

## CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Security --- 2

Steve Ko  
Computer Sciences and Engineering  
University at Buffalo

CSE 486/586

### Recap

- Three types of functions
  - Cryptographic hash, symmetric key crypto, asymmetric key crypto
- Cryptographic hash
  - Easy to compute  $h(m)$
  - Hard to find an  $m$ , given  $h(m)$
  - Hard to find two values that hash to the same  $h(m)$
- How to find collisions?
  - Birthday paradox: for 50% prob. &  $m$  bits,  $\sim 2^{m/2}$  numbers
- Symmetric key crypto
  - MAC: Compute  $H = \text{AES}_K(\text{SHA1}(M))$  & Send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
- Asymmetric key crypto
  - Guarantees rely on computational hardness

CSE 486/586

2

### Background: Digital Signatures

- Asymmetric crypto
- Signer:  $\text{compute } H = \text{RSA}_K(\text{SHA1}(M))$  & send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
- Verifier:  $\text{compute } H' = \text{RSA}_K(H)$  & verify  $H' == \text{SHA1}(M)$
- Not just integrity, but also authenticity

CSE 486/586

3

### Heard of Firesheep?

- Firesheep
  - A Firefox extension
  - A packet sniffer to intercept unencrypted cookies from certain websites (such as Facebook and Twitter)
  - Allows the user to take on the log-in credentials of the victim
- Solution?
  - Encrypt your traffic!
  - This is before facebook started using https, but now facebook uses https.

CSE 486/586

4


### “Securing” HTTP

- Threat model
  - Eavesdropper listening on conversation (confidentiality)
  - Man-in-the-middle modifying content (integrity)
  - Adversary impersonating desired website (authentication, and confidentiality)
- Enter HTTP-S
  - HTTP sits on top of secure channels
  - All (HTTP) bytes written to secure channel are encrypted and authenticated

CSE 486/586

5

### Encrypted Communication



- What is wrong with this?
  - How do you know you're actually talking to facebook and f-pub belongs to facebook?

CSE 486/586

6

## Digital Certificates

- A **digital certificate** is a statement signed by a third party principal, and can be reused
  - e.g., Verisign Certification Authority (CA)
- To be useful, certificates must have:
  - A standard format, for construction and interpretation
  - A protocol for constructing chains of certificates
  - A trusted authority at the end of the chain
- Example
  - When facebook sends you the public key, it also sends a signature for the public key signed by Verisign.
  - You pre-store Verisign's public keys & certificates (self-signed by Verisign), i.e., you have already established trust with Verisign.
  - Use Verisign's public key to verify facebook's public key.

CSE 486/586

7

## X.509 Certificates

- The most widely used standard format for certificates
- Format
  - **Subject:** Distinguished Name, Public Key
  - **Issuer:** Distinguished Name, Signature
  - **Period of validity:** Not Before Date, Not After Date
  - **Administrative information:** Version, Serial Number
  - **Extended information**
- Binds a public key to the subject
  - A subject: person, organization, etc.
- The binding is in the signature issued by an issuer.
  - You need to either trust the issuer directly or indirectly (by establishing a *root of trust*).

CSE 486/586

9

## Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- **SSL (Secure Socket Layer)** was developed by Netscape for electronic transaction security.
- SSL was adopted as **TLS** as an Internet standard.
- A protocol layer is added below the application layer for:
  - Negotiating encryption and authentication methods.
  - Bootstrapping secure communication
- It consists of two layers:
  - The **Record Protocol Layer** implements a secure channel by encrypting and authenticating messages
  - The **Handshake Layer** establishes and maintains a secure session between two nodes.

CSE 486/586

11

## On My Mac...

CA 2 Thawte Person  
**CSE 486/586**

8


## X.509 Certificates

Certificate:  
Data:  
Subject: 1 (0x0)  
Serial Number: 7829 (0x1e95)  
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption  
Issuer: C=US, O=Thawte Consulting Co.,  
L=Capitola, S=California, C=US  
OU=Certification Service Division,  
CN=Thawte Server CA/emailAddress=server-certs@thawte.com  
Validity:  
Not Before: Jul 9 16:04:02 1998 GMT  
Not After: Jul 9 16:04:02 1999 GMT  
Subject: C=US, O=FreeSoc, L=Montreal, S=Quebec, C=CA  
OU=FreeSoc, CN=www.freesoc.com/emailAddress=bacca@freesoc.org  
Subject Public Key Info:  
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption  
RSA Public Key:  
    Modulus:  
        09:42:11:98:0a:4c:bc:b2:c1:88:aa:dc:b0:c8:bb:  
        33:19:5d:04:6b:b9:d1:49:96:f3:c1:31:  
        64:4e:30:11:40:3a:3d:30:11:30:30:30:  
        70:33:52:14:c4:ec:49:91:51:70:39:3d:01:  
        85:17:  
    Exponent:  
        16:94:ee:45:4d:4f:4d:4c:3b:47:5e:51:0e:  
        77:  
        05:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:  
        77:  
        8f:ad:21:c7:4c:dd:16:65:00:01:c1:0f:db:b8:80:a3:  
        d2:75:63:4c:4c:59:5c:5e:5a:7d:c1:a1:10:bc:b1:  
        8b:  
        4b:  
        Exponent: 65537 (0x10000)  
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption  
93:55:08:5f:5c:ac:af:4d:1a:53:fd:45:21:b5:5d:9d:  
92:2e:4a:bb:1b:8a:b9:77:19:17:3d:19:f6:6d:63:2f:92:  
d0:4a:19:3a:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:4d:  
d0:d0:40:03:7f:ef:51:15:09:79:5a:44:6d:7b:16:b1:41:72:  
0d:19:an:ad:dd:9a:df:97:05:65:50:5c:5e:5a:5d:  
9d:3d:9a:ea:63:ed:cbe:cbe:d5:01:85:b5:6d:c8:13:d9:27:  
ff:0e:4c:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:1f:  
4b:9f

CSE 486/586

10

## TLS Protocol Stack




CSE 486/586

12

## TLS Record Protocol


- The record protocol takes an application message to be transmitted,
  - fragments the data into manageable blocks,
  - optionally compresses the data,
  - computes a message authentication code (MAC),
  - encrypts and
  - adds a header.



CSE 486/586

13

## TLS Handshake Protocol



CSE 486/586

14

## CSE 486/586 Administrivia

- Final: 5/18/2017, Thursday, 6 pm – 8 pm, Knox 110
- PA4 due on 5/12/2017 at 12 pm.

CSE 486/586

15

## Authentication


- Use of cryptography to have two **principals** verify each others' identities.
  - Direct authentication:** the server uses a shared secret key to authenticate the client.
  - Indirect authentication:** a trusted **authentication server** (third party) authenticates the client.
  - The **authentication server** knows keys of principals and generates temporary shared key (**ticket**) to an authenticated client. The ticket is used for messages in this session.
    - E.g., Verisign servers

CSE 486/586

16

## Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key




CSE 486/586

17

## "Optimized" Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key with three messages




• Anything wrong with this?

CSE 486/586

18

## Reflection Attack



CSE 486/586

19


## Needham-Schroeder Authentication

- An **authentication server** provides secret keys.
  - Every client shares a secret key with the server to encrypt their channels.
- If a client A wants to communicate with another client B,
  - The server sends a key to the client A in **two forms**.
  - First, **in a plain form**, so that the client A can use it to encrypt its channel to the client B.
  - Second, **in an encrypted form** (with the client B's secret key), so that the client B can know that the key is valid.
  - The client A sends this encrypted key to the client B as well.
- Basis for Kerberos

CSE 486/586

20

## Needham-Schroeder Authentication




CSE 486/586

21

## Nonce $N_A$ in Message 1

Because we need to relate message 2 to message 1



CSE 486/586

22


## Kerberos

- Follows Needham-Schroeder closely
- Time values used for nonces
  - To prevent replay attacks
  - To enforce a lifetime for each ticket
- Very popular
  - An Internet standard
  - Default in MS Windows

CSE 486/586

23

## Kerberos



CSE 486/586

24

## Summary

- Digital certificates
  - Binds a public key to its owner
  - Establishes a chain of trust
- TLS
  - Provides an application-transparent way of secure communication
  - Uses digital certificates to verify the origin identity
- Authentication
  - Needham-Schroeder & Kerberos

CSE 486/586

25

## Acknowledgements

- These slides contain material developed and copyrighted by Indranil Gupta (UIUC), Jennifer Rexford (Princeton) and Michael Freedman (Princeton).

CSE 486/586

26