

CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Security --- 2

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Recap

- Three types of functions
 - Cryptographic hash, symmetric key crypto, asymmetric key crypto
- Cryptographic hash
 - Easy to compute $h(m)$
 - Hard to find an m , given $h(m)$
 - Hard to find two values that hash to the same $h(m)$
- How to find collisions?
 - Birthday paradox: for 50% prob. & m bits, $\sim 2^{m/2}$ numbers
- Symmetric key crypto
 - MAC: Compute $H = \text{AES}_k(\text{SHA1}(M))$ & Send $\langle M, H \rangle$
- Asymmetric key crypto
 - Guarantees rely on computational hardness

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Recap: Digital Signatures

- Method
 - Signer: compute $H = \text{RSA}_k(\text{SHA1}(M))$ & send $\langle M, H \rangle$
 - Verifier: compute $H' = \text{RSA}_{k'}(H)$ & verify $H' == \text{SHA1}(M)$
- Not just integrity, but also authenticity

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Heard of Firesheep?

- Firesheep
 - A Firefox extension
 - A packet sniffer to intercept unencrypted cookies from certain websites (such as Facebook and Twitter)
 - Allows the user to take on the log-in credentials of the victim
- Solution?
 - Encrypt your traffic!
 - This is before facebook started using https, but now facebook uses https.

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
“Securing” HTTP

- Threat model
 - Eavesdropper listening on conversation (confidentiality)
 - Man-in-the-middle modifying content (integrity)
 - Adversary impersonating desired website (authentication, and confidentiality)
- Enter HTTP-S
 - HTTP sits on top of secure channels
 - All (HTTP) bytes written to secure channel are encrypted and authenticated

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Encrypted Communication



- What is wrong with this?
 - How do you know you're actually talking to facebook and f-pub belongs to facebook?


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TLS Record Protocol

- The record protocol takes an application message to be transmitted,

- fragments the data into manageable blocks,
- optionally compresses the data,
- computes a message authentication code (MAC),
- encrypts and
- adds a header.



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TLS Handshake Protocol

Cipher suite: a list of cryptographic algorithm supported by the client

Phase 1: Establish security capabilities

ClientHello
ServerHello

Establish protocol version, session ID, cipher suite, compression method, exchange random values

Phase 2: Server authentication and key exchange

Certificate
Certificate Request
ServerHelloDone

Optionally send server certificate and request client certificate

Phase 3: Client authentication and key exchange

Certificate
Certificate Verify

Send client certificate response if requested

Phase 4: Finish

Change Cipher Spec
Finished

Change cipher suite and finish handshake

The client sends a change Cipher Spec message and copies the pending

CipherSpec into the current CipherSpec.

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CSE 486/586 Administrivia

- PA4 due 5/9
- Final: 5/14, Wednesday, 3:30pm – 6:30pm
 - Norton 112

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Authentication


- Use of cryptography to have two principals verify each others' identities.
 - **Direct authentication:** the server uses a shared secret key to authenticate the client.
 - **Indirect authentication:** a trusted authentication server (third party) authenticates the client.
 - The authentication server knows keys of principals and generates temporary shared key (ticket) to an authenticated client. The ticket is used for messages in this session.
 - E.g., Verisign servers

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Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key




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"Optimized" Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key with three messages




- Anything wrong with this?

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Reflection Attack



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
Needham-Schroeder Authentication

- An **authentication server** provides secret keys.
 - Every client shares a secret key with the server to encrypt their channels.
- If a client A wants to communicate with another client B,
 - The server sends a key to the client A in **two forms**.
 - First, **in a plain form**, so that the client A can use it to encrypt its channel to the client B.
 - Second, **in an encrypted form** (with the client B's secret key), so that the client B can know that the key is valid.
 - The client A sends this encrypted key to the client B as well.
- Basis for Kerberos

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Needham-Schroeder Authentication




message

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Nonce N_A in Message 1

Because we need to relate message 2 to message 1



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
Kerberos

- Follows Needham-Schroeder closely
- Time values used for nonces
 - To prevent replay attacks
 - To enforce a lifetime for each ticket
- Very popular
 - An Internet standard
 - Default in MS Windows

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Kerberos



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Summary

- Digital certificates
 - Binds a public key to its owner
 - Establishes a chain of trust
- TLS
 - Provides an application-transparent way of secure communication
 - Uses digital certificates to verify the origin identity
- Authentication
 - Needham-Schroeder & Kerberos

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Acknowledgements

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