-objects exist in the sense of being actual; only some do in the sense of having Sein-correlates. But, further, both M-objects and their Sein-correlates exist together in one world, as pictured in (I). Moreover, M-objects are not mental entities, in the sense at least that they are independent of any particular mind. They are, however, a necessary requirement for thinking to be possible: without them, there would be no minds (or no mental activity of the intellectual, as opposed to the purely biophysical, kind).

The present study may be viewed as an essay in epistemological ontology. It is clear that the goals of metaphysics and epistemology
must carefully be kept distinct. This is especially important here, for many distinctions can be made in an epistemological ontology which cannot be made from a metaphysical point of view. Indeed, epistemological distinctions do not, in general, entail corresponding metaphysical ones. Meinong was also aware of this, though he phrased it differently. Findlay tells us that he thought "that many distinctions which belong to the theory of objects are obscured if we insist on regarding logical equivalences as identities" ([31]: 54). On the present point of view, such "logical equivalences" must be relations obtaining among certain M-objects with Sein (epistemological entities) asserting that some (or all) of their Sein-correlates (metaphysical entities) are identical. For example, it is important to distinguish, from an epistemological point of view, between the morning star, <M,S>, and the evening star, <E,S>, as shown by the Fregean tetrad of Chapter I, Section B.7. Yet there is an equivalence between them, with respect to certain invariant features of states of affairs of which they are constituents; and there is a corresponding identity between their Sein-correlates (more precisely, the Sein-correlate of <M,S> is genuinely identical to that of <E,S>).

Moreover, while we may not (or may never) adequately resolve the question of the relation of actual objects to their properties, we have a relatively clear answer for epistemological entities. The structure of the former solution is "Aristotelian" (in the sense of Section 4.1.3), although we note that the details are sorely lacking. The latter relation, between M-objects and properties, is clearly "Berkeleyan", and we shall present the details in Section 6.3. Note,
however, contra Grossmann [40]: 4, that the Aristotelian theory is not simpler than the present Berkeleyan theory. The former requires two categories (properties and individuals) and one relation (exemplification). The latter according to Grossmann requires two categories (properties and complexes) and two relations (association and part-of). But "association" is only needed to rule out <being red, being green> as a complex. On our interpretation of M-objects as epistemological entities, that "complex" (i.e., object) is perfectly acceptable. Hence, here too, we need employ only two categories (property and object) and one relation (constituency).

Considering M-objects as epistemological, rather than merely metaphysical, entities also supports the type-distinction; for now we may distinguish between actual and M-objects in terms of their functions. The latter, being in general finite and hence directly and completely accessible to thought, are the means with which we succeed in our aim of apprehending (albeit indirectly and incompletely) the former (cf. Sect. 5.7.4).

Thus, picture (I) is reality, and picture (II) is the way our minds, due to their very nature, partition reality in order to deal with it. We apprehend actual objects "through" M-objects; without this type-distinction, we would be apprehending the former "through" themselves. This, while not logically odd, explains nothing. On the other hand, we can explain how the mind directly grasps M-objects, because of their finiteness (in general). As Findlay puts it, we can be "acquainted" with finite M-objects but only know actual objects by "description" ([31]: 162-63; cf. pp. 156, 170).
5.7.4. The apprehension of actual objects. Let us take up and examine further one line of thought discussed in the last section. It certainly seems, *prima facie*, that we think directly of actual objects rather than indirectly of them via some intermediary (cf., e.g., Grossmann [40]: 194). Careful consideration indicates, however, that the object of our thought is finitely propertied. We must provide an answer, then, to the question of how an M-object helps in our apprehension of an actual object.

First, let us note that an answer must be forthcoming. For minds are indeed related to actual objects: psychological events consist of acts and contents, which are directed to M-objects, which in turn are related to actual objects. If this chain can be broken at any point, worse, "if minds cannot be related to anything else, then we can never know that there is anything else" (Grossmann [38]: 21). But minds do and, hence, can have knowledge about the actual world. The issue at hand concerns the nature of that knowledge—whether it is "direct" or "indirect" and how it comes about. We must note, finally, that (1) the form of the knowledge depends on the mediating entities and, thus, on our conceptual schemes (which describe the nature of objects) and that (2) it does not follow from the possibility of knowledge that we can know that or when we do have knowledge (cf. Sect. 5.9.4).

Meinong's own solution, according to Findlay, was that "we can only refer to a concrete [i.e., actual] object by including in our reference the assumption that the object to which we are referring is determinate in every respect" ([31]: 245). Thus, we refer to an actual object by substituting for a direct reference to it, a direct reference
to an incompete (indeed, finite) object with some such property as that of being actual, or being a consistent "completion" of the object. For instance, I can think (indirectly) of the actual morning star, i.e., Venus, by thinking (directly), not of \(<M,S>\), but of, say, \(<\text{being a consistent completion of }<M,S>\>\). Indeed, that is what we have been doing throughout this Section. For we have needed to talk "directly" about actual objects, but we have always and only been able to do so by referring to them as "Sein-correlates of (some given M-object) o".

The present theory is representationalist in the sense that M-objects intervene between our minds and actual objects (indeed there frequently are M-objects but no actual objects before our minds). Yet we can have direct, non-mediated access to some among the elements of the actual world: viz., the M-objects. And it is via them that we have access, albeit indirect, to the others. On the present view, "thinking is oriented toward the world, and often succeeds in hitting a real thing" (Castañeda [7]: 8). Indeed, it always succeeds, since all M-objects are actual; yet it never (except possibly in cases of demonstrative reference or perception) hits non-Meinongian actual objects: it can only be "oriented" in their direction.

Thus, while we view M-objects as intermediaries, we don't "sever the direct connection between the mind and its world" (Castañeda [11]: 126). For, first, M-objects are actual, and we are in direct contact with them. Second, it might be the case that we are directly connected with other actual objects through the senses. Third, even if not, we can have knowledge of actual objects in a pragmatic fashion, to be outlined in Section 5.9.4. So, the present theory is only
quasi-representationalist: it is non-representationalist with respect to M-objects (or, at any rate, with respect to those M-objects which are potentially pseudo-existent); but it is representationalist with respect to non-Meinongian actual objects (and to infinite and "barely finite" M-objects).

Nor does the present theory fall prey to the "dualism" that plagues Fregean representationalist views:

On that view a singular referring expression like 'Oedipus' father' refers when I use it in oratio recta to an ordinary infinitely-many propertied object; but when I use it in oratio obliqua it refers to a sense. . . . ([11]: 126.)

In the present theory, such an expression refers to the M-object in both sorts of oratio. Or, if it does refer to an actual object, it only does so in certain contexts, not in all oratio recta contexts. This is especially so since all contexts are implicitly in oratio obliqua (except possibly for certain artificial examples in philosophical or linguistic writings; cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.11.1).

It may prove helpful to list here some contexts in which 'Oedipus's father' refers to an M-object (in most cases, let us say, to <being a father (F), being a father of Oedipus (O)>):

(C.0) When no context is given, 'Oedipus's father' refers to <F,0>.
(C.1) John is thinking of Oedipus's father: Thinking-of(John, <F,0>).
(C.2) John believes that Oedipus's father is a father:
   (a) Believes(John, F c <F,0>)
   or (b) Believes(John, F c <F,0,D>) (see C.3b))
   or (c) Believes(John, $\exists \alpha(\alpha SC <F,0> \& \alpha ex F)$).
(C.3) John believes that Oedipus's father is dead:
(a) \text{Believes}(John, D \in <F,0>)
or (b) \text{Believes}(John, D \in <F,0,D>); here we assume that the
context makes clear what must be John's minimal under­
standing of 'Oedipus's father' in order to yield
maximum truth (cf. Sect. 5.9.2)
or (c) \text{Believes}(John, \exists \alpha (\alpha \in SC<F,0> \& \alpha \in ex D)).

If all referring expressions always and only are to refer to M-objects, how can we talk about actual objects? One way is to loosen this requirement on such expressions. Another way is to employ other mechanisms of reference. Yet another is to introduce a second referential relation. The present theory adopts all three. We have already discussed the third way in Section 4.2, and so we will concentrate on the other ways here.

Consider (C.3c), above. To paraphrase Castañeda [11]: 127, it is a statement in oratio recta about an M-object, but underlying it is a "tacit assumption" that that M-object is correlated with an actual ob­ject, which, in turn, is thus "secondarily" referred to. The tacit assumption is brought out by our reference to actual objects via quan­tification; and the secondary nature of this reference is brought out by the fact that the actual object is referred to, not directly, as Oedipus's father is, but indirectly via quantification. Indeed, quan­tification is one of the alternative referential mechanisms we may em­ploy to enable reference to actual objects (cf. [11]: 129; [15]: 42, 72).

Yet there are other means. The definite description 'the present Queen of England' refers in a secondary way to the actual object which is the common Sein-correlate of the M-objects the present Queen of England and the wife of the present Duke of Edinburgh. For, that actual object exemplifies the property of being the present Queen of
England. Which of the two items it refers to can only be determined by a consideration of the speaker, the time, and the context, and with an eye on minimizing ambiguity and maximizing truth (cf. Sect. 5.9.1). This is not an unusual extension of quantificational reference, for both are mechanisms of reference by means of variable-binding operators.

A special case of reference to actuals via definite descriptions occurs when abbreviatory devices are employed. The same sort of procedure is used in mathematics to deal with the actually infinite. No actual infinity is or can be exhibited, but only finite approximations thereto or parts thereof. We can "reach" an irrational number via a name (e.g., \( \pi \)), a description (e.g., a rule for calculating a decimal expansion, or a ratio such as that of circumference to diameter\(^{30} \)), or an approximation (e.g., 22/7); but each of these substitutes is finite.

One of the most common ways of referring to actual objects is by that special sort of abbreviation (though not (necessarily) a description!) known as a proper name. In general, we prefer to hold that proper names refer to M-objects, as do all singular referring expressions. Thus, depending on context, 'Oedipus' might refer to <being Oedipus>, <being named 'Oedipus'>, <being a character in Greek mythology who married his mother>, <being Greek, marrying his mother, killing his father, being a man>, etc.

However, there are circumstances in which proper names can be construed as referring to actual objects. An example might make this clearer. Suppose I introduce the name 'Guildenstern' for the M-object the other job candidate at College F and then explain that Guildenstern is (also) a job candidate at College I. Then 'Guildenstern' could
refer to the original M-object, the M-object the job candidate at College I, the M-object the job candidate at Colleges F and I, or—and this is the important case—to the actual object which is the Sein-correlate of all of these.

Thus, reference to actual objects may be had by means of variable-binders (such as quantifiers or definite-description operators; cf. the appendix, "Towards a Logic of M-Objects," for details), abbreviatory devices, and proper names.

It may be objected, finally, that in some cases, e.g., with ordinary perceptual objects, we can have direct access to the infinite actual object: "if we conceive of the door . . . as an individual thing which exemplifies numerous properties, but does not consist of them, then there is no strong reason to believe that we cannot perceive this individual thing (together with a few of its properties) in one act of perception" (Grossmann [40]: 194). I do not now want to get entangled in the difficult issue of the objects of perception, but it is important to pay attention to Grossmann's parenthetical remark. Perhaps we can perceive (have direct access to) the actual object—but not as infinite. We still must distinguish between the actual object which exemplifies an infinite number of properties and the finite object of our psychological act. We cannot see all of the properties exemplified by the actual object in one mental act (or any finite number of them). If, in fact, I do see the actual object, then I am only seeing one thing which exemplifies an infinite number of properties, although I am only aware of a finite subset of them. But I cannot think of an actual object with all of its properties.
### 5.7.5. Sein-correlation.

Even if it is ideas (Vorstellungen) which in the first instance "have" objects, what sort of a proper "having" is it, if that which the idea in question "has" can also at the same time quite well not exist? (Meinong [65]: 223-24.)

Thus Meinong stated the problem which the present theory answers by saying that the "having" is a relation between a psychological event (in particular, its content) and an M-object, which itself always exists (i.e., is "had", is actual), but which may or may not be correlated with another actual object.

Meinong does not provide a solution in [63]. However, Grossmann's solution, which he attributes to Twardowski, appears to be such that the Meinong of [63] would have found it acceptable ([40]: 109). It is this: the relation (call it "intentionality") between psychological event and object is such that it can obtain even if one of its terms does not exist.

The two solutions, our Meinongian one (M) and Meinong-Twardowski-Grossmann's (MTG), may be represented graphically thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>M-Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Event I diagram" /> (exists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Event II diagram" /> (doesn't exist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Event I diagram" /> Actual object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Event II diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In situation I, a psychological event "intends" an object which has Sein, and in II, it intends an object which lacks Sein. For MTG,
'x intends y' is such that it can be true even if y does not exist; for M, 'x intends y' is such that if it is true, there may or may not be a further relation between y and some z. Put otherwise, if y exists, then $x \text{ intends}_{MTG} y$ iff $x \text{ intends}_M y$ and $\exists z (z \text{SC} y)$; and if y does not exist, then $x \text{ intends}_{MTG} y$ iff $x \text{ intends}_M y$ and $\exists z (z \text{SC} y)$.

That is, we explicate the mysterious holding of a relation with a term that may or may not exist by means of two relations, one of which always holds and one of which sometimes does not. It is true that this theory requires two sorts of objects (Meinongian and actual) and two relations (albeit neither is "mysterious"), whereas the MTG-theory only requires one of each. Nevertheless, the MTG-theory requires two sorts of relations, in general: "normal" ones, whose terms exist, and "mysterious" ones, whose terms need not exist. The MTG-object does too many things—its functions aren't adequately separated for analysis (which, we note, is an epistemological task). Indeed, in the realm of epistemological ontology, one maxim ought to be to provide one (epistemological, i.e., M-) object per function. We may call this the Principal of Luxury (or Plato's Beard), as opposed to the Principal of Poverty, viz., Ockham's Razor (cf. Ch. I, Sect. C.1).

Is, though, the MTG-relation so mysterious? It might be argued that it is no different from a relation whose terms can lack, say, redness. But it is thus different, since a proponent of the MTG-theory does not claim that existence is a simple, first-order property like redness.

It might also be argued that there are other such relations, e.g.,
(RI) The ghost is the father of Hamlet.
(RII) Shakespeare is the creator of Hamlet.
(RIII) p or not-p.

But (RI) is odd, since the ghost isn't actually Hamlet's father: the relation of being the father of is not exemplified. Similarly, a better account of (RII) can be given in the present theory, taking 'Hamlet', here, to name an M-object, say <being named 'Hamlet', being a Prince of Denmark, being indecisive, being a character in a play>, and interpreting (RII) along the lines of "Shakespeare wrote a play about Hamlet".

As for (RIII), which is Grossmann's example, I would prefer to interpret 'p' as a proposition, a sentence, or--best--an objective, all of which exist, rather than as a state of affairs. (There are, of course, other alternatives: denying that "or" is a relation, denying that it is a proposition-forming relation, claiming that the relation is "or-not", etc.) In general, then, the reply to this sort of argument is that each such relation is either best understood in terms of the two modes of predication or reducible to our "double-relation" technique.

Since the relation of Sein-correlation (SC) is at the core of this technique, let us examine it further. Because of the type-distinction, SC is irreflexive (this would be true even if actual objects formed a proper subset of infinite M-objects). Note that in general nothing follows from $x_1$ SCy and $x_2$ SCy when $x_1 \neq x_2$ (except that $x_1$ and $x_2$ exemplify some common property). However, if $x_1 = x_2$ (i.e., if the converse of SC is a function), then $\{x: x$ SCy\} is a singleton. Suppose in that case that $y = \langle F \rangle$; then we may call the $x$ such that $x$ SCy "the F".
We must point out here an ambiguity in "the F"; for it may also be used to name an M-object, in which case failure of unique reference may be avoided by taking \(<F>\) as the F (e.g., the round square is \(<\text{being round, being square}>\)).

Finally, if \(x \text{SC} y_1\) and \(x \text{SC} y_2\) (where \(y_1 \neq y_2\)), then \(y_1\) and \(y_2\) may be said to have a common Sein-correlate: \(y_1 \text{SC} y_2\). \(\text{CSC}\) is reflexive within the realm of M-objects with Sein, and it is symmetric. However, it is not transitive: For consider \(B = <\text{being blue, being not-yellow}>\), \(R = <\text{being rectangular}>\), and \(Y = <\text{being yellow, being not-blue}>\). Now suppose I have on my desk two index cards, one entirely blue and the other entirely yellow. Then \(B \text{CSC} R\) and \(R \text{CSC} Y\), but \(B \text{CSC} Y\) is necessarily false. It will not suffice to require the "extreme" terms, \(x\) and \(z\), to have logically compatible properties. For, let \(x = <\text{having one horn}>\), \(y = <\text{being an animal}>\), and \(z = <\text{being equine}>\); then a narwhal is a common Sein-correlate of \(x\) and \(y\), and a horse is a common Sein-correlate of \(y\) and \(z\), but \(\neg x \text{SC} z\), there being no unicorns. The transivity comes about when all Sein-correlates of the "middle" term are Sein-correlates of one of the "extremes":

\[ \forall \alpha(\alpha \text{SC} y \to \alpha \text{SC} x) \to x \text{SC} y & y \text{SC} z \to x \text{SC} z. \]

We mention, finally, that \(\text{SC}\) is a "material mode" counterpart of the "formal mode" relation of having a reference (Bedeutung): the word '\(x\)' has an actual object \(\alpha\) as (indirect) reference iff the direct reference of '\(x\)', viz., some M-object \(x\), has \(\alpha\) as Sein-correlate, i.e., iff \(x\) exists (has Sein).
5.7.6. Orayen's argument. We conclude this section by replying to an attempted refutation of Meinong in Orayen [75]. We shall clarify some features of the present theory by showing that Orayen's argument fails when interpreted in it.

First, he claims ([75]: 337) that Meinong's theory contains as a thesis,

\[ T'_1 \] Every non-contradictory definite description denotes an object.

This is also valid for our theory. Next, (T'_1) entails

(Lem 1) If 'F' and 'G' are predicates such that (a) the propositional function 'x is F' is consistent and (b) 'x is F' logically implies 'x is G', then 'the F is G' is true. ([75]: 338.)

But the acceptability of this depends on what 'the F' refers to. If it refers to a Sein-correlate of <F>, and if 'is' is the "is" of exemplification, then (Lem 1) is all right. If it refers to <F>, and if 'is' is the "is" of constituency, then either 'F' means "G and . . . ", in which case (Lem 1) holds, or else (b) is false and (Lem 1) meaningless. In any event, let us accept (Lem 1) and proceed.

Orayen next assumes ([75]: 339)

(LL*) \[ \forall x \forall y (x = y \leftrightarrow \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)) \]

which is acceptable in our theory for both modes of predication. Finally, (LL*) grounds the validity of

(RS) \[ a = b, Fa/\iff Fb. \] ([75]: 339.)

This is also all right.

Now comes the heart of his argument ([75]: 341): Let 'b' and 'F' be linguistic expressions such that (I) 'b' is a non-contradictory definite description, (II) 'F' is a predicate, (III) 'b is F' is not
self-contradictory, and (IV) 'b is not-F' ('b es no F') is not self-contradictory. Therefore, 'ix(Fx & x = b)' is a non-contradictory definite description, as is 'ix(\overline{F}x & x = b)' (where \(\overline{F}\) names the property of being not-F). Hence, by (Lem 1) and (RS), we have the following seemingly valid arguments:

(1) \(\operatorname{ix}(Fx \land x = b) = b\), (2) \(\overline{\operatorname{ix}}(Fx \land x = b)\)/ therefore (3) \(Fb\).

(a) \(\operatorname{ix}(\overline{F}x \land x = b) = b\), (β) \(\overline{\operatorname{ix}}(\overline{F}x \land x = b)\)/ therefore (γ) \(\overline{F}b\).

But (3) and (γ) yield

(δ) \(Fb \land \overline{F}b\).

which appears to be a contradiction, thus refuting (T') and ultimately Meinong's theory.

Now, on the present theory, (1)-(3) can be interpreted in any of the following ways (for convenience, let 'B' name the property of being identical to b, and 'σ' the only Sein-correlate of <F,B> if such there be):

(1.1) \(<F,B> = b\)

(1.2) \(B \in <F,B>\)  (2.2) \(F \in <F,B>\)  (3.2) \(F \in b\)

(1.3) \(σ \in B\)  (2.3) \(σ \in F\)  (3.3) \(b \in F\)

(1.4) \(σ = b\).

There are, then, only the following valid arguments corresponding to (1)-(3):

(A1) \(<F,B> = b, F \in <F,B>\)/ therefore \(F \in b\)

(A2) \(<F,B> = b, σ \in F\)/ therefore \(F \in b\)

(A3) \(σ = b, F \in <F,B>\)/ therefore \(b \in F\)

(A4) \(σ = b, σ \in F\)/ therefore \(b \in F\).

In (A2), the conclusion follows directly from the first premiss; in (A3), it follows from the definition of σ plus the first premiss.
Corresponding to $(\alpha)-(\gamma)$, there are eight interpretations analogous to $(1.1)-(3.3)$ with $'F'$ substituted for 'F', and four valid arguments ((B1)-(B4)) analogous to (A1)-(A4).

Corresponding to $(\delta)$, then, we have

$(\delta AB1-2)$ \(F \land \overline{\Phi} \land b \land \overline{F} \land c \land b\)

$(\delta AB3-4)$ \(b \land \exists F \land b \land \exists \overline{F}\).

However, in each of these, there is an equivocation on 'b'. For $(\delta AB1-2)$ is really:

\[ F \land \overline{F} \land <F,B> \land \overline{F} \land c \land <F,B> \]

and in $(\delta AB3-4)$, the first occurrence of 'b' names the only Sein-correlate of $<F,B>$, whereas the second occurrence names the only Sein-correlate of $<\overline{F},B>$. In both cases, there is no contradiction. Moreover, $(\delta)$ itself is not a contradiction in our theory, for we could take $b = <F,\overline{F}>$.

Thus, Oreyen's objection fails, ultimately because of his failure to distinguish between the two modes of predication and the corresponding two types of objects.

5.8 Logic and M-objects. In [94] and [95], Russell presented his "chief objection" to Meinong's theory, namely, that it violates the Law of Contradiction (LC). The first version of this objection is that "if 'A differs from B' and 'A does not differ from B' are to be both true, we cannot tell ... whether a class composed of A and B has one member or two" ([94]: 533). The second version "is that such objects [viz., M-objects] ... are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended ... that the round square is round, and also not round" ([95]: 45; my emphasis).
The first version is easily overturned. It is doubtful, to begin with, that Meinong would ever have asserted that 'A differs from B' and 'A does not differ from B' were both true unless one of A or B lacked Sein. In that case, a class supposedly comprised of Sein-correlates of A and B would probably be empty. Indeed, if both objectives have Sein, then one pair of corresponding states of affairs would be:

\[(\text{being different from } B) \subset A\]
\[\text{not-}(\text{being different from } B) \subset A,\]

where \(A = \langle\text{being different from } B, \text{not-}(\text{being different from } B)\rangle\). Thus, A at least would be an impossible M-object.

To the second version, Meinong replied that LC is only valid in the domain of actual or possible objects ([64]: 222). Russell's rejoinder was that this overlooked "the fact that it is of propositions (i.e., of 'Objectives' . . .), not of subjects, that the law of contradiction is asserted" ([97]: 439). Russell himself appears to have overlooked his own formulation of LC in [95], which appears to be

\[(\text{LC1}) \text{ For all objects } x, \text{not-}(Fx \& \text{not-}Fx).\]

The version he advocates in [97] (cf. [93]: 343), then, would be

\[(\text{LC2}) \text{ For all objectives } p, \text{not-}(p \& \text{not-}p).\]

We note, incidentally, that (LC2) implies, but is not implied by, (LC1).

How does this version of the "chief objection" affect the present theory? To answer this, we employ a distinction, made by Meinong in [66]: 173, between a property, F, and its "complement" (or "opposite", 
or "negative") property, \( \overline{F} \). That is, we must be attentive to the distinction between the positive assertion that \( x \) is \( F \), the negative assertion that \( x \) is-not \( F \), and the positive assertion that \( x \) is not-\( F \).

For example, we may assert that there is a property \( F \) such that Yul Brynner is \( F \), viz., \( F = \) bald, and there is the complementary property \( \overline{F} \), which is such that Santa Claus is \( \overline{F} \), viz., hairy. It may not be immediately recognized that every property has such a complement. This is due to the fact that the distinction is primarily an epistemological one, for in the metaphysical realm, i.e., in the actual world, \( x \) ex \( \overline{F} \) iff not-(\( x \) ex \( F \)). We might try to define \( \overline{F} \) as that property exemplified by all and only those (actual) objects which do not exemplify \( F \), but I fear that this would run afoul of the case of distinct properties unexemplified by all and only the same objects (this problem is the complement of the "renate/cordate" problem; cf. Quine [85]: 21). Since \( \overline{F} \) is a constituent of a consistent \( M \)-object \( x \) iff \( F \) is not a constituent of \( x \), we might try to define \( \overline{F} \) on that basis; however, I prefer instead to define consistency in terms of \( \overline{F} \).

The resolution of the paradox is now straightforward. The objective the round square is round has as its only Sein-correlate the state of affairs whose structure is

(34) \( R \in <R,S> \),

there being no Sein-correlate of \( <R,S> \) to exemplify \( R \) (cf. Meinong's later solution in [67]: 20-21). The allegedly contradictory objective the round square is not round simply has no Sein-correlate. Candidates
for that position are:

(35) \( R \notin <R,S> \),

which is not a state of affairs;

\( \overline{R} \subset <R,S> \),

which is also not one; and the state of affairs

(36) \( S \subset <R,S> \)

together with a "law", \( L \), that all square things are not round. But what form would such a law take? It cannot be either of:

\[ \forall x (x \text{ is an } M\text{-object} \rightarrow S \subset x \rightarrow \overline{R} \subset x) \]
\[ \forall x (x \text{ is an } M\text{-object} \rightarrow S \subset x \rightarrow R \notin x) \],

for these are false: they contradict the data that I can think of a square which lacks non-roundness and I can think of the round square.

Neither will it help to invoke a principle such as

\[ \forall x (x \text{ is an } M\text{-object} \rightarrow \overline{R} \subset x \rightarrow R \notin x) \],

for this contradicts the datum that I can think of, say, a non-round circle (cf. Routley [91]: 31).

Nor could the law be either of:

(37) \[ \forall x (x \text{ is actual} \rightarrow x \text{ ex } S \rightarrow x \text{ ex } \overline{R}) \]
\[ \forall x (x \text{ is actual} \rightarrow x \text{ ex } S \rightarrow \text{not-}(x \text{ ex } R)) \],

for these, while true, do not help (36) to contradict (34). Indeed, (34) satisfies (LC2), since (35) is its proper contradictory. Similarly, if we apply Russell's objection to \(<R,\overline{R}>\), we find no conflict; for
is a state of affairs (as is: $\bar{R} c <R,\bar{R}>$), but

R $\not\in <R,\bar{R}>$

is not.

It is evident, then, that (LC2) is not violated in either the actual world or the realm of Aussersein, i.e., on either side of picture (II) (Sect. 5.7.2). On the other hand, we see that (LC1) is ambiguous between

(MLClb) $\forall x(x$ is an M-object $\not\rightarrow$ not-($F c x & \bar{F} c x$)),

which is false, and

(MLClb) $\forall x(x$ is an M-object $\not\rightarrow$ not-($F c x & F \not\in x$)),
(ALCla) $\forall x(x$ is actual $\not\rightarrow$ not-($x \in F & x \in \bar{F}$)),
(ALClb) $\forall x(x$ is actual $\not\rightarrow$ not-($x \in F & \not\in-x \in F$)),

which are true. (Of course, we note that insofar as M-objects are actual, (ALCla) and (ALClb) hold for them, too.)

What, then, is an impossible object? Clearly, $<R,\bar{R}>$ is one. But it is not sufficient to characterize "impossibilia . . . by the feature that each has both some trait f and its opposite not f" (Routley [91]: 230-31); for then the classical paradigm of an impossible object, $<R,S>$, would not be one unless R = $\bar{S}$. We might try saying that an object is impossible iff any Sein-correlate would have to violate (ALCla) or (ALClb). But such a counterfactual characterization is best avoided.
Instead, we must recognize that a notion such as "impossible", in this context, depends on the logic one wishes to impose. That is, it depends upon whether one wishes to delimit a certain collection, $C$, of $M$-objects by setting up boundary conditions (analogous to $L$, above) such as

$$\forall x (x \in C \leftrightarrow S \subset x \leftrightarrow \neg R \subset x \& R \not\subset x).$$

Let us consider the matter from a different perspective. Does (LC1) fail? We could say that it does if either it is not disambiguated or it is interpreted as (MLC1a). This suggests the following thought-experiment: What would be the nature of an entity which violated a logical law? The answer is not far to find: The realm in which logical laws "fail" is the realm of the psychological object.

To see why these realms coincide, consider the nature of logical laws. They are rules enabling us to infer truths from truths. Included among them are rules enabling us to infer some properties of things from other properties. If we are to "violate" such rules, we must employ entities which can block such inferences. On the other hand, we might not wish to block all such inferences. Consequently, we must restrict our attention to a realm of entities in which we are free to make assumptions as we will--in which "the rules of inference cannot bind our freedom of assuming" (Russell [93]: 343)--and in which, so to speak, we look at an object but no further. Such a realm would contain, at least, entities which "have" contradictory properties and entities which "have" some properties but not others which (depending on the logic chosen) logically follow from them. Clearly, $M$-objects
would be among these. And since any such entity could be the object of a thought, we have the sought-for coincidence of realms.

M-objects, then, can be treated as being "closed"—as having only thus many properties and no further ones (Meinong [65]: 271; cf. Castañeda [7]: 11-12, Findlay [31]: 157, and Grossman [40]: 75). Such are the "incomplete" objects, defined as those "violating" the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) (cf. Chisholm [21]: 248, Findlay [31]: 162). But care must be taken to properly interpret LEM; for M-objects respect

\[(\text{LEM1}) \forall x \forall F (F \in x \lor F \notin x)\]

but violate

\[(\text{LEM2}) \forall x \forall F (F \in x \lor \neg F \in x)\].

But the special case of incomplete M-objects that, on the present theory, are the only proper objects of thought are the finite ones, which are truly "closed" (rather than being merely "open-ended"); it is these which, not being subject to laws of logic of actual objects carry no "prejudice" to Sein or Nichtsein (cf. Meinong [63]: 491).

Once "boundary conditions" are set, in the form of logical laws, a structure is imposed upon items, constraining them in certain ways and enabling us to confidently infer facts about them. According to Russell, "In pure mathematics, actual objects in the world of existence will never be in question, but only hypothetical objects having those general properties upon which depends whatever deduction is being considered" ([92]: xvii; my emphasis). In particular, the hypothetical objects are assumed to have only those properties explicitly given them, of which there are a finite number, together with
whatever follows "logically", i.e., according to the logical laws imposed. With respect to a Meinongian theory of objects, since no laws of the nature of (MLCla) or (LEM2) are employed, M-objects have only those properties explicitly given them. A theory of M-objects, then, is a theory essentially of finitely-propertied items.

The imposed "logical" laws refer to specific disciplines, and perhaps are better termed "structural" laws. (In more common terminology they are, confusingly for us, called "non-logical" laws.) Thus, as Grossmann points out, "the law that nothing can be round and square . . . is a geometric necessity, because it follows from the geometric law (a) that everything that is round is not square together with the [as he calls it] logical law (b) that nothing can be both round and not round" ([40]: 32).

In particular, certain logical laws (e.g., LEM and LC, respectively) require objects to be complete (hence infinite) or consistent, and thus hold only among actual objects (or their complete and consistent M-analogues, depending on the interpretation). In this way we can understand Meinong's restriction of LC to the realm of the actual and the possible.

We may apply some of these results to answering Lambert's objection that this restriction of LC is arbitrary: "he [Meinong] tells us that the non-existence of the round square is implied by its nature. Since implication is a logical relation, we know that Meinong does permit some logical principles to apply to the realm of the impossible" ([53]: 308). The non-existence of \(<R,S>\) is implied by its nature plus (ALCla) and (37):
(ALCla) \( \forall \forall x (x \text{ is actual } \rightarrow \neg (x \text{ ex } F \& x \text{ ex } \overline{F})) \)
(37) \( \forall x (x \text{ is actual } \rightarrow \exists x \text{ ex } S \rightarrow x \text{ ex } \overline{R}) \)
(i) \( \exists x (x \text{SC}<R,S>) \) (assumption pro tem.)
Therefore (ii) \( \alpha \text{SC}<R,S> \) ((i), EI)
Therefore (iii) \( \alpha \text{ ex } S \& \alpha \text{ ex } R \) ((ii), def. of SC)
Therefore (iv) \( \alpha \text{ ex } \overline{R} \) ((iii), (37))
Therefore (v) \( \alpha \text{ ex } R \& \alpha \text{ ex } \overline{R} \) ((iii), (iv))
(vi) \( \neg (\alpha \text{ ex } R \& \alpha \text{ ex } \overline{R}) \) ((ALCla), IU)
Therefore (vii) \( \neg \exists x (x \text{SC}<R,S>) \) ((v), (vi)).

Note that we need a version of LC together with a "non-logical" or structural law (a "meaning postulate", in effect), viz., (37), to get the "implied" result that <R,S> doesn't exist. However, LC is not applied to an M-object, but only to the realm of actual objects. It is the fact that it applies there (together with (37)) that forces the round square out of existence.

To account for the truth of "the round square is round and square", one version of LC must be revised. This revision removes one of the major obstacles to what the Routleys call the Assumption Postulate (AP), viz., "where \( f \) is a characterising feature, the item which \( f \)s indeed \( f \)s" ([91]: 228). According to them, however, AP must yet be restricted in certain ways for another reason. Their argument is that

where \( L(y) \) is a law of logic for arbitrary \( y \), the item \( x \) which violates \( L(x) \), i.e., \( jx \neg L(x) \), yields a case of \( \neg L(y) \), and hence renders the theory inconsistent. But of course \( jx \neg L(x) \) is not assumptible, i.e., the AP does not apply. ([91]: 232.)

However (changing notation slightly), \( \\{x (\neg L(x)) \} \) names \( \overline{L} \), which is assumptible and which is such that both \( \overline{L} \subseteq \overline{L} \) (which renders no inconsistency), and \( \overline{L} \) does exemplify \( L \) (qua actual object).
Let us return now to the consideration of the realm of Aussersein as the realm of freedom from logical laws. We see that things are possible there which are logically impossible. Logical possibility, then, far from being the minimal variety of possibility (in comparison to, say, physical possibility), is more restrictive than the possibility which characterizes the realm of Aussersein.

Grossmann calls something very much like this "ontological" possibility ([40]: 31), though it will be more in keeping with the present viewpoint to consider it as an epistemological possibility—the "can" of what can be thought of. Even better, so as not to confuse pictorial imagination with the whole of thought, we can term it conceptual possibility—the "can" of what we can conceive of (cf. [40]: 240 n. 28). We shall provide a more thorough analysis of this in Section 6.1.

In a sense, then, logical laws such as LC are not laws of thought (pace Boole). Thinking, or conceiving, is not restricted by such laws (except insofar as the objects of thought are themselves actual, of course). This may be one of the reasons why disfavor has, until recently, been shown towards Meinong's theory of objects. The criticism would be that there are too many "degrees of freedom" and that a subject matter is only interesting when limits (in this case, the laws of logic) are placed on it. This is a variation of the theme that true creativity can only take place when there are constraints upon one's resources. 36 In the realm of Aussersein, anything is possible, or, better, nothing is prohibited: The laws of logic are best seen as prohibitions or restrictions on the above-mentioned degrees of freedom. Indeed, it is arguable that all laws are restrictive in this sense 37 --
they say what cannot be—and it should not be surprising to find the same true of logical laws. But what must be equally recognized is that it is possible, useful, and even necessary to deal with a realm apart from the restrictions placed upon it. Moreover, it must be emphasized that $M$-objects are "free" from logical restrictions only in the sense in which (MLCl.a), e.g., is false; for (MLCl.b) is perfectly valid for them.

### 5.9. The structure of truth.

#### 5.9.1. Introduction.

It should be clear by now that there are two kinds of objectives: Sein-objectives, which are (or represent) "the being . . . of some entity", and Sosein-objectives, which are (or represent) an entity's Sosein (cf. Findlay [31]: 70). In general, the latter have the form $x$ is $F$ and the former, $x$ is (or $x$ has Sein) (cf. Meinong [67]: 95).

Truth is ascribed to judgments which apprehend objectives with Sein (Meinong [63]: 499 and Grossman [40]: 204; but cf. Findlay [31]: 87), and objectives are (expressed as) that-clauses ([63]: 487). Thus, we have the general schema:

\[ j's\;judgment\;that-p\;is\;true\;iff\;that-p\;has\;Sein. \]

Accordingly, a Meinongian discussion of the existence of objectives is essentially a discussion of truth. In this section, we present a preliminary examination of various kinds of objectives and Sein-conditions for them (we go into more detail in the Appendix).

#### 5.9.2. Apriori and aposteriori knowledge.

According to Meinong, there are two kinds of knowledge: apriori, whose "acknowledgment of
legitimacy" lies "in the Sosein of their objecta or objectives", and a posteriori (or empirical), "where this is not the case" ([63]: 520). Since the objectives of knowledge must have Sein, we may say that an objective whose Sosein entails its Sein is knowable apriori and one where this isn't the case, yet has Sein, is knowable a posteriori.

Apriori knowable objectives have, in general, the form: the (all, some) FG is (are) F and G or . . . is not H; for example, the tallest mountain is tall, the round square is round, the present King of France is not bald. If, as Russell says, these do "not assert existence" (i.e., Sein; [96]: 412), then the existing round square exists is knowable apriori and does not entail the Sein of its objectum.

There are two forms of a posteriori knowable objectives: the (all, some) A is (are) B and x has Sein (Nichtsein), for example, the tallest mountain is in Asia, tame tigers exist, 9 = the number of planets, the round square lacks Sein.

It is convenient to classify the objectives themselves (or the corresponding judgments; cf. Findlay [31]: 181) as analytic (if knowable apriori) and synthetic (if knowable a posteriori). However, it must be realized that some objectives can be both (cf. [31]: 181). Consider, for instance, bachelors are unmarried; call this 'p'. The ambiguity concerns the understanding of 'bachelor', which could, let us suppose, name <being a bachelor> (or <B>, for short) or <being unmarried, being male> (or <U,M>, for short) (cf. Russell [93]: 519, Findlay [31]: 181, and Grossmann [40]: 167, 181, 251n.52). Then p is analytic iff its corresponding state of affairs is: U c <U,M>; it is synthetic and lacks Sein insofar as U \notin <B> is a state of affairs; and
it is synthetic and has Sein insofar as $\exists \alpha (\alpha SC <B> \& \alpha \text{ ex } U)$ is a state of affairs. 38

How do we understand a sentence which expresses an objective such as $p$, in practice? I suggest that two principles employed are a principle of minimization of ambiguity and a principle of maximization of truth. The least ambiguous interpretation of $p$ (in the absence of further context) is as $U \subset <B>$. Since $p$ thus construed lacks Sein, the principle of maximization of truth (or principle of tolerance; cf. Sect. 5.7.2) instructs us to interpret it as $\exists \alpha (\alpha SC <B> \& \alpha \text{ ex } U)$.

Compare the treatment of double negatives (and also Section 5.5): 'I ain't got none' must be interpreted (in the absence of contextual clues) "directly", in accordance with the principle of minimization of ambiguity, as "it's not the case that I have none", i.e., as "I have some". It is only when it is embedded in some context (including consideration of intonation) that, in accordance with the principle of maximization of truth, we interpret it "indirectly" as "I don't have any". 39

In a logically perspicuous language, all sentences are directly interpretable (disambiguated). That is, every true sentence expresses some subsistent objective, and each of the latter is correlated with many true sentences. So 'I ain't got none' always expresses, in the absence of context, the objective I have some. That objective, in turn, always can be expressed by 'I don't have any'.

Sentences like words, are not unambiguously meaningful when isolated from context; that is, they are only unambiguously meaningful
when viewed holistically, taking the entire text as minimal unit of meaning. Sentences, like words, can be given meaning outside of context, though not necessarily uniquely without the principle of minimization of ambiguity. (If Quine is right, neither can texts taken singly be given unique meaning.)

5.9.3. Sein-conditions. According to Meinong, Sein- and Sosein-objectives have essentially different structures, the former being "monadic" while the latter are "bipartite" ([67]: 95). It is therefore appropriate to give separate treatments of their Sein- (or truth) conditions. We recall in general, however, that there are no "truth-value gaps" among objectives: for every objective 0, either 0 has (a) Sein(-correlate) or 0 lacks Sein, i.e., either some state of affairs corresponds to 0 or none does (cf. [63]: 494, Findlay [31]: 49, and Sect. B.3.3.3).

5.9.3.1. Sein-objectives. In Section B.3.3.2, we raised the problem of an infinite regress connected with the Sein of an objectum. The problem is that (1) x has Sein iff x has Sein has Sein, but (2) x has Sein has Sein iff x has Sein has Sein has Sein, etc. ad infinitum. There is no stopping point, and so there seems to be no way to determine whether x has Sein. (This holds for Sosein-objectives, too.)

Meinong's way out is to accept the regress but to deny that (2) gives a Sein-condition for x has Sein ([65]: 70; cf. Findlay [31]: 75-76, 102; note that (1) gives a Sein-condition for x). Instead, he grounds the "factuality" of an objective in itself (cf. Grossmann [38]: 29). In the present theory, it is possible to avoid both the
infinite regress and the "self-grounding" solution (which is intrin-
sically unsatisfying) by moving in the other "direction" to states of
affairs. Just as objecta depend for their Sein on objectives, so
objectives can depend for their Sein on states of affairs. (Similarly,
states of affairs may be held to depend for their "existence" on actual
objects.) So, where 'O' names an objective, while

O has Sein iff O has Sein has Sein

is true, the right-hand objective isn't the ground of O's Sein. Rather,
a state of affairs is.

Consider the sentence 'x exists'. This expresses ambiguously two
objectives. It might affirm existence of some actual object x, in
which case it is trivially true or explicable in some manner such as
∃F(x ex F) or ∃y(xScy) (cf. Section 5.7.5). More likely, however, it
ascribes Sein to some M-object x. Now, according to the first inter-
pretation of Aussersein, x has Sein iff x has Sein has Sein. Our Sein-
condition for the Sein-objective x has Sein, in terms of its corres-
pondence to a state of affairs, is:

(S*) x has Sein has Sein has Sein iff ∃a(aScx).

5.9.3.2. Sosein-objectives (I). Now consider the sentence 'x is
F'. This, too, expresses ambiguously two objectives. It might predi-
cate F of some actual object x, in which case x is F has Sein iff x ex
F. (Note that if exemplification is explicated in terms of SC and c,
then x ex F iff ∃y(xScy & F c y). Cf. Castañeda [7], Sect. 5.)

More likely, however, it predicates F of some M-object x. Our
Sein-condition for the Sosein-objective x is F in terms of its
correspondence to a state of affairs, is:

\[ (So^*) \ x \text{ is } F \text{ has Sein iff (i) } F \text{ c x or (ii) } \exists \alpha (\alpha \text{SC} x \& \alpha \text{ ex } F). \]

Note that 'F c x' and '\( \exists \alpha (\alpha \text{SC} x \& \alpha \text{ ex } F) \)' are distinct, non-equivalent states of affairs. Since there are two modes of predication, there are two kinds of states of affairs which can correspond to a Sosein-objective. Accordingly, (So*) is essentially disjunctive.

From (So*), we can infer that the golden mountain is golden (by (i)), that the tallest mountain is tall (by (i) or (ii)), that the present King of France is not bald (by (i)), and that the tallest mountain is in Asia (by (ii)).

There is a small problem concerning (So*) which turns upon whether there can be an objective

\[ (0) \ \alpha \text{ exemplifies } F, \]

where \( \alpha \) names the M-object <being a Sein-correlate of x>. If the form of all Sosein-objectives is \( A \text{ is } B \), then \( A = \alpha \), and \( B = \text{ being such that it exemplifies } F \). Now, by (So*), (0) has Sein iff \( \exists \beta (\beta \text{SC} \alpha \& \beta \text{ ex } B) \), the constituency-clause of (i) being clearly irrelevant. Assuming \( \alpha \) has Sein, a candidate for \( \beta \) is any Sein-correlate of \( x \); i.e., \( \beta \text{SC} \alpha \iff \beta \text{SC} x \). So the operative clause of (So*) now becomes \( '\exists \beta (\beta \text{SC} x \& \beta \text{ ex } F)' \).

Hence, (0) has Sein iff \( x \text{ is } F \) has Sein (and is synthetic), and there is no problem with (0) after all.

5.9.3.3. Relational objectives. Relational objectives are a bit trickier to handle. Here, we merely offer some preliminary considerations.
According to Meinong, "the objective 'A and B is R' is a Sosein-objective like any other" ([65]: 283). One interpretation of this is that there is an objectum A-&-B (e.g., the sum-individual A + B) which is constituted by the property R. A simpler interpretation, which does not require sum-objects and avoids having one-place property-correlates of n-place relations, can be had at the cost of introducing relational properties (cf. Findlay [31]: 153) and reading

(Ri) \( xRy \)

as ambiguous between, roughly,

(Rii) \( x \) is \( Ry \)
(Riii) \( y \) is \( xR \).

The cost, however, is not excessive if one clearly distinguishes between epistemological and metaphysical ontology. Recall that when dealing on an epistemological plane, we needed both a property \( F \) and its opposite \( \lnot F \), but that on the metaphysical plane these "coincided" since \( \alpha \) ex \( \lnot F \) iff \( \alpha \) does not exemplify \( F \). Analogously, we have the following relationship between relational properties and relations:

(Riv) \( \alpha \) ex \( Ry \) iff \( \exists \beta(\beta Scy \& \alpha R\beta) \).

Thus, we can maintain that all objectives have the subject-predicate form \( x \) is \( F \), yet be able to express relations. States of affairs, on the other hand, can be relational in form. To see how this can be done in general, the following examples should suffice:

(R*) \( x \) is to the left of \( y \) has Sein iff (i) \( Ly \subset x \)

or (ii) \( \exists \alpha(\alpha Scx \& \alpha \) ex \( Ly \).
Note that (ii) is equivalent to
\[ \exists a \exists \beta (a \text{SC} x \& \beta \text{SC} y \& a \text{L} \beta). \]

In the special case of psychological relations, we must alter our schema somewhat since the object of thought is always an M-object. First, we must restrict (Riv) so that it only applies to non-psychological relations. Otherwise, if some actual person exemplified the relational property of thinking-of-x, then that person would stand in the relation of thinking-of to some Sein-correlate of x; but x need not have Sein. Indeed, if the person exemplifies thinking-of-x, then the person is-thinking-of x, and vice versa.

Accordingly, we have

\[ (R^{**}) \text{ John is thinking of } x \text{ has Sein iff } \]

(i) \[ T x \subset \text{John (where 'John' names an M-object),} \]

or (ii) \[ \exists a (a \text{SC} (\text{John}) \& a \text{ ex } T x), \]

or (iii) \[ \exists a \exists y (a \text{SC} (\text{John}) \& x \text{SC} y \& a \text{ ex } T y). \]

From our remarks above, (ii) and (iii) are equivalent, respectively, to,

\[ \exists a (a \text{SC} (\text{John}) \& a T x) \]

\[ \exists a \exists y (a \text{SC} (\text{John} \& x \text{SC} y \& a T y). \]

These clauses are necessary because of the two senses of "aboutness" involved: one can think directly only of M-objects but only indirectly—mediated by an M-object—of actual objects.

5.9.4. Coherence and pragmatism. In the previous sections, we have presented what is essentially a correspondence theory of truth (in the guise of a correspondence theory of Sein). Distinguishing as we have between the actual world and the realm of Aussersein, it may
be asked how we can know whether an M-object has a Sein-correlate if we only have direct "access" to the former. The question is especially pressing when it is formulated as a problem of false belief: How do we determine whether an objective has Sein (i.e., whether a judgment is true) without already having determined that a Sein-correlate exists (i.e., that the objective has Sein)?

To answer these questions, we suggest that an explanation of how and when thought is directed to that which exists is not an explanation of how thought "hits" a real thing as its target (cf. Castañeda [7]: 8). The target is never hit; but we can (to continue the metaphor) aim in the right direction, asymptotically approaching the bull's-eye.

In a Kantian sense, our beliefs about the actual world are filtered through the "rose-colored glasses" of M-objects. We use M-objects to construct a finite "model" of the infinite, actual world. At best, the world as we believe it to be is isomorphic to the actual world, and the nature of this isomorphism is embodied in the principle that if an M-object \( o \) has a Sein-correlate \( \alpha \), then \( F = o \iff \alpha \in F \). But it is important to realize that the success of our theories about the actual world depends on the "left-to-right" direction of this equivalence (the other direction being trivial): We can have knowledge of the actual object, if the M-object has Sein; but it does not follow that we would know that we had such knowledge.40

Our knowledge about an actual object \( \alpha \) can increase, or at least our beliefs can become more and more "accurate", as we continually replace some M-object correlated with \( \alpha \) by another one with more properties. We thus approach as a limit the complete and consistent M-object
correlated with $\alpha$. Our knowledge of states of affairs increases as we replace one objective by another. The former objective is, until replaced, our belief, which we act upon as if it had Sein. It is a hypothesis, which we replace when refuted, in good pragmatic fashion.

Thus, the problem of false belief is answered negatively: we cannot employ the correspondence theory of Sein as a means of deciding the existence of an objective. How, then, can we decide which objectives to believe? Those which "cohere" best with others—those which, e.g., are maximally consistent with others and have withstood refutation the longest. The correspondence theory is a metaphysical criterion of Sein; the coherence theory (or some version of one) is the epistemological criterion (cf. Grossmann [40]: 138 and [42]).

6. The Structure of Meinongian Objects.

6.1. Combinatorial possibility. We turn at last to an examination of the nature of M-objects and the relationship of them to their properties. To this end, we introduce a concept which will serve at once as a ground for the notions of Aussersein and of the actuality of M-objects, and which also will be of help in our discussion of constituency.

Meinong suggested that the mathematical theory of combinations could be placed "in the service of the theory of objects" ([63]: 511). To see how this might be done, let us turn to a consideration of a very weak sort of possibility.

Recall the problem of Nichtsein-objectives: an objective such as the round square lacks Sein "suggests" or "implies" that there "is" a
round square of which to deny existence. We may say, instead that it makes the round square "plausible" or that the objective the round square has Sein is "plausible" (or "colorable"). This notion of plausibility appears in other places, most notably when one is trying to prove a theorem: It sometimes happens that a problem which arises in the search for a proof is an "abstract" or "prima facie" (or "academic"; cf. Findlay [31]: 208) possibility, which needs to be examined and ruled out (as not being logically possible). Also, in animated films and trick photography, the situation in which, say, a cartoon character runs off a ledge yet doesn't fall is termed "the plausible impossible".

Related notions of possibility include Grossmann's "ontological" possibility, according to which "it is . . . ontologically possible that [this pencil] . . . is both red and not red" ([40]: 31); the "conceptual" possibility discussed in Section C.5.8; and Hintikka's "apparent" possibility ([43]: 44n.10). All of these notions have in common an independence of logical possibility and, hence, an intimate relation with the realm of M-objects, or possible objects of thought.

Each of these sorts of possibility stems from an incomplete (or finite) description. Thus, for example, it is plausible that one can run off a ledge without falling if one omits from one's description of the world the law of gravity. Similarly, "being round and square" or "being red and not red" may be considered as finite descriptions, each of each is, qua description, logically possible. The point may be put differently. To give a description, one must employ names of properties. Given the totality of properties, one can speak of various
combinations of them. These various combinations are all logically possible, and so we may say that any set of them is combinatorially possible (cf. Cohen [27]: 3 and Lewis [57]: 203). Since {being round, being square} is a combinatorially possible (c-possible) set of properties, we may treat it as an incomplete description.

Our strategy should now be obvious: we claim that M-objects are all c-possible. Indeed, c-possibility will solve the problems of Chapter I whether or not the AC0(O')-theory is viable. Orayen's objection (cf. n. 15) that that theory cannot be used as a "context of justification" for M-objects is thus avoidable. Our context of justification, if one be needed, is that c-possibility will allow us to have M-objects. But without an embedding theory, such as AC0(O'), c-possibility is an empty concept. That is why we delayed its introduction till now. It is the skeleton (but also the essential structure) of a solution, not a solution proper.

6.2. C-possibility, Aussersein, and Meinongian objects. One might wish to characterize actual objects incompletely described as being none other than incomplete M-objects. Incomplete descriptions are c-possible; that is, any set of properties is c-possible. It follows that all Soseins are c-possible, and, since there corresponds an M-object for every Sosein (cf. Sect. B.4), we see that all M-objects are c-possible. This includes the "impossible" ones (cf. Grossmann [40]: 250n.23) and the logically possible but non-existent ones such as ghosts (cf. Findlay [31]: 55). However, not all c-possible objects are possible objects of thought, for infinite M-objects are among the c-possibilia yet are not "thinkable".
Nevertheless, since all objects of thought are M-objects, c-possibility can serve as the ground of the psychological possibility involved in being a possible object of thought. In particular, the possible objects of thought are precisely the finite c-possibilia. This allows us to make the following crucial move: Since Meinong identified being a possible object of thought with "givenness" ([63]: 500), we can explicate the latter in terms of c-possibility, thus providing an alternative way out of the problem which led to Quasisein (cf. [63]: 492).

With this confluence of givenness, being a possible object of thought, and c-possibility, we can move swiftly to encompass Aussersein, too. The independence of c-possibility from logical possibility place c-possibilia (i.e., M-objects) far "beyond Sein and Nichtsein" and, hence, in the realm of Aussersein (cf. Grossmann [40]: 167). We have now the third and most fundamental interpretation of Aussersein— as the domain of c-possibilia (and, hence, of M-objects). Moreover, we can now allow our non-committal quantifiers to range over this domain.

Further, the identification recently made of the possible objects of thought with the finite c-possibilia is none other than the Principle of Freedom of Assumption (cf. Sect. A). According to this principle, we can choose from the realm of Aussersein (i.e., of c-possibilia) an M-object which has any given property. Among the various choice-functions is one we may call 'the'. The existence of such functions is guaranteed by the following non-trivial identity criterion for M-objects (which supplies what Lambert [53]: 313 claimed did not exist;
cf. Routley [91A: 3):

\[ o_1 = o_2 \iff \forall F (F \circ o_1 \leftrightarrow F \circ o_2). \]

Noting that the golden mountain = <being golden, being a mountain>, we may define the as that function whose domain is the class, S, of all c-possible Soseins (i.e., sets of properties), whose range, A, is the realm of Aussersein (i.e., all M-objects), and which is such that for every \( s \in S \), there is a unique \( o \in A \), such that \( o = \text{the}(s) \). In particular, where \( s = \{F, G, H\} \), \( \text{the}(s) = <F, G, H> \). For example, \( \text{the}(<\text{being round, being square}>)) = <\text{being round, being square}> = \text{the round square}. \)

(Note that the is an isomorphism.)

There is, of course, another use of 'the' in English, corresponding to a function from sets of properties to actual objects. This function, call it \( \text{the}^* \), is only a partial function; e.g., \( \text{the}^*(\{\text{being a present King of France}\}) \) is undefined. \( \text{the}^* \) is not especially important from the epistemological point of view (although of course it is metaphysically important), since it is isomorphic to the when its domain is restricted to the set of all Soseins whose M-objects have Sein. 43

Finally, not only are the objecta of our thoughts the finite c-possibilia, but also if we can conceive of an objective, then it is expressible as some grammatically possible combination of words, and, conversely, any grammatically possible combination of words is conceivable as an objective. Thus, we ought to be able to provide a uniform, model-theoretic ("direct") semantics for all such propositions, via the Sein-conditions for objectives, in accordance with the demands
of Chapter I. That is, paraphrasing Ryle ([99]: 262), the alternative facilities constantly provided by (developed) languages ought all to be handleable by such a semantics.

The present interpretation suggests that nothing is c-impossible (cf. the discussion of Nichtquasisein, Sect. B.2.3). That is, no combination of properties or words (perhaps modulo grammaticality) is such that we cannot think about it (or about the relevant M-object). To say otherwise would be to put a limitation on the nature of thought which is incompatible with the data of Chapter I. There may be objects that we are incapable of thinking about, either for physical reasons or because we don't yet have the required properties. Nevertheless, such properties exist, and therefore they can enter into possible combinations. Again, a c-impossible object would have to be constituted by properties not combinable in thought. Nevertheless, even were there such properties which thinking beings (not merely humans) could not think about, they would still be c-possible in the mathematical sense and, hence, ausserseiend.

6.3. The structure of constituency. The following diagram represents the relationships obtaining among actual and M-objects:

```
actual object
  /     \    
property --> M-object
  \     /    
      is a constituent of

exemplifies

is a Sein-
correlate of
```
Exemplification connects actual objects (and M-objects qua actual) with properties. Thus, while it is the case that if John thinks of the golden mountain, then \(<G,M>\) ex being-thought-of-by-John, in general \(<\text{being the Calder stabile in Bloomington}>\) (=\(<C>\)) does not exemplify being red \((R)\), even though the (actual) Calder stabile in Bloomington is red. On the present view, there is an actual object Sein-correlated with \(<C>\), and it exemplifies \(R\). There is no direct relationship between \(<C>\) and \(R\), but an indirect one. M-objects can be related to properties either directly via constituency or indirectly via SC together with ex. This "togetherness" is not reducible to constituency, since the truth of \(\exists a(\alpha \text{SC}<C> & \alpha \text{ex } R)\) does not entail that \(R \subseteq <C>\). Also, the fact that in some cases (e.g., 'the tallest mountain is tall') the composition of (the converse of) SC with ex is equivalent to \(c\) does not entail that \(c\) is redundant, since there are also cases of \(c\) that are not cases of \(\text{SC/ex}\) (e.g., 'the golden mountain is golden').

We have knowledge about actual objects and the properties they exemplify by means of M-objects and the properties which constitute them. Whether or not exemplification is merely constituency, i.e., whether or not the "Berkeleyan" tradition is metaphysically correct, we in fact only think of actual objects as complexes of properties, because we think of them via M-objects which are such complexes. In this section we turn to the nature of this complex.

Let us begin by considering Ryle's complaint that "Russell['s] . . . dictum 'logical constructions are to be preferred to inferred entities' would have horrified our champion inferrer of entities", 
viz., Meinong ([99]: 262). The first response to this is that if by 'entity' is meant "actual, non-Meinongian object", then Meinong is no champion. Second, on the present theory, the only entity inferred is, at most, a new mode of predication; for M-objects are treated as complexes of properties, and the latter either already exist or are themselves logical constructions from, say, actual objects or words.

There is one central criterion to which any analysis of the structure of objecta must be adequate. This is the fundamental distinction between a property, say F, and that which has the property (i.e., the subject of which the property is predicated), say <F>. In general, this is more of a distinction in function than in kind, since on most metaphysical views properties may themselves be treated as subjects of predication.

When presented with several properties, a mind can have either an idea of a single entity (an individual, if you will) or several ideas, one of each property. In the first case, the object of the idea is an objectum constituted by all of those properties; it is, in a sense, their joint instantiation (with respect to the constituency mode of predication). This illustrates the ability of the mind to "objectify" or "entify" a collection of properties--to be able to refer by means of noun phrases. Any attempt to exhibit the structure of an M-object is an attempt to represent this basic mental operation. Let us look at several such theories.

The question for which we seek an answer is this: Given a set of properties, i.e., a Sosein, what is the structure of the objectum constituted by those properties, i.e., having that Sosein? The first
possibility which offers itself is based on the fact that an object is determined by all of its subsisting Sosein-objectives (cf. Findlay [31]: 102). A natural interpretation of this is that an object, \( x \), is the set of all subsisting Sosein-objectives which are about \( x \). The difficulty with this is its apparent circularity, together with the fact that it does not provide an effective method for describing the object.

A somewhat more helpful answer is to view the act-component, \( A \), of a psychological experience as a function from the content-element, \( C \), to an object, \( O \); consequently, \( O \) could be defined as \( \lambda x(A^{-1}(x) = C) \). That is, the object of a psychological experience with content \( C \) is the unique item to which \( C \) is directed. This is reminiscent of the technique for introducing mathematical entities by "unique description", as, e.g., in the case of \(-1\) defined as \( \lambda x(x + 1 = 0) \), i.e., as the unique item satisfying a certain property. (Compare, too, Duns Scotus's description of haecceity as the unique thing which must have certain properties stemming from its role as individuator but is not otherwise characterized—or clarified.) We may, thus, consider the round square as \( \lambda x(x \text{ is round } \& x \text{ is square}) \), which we have chosen to represent as \( <R,S> \) (cf. Orayen [75]: 334). In general, then, given the Sosein-objective \( o \text{ is } F \), we abstract from it the objectum \( \lambda x(x \text{ is } F) \) (or \( \lambda x(F \in x) \)), written \( <F> \); given Sosein-objectives \( o \text{ is } F_1, \ldots, o \text{ is } F_n \), we abstract \( \lambda x(x \text{ is } F_1 \& \ldots \& x \text{ is } F_n) \), or \( <F_1, \ldots, F_n> \).

This appears to be essentially the solution proposed by Meinong's student Ernst Mally. Mally spoke of "determinations" (Bestimmungen), similar to Russell's propositional functions, each of which determines an object, but only some of which are "fulfillable" (erfüllbar) (cf.
Findlay [31]: 111, 183; and Weingartner [111]: 133-34). The difficulty with his theory is, first, that Mally rejects the Principle of Independence of Sosein from Sein (cf. [31]: 110), and second, it (like Scotus's haecceity) leaves unanswered the question of what is that \( x \) which satisfies \( x \text{ is } F \)? What sort of entity is it?

A plausible solution is that an object is the fusion, \( F_u \), of the set of its properties, i.e., of its Sosein, in the sense of Leonard and Goodman [56]. Thus, we might take the object \( \langle F_1, \ldots, F_n \rangle \) to be \( F_1 + \ldots + F_n \). There are, unfortunately, several problems with this approach. First, since the sum of individuals is again an individual, there is the possibility that a sum of properties is another property rather than an object. This in turn raises the question of the relation of a complex property such as red-and-round (if such there be) to the sum, red+round. Most seriously, however, is the fact that \( F_u\{F\} = F \), which violates the requirement that \( \langle F \rangle \neq F \). Nevertheless, it might turn out that those theses of the calculus of individuals which depend upon the identification of \( F \) with \( F_u\{F\} \) are not crucial to Meinongian theories; or, less happily, it might be possible to revise the calculus so as to provide some new individual, distinct from \( F \), to serve as \( F_u\{F\} \).

We leave these last two conjectures for future investigation.

7. Summary.

For convenience, let us call the present theory 'T'. Two types of entities are recognized by T: M-objects and actual objects. Besides these, T is also committed to properties, and for every property \( F \), there corresponds a unique and distinct "complementary" property, \( \overline{F} \).
T also admits sets of these properties, called Soseins. Finally, there are three relations: being a Sein-correlate of (SC), being a constituent of (c), and exemplifying (ex), such that if 'o' and 'α' name an M-object and an actual object, respectively, and 'F' is a variable ranging over properties, then αSCo iff ∀F(F α → α ex F).

The main theses of T which correspond to (M1)-(M9), of Section A, may then be stated as follows:

(T1) M-objects are c-possibilia (cf. (M4)).

(T2) Psychological events are analyzable as consisting of an act, A, and a content, C, such that A is directed to an (unique) M-object by C (cf. (M1)).

(T3) Definition: Let o be an M-object. Then o has Sein iff ∃α(αSCo) (cf. (M3)).

(T4) ~∀α∃o(αSCo) (cf. (M2)).

(T5) ∃o(∃F(F ∈ S) & ∀F(F α iff F ∈ S)) (cf. (M5)).

(T6) (T4) and (T5) are not inconsistent (cf. (M6)).

(T7) (a) ∀F(∃F(F ∈ S) → ∃o∀F(F α iff F ∈ S)) (cf. (M7a)).

(b) The psychological act (A) can be directed to any finite c-possibilium (cf. (M7b)).

(T8) ∃o∀F(F α x & F α x) (cf. (M8)).

(T9) The meaning of any noun phrase (including all definite descriptions) is an M-objectum; the meaning of any sentence (or proposition) is an M-objective; and the truth conditions for sentences (or propositions) are equivalent to the Sein-conditions for objectives, subject to the Principles of Minimization of Ambiguity and Maximization of Truth (cf. (M9)).

We may also note that in addition to (T4), (T5), and (T7a), we also have:

(T10) ∀α∃o(αSCo)

(T11) ∀α∃F(∃F(F ∈ S) & ∀F(F ∈ S ↔ α ex F))

(T12) ~∀F(∃F(F ∈ S) → ∃α∀F(F ∈ S → α ex F)).
The last of these, (T12), is crucial; for if there were an actual object corresponding to every Sosein, (T6) would fail. But ~(T12) is equivalent to

$$\forall \exists \exists \alpha (\exists \alpha \in F \land \exists \alpha \in \overline{F})$$

which violates the Law of Contradiction (ALC1a). That is, the Principle of Independence of Sosein from Sein (T6) is a direct consequence of the Law of Contradiction.
Notes to Chapter II

1 Cf. defs. 4-7 of the substantive 'object' and def. 1b of the obsolete adjective 'object' in [76]: 1963. Contrast Parsons' use of the term in [77]: 561-62.

2 'Ausser-' means "outside" in the sense of the prefix 'extra-'. 'Seiend' is best understood by comparing it to the adjective 'existierend' = "existent", as in 'an existent book' or 'the book is (an) existent'.

3 It should be noted that Findlay misdefines "incomplete object" as "finite object", but it is clear from Meinong [66] that incomplete objects can have an infinite number of determinations.


5 And when I point to an object so as to communicate its position to my cat, he looks at my finger!

6 Since "an objective must be about something . . . [but] no objec
tum is ever about anything else" (Findlay [31]: 72), we might also note that x is an objective iff x is about some y, and otherwise x is an objectum.

7 This distinction was pointed out to me by Hector-Neri Castañeda.

8 Concerning that-clauses, Meinong has this to say:

   Whoever . . . says, for example, "I believe that [the] harmonically pure can be melodically impure", says at least fundamentally etymologically nothing other than:

   "I believe this: [the] harmonically pure can be melodically impure". ([65]: 48.)


9 Note, however, that here truth seems to be ascribed to the objective in its role as objectum.

10 There is a potential textual objection to this in Meinong [65]. Since both the discussion of the content-object relationship and the objection are from different writings, seven years apart and at least six years after [63], our methodology does not require a reply; however,
it will be instructive to see how, on a very simple assumption, no problem need arise. In [65]: 276, we read:

... if I at one time apprehend the color Black through Seinsmeinen (reference by way of Sein), [and] at another time use the same content in addition (dazu) to think of "something which is black", in short "a black thing (ein Schwarzes)".

However, if a difference in object entails a difference in content, as we have just seen, then sameness of content entails sameness of object and the same content cannot serve to apprehend both the property Black and an object which is black, these being distinct things. It appears to follow that Meinong, at least at the time of [65], held that the object something black was the same as the property Blackness. Moreover, it seems to follow that the same content could be used for all black things, and this appears to be in conflict with the definition of content as that which, by directly varying with the object, directs our attention to the object.

I take it as a fundamental datum—a necessary assumption—that there is a distinction between a property and that which has the property, i.e., between predicate and subject. We may, then, either ignore the cited passage as irrelevant (in the Darwinian sense) or find some explanation for it. A plausible explanation may be had by recalling that it was only on the condition that the act-type remained constant, that different objects were apprehended by different contents. Apprehension through Seinsmeinen is apprehension of an objective, in particular, a Sein-objective of the form Black has Sein; but apprehension of a black thing is apprehension of an objectum. Hence, the difference in objects can be accounted for by a difference in acts.

A related problem, not so easily taken care of, is that "the same object can be apprehended by means of different contents. A blackboard, for example, can be apprehended by means of the content of the presentation [i.e., Vorstellung] 'black' as well as by means of the presentation 'square', since it is something black as well as something square" (Grossmann [40]: 194). This appears to be a counterexample to the principle that a difference in contents entails a difference in objects. It seems more reasonable to hold that a "black"-content only apprehends the object something black and a "square"-content only apprehends the object something square. Hence, neither apprehends the object something black and square nor a blackboard. To apprehend an object, a content must be precisely adequate to it (cf. Findlay [31]: 9); so, if the content is: "black", then its object is something black, and its object can be the blackboard only in some indirect sense dependent upon the relation (which is not genuine identity) between the blackboard and something black.

Cf. Kohl [46]: 23, where it is suggested "that for fluent speakers all material object words denote perfectly determinate classes."
For other observations on the uselessness of the distinction, cf. Lambert [55]: 225, Parsons [77]: 566f, Routley [91]: 227, and Landesman [54]: 4-6.

Similarly, it is impossible for two red apples to reflect the same photons, i.e., to have the same "particularized" color. Cf. Sect. B.2.1.

Grossman, it should be noted, objects to this interpretation.

A different sort of problem for which it provides a solution is Orajen's criticism that because the ACO-theory is the context of discovery of Meinongian objects, it cannot be used as the context of justification for them ([75]: 334f). Our method, of course, is different: we seek to develop Meinong's theory to explain the data of Ch. I. Our argument will be that the ACO(O')-theory together with a Meinongian theory of objects does the job and is thereby justified. However, even if the ACO(O')-theory is wrong, the AC(O')-theory suffices; hence, we don't even need to use the ACO-theory to justify Meinongian objects.

In S. Marc Cohen's lectures on Aristotle at Indiana University in 1972.

Meinong believed that they were; cf. Findlay [31]: 104.

To interpret (21) as:

\[ (21') \forall x (x = \text{the golden mountain} \rightarrow M_1(x, \text{being golden})) \]

would make (21) true, but would also make

\[ (21'') \text{The golden mountain is silver} \]

ture. Similarly, to interpret (21) by

\[ (21'''') \forall x (M_1(x, \text{being golden}) \& M_1(x, \text{being a mountain}) \rightarrow M_1(x, \text{being golden})) \]

also makes (21'') true. Yet part of our data is that (21'') is not true.

Castañeda has argued, in conversation, that his two copulas are not relations, although they are "dyadic entities". Perhaps; but I do not see the difference. Copulas, according to him, are not relations because (1) \( \exists R(aRb) \) cannot be instantiated to 'a is b', and (2) they cannot be put into "guise cores" (cf. [8]: 2,5; [15]: 63-64). In reply to (1), I don't see why, say, 'my notebook is red' is not an instantiation of \( \exists R(\text{my notebook R red}) \). As for (2), while copulas (or, for that matter, relations) as such cannot be members of either cores or Soseins, relational properties can be. Hence, being exemplified by my notebook or exemplifying red can be members of Soseins, even if not of cores.

The analogy is, of course, incomplete, since in the actual situation, there are many M-objects corresponding to each actual object.
But the metaphor of M-objects as "projections" of the actual world onto our minds is accurate.

21 Castañeda's image is that of a "metaphysical prism". So, too, is Scholes': "the white radiance of truth [i.e., fact] ... fragmented by the prism of fiction" ([101]: 3-4).

22 Due to c-possibility; see Sect. 6.1. We also note here that existing objects must also be consistent; see below.

23 I have in mind here the 3-pronged/2-pronged tuning fork, illustrated in Katz [45]: 132.

24 Sometimes, perhaps, minds are in direct contact with actual objects. I have in mind here cases of demonstrative reference—in general, of perception. At the very least, the objects of perception are, if finite or incomplete, vastly "larger" or "more" complete than objects of non-perceptual psychological acts.

25 But we can "construct" such worlds, populating them with suitable M-objects. Indeed, from the standpoint of the actual world, m-Sein-correlation could be taken as the identity relation restricted to some set m of M-objects. Problems of transworld identity may be handled in such a manner, too; cf. Findlay [31]: 209, 216-17. And an M-object <F,G> appears to be rigidly designated by "the F-ing G" (cf. Kripke [47]: 269).

26 J. Michael Dunn, in a personal communication, says that

\[(\text{PI}.11) \quad \neg \forall x (x \text{ has Sosein} \rightarrow x \text{ has Sein})\]

"seems to me to be the correct formulation of PI, with \(\rightarrow\) as relevant entailment. If \(\rightarrow\) were strict implication, this would collapse to your PI 10."

27 We note here that if one views properties as being eliminable in some way in favor of words, as some nominalists or behaviorists might be inclined, then one can view objecta as being constituted by words, and so (R1) is perfectly acceptable (and need not be analyzed into (R1A) and (R1B); cf. Sect. B.5 and n. 38).

28 This way of attacking the problem runs into certain difficulties. Our construal of PI is tantamount to saying that no Sosein-property is a Sein-entailing property, and this agrees with at least one statement made by Meinong: "There is (Es gibt) no object whose existence (Existenz) follows apriori from its nature (Natur)" ([67]: 95). Unfortunately, he appears to have vacillated on this point (cf. Goodmann [40]: 118), although it is possible that the only exceptions he allowed were for the subsistence of abstract objects (cf. Chisholm [21]: 256 n.8). For more on existence-entailing properties, see Cocchiarella [26].
There is, perhaps, a structural similarity between our postulation of entities, viz., M-objects (especially objectives), as the "carriers" of our beliefs and the physicists' postulation of entities (e.g., gluons, photons) as "carriers" of certain forces (e.g., the strong force, the electromagnetic force); cf. Glashow [35]: 45.

On the relation of epistemological to metaphysical ontology, cf. the discussion of Quine's ontology/ideology distinction in Hintikka [43], Sect. VIII and of phenomenological ontology in Castañeda [7], Sect. 8 and [13]: 10-16.

Here, note that at least one of the members of this ratio must itself be a finite representation of an irrational.

Perhaps we can; but we don't perceive them all—i.e., we are not conscious of them all. From a neurophysiological point of view, our brains do not and cannot process all of the information our senses feed it. Indeed, this is almost logically impossible, else our senses would be transmitting "noise" rather than "information". Cf. McCulloch [62]: 74ff, 146ff, 308ff.

We shall be more explicit on this ambiguity in Sect. 6.2.

Our reply follows the lines of a reply sent to Orayen by Castañeda; but since our two modes of predication differ from Castañeda's (see Ch. III, Sect. B), the details of our replies are also different.

Cf. Castañeda [7]: 12; Findlay [31]: 152, 160ff; Grossmann [40]: 31; Parsons [77]: 565; Plantinga [80]: 150; and Routley [91]: 150 for further discussion.

Their argument is a generalization of that of Orayen [75], dealt with above, and a similar one concerning $\forall x(x\neq x)$ found in Grandy [37]: 149. For the latter, we note that while being non-self-identical $c$ $<$being non-self-identical$ = \exists x(x\neq x), \exists x(x\neq x)$ exemplifies being self-identical, i.e., $\exists x(x\neq x) = \exists x(x\neq x)$.

Cf. Coleridge, cited in Chomsky [23]: 88 n.44.

Cf. Popper [82]: 69, 124, 428; for a more general discussion, cf. Walters [110], esp. 411ff.

The accepted belief that 'bachelors are unmarried' is "analytic" when understood as a relation between the properties of being a bachelor and being unmarried can be explained as follows. Consider the word 'bachelor' and all synthetic relations, so to speak, involving it. Find among them those relations which have the largest number of others among them as deductive consequents (e.g., according to classical logic). Call these 'analytic' (in a derivative sense). Thus, e.g., while 'bachelors are unmarried males' expresses a synthetic objective, since
all meanings (or semantic relations) of 'bachelor' can be deduced from it, it holds a central place in the logical network of these relations and so may be termed analytic. Cf. Ch. IV, n. 3.

39. This is merely a plausible proposal offered as a clarifying example. For an alternative analysis from a linguistic viewpoint, cf. Labov [48], esp. Sect. 4.

40. A psychological act "as it were, looks 'through' the model", e.g., an objective, indirectly at the actual objects, e.g., states of affairs (Popovich [81]: 23). True belief is looking "through" an objective which is "isomorphic" to a state of affairs; false belief is looking "through" an objective which is not thus isomorphic and not realizing the difference.

41. M-objectives are also ausserseiend. Indeed, they are combinations of M-objects with properties and are, hence, all c-possible. Aussersein can now be thought of as a "space" of "points", each of which represents some c-possible M-object or objective, and some of which are "occupied" by actual objects or states of affairs. Cf. Findlay [31]: 112.

42. Of course, we need either, in addition, a quantifier to range over actual objects, or else a quantifier which ranges indiscriminately over the union of the domains of Sein and Aussersein; the latter is (also) non-committal.

43. Parsons [77]: 572f has similar machinery. Another mechanism for choice is the 1-many relation a(n), with the same domain and range as the. Here, a(n)(s) ε {o ε A: (VFes)(F c o)}. Thus, to revert to the English reading, <round, square, pink> is a round square.

44. This is as it should be. Since M-objects are not parts of their actual-object correlates (if any), but are, rather, "projections" (into the world) of thoughts, it follows that a reasonable materialistic interpretation of them is as "brain states", sequences of neuron firings, or the like. And these are, in general, not (e.g.) red. Cf. Ch. III, n. 7.

45. A similar technique is developed in Goodman [36]: 49-57 and Yoes [114]. The fusion operator, Fu, also appears capable of being an interpretation of the concretizing operator, c, of Castañeda [7]: 11.
CHAPTER III

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

In this chapter, we examine two other theories which satisfy (M1)-(M9). One (Parsons') is an attempt to reconstruct Meinong's theory and, thus, shares similar goals with ours; but it makes little or no attempt to fit such a theory to any external data. The other (Castañeda's) is an original construction of a theory "made to measure" for such data.

A. Parsons' Meinongian Object Theory

Terence Parsons' "coherent reconstruction" of Meinong's Theory of Objects appeared as "A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics" [77]. There are some obvious similarities with our theory as put forth in Chapter II, as is to be expected from two formal renderings of a common theory. In this section, we examine some problems with Parsons' theory and raise some questions not answered in [77].

1. Properties.

Parsons distinguishes between two sorts of properties, "nuclear" and "extranuclear", based on a similar distinction Meinong adopted from Mally ([77]: 569, Findlay [31]: 176). Roughly, and in terms of our theory, a property, F, is nuclear iff F is a constituent of some M-object, and extranuclear iff exemplified by some M-object. (But cf. Ch. IV, Sect. B.4.) "Examples of . . . [nuclear] properties are: being blue, being clever, being 6 feet tall" ([77]: 564); examples of
extranuclear properties are: being an object, being possible, being incomplete ([77]: 569).

Some properties, however, appear capable of being both, even though Parsons views the classification as being disjoint ([77]: 569). For instance, the property of being thought about by Russell (TR) appears to be extranuclear ([77]: 569 n.13, 577) and (in our terms) capable of exemplification by the round square, \(<R,S>\). Yet, it can also be nuclear and (in our terms) capable of being a constituent of the round square thought about by Russell, \(<R,S,TR>\) ([77]: 569 n.13). Parsons says that it "cannot be nuclear, for then the round square (i.e., \ldots [<R,S>]) could not have been thought about by Russell without being the round square thought about by Russell (i.e., \ldots [<R,S,TR>])" ([77]: 569 n.13). But this indicates that what Parsons (or Meinong) needs is not a distinction between kinds of properties, but one between kinds of predications, as in our theory. Then, indeed, we can have \(<R,S>\) ex TR (i.e., the round square can have been thought about by Russell) without \(<R,S> = <R,S,TR>\). (However, some relation, short of genuine identity, ought to hold between these M-objects; we discuss this in Chapter IV.)

The two sorts of properties also raise a problem for fictional items. Presumably, the property of having been a character in a novel by Conan Doyle is an extranuclear property. But does not 'Sherlock Holmes' name \(<\text{living at 221B Baker Street, being a detective, solving crimes, \ldots}>\) ([77]: 568) just as well as \(<\text{being a character in a novel by Conan Doyle}>\)?
It would be better, as I have urged, to have two modes of predication. Parsons notes that Castañeda does this ([77]: 569 n.14), but, as we shall see in Section B, Castañeda's "external" predication is not merely predication of extranuclear properties as Parsons seems to think. Minimally, Parsons might be better off by saying that $F$ is nuclearly predicated of $o$ iff $F \subset o$, and $F$ is extranuclearly predicated of $o$ iff $o \ex F$, though, for reasons dealt with in Chapter II, we feel it more useful to extend exemplification to all actual objects rather than limit it to $M$-objects. With two modes of predication, no criterion is needed to distinguish between nuclear and extranuclear properties ([77]: 569). Rather, we need a criterion to distinguish between the two sorts of predication; but this criterion is, in general, a pragmatic one, depending on such pragmatic considerations as speaker and context, and guided by the principles of maximum truth and minimum ambiguity (Ch. II, Sect. C.5.9.2).

A final difference between the theories' treatment of properties concerns the truth-value of 'a is $P$'. Both agree that 'a is $P$' is true iff (in our terms) $P \subset a$ ([77]: 571). For Parsons, however, 'a is $P$' is false iff (in our terms) $P \not\subset a$ and $P \subset a$, while for us it is false iff $P \not\subset a$. We, unlike Parsons, find an ambiguity in 'a is not $P$' according to which this can be true if $P \subset a$.

2. Existence.

Parsons' theory recognizes two kinds of entities: individuals and objects ([77]: 564f); these correspond, respectively, to our actual and $M$-objects. Thus, Parsons, too, has a type-distinction, though he
does not argue for it. This is odd, since Meinong did not have the
type-distinction, and Parsons is not attempting (as we are) to meet
any but textual data.

Parsons takes individuals as primitive ([77]: 564, 579f) and
leaves objects unspecified—until p. 578, where he suggests that the
set of individuals forms a proper subset of the set of objects. In
our terms, he is holding that all actual objects are M-objects; our
theory, as previously stated, holds the reverse: all M-objects are
actual.

Parsons' move raises certain problems for his theory. First, it
appears to conflate his extranuclear-extranuclear relations (sets of
ordered pairs of objects) with nuclear-nuclear relations (sets of
ordered pairs of individuals) (cf. [77]: 579).

Second, on his view, if the object of my thought exists, it is
an individual and, therefore, it would appear, has an infinite number
of properties. But then, if I think of the morning star, which exists,
I am thereby thinking of the evening star, and this is incompatible
with the data presented by Fregean tetrads in Chapter I. In [77A]: 4,
he urges that:

substitutivity of identity in such contexts usually
doesn't fail, and that this datum is of paramount im-
portance in formulating a theory of intentionality.
Consider . . . [this] argument . . . :

II. I was thinking about Gerald Ford
Gerald Ford is our president
I was thinking about our president

Here, I think, Parsons has hit on something but runs the risk of miss-
ing the big picture. The risk is in not taking into account all the
data: both arguments in which substitutivity does and arguments in which it doesn't fail. But by observing that arguments such as (II) are valid, he gives a hint as to the nature of the required theory. The key is that (II) is an argument in the first person (as are all of his valid-inference examples in [77A]). Consider these versions of (II):

(IIA) I$_{Rapaport}$ believe Ford is from Michigan. Ford is our president. Therefore I$_{Rapaport}$ believe our president is from Michigan.

(IIB) Parsons believes Ford is from Michigan. Ford is our president. Therefore Parsons believes our president is from Michigan.

(IIC) Parsons was thinking about Ford. Ford is our president. Therefore Parsons was thinking about our president.

Any validity (II) and (IIA) have stems from their first-person nature; they reveal clearly the content (form) of my (Rapaport's) thinking---they are propositionally transparent. The invalidity (if any) of (IIB) and (IIC) is due to their second-hand nature. Someone (who at least believes him- or herself to be) other than Parsons is reporting the content (form) of Parsons' belief, and the report is propositionally opaque.

Finally, the assimilation of objects and individuals in the direction Parsons takes leaves undiscussed the questions of the relation of individuals to their properties and of the nature of non-existing objects: if non-existing objects are not individuals, what are they? Surely, they are not mere sets of properties, for then so ought to be individuals (i.e., existing objects) on grounds of parity (cf. Ch. I, n.22).
This raises the issue of existence. For Parsons (as for us), it is objects, not individuals, which do or don't exist. He claims ([77]: 566 n.9) that his quantifiers range over objects, so as to avoid existential "loading", yet his definition of 'exists' (same page)—"o exists = df (∃i)(i^C = o)"—either contradicts that claim or forces (rather than "suggests") individuals to be objects.

Let us look at his definition more closely. The 'i^C' stands for an "individual correlate", i.e., a Sosein (a set of properties), and the 'i' ranges over individuals. The definition, then, comes down to this: o exists iff o is (or, corresponds to) an individual correlate, i.e., iff o is (or, corresponds to) a set of properties had by an individual. In our terminology, this becomes: o exists (in Parsons' sense) iff ∃x{F: F c o} = {F: a ex F}; this is much more restrictive than our notion of exists, according to which o exists iff ∃x{F: F c o} ⊆ {F: a ex F}. Indeed, on Parsons' view, the blue pen on my desk does not exist, since ~(∃i)(i^C = {being blue, being a pen, being on my desk}) due to the finitude of that set.

Finally, let us look at Parsons' treatment of the existent round square ([77]: 573f). His analysis proceeds by rendering 'the existent round square exists' as 'the E_{1,RSE_{2}}'s' in order not to beg any questions, and 'the E_{1,RS}' is taken to be a "Meinongian" description as opposed to an "actual" one. The first possibility he considers is that E_{1} is an extranuclear property. In that case, 'the E_{1,RS}' does not refer, and so 'the E_{1,RSE_{2}}'s' is not true. But I see no reason why the description cannot refer to <E_{1,R},S>, making the sentence false; indeed, this is explicitly allowed by our theory and also by Meinong's
own (cf. Ch. II, Sect. B.5). If \( E_1 \) is nuclear, on the other hand, Parsons' solution is essentially ours (except for his two kinds of properties vs. our two kinds of predications): \( E_2 \) might then be nuclear, too, in which case the sentence is harmlessly true; or \( E_2 \) might be extranuclear and the sentence false. There is, however, a difference between "not true" and "false". Parsons allows truth-value gaps. Here, he differs sharply from our theory, since we, following Meinong, hold that every objective either has or lacks Sein, *tertium non datur* (cf. Ch. II, Sects. B.3.3.3, C.5.9.3).

**B. Castañeda's Theory of Guises and Consubstantiation**

The theory put forth by Hector-Neri Castañeda in [7]-[8], [10]-[13], and [15] is not intended as a version of Meinong's theory. Nevertheless, it demands consideration here for several reasons. First, it is the chronological and philosophical predecessor of the theory we constructed in Chapter II. Second, the data supporting and motivating Castañeda's theory overlaps greatly (if not entirely) with that of Chapter I (cf. [7], [11]). Finally, embodied in his theory are theses corresponding to the nine key theses of Meinong's theory, listed as (M1)-(M9) in Chapter II.

1. Guises.

The theoretical analogue of M-objects in Castañeda's theory are called "guises". Both serve as the objects of linguistic reference, in particular, of definite descriptions ([7]: 23, [11]: 128, [15]: 65); both are the objects of thought ([7]: 17, [11]: 128, [15]: 3), and guises are also objects of perception ([11]: 128, [15]: 3); and both
are related to sets, which may be finite, of relatively arbitrary properties. Such sets are called "guise cores" by Castañeda. One marginal difference here is that our Soseins are sets of arbitrary monadic (including relational) properties, whereas cores are restricted to monadic (including relational) first-order properties ([7]: 11; [8]: 110-11, 114; [15]: 62).

Where \{F_1, \ldots, F_n\} is a core, c\{F_1, \ldots, F_n\} is a guise. What is c? Parsons believes (and I am inclined to agree) that it is a function from cores to guises ([77]: 565 n.6), much as our < > is a function from Soseins to M-objects intended as a formal counterpart of the mental operation of "individualizing" or "objectifying" discussed in Chapter II, Section C.6.3. According to Castañeda [10], c's role is to be the "individuator"—that which turns the core (an "abstract individual") into a "concrete individual" ([7]: 10f) and thus solves the classic problem of individuation. Its ontological category is that of being an "operator" ([7]: 11), which Castañeda claims is not a function. But what an operator is if not a function is unspecified; he suggests that it is an operator in a "constitutive" sense, similar to a part-whole structure (cf. [15]: 62-64) but leaves this further unspecified. This attitude is defensible, however: In a sense, the obscurity of c is superior to the functional account, since Castañeda's desire is to "clarify the metaphysical status" of c, while the functional interpretation merely "adds to the mystery" rather than resolving it. (Cf. Ch. II, n.45, for a possible interpretation of c.)

There is one more feature of c which must be taken into account. Castañeda has said that in its rules of formation c is a "generalization"
of the definite-description operator, \( l \), which allows for an infinite number of properties, and guises are generalizations of the senses of definite descriptions ([11]: 126). More precisely, since the schema for the \( l \)-operator is \( \forall x(F_1 x \& \ldots \& F_n x) \), how in the absence of infinite conjunction is one to allow for a "description" involving all of the (infinitely many) properties of an actual object? The move advocated is to introduce an "operator", \( c \), on sets of properties of arbitrary cardinality. An important open question here (recognized as such by Castañeda) is whether the members of this "core" are to be properties (e.g., \( F \)-ness) or propositional functions (e.g., \( F x \)), for it is unclear whether one can have sets of things (like propositional functions) which aren't individuals.

The main difference between guises and M-objects, however, concerns their relations to physical and actual objects, respectively. Guises are, literally, parts of the infinitely-propertied physical objects in that the physical objects are consubstantiation-clusters of guises: semi-lattices of mutually consubstantiated guises, whose maximal elements are "Leibnizian", or maximally consistent, guises (cf. [7]: 16, 26; [11]: 128; [15]: 43, 80). M-objects are not parts, in any sense, of actual objects; that is, SC is not a part-whole relation. For example, guises "of physical objects are physical entities" ([15]: 44); in contrast, M-objects Sein-correlated with physical entities are not physical, though they are actual and, thus, exemplify properties in their own right. Physical-object guises, because they are physical objects too, are infinitely (albeit externally) propertied
in their own right, also, by means of the consubstantiation relations in which they stand.

This theoretical difference can be highlighted as follows. In Castañeda's theory, "for any property Fness, the existing Fer is the same as the Fer" ([7]: 21). For us, the actual Fer is not the Fer: the actual α such that αSC<φ> ≠ <φ>. But the actual existing Fer is identical with the actual Fer: the actual α such that αSC<φ> = the actual α such that αSC<φ,F>, where F = being existent. However, here F must be "unique", since, for most G, ∃α∃β(αSC<G> & βSC<G> & α ≠ β).

Let us make the difference between our theories explicit. For Castañeda, physical objects are (concrete) patterns of guises. This may be seen most clearly in his discussion of change:

[C]hanges in a physical object are to be understood as the separation of some guises from the remaining subsystem of guises in a physical object. ([15]: 93.)

Here, "some" includes the Leibnizian guise at the top of the semi-lattice (though not (necessarily) the quasi-Leibnizian guises which "point" to it; cf. [15]: 72f). So when a change occurs, one physical object disappears and is replaced by another.

In our theory, actual objects turn out to be very much like bare substrates, having merely external relations to properties. On our theory, if an actual object α changes a property, we keep α but locate the change in its (external) relationships to M-objects. Thus,

∃α(αSCx (at t) & ~αSCx (at t')).

But it is the same (genuinely identical) α.
2. **External Predication.**

Castañeda distinguishes, as we have noted in Chapter II, Section C.4.1.1, between "internal" and "external" modes of predication. The former links guises with the properties in their cores. More precisely, internal predication is a "compounding of the way in which properties enter into guise cores and the way in which guise cores enter into guises" ([15]: 64). While this is somewhat unclear, it is sufficiently like our constituency mode of predication to be acceptable.

External predication, on the other hand, is not the expected direct link between a guise and non-core properties, although it is the method whereby the link is forged (cf. [7]: 13; [15]: 75). Thus, it differs from our exemplification—the mode in which properties are predicated of actual objects. Nor is it, pace Parsons (as noted above, Section A.1), the predication of extranuclear properties. Indeed, Parsons lacks any link between his objects and nuclear properties not in them (recall that he identifies objects with sets of nuclear properties). This, I believe, is because his only existing objects (i.e., those even potentially linkable with non-constituting nuclear properties) are complete and consistent; thus, all predications for him appear to be of the internal or constituting variety. Castañeda's and our theories need external linkage of one variety or another because we both allow finite items (guises and M-objects) to "exist" (albeit in different senses, as will be seen). That is, if the blue pen on my desk is \{blueness (B), penness (P), on-my-desk-ness (D)\} and doesn't exist, as for Parsons, then there is no need to account for its being a Bic; but if the blue pen on my desk is \(_\text{c}\{B,P,D\}\) or \(<B,P,D>\) and does
exist (i.e., is self-consubstantiated or has a Sein-correlate, respectively), then there is need for linking it with the property of being a Bic. (Castaneda's guise is so linked by being consubstantiated with its being-a-Bic protraction; our M-object is so linked by having a Sein-correlate in common with <being a Bic>.)

Castañeda's external predication connects pairs of guises to a few "externally predicables", viz., what he calls the "sameness family" ([11], Sect. IV), the most important of which is consubstantiation (C*), to which we now turn.

3. Consustbantiation.

From examples such as those in [11]: 13f, we can characterize C* roughly and informally in a somewhat recursive fashion. Statements of the form 'x is externally F' which are to be analyzed by means of C* are first analyzed as so-called contingent identities of the form 'x is contingently identical to the F-ing x', and these are then ontologically assayed as consubstantiations of guises: C*xy if x is (in the pre-theoretical sense) contingently identical to y. Formally, C* is characterized by the laws given in [7]: 15-17 and [15]: 78f.

It may seem that C* is an analogue of our CSC-relation (Ch. II, Sect. C.5.7.5), for just as

\[ C^* (a, b) \]

([7]: 13; brackets in original.)

so can it be put, in our theory, as the fact that
\exists \alpha \exists \beta (\alpha \text{SCa} \land \beta \text{SCb} \land \alpha = \beta)

or \ \exists \alpha (\alpha \text{SCa} \land \alpha \text{SCb})

or \ \alpha \text{CSCb}.

The appearance of analogy is fostered, too, by such partial characterizations as:

Consubstantiation is the co-existence of guises into one ordinary object. ([13]: 325; cf. [11]: 145, [15]: 49.)

However, CSC and C* are quite distinct, for the former is not transitive (Ch. II, Sect. C.5.7.5) while the latter is.

Before we can give an answer to the question of how C* might be modeled in our theory, we will need to consider its nature in greater detail. It should be noted that Castañeda analyzes 'x is externally F' as

(38) \ C^*(x, x[F])

and not as

(39) \ C^*(x, c\{F\}).

(In (38), x[F] is the "F-protraction" of x: where x = c\alpha, x[F] = c(\alpha \cup \{F\}).)

But (39) can't be correct; otherwise c\{F\} would exist (which is generally false in Castañeda's theory), and C* would not be transitive. To see the latter, suppose we analyzed 'x is a horse' as: C*(x, c\{being a horse (H)\}). It would follow (by C*.0, [15]: 78) that c\{H\} existed, which it doesn't (although <H> does exist in our theory).

Similarly, we would be able to show that c\{being an animal (A)\} and c\{being one-horned (OH)\} existed. Since x is both a horse and an
animal, we would have $C^*(c\{H\}, c\{A\})$; and since a narwhal is a one-horned animal, we would have $C^*(c\{A\}, c\{OH\})$. Were $C^*$ transitive (as, of course, it is), these would yield: $C^*(c\{H\}, c\{OH\}^*)$, which is false, there being no unicorns. But $C^*$ is transitive, $c\{H\}$ doesn't exist, and (39)-style analyses are incorrect.

Let us say that if $x$ is a protraction of $y$, then $y$ is a retract of $x$. The non-existence of the thing which alone has nothing but the property of being a horse, viz., $c\{H\}$, leads to the interesting result that, in general, existing guises are not consubstantiated with their retracts, but only with their existing retracts (whereas, for each property, $F$, an existing guise is always consubstantiated with either its $F^*_\neg$ or its $\neg F$-protraction, by $C^*6$, [7]: 16).

The non-existence of $c\{H\}$ is not a rarity. In general, such "singleton" guises don't exist, unless their constituting property is sufficiently complex. Castañeda's picture of the world (cf. our pictures in Chapter II, Section C.5.7.2) is, roughly, this:

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  each (triangular) cluster of guises is an ordinary, infinitely propertied individual.
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We said that \( C^* \) was not CSC; yet, clearly, \( C^* \) is related somehow to our SC-relation. Without more ado, they are related as follows:

\[
(A^*) \quad C^{xy} \text{ iff } 3a3b(\alpha SCx \land \beta SCy \land V(\gamma SCx \rightarrow \gamma = \alpha) \land V(\delta SCy \rightarrow \delta = \beta) \land \alpha = \beta).
\]

That is, two guises are consubstantiated iff each (or, rather, the M-object-analogue of each) has the same, unique Sein-correlate. It is a straightforward task to show that \( (A^*) \) satisfies all the laws of consubstantiation. For instance, \( x \) exists iff \( C^{xx} \), i.e., iff \( \exists!\alpha(\alpha SCx) \), which is quite a different concept of existence from ours. Also, no singleton guise exists, since each such guise (or, again, its M-object analogue) usually has more than one Sein-correlate. Note, too, that our theory is capable of expressing this relationship between singleton individuals and actual objects while Castañeda's theory is not; that is, we can say '\( \exists x(\alpha SCx) \)', but Castañeda cannot.

The important feature of \( (A^*) \), however, is that while it is an isomorphism, it is not a reduction of one theory to another. Indeed, it can't be, given the differences between guises and M-objects.

4. Existence.

Let us, finally, turn to questions of existence and the existent round square. Castañeda's existence is a relation between guises, ours is a relation between the two domains of actual and M-objects (or, between certain actual objects and certain others; or, between the representations and the represented, to use a different vocabulary).

Is existence a property? In Castañeda's theory, it "is a property in that it is thought of through the property [better: relation]
Form C*" ([7]: 20). For us, it is a property since it is thought of through the relation SC—a relation that "one subset of the entities we deal with in our daily experience" ([12]: 5), viz., M-objects, bears to actual objects.

On the other hand, "existence [for Castañeda] is not a property in that it [= existence] is the contingency of the world underlying the property C*, but lying fathomless beyond the jurisdiction of the mind as the target of thought" ([7]: 20). In our theory, too, existence is the "contingency of the world" underlying the relational property \(\exists \alpha (\alpha SC_\_ )\).

Our theory of existence is quite different from Castañeda's. 7 Ours seems the more basic notion, since we can define his 'exists' in terms of it: \(x\) exists in Castañeda's sense iff \(x\) exists (in our sense) uniquely; more precisely:

\[(E^\star) \; \; x \text{ exists in Castañeda's sense iff } \exists! \alpha (\alpha SCx) .\]

Naturally, our notions of non-existence differ, too. Non-existence in Castañeda's sense "consists in their [i.e., guises'] not being joined with other guises in a real object existing in physical space-time" ([15]: 69). But note: From \((E^\star)\), we have

\[(NE^\star) \; \; \neg (x \text{ exists in Castañeda's sense}) \iff \]

\[\neg \exists! \alpha (\alpha SCx) \text{ or } \exists \exists \beta (\alpha SCx \land \beta SCx \land \alpha \neq \beta).\]

That is, whereas for us there is only one "way" for an M-object not to exist (viz., \((NE^\star i))\), there are two "ways" for guises not to exist: \((NE^\star i)\) they might not be "joined with other guises" or \((NE^\star ii)\) they might be so "joined" but not in "a real object". (However, if
non-existing singleton guises cannot be so "joined", then the latter disjunct is not a live possibility; but this, of course, recalls other issues already dealt with.)

Since existence for Castañoeda is self-consubstantiation, his solution of the existent round square puzzle does not involve two sorts of existence (as Meinong's, Parsons', and our solutions do), but only two sorts of predication (as does ours). Specifically, 'the existent round square is existent' is analyzed as, roughly,

\[ c\{\text{being-self-consubstantiated, being round, being square}\} \]
\[ \text{is-internally self-consubstantiated,} \]

which is true; and 'the existent round square exists' becomes

\[ c\{\text{being-self-consubstantiated, being round, being square}\} \]
\[ \text{is-externally self-consubstantiated,} \]

which is false (cf. [7]: 22 and [15]).
Notes to Chapter III

1. To conform to Darwinian methodology (see Ch. II, Sect. B.1), we should, strictly, limit our considerations to [7]. However, [10], [11], and [12] were intended as "introductions" and clarifications of [7], and [15] is intended as an extension and deepening of [7], so that we feel justified in speaking of "Castañeda's theory" in the singular.

2. We shall not argue the point here, but refer the reader to [7]: 9-17, [8]: 110f, [11]: 128f, and [15]: 64.

3. In comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

4. Castañeda feels (see n.3, above) that this ignores the irreducible difference between an individual and a state of affairs.

5. The phrase is Castañeda's; see n.3.

6. The lists in [7] and [15] are not identical. C^*.0, which is meant to embody the definition of existence of [7], does not appear in [7] and seems indistinguishable from C^*.1 as stated in [15]. C^*.7 is stated in a stronger form in [15] than in [7]. C^*.7A appears only in [15], C^*.8 and C^*.9 only in [7].

7. It is also, perhaps, more empirically adequate. If theories such as ours or Castañeda's are to embody the structure of the nature of thinking and its relation to the world, then any adequate neurophysiological theory about the nature of thinking ought to have such a structure. Suppose that acts of thinking turn out to be certain sequences of neuron firings, as seems reasonable. Suppose further that when I think of Pegasus, a certain such sequence occurs and that when I think of my cat a different sequence occurs; this, too, seems reasonable. Suppose, moreover (though this is not strictly necessary), that every time I think of Pegasus, the same (kind of) sequence occurs, and similarly for the times I think of my cat. In other words, suppose that it is in principal possible to identify or correlate certain neurological processes with certain thoughts. We could then identify (my thought of?) Pegasus (or my cat) with a certain type of sequence of neuron-firings. This could be a physical interpretation of an M-object. Then we could say that Pegasus exists iff there is a physical object which can be correlated with this type of sequence. This could be a (physical) interpretation of SC. But it is hard to see how C^* could be thus directly physically interpreted, given its complex analysis in terms of SC. Cf. Ch. II, n.44.
CHAPTER IV
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

A. Introduction

It is time now to take stock of our progress—the adequacies and inadequacies of our interpretation of Meinong's theory—to see where we have been in order to decide what direction we should take. We have set forth a wide variety of data and problems, though we have by no means exhausted the supply. We have looked at Meinong's Theory of Objects and developed a version of it for which we make three claims: (1) It is a theory in the spirit of Meinong's; this means, among other things, that we have adopted some of his assumptions and principles uncritically (though at the same time we have explored alternatives; cf. Ch. II, Sect. C.3). (2) It is more coherent than the original; this does not mean that it is less complicated or "more true" than the original, but merely that it can withstand the objections raised against Meinong's own version. (3) It takes into account more of the data, and in a more explicit fashion, than the original. Finally, we have taken a look at two other theories that have tried either to refine Meinong or to be adequate to data such as ours.

We are left with an idea of the general form to be taken by our ultimate theory—the theory which is adequate to the criteria (C1)-(C7) of Chapter I, which provides an analysis of psychological discourse and a foundation for natural-language semantics, and which is true.
Such a theory, we believe, will have to be Meinongian in the sense of embodying some version of Meinong's key theses (M1)-(M9) of Chapter II. (Note that both Parsons' and Castañeda's theories are Meinongian, in this sense.)

We are also left with problems inherent in our present first approximation to that theory, problems which the true theory will have to overcome. And we are left with unfinished business, issues not dealt with by the theory as presented. Let us, in this final chapter, look at these problems and issues.

B. Problems

1. Predication.

It seems clear that either two kinds of properties or two kinds of predications are required; here, we are in agreement with Parsons and Castañeda. Given that there is only one kind of relevant properties, what is not clear is whether the double-copula theory ought to be more like Castañeda's or ours.

Against our theory, there is the objection that the motivation for constituency as a mode of predication is weak, based as it is on the alleged truth of such statements as 'the golden mountain is golden'—though here, of course, we were trying to be faithful to Meinong. There is also the objection that some of the purposes to which the two modes of predication are put do not need them (e.g., the round square exemplifies being-thought-of-by-Meinong). On the other hand, use of the two modes does help in avoiding serious objections to Meinong's theory, such as those raised by Russell, Orayen, and Routley.
M-objecta as we construe them behave very much like properties and therefore, perhaps, are more like Meinong's original objecta than Castañeda's guises. Even better, they behave like universals, for they can be "one in many": If there are three actual circles on a piece of paper, then \(<C>\), the particular which alone has only the property of being a circle, exists in three places, since
\[ \forall \alpha (\alpha \mathrm{SC}<C> \iff \alpha \mathrm{ex} C) \]. So, either there are three \(<C>'s, and the uniqueness of 'the' is lost; or there is one \(<C>\) three times, so to speak, and particularity is lost.

I'm not sure I can answer this satisfactorily; that is why it is a problem. First, however, I don't think that there are three \(<C>'s; rather, there are three states of affairs which independently support the truth of '<C> exists', and \(<C> is a particular: it is a particular M-object. Second, even if there are three \(<C>'s, this can only be in the sense that there are three actual circles which are Sein-correlates of \(<C>\), so that while it is false to speak of 'the (actual) circle', it is perfectly all right to speak of 'the (Meinongian) circle'; as mentioned in Chapter II, Section C.6.2, there are two senses of 'the'.

Also, if M-objects do behave like properties, then the fact that we have distinguished between say, \(<C> and C suggests that we have a duplication of entities. This, though, largely depends on the acceptability of so-called complex properties, which we have not taken a stand on. If there are not such entities or they are not recognized as properties, then the duplication might not be an issue. And even
if they are, it remains to be shown whether the duplication is one susceptible to Ockham's Razor.

3. Objectives.

There are several problems with objectives, all of which require further development. Our analysis of relational objectives in Chapter II, Section C.5.9.3.3, for instance, is rather sketchy and moves too quickly back and forth between M-objecta and actual objects.

3.1. Sosein-objectives (II). The Sein-condition for Sosein-objectives,

\[(\text{So}^*) \ x \text{ is } F \text{ has Sein iff (i) } F \subseteq x \text{ or (ii) } \exists \alpha(\alpha \text{Sc}x \& \alpha \text{ ex } F),\]

also requires further thought. Consider the objectives \(x \text{ is green}\) and \(x'\text{'s atoms reflect light of wavelength } g\) (which we shall abbreviate as \(x \text{ is } G\) and \(x'\text{'s atoms reflect } g\)-light). Let us suppose that these are synthetic and have Sein. If we wish to maintain that they have a common Sein-correlate, S, then we must explain the relationship of S to

\[(S') \ \exists \alpha(\alpha \text{Sc}x \& \alpha \text{ ex } G)\]

and the relationship of both of them to:

\[(S'') \ \exists \alpha(\alpha \text{Sc}(x'\text{'s atoms}) \& \alpha \text{ ex Reflecting-}g\text{-light}).\]

If (S') and (S'') are identical (in some sense), then we seem to be faced with the possibility that \(x \text{ is } G\) has Sein iff (S''); this, while true, seems as undesirable as saying that 'snow is white' is true iff grass is green (cf. Reeves [87]).

We might say that states of affairs, such as S, are not uniquely characterizable and that (S') and (S'') are alternative descriptions
of S. If the present difficulty is a real one, and if this is a reasonable way out of it, then we might wish to revise (So*) thus:

\[(So^+) \ x \text{ is } F \text{ has Sein iff } F \subseteq x \text{ or } \exists \alpha (\alpha \text{SC}(x \text{ is } F)),\]

without specifying the structure of \(\alpha\) (except to say that \(\alpha \neq F \subseteq x\)). This move is further supported by our position that a Sein-correlate of an M-object is an actual, infinite object which cannot be specified more precisely without bringing in other M-objects as substitutes for it.

To return to our example, note that \(x \text{SC}(x's \text{ atoms})\), so that the problem focuses on the relation of exemplifying G to exemplifying Reflecting-g-light. It also follows that since \((S')\) and \((S'')\) describe one state of affairs, S, 'exemplification' is at best a name for, but resolves no, issues about the nature of predication in the actual world. We may, then, ask whether the properties of being green and reflecting g-light are genuinely identical. Surely, they are not. We merely have a case of two properties which are exemplified by the same actual objects.

The question then becomes: Is the state of affairs S constituted by an actual, infinite object exemplifying many properties or one "infinite" property? Suppose that \(\alpha \text{SC}x\) and that \(\alpha\) is located at space-time point \(p\). Is that ("part" of) S, or is it a different state of affairs? I am inclined to say that S consists of \(\alpha\) exemplifying many properties, among which are G and Reflecting-g-light, and that \(\alpha\)'s exemplifying the property of being at \(p\) is a distinct, but "coincident", state of affairs (since surely it is not the case that \(\alpha\) ex
A potentially fruitful way out of this dilemma might be to turn to a notion similar to Castañeda's "propositional guises" ([15]: 89ff) and to one of "property guises". One important point may be re-emphasized: the actual world is too complex to think about in its infinite entirety—we must "split it up" into finite aspects which the mind can deal with, viz., M-objects.

3.2. Objectives and objecta. Another unresolved problem of objectives is the extraordinarily difficult question of their relation to objecta. Recall that Meinong's first proposed solution was that objectives were wholes of which objecta were parts. His language clearly suggests that some such relationship is appropriate: We know at least that for every objective, there corresponds an objectum which is "its" ([63]: 491-92), "belongs to" or "accompanies" it ([63]: 492), or is "implied in" it ([63]: 499).

However, Meinong rejects the view according to which "the objective is treated ... as a kind of complex, the objectum belonging to it as a kind of component (Bestandstück)" ([63]: 493), on the ground that it leads to the difficulties of Quasisein. Despite this, our second interpretation of Ausserseine (as a label for the "double aspect" of existence) enables us to maintain that objectives are actual wholes with objecta as actual parts, while skirting the pitfalls of Quasisein. For, just as we can explain one's thinking about a non-existent as thinking of an actual M-object which lacks Sein, so can we explain an existing whole's having a non-existent part as its having as a part an
actual M-object which lacks Sein (cf. Grossmann [39]: 68, 82 n.1). With this in mind, let us investigate Meinong's own solution.

According to the first interpretation of Aussersein, 'Sein' is properly predicable only of objectives. This suggests that objectives are the basic entities of Meinong's ontology ("unique and irreducible", Findlay [31]: 60) and that objecta are merely "derived" entities. This is a nicely holistic view (in keeping with our remarks in Chapter II, Section B.3.3.3) capable of supporting Meinong's claim about the predicability of Sein.

Two methods of deriving objecta from objectives suggest themselves, "abstraction" and "construction". By the former, I have in mind an analytic process, analogous to the abstraction of a morpheme common to several utterances of some (unknown) language, e.g., the abstraction of the morpheme cat from such utterances (heard as single, continuous sounds) as catsareanimals, thecatisblack, etc. Compare, too, the way the meaning of certain words is learned by abstraction from the contexts in which it occurs (including, but not limited to, definitional or meaning-postulate contexts).

By 'construction', I have in mind a process similar to that of Russell's "logical construction" (cf. [98]: 9), according to which an objectum would be generated from (hence, determined by) "its" subsistent Sosein-objectives in a manner which yields the constituency-structure of the objectum. We considered this in Chapter II, Section C.6 (cf. Routley [91]: 34).³

It has been objected that this view, according to which objectives are unanalyzable, prevents them from being classified "by means of
their constituents" (Grossmann [40]: 113). However, such classification is not prior, but subsequent, to the analysis into (and abstraction of) constituents. As fundamental givens, objectives are neither classified nor classifiable. They only become so when we discern constituents in them. (Cf. Carnap's treatment of "elementary experiences" in [4], Sects. 67f.)

A more serious objection is Meinong's later claim that objectives are "higher-order" objects built upon objecta ([65]: 94), which is in direct conflict with our present interpretation of the objective/objectum relationship. The clash can be somewhat lessened by noting that objectives are a special kind of higher-order object since, unlike other higher-order objects such as relations, "the dependence of the objective on the objectum is not a dependence as regards being" (Findlay [31]: 72); moreover, they may in fact be mutually interdependent ([31]: 73). On the other hand, the entire view of objectives as higher-order objects may be mistaken (cf. Grossmann [40]: 103).

We could, indeed, choose to ignore the problem on the "Darwinian" methodological ground that it is a chronologically distant development to which Meinong's theory in [63] is immune. Further, since our theory does not distinguish between subsistence and existence, all M-objects are of one "order"; hence, objectives cannot be higher-order objects. We may note, finally, that the confusion over the "direction" of the objective/objectum relationship may be due to the conflation of our two domains of Aussersein and the actual world. It might be that the objective is epistemologically "prior" to or built upon the objectum,
whereas actual individuals are *metaphysically* (or "existentially") "prior" to states of affairs.  


With apologies to Frege, hardly anything more unwelcome can befall a philosophical writer than that one of the foundations of his edifice be shaken after the work is finished. I have been placed in this position by a conversation with Professor Romane Clark.

Since M-objects are themselves actual, he observed that we may consider the possibility of an M-object's being its own Sein-correlate; thus,

\[ o \text{SCo iff } \forall F (F \circ o \rightarrow o \in F). \]

Next, we may consider the properties of being a self-Sein-correlate and of being a non-self-Sein-correlate, which we may represent, respectively, as:

\[ \lambda x \forall F (F \circ x \rightarrow x \in F) \]
\[ \lambda x \exists F (F \circ x \& \neg (x \in F)); \]
for convenience, let us name these 'SSC' and '\overline{SSC}', respectively.

We arrive at a paradox, which we adapt from Clark's original version, by considering \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater}:

Assume \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC.

Therefore \(\forall F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \rightarrow \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F)\)

Therefore \(\overline{SSC} \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} + \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex \overline{SSC}\)

But SSC \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater}

\((*)\) Therefore \(\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC\)

i.e., \(\exists F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \land \neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F))\)

Therefore \(F_{1} \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \land \neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F_{1})\)

But \(\forall F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \rightarrow F = \overline{SSC})\)

Therefore \(F_{1} = \overline{SSC}\)

Therefore \(\neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC), which contradicts (*).\)

Therefore \(\neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC), contrary to our assumption.\)

Assume \(\neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC).\)

Therefore \(\neg \forall F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \rightarrow \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F)\)

Therefore \(\exists F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \land \neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F))\)

Therefore \(F_{1} \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \land \neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F_{1})\)

But \(\forall F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \rightarrow F = \overline{SSC})\)

Therefore \(F_{1} = \overline{SSC}\)

\((**)\) Therefore \(\neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC)\)

Therefore \(\exists F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \land \neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F))\)

Therefore \(\forall F (F \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \rightarrow \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex F)\)

Therefore \(\overline{SSC} \subset \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} \rightarrow \textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex \overline{SSC}\)

Therefore \(\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC, which contradicts (**)\)

Therefore \(\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC, contrary to assumption.\)

Therefore, \(\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC \text{ and } \neg (\textit{\textless SSC\textgreater} ex SSC), which violates the Law of Contradiction (ALCla) (cf. Ch. II, Sect. C.5.8).\)

The importance of this antinomy lies not so much in that it shows our theory inconsistent, but that it suggests that there is in
Aussersein no such M-object as \(<\text{SSC}>\); that is, it suggests that there is a limitation on what can count as an object of thought, in contradiction to the Principle of Freedom of Assumption. But this suggestion appears to be self-defeating, for to argue the paradox itself, one must think of \(<\text{SSC}>\). (We note, incidentally, that \(<\text{SSC}>\) has Sein, though it is not its own Sein-correlate on pain of contradiction. One of its Sein-correlates, however, is \(<\text{being red}>\), since this exemplifies SSC; i.e., \(\exists F (F \land <\text{being red}> \land \neg(<\text{being red}> \land F))\), viz., \(F = \text{being red.}\))

What lessons, then, can we learn from Clark's paradox? The first and most important lesson is that our extension of Meinong's theory, while immune to the objections thought fatal to Meinong's original theory, has nevertheless its own flaws. This, I think, is an important result: that a theory strong enough simultaneously to be an explication of Meinong's theory, to meet the objections to Meinong's theory, and to take into account the data of Chapter I is inconsistent.

A second lesson is that if we do not wish to abandon the entire system, but rather to repair it, then there are two weak spots to be looked after. There are two ways to block the paradox (short of tampering with the nature of exemplification): The first is to deny that there are complex properties (cf. Sect. 2). By doing so, we are able to deny that there is in Aussersein such an M-object as \(<\text{SSC}>\) (for the simple reason that there is no such property as \(\text{SSC}\)) without placing a limitation on the possible objects of thought. But, while it is easy to deny that where \(F\) and \(G\) are properties, there is also the complex property \(F \land G\), it is not so easy to deny the complex property \(F \lor G\) (or the M-object \(<F \lor G>\)) and even harder to see how \(\text{SSC}\) can be
"reduced" to its "constituents" (or what M-object would correspond to such a reduction).

The second way to block the paradox is to deny that M-objects are actual, for then they would not exemplify any properties. This move would require the introduction of an analogue of Castañeda's C** to account for the relation between a thinker and the object of his thought (cf. Sect. C.2), but it has the advantage of eliminating some of the representationalism of our theory. On the other hand, it leaves open the nature of M-objects (if they are not actual, i.e., among the furniture of the world, what are they?), and it raises questions concerning the nature of the predication to M-objects of such properties as being finite, being pseudo-existent, or being an M-object.

It proves interesting to apply the paradox to Parsons' and Castañeda's systems. As noted, Parsons has only one mode of predication but two kinds of properties. In [77B], we learn that each nuclear property, p, has an extranuclear image, \( \mathcal{E}_p = \{x: p \in x\} \), and that \( x \) has \( \mathcal{E}_p \) iff \( x \in \mathcal{E}_p \). To set up the paradox, then, we want to consider the following properties, which we shall name 'PSSC' and 'PSSC', respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda x \forall F (F \in x \rightarrow x \in \mathcal{E}_F) \\
\lambda x \exists F (F \in x \& x \notin \mathcal{E}_F)
\end{align*}
\]

(We note that to be able to say that \( o \) is PSSC, we may need to assume, with Parsons, that all individuals are objects.) Consider now the object \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \). To do this, we must assume that \( \text{PSSC} \) is a nuclear property; if it is not nuclear, then there appears to be an untenable
limitation in Parsons' theory on what can be thought.

Assume \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \) is not PSSC.

Therefore \( \exists F (F \in \{\text{PSSC}\} \land \{\text{PSSC}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_F) \)

Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_{\text{PSSC}} \)

Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \notin \{y: \text{PSSC} \in y\} \), which is false.

Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \) is PSSC.

Assume \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \) is PSSC.

Therefore \( \forall F (F \in \{\text{PSSC}\} \land \{\text{PSSC}\} \in \mathcal{E}_F) \)

\( (+) \) Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \in \mathcal{E}_{\text{PSSC}} \), which is true.

That is, Clark's paradox does not arise in Parsons' system. However, this is due primarily to Parsons' account of what it is to have an extranuclear property, viz., to be in a certain set. If, instead, we take a more intuitively plausible account, i.e., a less set-theoretically formal one, then the paradox is derivable: From \( (+) \), we infer

\[ \exists F (F \in \{\text{PSSC}\} \land \{\text{PSSC}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_F) \]

Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \notin \mathcal{E}_{\text{PSSC}} \), which contradicts \( (+) \)

Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \) is not PSSC

Therefore \( \{\text{PSSC}\} \) is and is not PSSC.

Castañeda's system proves even more paradox-resistant. The properties we want to consider here, call them 'CSSC' and 'CSSC', respectively, are:

\[ \lambda x \forall F (xF \to C^* (x, x[F])) \]

\[ \lambda x \exists F (xF \land \neg C^* (x, x[F])) \]

Consider the guise \( c\{\text{CSSC}\}; \) call it '\( g \)', for short. There are several ways to begin the argument. We could assume that \( g \) is \( \text{CSSC} \); this is
simply false and leads to no paradox. We could assume that \( g \) is CSSC in the sense that

\[
\forall F(gF \rightarrow C^*(g, g[F]))
\]

\((++)\) Therefore \( C^*(g, g) \), since \( g_{\text{CSSC}} = g \)

i.e., \( g \) is CSSC

Therefore \( \exists F(gF \& \neg C^*(g, g[F])) \)

Therefore \( \neg C^*(g, g) \), which contradicts \((++)\).

Therefore \( g \) is not CSSC

Assume \( g \) is not CSSC.

Therefore \( \exists F(gF \& \neg C^*(g, g[F])) \)

Therefore \( \neg C^*(g, g_{\text{CSSC}}) \)

Therefore \( \neg C^*(g, g) \), since \( g_{\text{CSSC}} = g \).

But this leads to no contradiction, only to the result that \( g \) does not exist.

We could also assume that \( g \) is CSSC to begin with.

Therefore \( C^*(g, g_{\text{CSSC}}) \& C^*(g, g) \& C^*(g_{\text{CSSC}}, g_{\text{CSSC}}) \)

Therefore \( g_{\text{CSSC}} \) is CSSC \( \rightarrow \neg g_{\text{CSSC}} \) is CSSC, by \( C^* \).

But \( g_{\text{CSSC}} \) is CSSC

\((#)\) Therefore \( \neg g_{\text{CSSC}} \) is CSSC

But \( g_{\text{CSSC}} \) is CSSC, since \( g \) is CSSC, which contradicts \((#)\)

Therefore \( \neg (g \text{ is CSSC}) \).

Assume \( \neg (g \text{ is CSSC}) \)

Therefore \( \neg C^*(g, g_{\text{CSSC}}) \).

But this, too, leads to no contradiction.

**C. Other Unfinished Business**

As we have already discussed in Chapter II, Section C.5.7.4, we have left open the question of whether M-objects are also objects of perception or whether, when we perceive, we perceive the actual object.
This is a vast topic, and one that both Meinong [67] and Castañeda [15] have dealt with. It is unquestionably part of our overall project, but one well beyond our present scope. Other open questions can, however, be treated here.

1. Actual Objects.

The nature of actual objects has been left virtually untouched, in spite of all we have had to say about them.

For one thing, it might be objected that we have not yet answered, much less faced up to, the question of the nature of the "existence" or actuality (tautologous though it be) of actual objects. The charge is almost correct, for since they are referred to via quantification, their existence consists in being values of the variables of these existentially-loaded quantifiers.

Insofar as the charge is correct, the defense is two-fold. First, it is not our purpose, at this stage, to answer the question. Rather, we are presenting an interpretation and revision of Meinong's theory in light of the data of Chapter I. While problems of the nature of existential statements are among such data (and the theory does resolve them), they don't really touch the nature of existence. Consequently, neither does the theory, except insofar as it isolates the proper questions from extraneous surrounding puzzles.

Second, the problem is a deep one and not susceptible of simple solution. For either (1)(a) it is unsolvable or (b) "existence" (in the relevant sense) is a primitive (hence unanalyzable) notion, or (2) the solution will be of a type not hitherto envisaged by philosophers, or (3) it is solvable by one of the following means:
(A) Via Castañeda's $C^*$-relation (cf. [7]: 15), where $x$ exists iff $C^{*xx}$: But this either shifts the issue to "What is the nature of $C^*$?"; or else this is an adequate solution, in which case our theory also provides a solution via SC. (We discussed the relation between $C^*$ and SC in Chapter III, Section B.)

(B) An actual object, $x$, exists iff $\exists P(P \text{ is a property } \& x \text{ ex } P)$: But this presupposes, or shifts the problem to, a prior understanding of exemplification and the existence of properties, both of which we lack, or to the nature of "existence-entailing" properties (cf. Cocchiarella [26]). (And to say that a property, $P$, exists iff $\exists x(x \text{ ex } P)$ is to go around in circles; these are three interconnected problems, as we have often noted.)

(C) An actual object, $x$, exists iff $\exists S(S \text{ is a state of affairs } \& x \text{ is a constituent of } S)$: Here, too, the problem has been shifted to, or presupposes answers to, the questions of what it is for a state of affairs to exist and what it is for an actual object to be a constituent of one.

A second sort of objection to our actual objects concerns the problem of change. We noted in Chapter III, Section B.1, that a change in an actual object is really a shifting of its Sein-correlations with $M$-objects. This makes it appear that actual objects are bare substrates. But then, how are the Sein-correlations of a given actual object determined? Why, that is, should it be the Sein-correlate of a certain complete and consistent $M$-object and not another? And if it is bare substrate, how does it occupy space? These are all questions we shall have to consider.
2. Consociation.

In his theory, Castañeda has several "sameness" relations besides C*, which have no direct counterpart in our theory. In some cases, this is because we are able to handle propositions in which they appear by alternative means. For instance, our analysis of

(40) Meinong is thinking of the round square

is either

(40A) Thinking-of(Meinong, <R,S>)

or perhaps

(40B) exists α(αSC<being Meinong> & Thinking-of(α, <R,S>)).

In either case, we do not need anything more than SC. However, Castañeda's analysis of (40) makes essential use of both C* and consociation (C**).

(40C) C*(Meinong, Meinong[thinking of the round square]) & C**(the round square, the round square[being thought of by Meinong]). ([7]: 18.)

However, C** does serve a useful function not readily handled in our theory. For instance, how would our theory handle (41)?

(41) The detective residing at 221B Baker St. plays the violin.

Either (41) is false, since V ∉ <D, 221B>; or else it is to be interpreted (for some speaker S at time t in context C) as

V c <D, 221B, V, named 'Sherlock Holmes', ...>.

Similarly,
John believes that the detective Holmes resides at 221B Baker St. or John believes that the possible fat man in the doorway is bald, might best be handled by a mechanism like $C^{**}$. Finally, the relation needed in Chapter III, Section A.1, between the round square and the round square thought about by Russell probably ought to be either $C^{**}$ or some SC-like version thereof.

D. Conclusion

Our work, then, is cut out for us. Patently, more data must be taken into consideration, especially data from problems of perception and problems of fiction. Too, careful consideration will have to be given to the more purely metaphysical issues surrounding the nature of properties, of subjects of properties, and of predication. But it seems reasonable to expect that the hoped-for theory lies in the direction of the path taken here.
Notes to Chapter IV

1 The second clause is intentionally ambiguous.

2 This objection is due to Castañeda.

3 It might be possible to define the meaning of an expression (in general, any expression, but especially a noun phrase) as an M-object constructed from (i.e., constituted by) the contexts (open sentences) in which the expression occurs. In the case of an (unambiguous) NP, we could say that its "definition" was the conjunction of those constituent contexts (or "properties") which had the (largest number of) others among them as deductive consequents. E.g., the meaning of 'bachelor' (for a person S at a time t) might be <...s are unmarried, John is a ..., that guy is a ..., no women are ...s, ...s are men, etc.>, and its definition might be: x is a bachelor iff x is unmarried and x is a man. Cf. Ch. II, nn.27, 38.

4 The relation of being built upon is perhaps best understood as the relation of being about: an objective is "about" its objectum (cf. Findlay [31]: 72). This could mean that the objective and "its" objectum are distinct, but related in a fashion similar to the following:

[W]hen a particle is subject to several forces, no one of the component accelerations actually occurs, but only the resultant acceleration, of which they are not parts. . . . (Russell [92]: xvi-xvii.)

Cf. Findlay [31]: 123. Cf. also the complex/complexion distinction ([31]: 138), which may be illustrated thus:

complexion
= objective

complex of
objecta

5 A full treatment of the parallel psychological issue concerning the relation of idea to judgment is beyond our scope, but is necessary in order to come to a full understanding of the objective/objectum relation. Relevant passages to consider include Meinong [67]: 60; Findlay [31]: 63, 171, 238; and Grossmann [40]: 86, 102.
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APPENDIX

TOWARDS A LOGIC OF M-OBJECTS

We present here the barest outline of a logic underlying the theory put forth in Chapter II. The possibility of development along the lines to be suggested shows, minimally, that the domain of M-objects (and the domain of Meinong's own objecta insofar as it is adequately explicated by the theory of Chapter II) is not without interesting and, perhaps, significant structure.

I

In this sketch, we present a fragment, L, of a formal language, L*, and a semantic interpretation for it based on domains of actual and M-objects. We also hope to suggest thereby how it might be possible to construct a non-modal, model-theoretic semantics for natural languages adequate (inter alia) to the criteria set forth in Chapter I. (By "non-modal" we mean that no essential use is made of the notion of "possible worlds".) A syntactic component (axioms and rules of inference) can be constructed by determining which wffs are valid. We leave this project for future investigation, but we note here that most theorems of both classical and free logics remain theorems under reasonable translation procedures into L*, the main syntactical difference being the greater expressive power and "naturalness" of L*.

Towards making L* as similar as possible to natural language, we take all logical connectives and variable-binding operators as primitive
and distinct symbols. Thus, e.g., $P \rightarrow Q$ is not to be defined as $\neg P \lor Q$, but their equivalence (if any) will be a theorem. (Possible exceptions are those symbols such as $\leftrightarrow$ (iff), '/' (neither-nor), etc. (cf. Church [1]: 78, esp. D3, D6-D11), which seem intuitively more "complex" than others, though we recognize the difficulty of making this notion precise.) No limitation will be placed, in a general development, on choices among "competing" connectives. Thus, a more complete fragment of $L^*$ might include the implication symbols of both classical and relevance logics, or the negation symbols of both classical and intuitionistic logics. For simplicity of presentation, $L$'s connectives shall be classical.

Since we have two kinds of items in our domain of interpretation, viz., actual and $M$-objects, we could employ two different styles of variables, thus making our system two-sorted. Natural languages, however, do not possess two corresponding styles of pronouns or substantives (one for "existing", one for "non-existing" entities), and so neither will $L^*$. We shall instead employ two styles of variable-binding operators (after the fashion of Routley [5], Cocchiarella [2], Rescher [4]: 156-67, and Scott [6]: 149, 158). Our recognition of two modes of predication will be made explicit in $L^*$ by having separate copula-symbols.

An alternative to this abundance of primitive symbols would be to have only one style of variable and one style of operators. In that case, the formal renderings of such ordinary-language sentences as 'The tallest mountain is tall' and 'The Queen of England is bald' would be ambiguous in that multiple and frequently incompatible semantic
interpretations for them would be available (cf. Ch. II, Sect. C.4.1.2).
While we could leave our syntax ambiguous (and probably should in a
complete development), doing so would require a double-level semantic
theory, the first (or disambiguating) level of which would clarify the
specific M-objective meant by the speaker at the time of utterance and
in the context of utterance, and the second level of which would be a
straightforward semantic interpretation. We may, then, view L as
being an unambiguous portion of L* in the sense that there is a 1-1
correspondence between the wffs of L and the M-objectives assigned to
them by (or, which are their meanings according to) such a first-level
semantics.

II

The language L consists of the following symbols:

A stock of n-place predicate symbols (n ∈ ω): F, G, ....
Predicate constants: S!, =.
A stock of individual variables: x, y, z, ....
A stock of individual constants (or names): a, b, c, ....
Logical connectives (all "classical"): ¬, ∨, V, ⊕.
Quantifiers: A@, V@, A^M, V^M.
Definite-description operators: 1@, 1^M.
Copula symbols: C@, C^M.
(Commas, parentheses, etc., as needed.)

The formation rules of L are:

(T1) If t is an individual variable or constant, then t is a term.
(F1) If F is an n-place predicate symbol and t_1, ..., t_n are terms,
then FC@t_1...t_n and FC^M t_1...t_n are wffs.
(F2) If t is an individual variable or constant and t^M_xφ is a term,
then S!t and S!1^M t_xφ are wffs.
(F3) If \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) are terms, then \( t_1 = t_2 \) is a wff.

(F4) If \( \phi, \psi \) are wffs and \( x \) is an individual variable, then \( \neg \phi, \phi \land \psi, \phi \lor \psi, \forall x \phi, \forall^M x \phi, \forall^G x \phi \) are wffs.

(T2) If \( \phi \) is a wff and \( x \) is an individual variable, then \( \forall^G x \phi \) and \( \forall^M x \phi \) are terms.

(FT5) Nothing is a term or wff unless it is generated by these rules.

(We remark here that (Fl) may not be entirely adequate as it stands to express relations. Moreover, the semantic interpretation of relations proves to be rather complicated. Accordingly, in the present sketch we shall limit our considerations to the monadic fragment of L.)

III

We take as the basic model \( \mathcal{A} = \langle \mathcal{O}, M, \mathcal{P} \rangle \), where

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O} & = \text{the set of actual objects} \\
M & = \text{the set of } M\text{-objects} \\
\mathcal{P} & = \text{the set of properties},
\end{align*}
\]

all of which are non-null. (While we hold that \( M \subseteq \mathcal{O} \) (cf. Ch. II, Sect. C.5.6), this condition can be dropped.) As in Chapter II, we use 'c' as the symbol for the mode of predication appropriate to \( M\)-objects qua \( M\)-objects (i.e., the basic relation between \( M \) and \( \mathcal{P} \)); 'ex' as the symbol for the mode of predication appropriate to actual objects (and, if \( M \subseteq \mathcal{O} \), to \( M\)-objects qua actual objects) (i.e., the basic relation between \( \mathcal{O} \) and \( \mathcal{P} \)); and 'SC' as the symbol for the basic relation between \( \mathcal{O} \) and \( M \), viz., Sein-correlation.

If \( \mathcal{O}' \subseteq \mathcal{O} \), \( M' \subseteq M \), and \( \mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P} \), then we call \( \mathcal{A}' = \langle \mathcal{O}', M', \mathcal{P}' \rangle \) a restricted model. Use of such models allows us to investigate (i) so-called empty domains (i.e., actual domains "empty" save for \( M\)-objects),
(ii) special (arbitrary) sets of M-objects, each of which may, e.g., have a certain property (such sets can correspond to "possible"—or "impossible"—worlds, worlds of myth or fiction, etc.), and (iii) theories which place restrictions on admissible properties, e.g.,

\[ \mathcal{P}' = \{ F \in \mathcal{P} : (\exists \alpha \in \mathcal{G})(\alpha \in F) \} \]  

(in which case, all M-objects of the form \(<F>\) have Sein). We shall not discuss restricted models further in this outline.

We define \( \nu \) to be an assignment of values from \( \mathcal{G} \) to the terms of \( \mathcal{L} \), if it satisfies conditions which are appropriate generalizations of the following (where \( F \) is a predicate symbol naming \( \mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{P} \)):

(v.1) \[ \nu(I^{G}_x(F \land G) x) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{the unique } \alpha \in \mathcal{G} \text{ such that } \alpha \in F, & \text{if } (\exists ! \alpha \in \mathcal{G})(\alpha \in F) \\ \text{undefined, otherwise.} & \end{array} \right. \]

(v.2) \[ \nu(I^{M}_x(F \land G) x) = <F>. \]

Some remarks are in order. First, in an "appropriate generalization", we would need clauses which explain the interpretations of wffs such as:

1. \[ I^G_x(F \land G) x \]
2. \[ I^M_x(F \land G) x \]
3. \[ I^M_x(F \land G) x \]

(If \( \nu \) is defined for (1), then \( \nu((1)) = \text{the unique } \alpha \in \mathcal{G} \text{ such that } \alpha \in F \text{ and } \alpha \text{ is an M-object constituted by } G. \text{ } \nu((2)) = <F, G>. \text{ I am undecided about } \nu((3)), \text{ but it might be } \nu((1)). \text{ On the other hand, we might wish to change (T2) so as to allow } I^M_x\phi \text{ to be wf only when } \phi \text{ contains no occurrences of 'C'.})

Second, \( \nu \) is a partial semantic interpretation function (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.5), since it is not defined for all terms. A plausible
alternative to (v.1) is:

$$v(I^x x) = \begin{cases} 
\text{the unique } a \in @ \text{ such that } a \in F, & \text{if etc.} \\
\ v(M^x x), & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}$$

(though this would remain a partial function if (T2) were changed as suggested).

Third, if the domain of $v$ is restricted to pure $M$-wffs (i.e., those wffs with no occurrences of $\lambda^@, \forall^@, \exists^@, C^@$) and its range restricted to $M$, then the resulting function, $v_M$, is a total semantic interpretation function (cf. Ch. I, Sect. B.5). The complementary restriction of the domain of $v$ to pure $@$-wffs (those lacking occurrences of $\lambda^M, \forall^M, \exists^M, C^M$) and of its range to $@-M$, call it $v_{@-M}$, is like an ordinary assignment of standard quantification theory.

Before presenting the truth-conditions for wffs (or the Sein-conditions for objectives; cf. Ch. II, Sect. C.5.9.3), it should be pointed out that we will not employ the usual set-theoretical interpretation of properties. We refrain from this because, first, it begs the question of the nature of $M$-objects (if properties are certain sets of actual objects, then $M$-objects will be constituted by such sets; cf. Ch. II, Sect. C.5.9.3); and, second, if we are going to employ properties themselves in the construction of $M$-objects, then we might as well use them for our semantic interpretation of (pure) $@$-wffs.

The basic notion is satisfaction by an assignment, $\vDash_v$ (we shall drop the subscript, where possible), but since, in general, assignments will differ only in what they assign to free variables (names being
disambiguated in the syntax or in the first-level semantics), we might as well call this truth. The conditions are appropriate generalizations (in the same sense and with the same notation as in our discussion of (v.1) and (v.2)) of:

(I) \( \models \langle FC \rangle t \iff v(t) \in F \)

(II) \( \models \langle FC \rangle t \iff \sim F \subseteq v(t) \)

(III) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^xGC_{\sim}x \iff (\exists ! \alpha \in \sim)(\alpha \subseteq I^xGC_{\sim}x) \).

(IV) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^M_xGC_{\sim}x \iff \sim \in F \)

(V) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^M_xGC_{\sim}x \iff v(I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x) \in M \land \sim \subseteq v(I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x) \)

(VI) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^M_xGC_{\sim}x \iff \sim \subseteq I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x \)

(VII) \( \models \langle S \rangle ! \alpha \iff (\exists ! \alpha \in M)(\alpha \subseteq I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x) \)

(VIII) \( \models \langle S \rangle ! I^M_xFC_{\sim}x \iff (\exists ! \alpha \in M)(\alpha \subseteq I^\alpha_xFC_{\sim}x) \).

(We note that while 'the (actual) present King of France is (actually) bald' is plausibly construed as either meaningless or truth-valueless since \( v(\text{the (actual) present King of France}) \) is undefined, if we understand that \( \alpha \in F \) if and only if \( F \) is exemplified by \( \alpha \), then when \( \alpha \not\in \sim \), \( F \) is not exemplified by \( \alpha \), and therefore not-(\( \alpha \in F \)).)

(IV) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^M_xGC_{\sim}x \iff \sim \subseteq F \)

(V) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^M_xGC_{\sim}x \iff v(I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x) \in M \land \sim \subseteq v(I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x) \)

(VI) \( \models \langle FC \rangle I^M_xGC_{\sim}x \iff \sim \subseteq I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x \)

(VII) \( \models \langle S \rangle ! \alpha \iff (\exists ! \alpha \in M)(\alpha \subseteq I^\alpha_xGC_{\sim}x) \)

(VIII) \( \models \langle S \rangle ! I^M_xFC_{\sim}x \iff (\exists ! \alpha \in M)(\alpha \subseteq I^\alpha_xFC_{\sim}x) \).

(Other formal renderings of the English 't exists' are EC_\alpha t, \( EC_\alpha t \), (has-Sein)_\alpha t, and (has-Sein)_\alpha t, all of which may be handled by (II)-(VI).)

(IX) \( \models t_1 = t_2 \text{ iff } v(t_1) = v(t_2) \).

(Here we observe that if either \( v(t_1) \) or \( v(t_2) \) is undefined, and \( t_1 \neq t_2 \) (i.e., they are distinct terms), then \( \not\models t_1 = t_2 \). If \( v(I^\alpha_xFC_{\sim}x) \) is undefined, then the evaluation of \( \models I^\alpha_xFC_{\sim}x = I^\alpha_xFC_{\sim}x \) may be made arbitrarily.
There appear to be plausible arguments on both sides: in favor of $\mathcal{F}$ is the first sentence of this parenthetical remark; in favor of $\mathcal{I}$ is the observation of Leblanc and Hailperin [3]: 242 that $\mathcal{I}_{t_1}^\mathcal{I}_{t_2}$ iff $t_1$ designates whatever $t_2$ designates, and that $\mathcal{I}^\mathcal{F}_x$ always designates what $\mathcal{I}^\mathcal{F}_x$ designates, even if it doesn't designate. A potential problem is the possibility of the actual $F$'s being identical with the Meinongian $G$. That is, we might have $v(\mathcal{I}^\mathcal{F}_x) = v(\mathcal{I}^\mathcal{M}_x)$ because the unique actual object that exemplifies $F$ is the $M$-object constituted by $G$; however, I see no immediate problem here.)

(X) $\mathcal{I}_{\neg \phi}$ iff $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}$
(XI) $\mathcal{I}_{\phi \psi}$ iff $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}$ & $\mathcal{I}_{\psi}$
(XII) $\mathcal{I}_{\phi \vee \psi}$ iff $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}$ or $\mathcal{I}_{\psi}$
(XIII) $\mathcal{I}_{\phi \rightarrow \psi}$ iff $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}$ or $\mathcal{I}_{\psi}$

For (XIV)-(XVII), let $v'_{Mx} = v$ mean that $v'$ is like $v$ except for its assignment to $x$ and $v(x) \in M$ and $v'(x) \in M$; and let $v'_{@x} = v$ mean the appropriately similar statement for $@$.

(XIV) $\mathcal{I}_{v_{Mx}^M} \phi$ iff $\forall v'(if v'_{Mx} \phi, then \mathcal{I}_{v'} \phi)$
(XV) $\mathcal{I}_{v_{@x}^@} \phi$ iff $\forall v'(if v'_{@x} \phi, then \mathcal{I}_{v'} \phi)$
(XVI) $\mathcal{I}_{v_{Mx}^M} \phi$ iff $\exists v'(v'_{Mx} \phi \& \mathcal{I}_{v'} \phi)$
(XVII) $\mathcal{I}_{v_{@x}^@} \phi$ iff $\exists v'(v'_{@x} \phi \& \mathcal{I}_{v'} \phi)$.

Finally, we can define a notion of $M$-truth (for pure $M$-wffs) as follows:

\[ \mathcal{I}_{M} \phi \iff \forall v_{M} \mathcal{I}_{M} \phi. \]
References for Appendix


INDEX OF TERMS INTRODUCED IN CHAPTER II

AC-theory (act-content, or adverbial, theory): C.3, 4.2

ACO-theory (act-content-object theory): C.3, 4.2, 5.7.2

ACO(O')-theory (act-content-M-object(-actual-object) theory: C.3, 4.1.1, 4.2, 5.7.2, 6.1

Ambiguity, Principle of Minimization of: C.5.9.2, 7

assumption: B.2.2.2; C.2, 5.4

Assumption, Principle of Freedom of: A; C.6.2, 7

Aussersein: A; B.3-5; C.5.3-5.6, 5.7.1-5.7.2, 5.8, 5.9.3.1, 5.9.4, 6.1-6.2, 7

constituency (mode of predication for M-objects; F c o iff F oresein(o)): C.4.1.2, 4.2, 4.5.1, 4.5.3, 4.6, 5.1, 5.4-5.6, 5.7.1, 5.7.3-5.7.4, 5.7.6, 5.8, 5.9.2, 5.9.3.2-5.9.3.3, 6-7

Contradiction, Law of: B.5; C.5.8, 7

Excluded Middle, Law of: C.4.5.2, 5.8

exemplification (mode of predication for actual objects; a ex F): C.4.1.2, 4.5-4.6, 5.1, 5.4-5.5, 5.7.2-5.7.4, 5.7.6-5.8, 5.9.2-5.9.3, 6.3, 7

existence (Existenz): A; B.3.1—see Sein

idea (Vorstellung) B.2.2.2; C.2-3

Independence, Principle of of: A; B.4; C.5.5, 6.3, 7

judgment: B.2.2.2; C.2-3, 4.4, 5.9.1, 5.9.4

object, M- or Meinongian (Gegenstand): A; B.2, 3.3.4, 4; C.2-4, 5.1-5.8, 5.9.3-7

-actual: C.2, 4, 5.1-5.3, 5.6-5.7.5, 5.9.3, 6.2-7

-complete and incomplete: A; C.4.5.2-4.5.3, 5.7.4, 5.8, 6.2

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objective (Objektiv): B.2.2.3, 3.3.3-3.3.4; C.4.4, 5.4-5.7.1, 5.7.5, 5.9-7
  - analytic: C.5.6
  - knowable apriori and aposteriori: C.5.6, 5.9.2

objectum (Objekt): B.2.2.3, 3.3.3, 4; C.4.2, 5.4, 5.7.1, 5.9.2-5.9.3.1, 5.9.3.3, 6.2-7
  - notation for: B.4

pseudo-existence: B.2.2.1, 4; C.4.5.2-4.5.3

Quasisein (alleged third degree of Sein): A; B.3.2, 3.3.3, 5.4; C.5.2-5.4, 6.2

Sein (being) and Nichtsein (non-being): A; B.3-5; C.2, 4.5.3, 5.1-5.7.3, 5.7.5, 5.8-5.9, 6.2-7

Sein-correlation (aSCo iff ∀(F c o + α ex F)): C.5.1-5.8, 5.9.3-5.9.4, 6.3-7

Sosein (so-being): A; B.4-5; C.5.4-5.5, 5.9.1-5.9.2, 6.2-7

states of affairs: C.4.4, 5.7.2, 5.7.5, 5.8, 5.9.3-5.9.3.2

subsistence (Bestand): A; B.3.1

Tolerance, Principle of: C.5.7.2, 5.9.2

Truth, Principle of Maximization of: C.5.9.2, 7

Type-distinction: C.4.1.1, 4.2-4.6, 5.1, 5.5, 5.7.1, 5.7.3, 5.7.5
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