Introduction to Elementary Number Theory and Cryptography

CSE 191, Class Note 07 Computer Sci & Eng Dept SUNY Buffalo

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Outline

Introduction to Elementary Number Theory

- 2 Integer division
- 3 Congruence
- Prime numbers
- 5 Greatest common divisor
- Euclidean GCD algorithm
- 7 Factoring and Primality Testing Problems

8 Encryption

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- Number Theory is one of the oldest branch of mathematics.
- It studies the properties of integers, especially prime numbers.
- There are several simple looking, yet very challenging problems in number theory.
- There are a number of applications in Computer Science. The most important and well known is the RSA Public Key Cryptosystem, which is the basis of virtually all current computer security systems.
- We will study some of the basic topics in number theory, so that we can describe and understand RSA Public Key Cryptosystem.

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Some example problems in Number Theory

Fermat's Last Theorem:

For any integer $n \ge 3$, there is no integer solution x, y, z for the equation

$$x^n + y^n = z^n$$

This problem had been open for more than 350 years. It was proved by Andrew Wildes in 1995.

Goldbach's Conjecture:

Every even integer $n \ge 2$ is the sum of two prime numbers.

Example: 4=2+2; 6=3+3; 8=3+5; ..., 20=3+17; 22 = 3+19= 11+11;

- It has been verified that this conjecture is true for *n* up to $1.6 \cdot 10^{18}$.
- British publisher Tony Faber offered a \$1,000,000 prize if a proof was submitted before April 2002. The prize was not claimed.
- It remains unsolved today.

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- Let *a* be an integer and *d* be a positive integer. Then there are unique integers *q* and *r* ($0 \le r < d$), such that a = dq + r.
 - This is the the division of *a* by *d*.
 - q is the quotient of this division. We write $q = a \operatorname{div} d$.
 - *r* is the remainder of this division. We write $r = a \mod d$.
 - If r = 0, then we say d divides a, and write d|a.

Example:

We divide 13 by 3, and get that $13 = 3 \times 4 + 1$.

• So, 13 div 3 = 4 and 13 mod 3 = 1.

• Since the remainder is not 0, we say that 3 does not divide 13.

- Divide 27 by 5. What is the quotient and what is the remainder?
- Does 14 divide 98?
- Divide 1000 by 333.
- Does 1111 divide 2345?

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Let a, b, c be integers. Then:

- 1 If a|b and a|c, then a|(b+c).
- 2 If a|b, then a|(bc) for all integers c.

3 If a|b and b|c, then a|c.

Proof: (1) Let d = b div a and d' = c div a. Then b + c = da + d'a = (d + d')a. So a|(b + c). (2) Let d = b div a. Then bc = adc. So a|bc. (3) Let d = b div a and d' = c div b. Then c = d'b = d'da. So a|c.

Example

Suppose *a*, *b*, *c* are integers such that a|b and a|c. Then, for all integers m, n, a|(mb + nc).

Proof: Let d = b div a and d' = c div a. Then:

$$mb + nc = mda + nd'a = (md + nd')a$$

So, a|mb + nc.

Note: you should memorize this result.

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Let *a* and *b* be integers, and *m* be a positive integer. Then we say *a* is congruent to *b* modulo *m* if $a \mod m = b \mod m$. We write $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$.

Example:

$$13 \mod 4 = 1 = 21 \mod 4$$

So, we have $13 \equiv 21 \pmod{4}$.

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Equivalent definition for congruence

Theorem:

Let *a*, *b* be integers and *m* be a positive integer. Then $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ if and only if m|(a - b).

Proof: Let a = mq + r and b = mq' + r'. With out loss of generality, assume $r \ge r'$. So a - b = m(q - q') + (r - r').

 $a \equiv b \mod m \iff r = r'$ (the remainders of a, b divided by m are the same) $\Leftrightarrow (a - b) = m(q - q')$ $\Leftrightarrow m|(a - b)$

Example for congruence

- Is 101 congruent to 91 mod 9?
- $101 \equiv 91 \pmod{??}$
- $100 \equiv 99 \pmod{??}$

Let *m* be a positive integer. If $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$, then $a + c \equiv b + d \pmod{m}$.

Proof:

 $a \equiv b \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (a - b) \Leftrightarrow (a - b) = k_1 \cdot m$ for some integer k_1 . $c \equiv d \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (c - d) \Leftrightarrow (c - d) = k_2 \cdot m$ for some integer k_2 .

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Hence: $(a + c) - (b + d) = (a - b) + (c - d) = m \cdot k_1 + m \cdot k_2 = m \cdot (k_1 + k_2).$

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Let *m* be a positive integer. If $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$, then $a + c \equiv b + d \pmod{m}$.

Proof:

 $a \equiv b \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (a - b) \Leftrightarrow (a - b) = k_1 \cdot m \text{ for some integer } k_1.$ $c \equiv d \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (c - d) \Leftrightarrow (c - d) = k_2 \cdot m \text{ for some integer } k_2.$

Hence: $(a + c) - (b + d) = (a - b) + (c - d) = m \cdot k_1 + m \cdot k_2 = m \cdot (k_1 + k_2).$

This means m | [(a + c) - (b + d)]. By the equivalent definition of congruence, $(a + c) \equiv (b + d) \pmod{m}$.

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Example

 $10001 + 20000005 + 3004 \equiv ? \pmod{10}$

Solution:

10001	\equiv	1(mod 10)
20000005	\equiv	5(mod 10)
3004	\equiv	4(mod 10)

So $10001+2000005+3004 \equiv 1+5+4 \pmod{10} \equiv 10 \pmod{10} \equiv 0 \pmod{10}$.

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Multiplication of congruence

Theorem:

Let *m* be a positive integer. If $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$, then $ac \equiv bd \pmod{m}$.

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Multiplication of congruence

Theorem:

Let *m* be a positive integer. If $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$, then $ac \equiv bd \pmod{m}$.

Proof:

 $a \equiv b \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (a - b) \Leftrightarrow (a - b) = k_1 \cdot m$ for some integer k_1 . $c \equiv d \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (c - d) \Leftrightarrow (c - d) = k_2 \cdot m$ for some integer k_2 .

Hence:

 $ac-bd = ac-ad+ad-bd = a(c-d)+d(a-b) = am \cdot k_2 + dm \cdot k_1 = m \cdot (ak_2 + dk_1).$

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Multiplication of congruence

Theorem:

Let *m* be a positive integer. If $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$, then $ac \equiv bd \pmod{m}$.

Proof:

$$a \equiv b \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (a - b) \Leftrightarrow (a - b) = k_1 \cdot m$$
 for some integer k_1 .
 $c \equiv d \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m | (c - d) \Leftrightarrow (c - d) = k_2 \cdot m$ for some integer k_2 .

Hence:

 $ac-bd = ac-ad+ad-bd = a(c-d)+d(a-b) = am \cdot k_2 + dm \cdot k_1 = m \cdot (ak_2 + dk_1).$

This means m|(ac - bd). By the equivalent definition of congruence, $ac \equiv bd \pmod{m}$.

Example: 10001 X 20000005 \equiv ? (mod 13)

Solution: $10001 \equiv 4 \pmod{13}$ and $20000005 \equiv 12 \pmod{13}$ So, $10001 \times 20000005 \equiv 4 \times 12 \pmod{13} \equiv 48 \pmod{13} \equiv 9$

Let m be a positive integer and a, b be integers. Then,

 $(a+b) \mod m = ((a \mod m)+(b \mod m)) \mod m.$

Proof: Clearly, we have $a \equiv a \mod m \pmod{m}$, and $b \equiv b \mod m \pmod{m}$. So, we get that $a + b \equiv (a \mod m) + (b \mod m) \pmod{m}$, which is equivalent to that $(a + b) \mod m = ((a \mod m)+(b \mod m)) \mod m$.

Theorem:

Let m be a positive integer and a, b be integers. Then,

 $ab \mod m = ((a \mod m)(b \mod m)) \mod m.$

The proof is analogous to the previous theorem and so we skip it here.

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Example: What is 2008²⁰⁰⁸ mod 3?

$$2008^{2008} = (\underbrace{2008 \times \ldots \times 2008}_{2008 \text{ times}}) \mod 3$$

= ((2008 mod 3) × ... × (2008 mod 3)) mod 3
= (2008 mod 3)^{2008} mod 3
= 1^{2008} mod 3 = 1

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- A positive integer *p* (> 1) is called prime if the only positive integers that divide *p* are 1 and *p* itself.
- A positive integer (> 1) that is not a prime is called composite.

Example:

Prime: 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 Composite: 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18

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Fundamental theorem of arithmetic

Theorem:

Every positive integer n > 1 can be written uniquely as a prime or as the product of two or more primes where the prime factors are written in order of non-decreasing size:

$$n = p_1^{r_1} \times p_2^{r_2} \times \cdots \times p_k^{r_k}$$

which is called the (prime) factorization of *n*.

Example:

We can write $100=2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5=2^2 \times 5^2$. We can write 241=241.

Example:

625 = ? 891 = ?

Prime factor test

Theorem:

If *n* is a composite, then *n* has a prime factor less than or equal to \sqrt{n} .

Proof: We prove by contradiction. Suppose that *n* is a composite and does not have any prime factor $\leq \sqrt{n}$. By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, we know that $n = p_1 \cdot p_2 \cdots p_k$, where the prime factors $p_1 > \sqrt{n}, p_2 > \sqrt{n}, \dots p_k > \sqrt{n}$. Furthermore, since *n* is a composite, $k \geq 2$. So we have

$$n = p1 \cdot p2 \cdots p_k > p_1 \cdot p_2 > \sqrt{n} \cdot \sqrt{n} = n$$

Contradiction.

Example: Show 71 is a prime.

Note that $\sqrt{71} = 8.4...$ The only primes $\leq 8.4...$ are 2, 3, 5, 7. So we divide 71 by 2,3,5,7. None of them is a factor of 71. Then we can conclude 71 is a prime.

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Theorem: There are infinitely many primes.

Proof: We prove by contradiction. Suppose that there are only a finite number of primes: p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n . Now consider

 $p=p_1\cdot p_2\cdots p_n+1$

On one hand, p must be a composite since it is greater than any of the above n primes. So by the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, it can be written as the product of two or more primes.

On the other hand, it is easy to verify that any prime p_i ($1 \le i \le n$) cannot divide p since the remainder of the division is 1. Contradiction.

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Let *a* and *b* be integers, not both 0. The largest integer *d* such that d|a and d|b is called the greatest common divisor of *a* and *b*. We write:

d = gcd(a, b)

Example:

gcd(30, 6) = 6 since 6|30.

Calculating gcd(a, b)

How to calculate gcd(a, b)?

- Express a and b as products of powers of increasing primes.
- Select the prime divisors a and b have in common.
- I For each of the common prime divisor, pick the smaller exponent.
- Calculate the product of the powers of these common prime divisors, where the exponents are what we just selected.

Example: how can we calculate gcd(168, 196)?

- $168 = 2^3 \times 3 \times 7$; and $196 = 2^2 \times 7^2$.
- 2 and 7 are the common prime divisors of 168 and 196.
- For prime divisor 2, we have exponents 3 (for 168) and 2 (for 196). Hence, we select 2; for prime divisor 7, we have exponents 1 (for 168) and 2 (for 196). Hence, we select 1.
- Calculate $2^2 \times 7^1 = 28$. So gcd(168, 196) = 28.

The integers *a* and *b* are coprime (relatively prime) to each other if gcd(a,b) = 1.

Use the method just learned to calculate gcd(a, b), you know whether a and b are coprime to each other.

Example:

- 15 and 25 are not coprime to each other since gcd(15, 25) = 5.
- 15 and 24 are not coprime to each other since gcd(15, 24) = 3.
- 15 and 28 are coprime to each other since gcd(15, 28) = 1.

Consider *n* integers $a_1, a_2, ..., a_n$. They are called pairwise coprime if $gcd(a_i, a_j) = 1$ for any $i \neq j$.

Example:

- 15, 17, 25 are not pairwise coprime since gcd(15, 25) = 5.
- 15, 17, 28 are pairwise coprime since gcd(15, 17) = gcd(15, 28) = gcd(17, 28) = 1.

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The least common multiple of positive integers a and b is the smallest positive integer that can be divided by both a and b. We denote it by lcm(a, b).

Example:

lcm(30, 6) = 30 since 6|30.

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How can we calculate lcm(a, b)?

- Express a and b as products of powers of increasing primes. (Analogous to calculating gcd).
- Select the prime divisors a and b have in common. (Analogous to calculating gcd)
- Sor each of the common prime divisor, pick the larger exponent.
- Calculate the product of the powers of these common prime divisors, where the exponents are what we just selected, and also all primes that only one of them has. (Different from calculating gcd)

Example: how can we calculate *lcm*(168, 196)?

- $168 = 2^3 \times 3 \times 7$ and $196 = 2^2 \times 7^2$.
- 2 and 7 are the common prime divisors of 168 and 196.
- For prime divisor 2, we (Different from calculating gcd) have exponents 3 (for 168) and 2 (for 196). Hence, we select 3; For prime divisor 7, we have exponents 1 (for 168) and 2 (for 196). Hence, we select 2.
- Calculate $lcm(168, 196) = 2^3 \times 7^2 \times 3 = 1176$.

Suppose *a* and *b* are positive integers. Then $ab = gcd(a, b) \cdot lcm(a, b)$.

Example:

- gcd(168, 196) = 28 and lcm(168, 196) = 1176.
- $168 \times 196 = 32928 = 28 \times 1176$.

This tells us that if we can calculate the gcd, then we can easily get the lcm, and vice versa.

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
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- The gcd (and lcm) algorithms described above rely on finding the factorization of *n*.
- Although it looks very simple, it is very time consuming even for super computers to find prime factors of large integers.
- This fact (that it is difficult to find prime factors) is the basis of the cryptography (to be discussed later).
- Euclidean algorithm is a much faster algorithm for finding gcd(a, b). It does not rely on prime factorization.

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Euclidean-GCD (a, b: positive integers)



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$$x := y$$

•
$$y := r$$

4 return x (gcd(a, b) is x)

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Example of Euclidean GCD algorithm

Example:

$$287 = 91 \cdot 3 + 14 91 = 14 \cdot 6 + 7 14 = 7 \cdot 2$$

So gcd(287, 91) = 7

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Example of Euclidean GCD algorithm

Example:

So gcd(287,91) = 7

Why Euclidean-GCD algorithm work?

Lemma

Let *a*, *b* are positive integers and $r = a \mod b$. Then gcd(a, b) = gcd(b, r).

Proof: We have $a = b \cdot q + r$. Thus $r = a - b \cdot q$.

Let *d* be a common divisor of *a* and *b*. Namely d|a and d|b. This implies that $d|(a - b \cdot q)$. Namely d|r. Similarly we can show if d|b and d|r, then $d|(b \cdot q + r)$. Namely d|a. Hence $\{a, b\}$ and $\{b, r\}$ have exactly the same set of divisors. So gcd(a,b) = gcd(b,r).

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In the Euclidean-GCD algorithm, let $r_0 = a$ and $r_1 = b$. We have

$$\begin{array}{rcl} r_{0} & = & r_{1}q_{1} + r_{2} & 0 \leq r_{2} < r_{1} \\ r_{1} & = & r_{2}q_{2} + r_{3} & 0 \leq r_{3} < r_{2} \\ \vdots \\ r_{n-2} & = & r_{n-1}q_{n-1} + r_{n} & 0 \leq r_{2} < r_{1} \\ r_{n-1} & = & r_{n} \cdot q_{n} \end{array}$$

So

 $gcd(a,b) = gcd(r_0,r_1) = gcd(r_1,r_2) = \ldots = gcd(r_{n-2},r_{n-1}) = gcd(r_{n-1},r_n) = r_n.$

Bézout's Theorem

Bézout's Theorem

Let *a* and *b* be positive integers. Then there exist integers *s* and *t* such that gcd(a,b) = sa + tb.

By reversing Euclidean GCD algorithm, we can find s and t.

Example: a = 287, b = 91. We have:

287	=	$91 \cdot 3 + 14$
91	=	$14 \cdot 6 + 7$
14	=	$7 \cdot 2$

So gcd(287,91) = 7. Now going backward:

$$7 = 91 - 14 \cdot 6 = 91 - (287 - 91 \cdot 3) \cdot 6 = -6 \cdot 287 + 19 \cdot 91$$

Hence s = -6 and t = 19.

This process for finding *s* and *t* is called Extended Euclidean Algorithm.

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P1: Factoring Problem

Input: an integer *X*. Output: Find its prime factorization.

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Input: an integer *X*. Output: Find its prime factorization.

If X = 117, the output: $X = 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 13$.

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P1: Factoring Problem

Input: an integer *X*. Output: Find its prime factorization.

If X = 117, the output: $X = 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 13$.

P2: Primality Testing

Input: an integer *X*. Output: "yes" if *X* is a prime number; "no" if not.

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P1: Factoring Problem

Input: an integer *X*. Output: Find its prime factorization.

If X = 117, the output: $X = 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 13$.

P2: Primality Testing

Input: an integer *X*. Output: "yes" if *X* is a prime number; "no" if not.

• If *X* = 117, output "no".

P1: Factoring Problem

Input: an integer *X*. Output: Find its prime factorization.

If X = 117, the output: $X = 3 \cdot 3 \cdot 13$.

P2: Primality Testing

Input: an integer *X*. Output: "yes" if *X* is a prime number; "no" if not.

- If X = 117, output "no".
- If *X* = 456731, output = ?

- P1 and P2 are related.
- If we can solve P1, we can solve P2 immediately.

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- How to solve P1?

- P1 and P2 are related.
- If we can solve P1, we can solve P2 immediately.
- The reverse is not true: even if we know *X* is not a prime, how to find its prime factors?
- P1 is harder than P2.
- How to solve P1?
- **Find-Factor**(*X*)
 - 1: if X is even then
 - 2: return "2 is a factor of X" and stop
 - 3: end if
 - 4: for i = 3 to \sqrt{X} by +2 do
 - 5: test if $X \mod i = 0$, if yes, return "*i* is a factor of X" and stop
 - 6: end for
 - 7: return "X is a prime"

 To solve P1, we call Find-Factor(X) to find the smallest prime factor *i* of X. Then call Find-Factor(X/*i*) ...

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- To solve P1, we call **Find-Factor**(*X*) to find the smallest prime factor *i* of *X*. Then call **Find-Factor**(*X*/*i*) ...
- The runtime of **Find-Factor**: Suppose the input size is *n* (Namely *X* is represented by *n* bits).

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- To solve P1, we call Find-Factor(X) to find the smallest prime factor i of X. Then call Find-Factor(X/i) ...
- The runtime of **Find-Factor**: Suppose the input size is *n* (Namely *X* is represented by *n* bits).
- Since *X* is *n* bits long, the value of *X* is $\geq 2^{n-1}$.
- In the worst case, we need to perform $\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2^{n-1}} = \frac{1}{2}(1.414)^{n-1}$ divisions. So this is an exponential time algorithm.
- Minor improvements can be (and had been) made. But basically, we have to perform most of these tests. No poly-time algorithm for Factoring is known.
- It is strongly believed, (but not proven), no poly-time algorithm for solving the Factoring problem exists.

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- Suppose we want to factor a number *X* with 220 digits.
- Since *X* is 220 digits long, the value of *X* is $\ge 10^{219}$.
- So we need to perform $\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{X} > 10^{108}$ divisions.

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- An exponential time algorithm cannot be used to solve problems of realistic input size, no matter how powerful the computers are!

Outline

Introduction to Elementary Number Theory

- 2 Integer division
- 3 Congruence
- Prime numbers
- 5 Greatest common divisor
- Euclidean GCD algorithm
- 7 Factoring and Primality Testing Problems

8 Encryption

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 - Even if Evil sees C, he doesn't know $S_A()$, so cannot recover M.



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- There are many different ways for 1-1 Encryption. It is not hard.
- However, Bob is dealing with many customers, and Alice is dealing with many banks, on-line accounts ...
- It would be a nightmare if we have to arrange a different key for each (Alice, Bob) pair.

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- The pair (n, e) is the public key. Bob makes it public.
- (*n*, *d*) is the secret key. Only Bob knows it.

Example

p = 7, q = 29. Then $n = 7 \cdot 29 = 203$, and $(p - 1) \cdot (q - 1) = 168$. Pick e = 11 and d = 107, then $11 \cdot 107 = 1177 \equiv 1 \pmod{168}$. Thus (203, 11) is the public key. (203, 107) is the secret key.

©Xin He (University at Buffalo)

CSE 191 Descrete Structures

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- Bob: Receiving C(=4). Recover the original message $M = S_A(C) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C^d \pmod{n}$. (In our example $4^{107} \pmod{203} = 100$).
- Because of the the choice of *e*, *d*, the number theory ensures the result *M* is the same as the original message *M*. (Namely (*M^e*)^d = *M* (mod *n*) for all *M*.)

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- But Evil knows *n* (since this is public).
- If Evil can factor $n = p \cdot q$, he can calculate *d*. Then he knows every thing that Bob knows.
- But he must factor a 256 digit number *n*. This will need much much much longer time than the previous problem of factoring a number of 220-digits!

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- This system works because the strong (but not proven) belief: The Factoring (P1) problem cannot be solved in poly-time.
- For long time, it is not known if the problem P2 (Primality Testing) can be solved in poly-time.
- In 2001, Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena found a poly-time algorithm for solving P2.
- Had they found a poly-time algorithm for solving P1 (Factoring), RSA system (and the entire computer security industry) would have collapsed overnight!

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Number Theoretic Foundation of RSA Encryption

Fact

Consider the set *R* of real numbers. For any $a \in R$, the equation

a + x = 0

has a unique solution $-a \in R$, which is called the additive inverse of a.

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Consider the set *R* of real numbers. For any $a \in R, a \neq 0$, the equation

 $a \cdot x = 1$

has a unique solution $a^{-1} \in R$, which is called the multiplicative inverse of *a*.

Fact:

If we replace *R* by *Q*, the set of rational numbers, the above facts are still true. Namely, every $a \in Q$ has an additive inverse $-a \in Q$ and every $a \in Q, a \neq 0$ has a multiplicative inverse $a^{-1} \in Q$.

Caution:

Consider *Z*, the set of integers. Every $a \in Z$ still has an additive inverse $-a \in Z$. However for $a \in Q, a \neq 0$, *a* has NO multiplicative inverse in *Z*: $a^{-1} \notin Z$ (unless a = 1 or a = -1).

Definition

Let *n* be a positive integer. $Z_n = \{0, 1, 2, ..., n-1\}$. For elements in $a, b \in Z_n$, define:

$$a+b = (a+b) \mod n$$

 $a \cdot b = (a \cdot b) \mod n$

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- For any $a \in Z_n$, there is an additive inverse in Z_n . Example: n = 14, and a = 5. Then $-4 = 10 \mod 14$. Thus $-4 = 10 \inf Z_{14}$.
- On the other hand, *a* ∈ *Z_n*, *a* ≠ 0 may not have a multiplicative inverse:
- For example:

 $4 \cdot x = 1 \mod 14$

has no solution in Z_{14} .

Number Theoretic Foundation of RSA Encryption

Definition
$$Z_n^* = \{i \mid 1 \le i \le n - 1 \text{ and } gcd(i, n) = 1\}$$

Example: $Z_{14}^* = \{1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13\}$

Fact:

For any $a, b \in Z_n^*$, $a \cdot b \in Z_n^*$.

Example: n = 14:

- $3 \cdot 5 = 1 \mod 14$, and $1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{14}^*$.
- $3 \cdot 11 = 5 \mod 14$, and $5 \in \mathbb{Z}_{14}^*$.
- $5 \cdot 11 = 13 \mod 14$, and $13 \in \mathbb{Z}_{14}^*$.

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Fact:

Every $a \in Z_n^*$, $a \neq 0$ has a unique multiplicative inverse a^{-1} in Z_n^* . In other words, the equation

$$a \cdot x = 1 \mod n$$

has an unique solution in Z_n^* .

Example: n = 14

- Since $3 \cdot 5 = 1 \mod 14$, so $3^{-1} = 5 \inf Z_{14}^*$.
- Since $9 \cdot 11 = 1 \mod 14$, so $9^{-1} = 11 \inf Z_{14}^*$.

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Definition: Euler Totient Function. We define $\phi(n) = |Z_n^*|$.

Namely $\phi(n)$ is the number of integers in $\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ that are coprime to *n*.

Fact:

• If p is a prime, then
$$\phi(p) = p - 1$$
.

• If $n = a \cdot b$ and gcd(a, b) = 1, then $\phi(n) = \phi(a) \cdot \phi(b)$.

Example:

•
$$Z_7^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$$
. So $\phi(7) = 7 - 1 = 6$.

•
$$\phi(14) = \phi(7) \cdot \phi(2) = (7-1) \cdot (2-1) = 6.$$

(Fermat-)Euler Theorem:

For any *n* and all $a \in Z_n^*$,

 $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \mod n$

Example: n = 14, $\phi(14) = 6$, and a = 3

```
3^2 \equiv 9 \mod 14;

3^3 \equiv 27 \equiv 13 \mod 14;

3^4 \equiv 13 \cdot 3 \equiv 39 \equiv 11 \mod 14;

3^5 \equiv 11 \cdot 3 \equiv 33 \equiv 5 \mod 14;

3^6 \equiv 5 \cdot 3 \equiv 15 \equiv 1 \mod 14;
```

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Number Theoretic Foundation of RSA Encryption

- Bob picks two prime numbers p, q and calculate $n = p \cdot q$.
- Since p and q are primes, gcd(p,q) = 1.
- So we have $\phi(n) = \phi(p) \cdot \phi(q) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$.
- Bob pick any integer *e* so that $gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$.
- This means that there exists integers *d* and *y* such that

$$d \cdot e + y \cdot \phi(n) = 1$$

d and y can be calculated by using the extended Euclidean GCD algorithm.

Thus

$$d \cdot e \equiv 1 \mod \phi(n)$$

• Bop publishes (n, e) as the public key. And keep (n, d) as the secrete key.

Number Theoretic Foundation of RSA Encryption

Recall that RSA Encryption works like this:

- Alice wants to send a message, represented by a number *M*, to Bob.
- She encrypts *M* by calculating $C \equiv M^e \mod n$, and send *C* to Bob.
- Bob receives C, and decrypt C by calculating $C^d \mod n$.

For the RSA encryption to work, all we need to do is to show:

Theorem

For any $M \in Z_n$, we have $(M^e)^d \equiv M \mod n$.

If $M \in Z_n^*$ we have:

$$(M^e)^d = M^{ed} \mod n = M^{(ed-1)+1} \mod n$$

= $((M^{ed-1} \mod n) \cdot (M \mod n)) \mod n$
= $((M^{\phi(n)} \mod n) \cdot (M \mod n)) \mod n$
= $(1 \cdot (M \mod n)) \mod n$
= $(M \mod n) \mod n$
= M

If $M \in Z_n - Z_n^*$, we can still show $M^{ed} = M \mod n$. (The proof is more involved.)