

## CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Security --- 2

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### Recap

- Three types of functions
  - Cryptographic hash, symmetric key crypto, asymmetric key crypto
- Cryptographic hash
  - Easy to compute  $h(m)$
  - Hard to find an  $m$ , given  $h(m)$
  - Hard to find two values that hash to the same  $h(m)$
- How to find collisions?
  - Birthday paradox: for 50% prob. &  $m$  bits,  $\sim 2^{m/2}$  numbers
- Symmetric key crypto
  - MAC: Compute  $H = AES_K(SHA1(M))$  & Send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
- Asymmetric key crypto
  - Guarantees rely on computational hardness

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### Recap: Digital Signatures

- Method
  - Signer:  $compute H = RSA_K(SHA1(M))$  & send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
  - Verifier:  $compute H' = RSA_K(H)$  & verify  $H' == SHA1(M)$
- Not just integrity, but also authenticity

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### Heard of Firesheep?

- Firesheep
  - A Firefox extension
  - A packet sniffer to intercept unencrypted cookies from certain websites (such as Facebook and Twitter)
  - Allows the user to take on the log-in credentials of the victim
- Solution?
  - Encrypt your traffic!
  - This is before facebook started using https, but now facebook uses https.

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
### “Securing” HTTP

- Threat model
  - Eavesdropper listening on conversation (confidentiality)
  - Man-in-the-middle modifying content (integrity)
  - Adversary impersonating desired website (authentication, and confidentiality)
- Enter HTTP-S
  - HTTP sits on top of secure channels
  - All (HTTP) bytes written to secure channel are encrypted and authenticated

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### Encrypted Communication



- What is wrong with this?
  - How do you know you're actually talking to facebook and f-pub belongs to facebook?

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## Digital Certificates

- A **digital certificate** is a statement signed by a third party principal, and can be reused
  - e.g., Verisign Certification Authority (CA)
- To be useful, certificates must have:
  - A standard format, for construction and interpretation
  - A protocol for constructing chains of certificates
  - A trusted authority at the end of the chain
- Example
  - When facebook sends you the public key, it also sends a signature for the public key signed by Verisign.
  - You pre-store Verisign's public keys & certificates (self-signed by Verisign), i.e., you have already established trust with Verisign.
  - Use Verisign's public key to verify facebook's public key.

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## On My Mac...

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## X.509 Certificates

- The most widely used standard format for certificates
- Format
  - **Subject:** Distinguished Name, Public Key
  - **Issuer:** Distinguished Name, Signature
  - **Period of validity:** Not Before Date, Not After Date
  - **Administrative information:** Version, Serial Number
  - **Extended information**
- Binds a public key to the subject
  - A subject: person, organization, etc.
- The binding is in the signature issued by an issuer.
  - You need to either trust the issuer directly or indirectly (by establishing a *root of trust*).

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## X.509 Certificates


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## Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- **SSL (Secure Socket Layer)** was developed by Netscape for electronic transaction security.
- SSL was adopted as **TLS** as an Internet standard.
- A protocol layer is added below the application layer for:
  - Negotiating encryption and authentication methods.
  - Bootstrapping secure communication
- It consists of two layers:
  - The **Record Protocol Layer** implements a secure channel by encrypting and authenticating messages
  - The **Handshake Layer** establishes and maintains a secure session between two nodes.

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


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## TLS Record Protocol


- The record protocol takes an application message to be transmitted,
  - fragments the data into manageable blocks,
  - optionally compresses the data,
  - computes a message authentication code (MAC),
  - encrypts and
  - adds a header.



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## TLS Handshake Protocol



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## CSE 486/586 Administrivia

- CSE 622 Advanced Computer Systems
  - Probably on Android platform
  - Is open for registration
- PA4 due this Friday @ 2:59pm.
  - Will target finishing up grading next week.
- PA3 grading underway
  - Will be done this week.
- Final: 5/6, Monday, 3:30pm – 6:30pm
  - Davis 101
  - Everything up to this Friday
- Anonymous feedback form still available.
- Please come talk to me!

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## Authentication


- Use of cryptography to have two **principals** verify each others' identities.
  - Direct authentication:** the server uses a shared secret key to authenticate the client.
  - Indirect authentication:** a trusted **authentication server** (third party) authenticates the client.
  - The **authentication server** knows keys of principals and generates temporary shared key (**ticket**) to an authenticated client. The ticket is used for messages in this session.
    - E.g., Verisign servers

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## Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key




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## “Optimized” Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key with three messages




- Anything wrong with this?

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## Reflection Attack



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
## Needham-Schroeder Authentication

- An **authentication server** provides secret keys.
  - Every client shares a secret key with the server to encrypt their channels.
- If a client A wants to communicate with another client B,
  - The server sends a key to the client A in **two forms**.
  - First, **in a plain form**, so that the client A can use it to encrypt its channel to the client B.
  - Second, **in an encrypted form** (with the client B's secret key), so that the client B can know that the key is valid.
  - The client A sends this encrypted key to the client B as well.
- Basis for Kerberos

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## Needham-Schroeder Authentication




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## Nonce $N_A$ in Message 1

Because we need to relate message 2 to message 1



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
## Kerberos

- Follows Needham-Schroeder closely
- Time values used for nonces
  - To prevent replay attacks
  - To enforce a lifetime for each ticket
- Very popular
  - An Internet standard
  - Default in MS Windows

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## Kerberos



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