# Time and Difficulty

Artificial Intelligence and Sustainable Computing (AISC 2024)

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¹With grateful acknowledgment to co-authors Guy Haworth and Tamal Biswas, students in my graduate seminars, and UB's Center for Computational Research (CCR)

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In a *utility-based* model, each  $m_i$  has a utility or cost  $u_i$ . The main risk/reward quantity is then  $E = \sum_i p_i u_i$ . Examples:

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
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- Multiple-choice tests:  $m_i$  are possible answers to a test question,  $u_i = \text{gain/loss}$  for right/wrong answer.

## Chess and Tests—With Partial Credits (Or LLMs?)


The of drug-resistant strains of bacteria and viruses has researchers' hopes that permanent victories against many diseases have been achieved.

- vigor . . corroborated
- (b) feebleness . . dashed
- (0) proliferation . . blighted
- (d) destruction . . disputed
- (e)






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## A Difficult Trap (Kramnik-Anand, 2008 WC)





Depths..

Values by Stockfish 6


	Depu	ıs												values by Stockfish 6						
Move	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
Nd2	103	093	087	093	027	028	000	000	056	-007	039	028	037	020	014	017	000	006	000	
Bxd7	048	034	-033	-033	-013	-042	-039	-050	-025	-010	001	000	-009	-027	-018	000	000	000	000	
Qg8	114	114	-037	-037	-014	-014	-022	-068	-008	-056	-042	-004	-032	000	-014	-025	-045	-045	-050	
Nxd4	-056	-056	-113	-071	-071	-145	-020	-006	077	052	066	040	050	051	-181	-181	-181	-213	-213	

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
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
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- Expectation  $e = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(c(R_P R_O))}$  depends only on difference to opponent's rating  $R_O$ . With  $c = (\ln 10)/400$  the curve is:



## Position Value $\longleftrightarrow$ Expectation (2000 vs. 2000)




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
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


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- Complication: dependence on rating itself.

## Item-Response Theory (IRT source)




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- Slope at y = 0.5 correctness rate is the discrimination factor.

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- How well does hazard—normalized over aptitude—work as a measure of difficulty?

Should a grading metric  $\mu$  expect to assess lower performance on more-difficult questions, or should it show a *constancy of signal*  $\theta$  across all types of questions?

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
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Internal evidence that it gives  $\approx (1 + \epsilon)$  relative error with  $\epsilon \approx 0.04$  for most rating levels. Means it supports betting on chess moves with only 5% "vig" to avoid arbitrage. (Except for bets against clear-best moves.)



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
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  - 1–2 pawns ahead: **2085** +- **120**; better: **2020** +- **155**
  - Within 1.00 of equal: 2145 +- 45; within 0.50: 2125 +- 65.
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- Low-hazard positions either have an obvious best move or many good moves.



### Example: Niemann-Shankland, USA Ch. 2023



Low-hazard because crisis is far off, but difficult in real chess terms. Low  $E_L$ , high entropy H. (Niemann lost.)

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  - Carow and Witzig [CW, Feb. 2024] consider all the above, but strive for human-chess based measures.

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
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- For 25-minute Rapid, I measure **240** reduction in quality per IPR.
- For 5-minute Blitz, 575 lower. (Error bars for both are about  $\pm 25$ .)

# Time-Quality Curves (whole graph)



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  2860 +- 75.
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- Vivid reproduction of [SZS 2022] (and also Anderson et al., 2016 thru now for online blitz).



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Results are more as-expected on turns with little time budget left:

• When player has  $\leq 180$  seconds left (633 turns): 1540 +- 280.

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- Or average 30 seconds left to turn 40, counting half the increment time: 1395 +- 425. (In all cases, average hazard.)

Students in my CSE702 graduate seminar proposed a measure  $H_U$  of entropy that uses only the move utilities  $u_i$ , not the projected probabilities  $p_i$  (nor their logs). Avoids the rating feedback loop.

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- Much more work to do...



### Discussion and Q & A

[And Thanks]

[Possible extra slides for Q & A follow...optional, of course...]

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- ...with unclear metrics and alignment of personal vs. test goals..., and where
- ...reproducibility is doubtful and arduous.

The *chess angle* is to trade 1 against wealth of 2,3,4,5: lots of players and games, real competition, clear goals and metrics (Elo ratings), and not only reproducible but conducive to abundant falsifiable predictions.

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- How can we distinguish uncovering genuine cognitive phenomena from artifacts of the model?

# Some Cognitive Nuggets

• Dimensions of Strategy and Tactics

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  - Large field of **Item Response Theory** (IRT).

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- How To Manage Time Budget (basically, follow V. Anand!).

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- In a 500-player Open, you should see ten such scores.



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- Now suppose the factual positivity rate is 20%. Can we do this in our heads?

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- This is relevant insofar as I often get a lot of 3.00–4.00 range results.

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- Rapid and Blitz trained on **in-person** events in 2019. Slow chess trained on in-person FIDE Olympiads from 2010 to 2018.

- Makes a simple "box score" of agreements to the chess engine being tested and the **scaled** average centipawn loss from disagreements.
- Creates a Raw Outlier Index (ROI) from the raw metrics.
- ROI is on same 0-100 scale as flipping a fair coin 100 times: 50 is the expectation *given one's rating* and 5 is the standard deviation, so the "two-sigma normal range" is 40-to-60.
- Like medical stats except **indexed** to common **normal** scale.
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- Completely data driven—no theoretical equation.
- Rapid and Blitz trained on **in-person** events in 2019. Slow chess trained on in-person FIDE Olympiads from 2010 to 2018.
- Does not account for the *difficulty* of games. That is the job of the full model.

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- Show this GLL article including example of Ms. Velpula Sarayu.

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- A natural metric **apart** from both my model and Sonas's domain cross-validates his observations and arguments.
- I will now discuss some other applications that these solid foundations enable.

#### Hans Niemann: Platform or Plateau?



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- Picture emerging from recent youth events...?