

CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Byzantine Fault Tolerance

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Recap

- Digital certificates
 - Binds a public key to its owner
 - Establishes a chain of trust
- TLS
 - Provides an application-transparent way of secure communication
 - Uses digital certificates to verify the origin identity
- Authentication
 - Needham-Schroeder & Kerberos

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Byzantine Fault Tolerance

- Fault categories
 - Benign: failures we've been talking about
 - Byzantine: arbitrary failures
- Benign
 - Fail-stop & crash: process halted
 - Omission: msg loss, send-omission, receive-omission
 - All entities still follow the protocol
- Byzantine
 - A broader category than benign failures
 - Process or channel exhibits arbitrary behavior.
 - May deviate from the protocol
 - Processes can crash, messages can be lost, etc.
 - Can be malicious (attacks, software bugs, etc.)

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Byzantine Fault Tolerance

- Result: with f faulty nodes, we need $3f + 1$ nodes to tolerate their Byzantine behavior.
 - Fundamental limitation
 - Today's goal is to understand this limitation.
- How about Paxos (that tolerates benign failures)?
 - With f faulty nodes, we need $2f + 1$.
 - Having f faulty nodes means that as long as $f + 1$ nodes are reachable, Paxos can guarantee an agreement.
 - This is the known lower bound for consensus with non-Byzantine failures.

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"Byzantine"

- Leslie Lamport (again!) defined the problem & presented the result.
- *"I have long felt that, because it was posed as a cute problem about philosophers seated around a table, Dijkstra's dining philosopher's problem received much more attention than it deserves."*
- *"At the time, Albania was a completely closed society, and I felt it unlikely that there would be any Albanians around to object, so the original title of this paper was The Albanian Generals Problem."*
- *"...The obviously more appropriate Byzantine generals then occurred to me."*

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Introducing the Byzantine Generals




- Imagine several divisions of the Byzantine army camped outside of a city
- Each division has a general.
- The generals can only communicate by a messenger.

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Introducing the Byzantine Generals



- They must decide on a common plan of action.
 - What is this problem?
- But, *some of the generals can be traitors.*

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Requirements

- All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action (e.g., attack or retreat).
- A small number of traitors cannot confuse the loyal generals nor cause the loyal generals to adopt a bad plan.
- There has to be a way to communicate one's opinion to others correctly.

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The Byzantine Generals Problem

- The problem boils down to how a single general sends the general's own value to the others.
 - Thus, we can simplify it in terms of a **single commanding general** sending an order to **lieutenant generals**.
- Byzantine Generals Problem: a commanding general must send an order to $n-1$ lieutenant generals such that
 - All loyal lieutenants obey the same order.
 - If the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order the commanding general sends.
- We'll try a simple strategy and see if it works.
 - All-to-all communication: every general sends the opinion & repeatedly sends others' opinions for reliability.
 - Majority: the final decision is the decision of the majority
 - Similar to reliable multicast

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Question

- Can three generals agree on the plan of action?
 - One commander
 - Two lieutenants
 - One of them can be a traitor.
 - Want no confusion, no bad plan, but a good plan.
- This means that we have $2f + 1$ nodes.
 - Again, this is the known lower bound for consensus with non-Byzantine nodes.
 - Protocols like Paxos provides the consensus guarantee.
- The question is if we can **still have this same minimum nodes** to reach consensus with Byzantine nodes.

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
Question

- Protocol
 - Commander sends out an order ("attack"/"retreat").
 - Lieutenants relay the order to each other for reliability (to tolerate message losses).
 - Lieutenants follow the order of the commander.
 - If the commander is the traitor, we elect a new commander.
 - If one of the lieutenants is the traitor, we follow the commander.
 - We want no confusion.
- Can you come up with some scenarios where this protocol doesn't work?

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
Understanding the Problem



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Understanding the Problem



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Understanding the Problem

- One traitor makes it impossible with three generals.
- Comparison to non-Byzantine failures (e.g., Paxos)
 - With non-Byzantine failures, f nodes can *fail (or disappear)* from the system, but *they don't lie*.
 - E.g., Paxos works with $2f + 1$ nodes when f nodes are faulty (i.e., $f + 1$ nodes are reachable).
- In the Byzantine generals problem, *these f nodes might be alive and malicious*.
 - Failures are not any more about reachability.
 - Even if some nodes are reachable, they might be lying.
 - Additional concern: Is this true?
- In general, you need $3f + 1$ nodes to tolerate f faulty nodes in the Byzantine generals problem.
- Why?

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CSE 486/586 Administrivia

- PA4 due Friday next week
- Final: 5/15 (Friday), 11:45am – 2:45pm
 - NSC 201
 - Everything
 - **No restroom use** (this quickly becomes chaotic)

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Intuition for the Result

- Problem
 - What is the minimum number of nodes do we need to communicate to reach consensus in the presence of Byzantine (malicious) nodes?
 - Phrased differently, **how many minimum votes or replies** do we need from different nodes?
 - We're not talking about a protocol that makes consensus possible, but rather the minimum bound.
- For the sake of discussion, assume this setting:
 - You're interacting with replicated state machines, e.g., you're using a website that has multiple servers.
 - You send a request, all servers reply back. Some servers might be controlled by an attacker.
 - Based on the replies, you determine the actual result (e.g., yes/no).

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Intuition for the Result

- With non-Byzantine failures
 - Up to f nodes can be unreachable, meaning, if there is n nodes, **you might only get $n - f$ votes**.
 - This means that **just with $n - f$ votes, you should be able to make a decision on consensus**.
 - If we set $n = 2f + 1$, we can do just that, e.g., Paxos.
- With Byzantine failures
 - One extreme: Up to f nodes can be **unreachable** (if all exhibit non-Byzantine failures), meaning, if there is n nodes, **you might only get $n - f$ votes**, i.e., **you should be able to make a decision on consensus with just $n - f$ votes**.
 - Another extreme: Up to f nodes can be lying if all exhibit Byzantine failures, i.e., **you should still be able to make a decision on consensus with just $n - f$ votes, even if f votes out of those $n - f$ votes are in fact lies**.
 - What is the minimum n then?

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Intuition for the Result

- Let's try $n = 2f + 1$.
 - We should be able to reach consensus with $n - f$ votes, i.e., **$f + 1$ votes** (due to potential unreachability from last slide).
 - And, out of $f + 1$ votes, **it's possible that f votes are in fact lies**.
- Example
 - $2f + 1$ nodes, and outcome by $f + 1$ votes.
 - f faulty nodes say no.
 - $f + 1$ non-faulty nodes say yes
 - You get $f + 1$ votes.
 - Ideal scenario?
 - Other possibilities?
- $n = 2f + 1$ does not work.

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Intuition for the Result

- Once again (reminder),
 - We should be able to reach consensus with $n - f$ votes.
 - And, out of $n - f$ votes, it's possible that f votes are lies.
- Intuition
 - If we make sure that $n - f$ votes always contain more votes from honest nodes than Byzantine nodes, we're safe.
 - E.g., among $n - f$ server replies, if there are more replies from honest servers, we can determine the correct result.
- How can we make sure of this?
 - We set $n = 3f + 1$.
 - We can always obtain $n - f$, i.e., $2f + 1$ votes. Then we have at least $f + 1$ votes from honest nodes, one more than the number of potential faulty nodes.

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Summary

- Byzantine generals problem
 - They must decide on a common plan of action.
 - But, some of the generals can be traitors.
- Requirements
 - All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action (e.g., attack or retreat).
 - A small number of traitors cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt a bad plan.
- Impossibility results
 - With three generals, it's impossible to reach a consensus with one traitor
 - In general, with less than $3f + 1$ nodes, we cannot tolerate f faulty nodes.

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Acknowledgements

- These slides contain material developed and copyrighted by Indranil Gupta (UIUC).

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