## CSE439 Fall 2024 Week 9: Shor's Algorithm

In general, a **period** of a function f is a value r such that for all x,

$$f(x+r) = f(x).$$

The string s of the "promise property" in Simon's algorithm actually obeys this definition, even though it is a vector not a scalar. When Peter Shor read Simon's paper, he conceptualized that the final Hadamard transform *amplified* the periodic structure in the form of peaks and troughs of waves. The "trough" is how having  $a \bullet s = 1$  made the two terms in the amplitude cancel, whereas having  $a \bullet s = 0$  made them add with the same sign and hence concentrate the resulting probabilities on those cases.

Now, ahem, converting *periodic* structure into *peaks* is really the job of the *Fourier transform*, not the Hadamard transform. And the Fourier transform does this with numeric data, not just binary-string data. Shor conceptualized that replacing the final Hadamard transform with the **quantum Fourier transform** (**QFT**) might allow a similar concentration that makes a numeric period r emerge. And there is one such function and period of pre-eminent interest in cryptography... Incidentally, the QFT on r qubits is just the same as the ordinary Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) on vectors of length r = r . The circumstance that the QFT can be applied with r quantum effort---so the theory of quantum circuits tells us---is what makes the difference.

## **Periodic Functions**

The important example of a periodic function is **modular exponentiation**:

$$f_a(x) = a^x \mod M$$
.

Here a is a number in  $\{0,1,\ldots,M-1\}$  that is **relatively prime** to M. This means that a does not share a prime divisor with M. When M=pq is the product of two different primes p and q, this simply means that a is not divisible by p or by q. If a and M did share a divisor p, then  $a^x$  would always be a multiple of p, and  $a^x \mod M$  is also a multiple of p because p divides M too. So you would not get all of the possible values modulo M. When a is relatively prime to M, what you always get is a number relatively prime to M. This is worth spelling out more than the text does:

**Definition**:  $G_M = \{1\} \cup \{a: 1 < a < M \text{ and a is relatively prime to } M\}$ .

**Theorem**:  $G_M$  forms a **group** under multiplication.

A **group** is a set G with a distinguished element 1 together with an operation  $\odot$  that satisfies the following axioms:

- For all  $g \in G$ ,  $g \odot 1 = 1 \odot g = g$ .
- For all  $g \in G$  there is a unique  $h \in G$  such that gh = 1 and hg = 1. We write  $h = g^{-1}$ .

For example, the  $n \times n$  unitary matrices U form a group with  $U^{-1} = U^*$ . Well, the numbers in modular arithmetic form groups that are simpler to understand.

When M=pq is a product of two primes, the size of  $G_M$  is exactly (p-1)(q-1). (The general name for the size of  $G_M$  is the **totient** function of M, devised by and often named for the mathematician Leonhard Euler.) The consequence of  $G_M$  being a group that we need is:

**Corollary**: For all  $a \in G_M$  there is a positive integer r such that  $a^r \equiv 1 \mod M$ .

The least such r is exactly the period of  $f_a(x)$  that we want to find. It always divides  $|G_M|$ , so when M = pq we get that r divides (p-1)(q-1). You might think this should narrow down the possibilities, but:

- We don't actually get the value m = (p-1)(q-1) factored for us---we don't even know m because we don't know how to factor M =: pq to begin with.
- Compared to the number n of bits or digits of M, which is the complexity parameter we care about, the range of numbers less than m we might have to check is exponential in n.
- By the way, the number x in  $a^x$  can be exponential in n, so it looks like it takes too long to compute  $f_a(x)$  to begin with. However, by **iterated squaring modulo** M we can compute the following values in  $\widetilde{O}(n^2)$  time:  $a_1 = a^2 \mod M$ ,  $a_2 = a_2^2 \mod M = a^4 \mod M$ ,  $a_3 = a_2^2 \mod M = a^8 \mod M$ ,  $a_4 = a_3^2 \mod M = a^{16} \mod M$ , and so on up to  $a_{n-1} = a_{n-2}^2 \mod M = a^{n-1} \mod M$ . Then we need only multiply together those  $a_i$  such that x as a binary number includes  $2^i$ . This needs only 2n multiplications and mod-M reductions of n-bit numbers, so it is doable in  $\widetilde{O}(n^2)$  time using an  $\widetilde{O}(n)$ -time integer multiplication algorithm. (Or we can say  $O(n^3)$  time using the simple multiplication algorithm. The RSA cryptosystem uses modular exponentiation too---and this time is largely why your credit card needed a chip.)

Nevertheless, if we *do* find the period r---for a "good" value a which we stand a fine chance of picking at random from  $G_M$ ---then it was known long before Peter Shor found his algorithm in 1993 that we can go on to find p and q by classical efficient means.

**Theorem**: There is a classical randomized algorithm that, when provided a *function oracle*  $g(M, a) = \text{some integer multiple of the period of } f_a \mod M, \text{ finds a factor of } M \text{ in expected polynomial time.}$  That is, Factoring is in BPP§.

The proof is the entire content of Chapter 12. Lipton and I bundled this up into a separate chapter so that instructors would have the freedom to skip it, as we'll do for the time being. (2024: It will be in a replacement lecture done online via Zoom.) So we can focus on the task of finding r (or at least a multiple of r) via *quantum means*.

**Shor's Theorem**: Factoring is in BQP.


## Steps of Shor's Algorithm

- 1. Given M, use classical randomness to guess a number a between 2 and M-1.
- 2. Use Euclid's algorithm to find gcd(a, M). If it gives a number c > 1, then "ka-ching!"---we got a divisor of M. Since both c and M/c are below M/2, we can recursively factor both of them.
- 3. If it gives  $\gcd(a,M)=1$ , then we know  $a\in G_M$ . In the important M=pq case, this had probability  $\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{pq}$  and so was pretty likely anyway. By the way, Euclid's algorithm also gives you a number b such that  $ab=1 \mod M$ . But it doesn't give you this b as a power of a (to wit, as  $b=a^{r-1} \mod M$ ), which is what you'd need to get r.
- 4. To give some slack, we choose a number  $Q=2^\ell \approx M^2$  and expand the domain of  $f_a(x)$  to include x in the interval up to Q-1, not just up to M-1. The range is still 1 to M-1. So our domain is x in the range 0 to  $2^\ell-1$ , which uses  $\ell \approx 2n$  bits. This gives us quadratically many "ripples" of the period, which in turn helps the trigonometric analysis in the body of the proof.
- 5. The quantum circuit begins with q-many Hadamard gates, followed by a quantum implementation of the  $n^{O(1)}$  classical gates needed to compute modular exponentiation. This produces the functionally superposed quantum state

$$\Phi_f = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell}} |x f_a(x)\rangle.$$

- 6. Apply the QFT (or its inverse) to the first  $\ell$  qubits.
- 7. Then *measure* the whole result. Curiously, we ignore what happens in the " $f_a(x)$ " portion of the circuit. The fact that those final n qubits were entangled with the first  $\ell$  qubits is enough. So we let our output w in the "x-space" be the first  $\ell$  bits of the measured result over the binary standard basis.

My own quantum circuit simulator draws an ASCII picture of the Shor circuit, here for M=21=3\*7 (where I guessed a=5), which gave  $\ell=9$  since  $2^9=512$  is the next power of 2 after  $M^2=441$ :




But there isn't any more to the quantum circuitry than that. It's all simply: compute a giant functional superposition and apply QFT (or its inverse) to it.

The analysis establishes that with pretty good probability already in one shot, the output y reveals the period r by a followup classical means. And with initial good probability over the choice of a, the resulting value r unlocks the key to factoring M. We will focus on understanding why the measured y has much to do with the period r to begin with. Then basic point---which has been known for centuries--is that the Fourier transform converts *periodic data* to *peaked data*. Here is how the simple quantum circuit above applies this fact.

The Intuition (See also Scott Aaronson, <a href="https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=208">https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=208</a>)

Let r stand for the true period of f. Let a be any element of the group  $G_M$  of size (p-1)(q-1). Then we will picture a as a "crazy clock" that jumps a units *counter*-clockwise at each time step.



With fairly high probability, measurement---followed by figuring needed to get the guessed  $r_i$  from the measurement---yields a multiple of r. The true r is the least of the multiples. It is individually the most likely value returned and is also returned with reasonable probability. A non-least r might work anwyay. We can tell whether r works by seeing if the classical part gives us p or q, else we just try the quantum process again.

Heading into the analysis, however, we need to say exactly what the measured string  $\boldsymbol{w}$  actually represents. In general, the angle  $\alpha$  represented by a (when we actually use the complex plane to model the "crazy clock") will not be a whole-number fraction of the circle. But let us first suppose it is. Then the smallest period r (i.e., the true period) will go exactly once around the circle and back to angle  $\alpha$  as represented by a. So suppose  $r_i$  is a correct guess of r. Then with high probability, the output  $\boldsymbol{w}$  of the measurement has the same angle  $\alpha$ . Since angles add when we multiply complex numbers, this means  $r\alpha$  takes us once around the circle. This in turn means that  $\alpha$  is the reciprocal of r with regard to the circle. So  $\boldsymbol{w}$  would be close to this reciprocal.

In the general case, we have to go some number t times around the circle before we get exactly back to a. That is, we have  $r\alpha = t$  with respect to the circle. So  $\alpha = \frac{t}{r}$  times whatever number Q represents the extent of once-around-the-circle in the units we are using. This finally means that  $\boldsymbol{w}$  should be close to  $\frac{tQ}{r}$  in these units. The  $\boldsymbol{w}$  needs to be close enough to pull one final switcharoo: We don't know what t is either, but from  $\boldsymbol{w} \approx \frac{tQ}{r}$  we get  $r \approx t\frac{Q}{\boldsymbol{w}}$ . Since r has to be an integer, we just need to find a t that multiply the fraction  $\frac{Q}{\boldsymbol{w}}$  into being real close to an integer. It turns out this will work when the additive error in the measured  $\boldsymbol{w}$  relative to the "true amplifying direction"  $\frac{tQ}{r}$  is at most  $\pm 0.5$  in the circle's units. Choosing Q high enough makes those units fine enough for this to work. The "analysis

of the quantum part" tells how often the measured w is close enough to be "good." (As was the case with Simon's algorithm, the text re-uses the letter "x" to denote the particular string from the "x-space" that was obtained in the measurement.)

## Simulation Interlude

Before we go to this analysis, let's see a brute-force simulation of Shor's algorithm. It pretty much builds the concrete "mazes" for  $\ell+n$  qubits and simulates all the legal "Feynman mouse paths" through them. The run of my simulator on M=21 and a=5 succeeded on the second try:

```
About to do try 1 of sampling QFT applied to 10101010101010100 with status now PROBS_ENUMERA Sampling with status PROBS_ENUMERATED:
Base probability for conditionals: 0.166015625000
Current: 0 with probability 0.083007813 on rolling 0.325191374; last 0 prob = 0.500000000
Current: 00 with probability 0.025082593 on rolling 0.563273639; last 0 prob = 0.665992647
Current: 001 with probability 0.02768299 on rolling 0.5959076137; last 0 prob = 0.499678899
Current: 0010 with probability 0.027418884 on rolling 0.941772811; last 0 prob = 0.991309060
Current: 001010 with probability 0.025482989 on rolling 0.3984380; last 0 prob = 0.99836782
Current: 001010 with probability 0.025482040 on rolling 0.39844900; last 0 prob = 0.09774850
Current: 001010 with probability 0.025482040 on rolling 0.5954201; last 0 prob = 0.0777850
Current: 001010 with probability 0.025482040 on rolling 0.5954201; last 0 prob = 0.782866
Current: 00101010 with probability 0.0250482040 on rolling 0.791199131; last 0 prob = 0.782866
Current: 00101010 with probability 0.018908726 on rolling 0.791199131; last 0 prob = 0.782866
Current: 00101010 with probability 0.018908726 on rolling 0.791199131; last 0 prob = 0.782866
Current: 00101010 as 85 giving 0.166015625
Fractional approximation is 1/6
: Possible period is 6
: Unable to determine factors, we'll try again.
Let's take a free random crack at it without the QFT application...
Fractional approximation is 2/3
: Odd denominator, trying to expand by 2.
: Possible period is 6
: Unable to determine factors, we'll try again.

About to do try 2 of sampling QFT applied to 101010101010101010 with status now PROBS_ENUMERA Sampling with status PROBS_ENUMERATED:
Base probability for conditionals: 0.166015625000
Current: 10 with probability 0.02756313 on rolling 0.572773717/; last 0 prob = 0.590000000
Current: 10 with probability 0.02756410 on rolling 0.572773717/; last 0 prob = 0.99986499
Current: 10000 with probability 0.02756410 on rolling 0.55239797; last 0 prob = 0.9998708
Current: 1000000 with probability 0
```

The detailed analysis from chapter 11 (continuing into chapter 12) will come in week 10.